This blog is concerned with most topics in applied philosophy. In particular it is concerned with autonomy, love and other emotions. comments are most welcome
Saturday, 1 October 2011
Decreasing Violence
Sunday, 18 September 2011
Can Consent be Presumed?
Proponents of an opt out scheme of organ donation seem to assume that in such a scheme, provided someone has not opted out, his consent for organ donation may be presumed. Govert Den Hartogh argues out such an assumption is unsound (1). In this posting I will briefly outline Den Hartogh’s argument. I will accept his argument. Nevertheless I will then argue that nonetheless an opt out scheme still respects donor autonomy.
Consent is roughly defined as the giving of agreement or permission for some act. Clearly the dead cannot give their permission for organ removal. Proponents of an opt out donation scheme argue someone’s consent may be presumed provided he hasn’t opted out of the scheme. Den Hartogh argues “presumed consent” depends on a particular conception of consent. The mental state conception of consent “according to which consent to an action refers to a disposition to prefer or wish or desire that action to be done” (2). “Presumed consent” means it may be presumed that a donor had a disposition to donate her organs and by transplanting some of her organs a transplant team are simply fulfilling her wishes. It is clear that not all potential donors who have failed to opt out had would have had a disposition to donate at the time of donation. It follows that accepting presumed consent would mean accepting that some people who did not have a disposition to have their organs transplanted would nevertheless have had these organs transplanted. It further follows that “presumed consent” as defined above would be better described as “probabilistic presumed consent”. “Probabilistic presumed consent” simply means it was more probable a potential donor had had a disposition to donate than he did not. There are two problems associated with “probabilistic presumed consent”. Firstly accepting “probabilistic presumed consent” seems also to presume the majority of potential donors did have a disposition to donate. However as Den Hartogh points out evidence from the Netherlands would suggest this presumption may be unsound (3). Howevereven if we accept that a majority of potential donors did in fact have a disposition to donate why should we accept this majority view? After all in criminal cases jurors do not presume the defendant guilty because the majority of the evidence points to his guilt. The evidence must be overwhelming, beyond reasonable doubt.
More importantly in my opinion Den Hartogh argues the underlying conception of consent as a disposition to prefer, wish or desire that action is done is unsound. He argues that any form of genuine consent must involve the idea of authorisation. Possibly someone who has died and made a valid will might be said to have authorised some action. However if he has not made a will the idea of his presumed authorisation clearly seems nonsensical. It follows provided we accept Den Hartogh’s arguments that “presumed consent” is a fiction and hence not really a form of consent.
If we accept “presumed consent” is not a genuine form of consent does this mean that doctors should only be able to transplant organs from those who have registered as donors? I will now argue it does not. I will argue however even though “presumed consent” is meaningless in the context of organ donation it does not follow we cannot take healthy organs from donors who have not opted out. The reason why consent is central to medical ethics is respect for autonomy. Because I have argued consent is meaningless in this context I will base my argument directly on respect for autonomy. Den Hartogh believes when we presume someone consents the following holds. There is no compelling evidence to hold that someone would consent, nevertheless we proceed as if he had consented, unless there is sufficient evidence to show he wouldn’t have consented (4). In an opt out system we only have probabilistic evidence a donor might have consented to donate his organs. However I will now argue we do have evidence that a potential donor who did not opt did not care much about what might happen to his organs after his death. If he had cared enough he would have opted out. Autonomy is linked to caring about. If someone cares about nothing he is merely a wanton and it is difficult to see how he can lead any sort of coherent life. If autonomy is based on caring about then an opt out system offers evidence that a potential donor, who had not opted out, would not have made an autonomous decision to refuse to give consent to the removal of his organs. It follows we have some grounds to presume that if we transplant his organs we are not disrespecting his autonomy.
In the light of the above it seems reasonable to conclude that an opt out system of organ donation might be justified by respect for donor autonomy. And that it is permissible to transplant organs from all potential donors who have not opted out of the system. At this point I want to make it exactly clear what I am suggesting. I am not suggesting a potential donor would have made an autonomous decision to donate had he been in a position to do so. What I am suggesting is that a potential donor is someone who would not have made an autonomous decision not to donate. I would further suggest the needs of the potential recipients of his organs means we are justified in taking these organs provided he has not opted out.
It might be objected that if an opt out system is introduced some people who would have made an autonomous decision not to donate will not opt out because they were unaware of the need to do so. I accept my objectors point. However it seems to me her objection can be nullified to some extent provided the introduction of an opt out system is given sufficient publicity. My objector might then further object that some time after the introduction of the scheme people’s awareness of the need to opt out if they don’t wish to have their organs transplanted will diminish. I accept my objector’s further point. However once again I think this point may also be nullified to some extent. If an opt out system of organ donation is not to infringe donors autonomy must include an ongoing information program. Respecting autonomy involves making sure people have the opportunity to exercise their autonomy it does not involve ensuring they actually do so. This information should actively be made available in doctor’s surgeries and perhaps taught as part of citizenship in schools. Providing such information should not be costly. It follows that provided such information continues to be provided that an opt out system of organ donation will not lead to a diminishment of people’s awareness of the need to opt out if they don’t want to have their organs transplanted. Finally my objector might object that even if people are for the most part aware of the need to opt out that some people who don’t wish to have their organs available for transplant might delay doing so. She might suggest any opt out system does not fully respect the autonomy of these people. I would reject this last objection. Respecting autonomy involves making sure people have the opportunity to exercise their autonomy; it does not involve ensuring they actually do so.
- Govert Den Hartogh, 2011, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 28(3)
- Den Hartogh, page 296.
- Den Hartogh, page 299.
- Den Hartogh , page 297
Thursday, 25 August 2011
Riots and the Unbearable Lightness of Simply Being
- Frankfurt 1988, The
Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press,
page 83.
- Frankfurt,
1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University
Press, page 106.
- Frankfurt,
1999, page 90.
- Frankfurt,
1999, page 89.
Thursday, 11 August 2011
Zero Degrees of Empathy and Evil
In this posting I want to set out some thoughts about evil and empathy rather than pursuing a specific argument. My starting point is Simon Baron-Cohen’s book (2011, Zero Degrees of Empathy,
“Empathy is our ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling, and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.” (Page 11)
However it might be questioned whether a lack of empathy is really directly connected to evil. Consider the Milgram experiments. These experiments involved the participants in giving what they believed to be very large electric shocks to a learner. In practice there were no real shocks and the learner was really an actor who faked his response. This experiment raises two questions. Firstly were the participants doing something evil? It seems clear to me they were. Secondly did these participants lack empathy? There were 40 volunteer participants in the trial all male whose ages ranged between 20 and 50 and whose jobs ranged from unskilled to professional. Let it be accepted that sociopaths who lack all empathy can commit evil acts. However it seems improbable to me that Milgram could have picked 40 sociopaths for his experiment and that at least some of the participants must have had some degree of empathy. It follows evil acts can be committed by both people who lack and possess empathy.
Baron-Cohen suggests that the extremes of evil are usually relegated to the unanalysable, see page 100. The question immediately arises why do we want to analyse the term evil? Perhaps analysing the term evil might be useful in some contexts? Consider the case of Josef Fritzl who imprisoned and raped his daughter Elisabeth. It seems to me the term evil is useful in this context by simply expressing our moral disgust at Fritzl’s actions. To re-describe Fritzl’s actions as lacking in empathy rather than evil would seem to be much less effective way of expressing our disgust. The term evil simply doesn’t need analysing in this context. However the term evil may have other uses. Baron-Cohen further suggests we can replace the terms ‘evil’ and ‘cruelty’ with the term ‘empathy’ in relation to those with zero negative empathy, see page 65. I will assume here by ‘empathy’ he means ‘lack of empathy’. It seems obvious that simply labelling people like Fritzl simply as evil is not useful in the context of explaining their actions. This context includes both the causes of evil and the way it spreads. Indeed in this context such simple labelling prevents explanation. In the rest of this posting I want to examine the causes of evil and the reasons for its spread. In order to do so I want to differentiate between two categories of people who commit evil acts. Firstly there are people who do evil acts but who do not conceive the acts. They simply propagate these acts. Secondly some people cause evil, originate the evil acts that they and others propagate.
I will consider those who cause, originate, evil first. It seems to me there are three main reasons why people originate evil. Firstly they commit an evil act when pursuing some other goal; for instance the CEO of some company, who knowingly lets his company pollute the environment near to a factory, hereby causing birth defects, in order to maximise profits. Secondly some people simply enjoy the infliction of suffering. Lastly evil is committed to further some greater cause; for instance the purification of the Germanic race or a jihad against the infidels. In this last case the perpetrators of evil may actually see themselves as acting for the best especially if they understand morality in a utilitarian way. None of the above reasons for the origin of evil depend directly on the perpetrators of evil having zero degrees of empathy. The CEO may love his wife and children. The torturer who enjoys suffering may actually need some partial form of empathy with his victim in order to increase his pleasure. He needs the ability to identify what his victim is thinking or feeling even if he lacks an appropriate response. And lastly a Jihadist may have started his Jihad because of his empathy for fellow Moslems. In the light of the above it would appear there is nothing to be gained by simply re-describing people who originate evil as people possessing near zero degrees of empathy rather than evil people. Nonetheless it is true that some people who originate evil acts do have a zero degree of empathy. Does having a zero degree explain the origin of evil in these cases? It would appear not. For as Baron-Cohen points out people with Asperger Syndrome and mild autism often develop a moral code through systemizing rather than empathy and as a result would appear to be no more likely to originate evil than anyone else, see page 84. It would appear having a zero degree of empathy is not useful in explaining why some people originate evil.
Nonetheless Baron-Cohen is correct to connect evil and empathy. A lack of empathy may not originate evil but if someone has sufficient empathy his empathy might act like a vaccine preventing him from originating evil. Sufficient empathy may be very important in controlling what we can think of as permissible. Indeed I would suggest that in the Western World the re-description of the civilian victims of bombing as collateral damage might be seen as an unconscious, at least I hope unconscious, attempt to limit our empathy. After all we describe famine victims as victims and not as the collateral damage caused by drought. It is an interesting question as to what proportion of evil doers are capable of originating evil. Perhaps this question is open to empirical research.
I now want to consider the possible causes for the propagation of evil? I would suggest three main interconnected causes. Firstly it seems clear from the Milgram experiment that respect for authority is a factor. In this experiment the experimenter told the teacher either it was essential to continue, the experiment required that he continue or that he had no choice but to go on. The experimenter would seem to be a figure of some authority. The second cause is linked to the first. Most people seem to find some sort of reassurance that what they are doing the right thing if others behave in a similar fashion. The Herd Instinct seems to confer some sort of legitimacy to their actions. The Herd Instinct means people tend to act as others do and their individuality declines. Lastly if the number of people contributing to an evil act is large enough individuals may not see themselves as really responsible for the act. The trouble is no one else may see themselves as responsible for the act. I argued in my posting of 24/05/11 that in such situations responsibility becomes smeared, see also Parfit (1984, Reasons and Persons,
What then might be done to combat the propagation of evil? I argued above a lack of empathy does not cause someone to propagate evil. In addition I suggested if someone has sufficient empathy his empathy might act like a vaccine preventing him from originating evil. I believe this suggestion also applies to the propagation of evil. Intuitively it seems plausible that increasing someone’s empathy might help him resist both authority and herd pressure in his dealings with others. I am however doubtful that increasing someone’s empathy will make him more aware of his responsibilities. Empathy might be increased in at least three ways. Firstly, John Bowlby’s attachment theory shows that children who experience stable loving parenting are likely to grow up well adjusted to the world. This good adjustment may be partly due to an increased capacity to feel empathy, see my posting of 30/03/09. Attachment theory predicts trans-generational effects so it follows that society should take active steps to enable parents, especially mothers, who experienced attachment problems as children become good parents. Someone might object I am encouraging the nanny state and that parenting is a purely personal matter. Let it be accepted bad parenting harms children. Mill argued “that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” (1859, On
Secondly it is possible that individual empathy flourishes better in less individualistic and more caring societies. Robert Cialdini’s work has shown if we give someone something he is likely to reciprocate, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Cialdini. Cialdini’s work is based on giving and not on expressing an emotion. However it seems plausible that the expression of an emotion leads others to reciprocate. Anger leads to anger and perhaps empathy to empathy. It is possible that a more empathic society might increase individual empathy. Someone might object that the above is too simplistic. He might point out there are angry people, empathic people but there are no angry or empathic societies. I accept my objectors point. I would however suggest societies in which people feel at ease are societies which contain less angry and more empathic individuals. I would further suggest people might feel more at ease in caring, giving societies. Lastly in a more speculative vein in the future we might be able to enhance our natural empathy by biomedical means. For instance Paul Zak has shown oxytocin delivered as a nasal spray increases our natural empathy, see http://www.luiss.it/esa2007/programme/papers/3.pdf .
In the light of the above it might appear that we should embrace all three of these means of increasing our natural empathy in order to combat the spread of evil. However I would urge caution. Firstly caution is needed with all biomedical enhancements. Secondly the above appearance depends on the assumption that increased empathy will reduce evil. However we should consider exactly how empathy might be increased. Empathy might be increased in two ways. Firstly empathy might be increased by increasing the empathy we feel towards those people who we already feel empathic concern for. Secondly it might be increased by increasing the range of people we feel empathic concern for; it might increase our domain of empathic concern. I would suggest simply increasing empathy, whilst desirable, is not always useful in combating the spread of evil. For instance if the empathy Germans felt for Germans under the third Reich had been increased it is extremely doubtful whether this increase would have prevented the Holocaust. It follows if we are serious about using increased empathy to combat the spread of evil that we must pay attention to increasing the domain of empathy in addition to increasing empathy in general.
The second cause of the propagation of evil I mentioned above was the herd instinct. For instance when crossing the road a Leeds University study discovered pedestrians are likely to act as a herd, blindly following other pedestrians, see http://www.physorg.com/news/2010-11-pedestrians-herd-instinct-road.html . It therefore seems quite plausible someone might blindly follow others, the herd, in propagating evil. One way of combating the herd instinct is to encourage individuality. It might then be suggested encouraging empathy damages individuality. Accepting this suggestion gives us a further reason to be cautious about simply increasing our empathy if we are seriously thinking about combating evil. However I would reject such a suggestion. I don’t believe building a more caring society must inevitably damage individuality. Firstly if we attempt to increase empathy by encouraging good parenting it seems likely any increase in empathy will not damage individuality. In what follows I will assume individuality means the capacity to act autonomously. Bowlby’s attachment theory predicts children with firm attachment will be more confident in exploring relationships with others. This confidence should increase rather than decrease their capacity to act autonomously. Moreover this confidence to explore their relationships with others should expand the domain of their empathic concern. The second way in which we might encourage empathy I listed above was to foster more caring and giving societies. I see no reason why increasing empathy by this means should damage individuals capacity for autonomy provided this is done from a position of epistemic humility. I believe truly beneficent care must involve adopting a position of epistemic humility, see my posting of 19/06/08. Building a more caring society from such a position means we must give priority to respecting the autonomy of others and provided we do so we should not damage individuality. Unfortunately even if we increase empathy by building a more caring society does not automatically follow that we increase the domain of our empathic concern, which is what I have suggested, is really needed to combat evil. It seems to me that the way our society is structured may be much more likely to increase empathy than by increasing how much it cares. Lastly it seems it may be possible to enhance our natural empathy by biomedical means. I would argue such enhancement should not be attempted if it damages our capacity for autonomy. In addition there appears to be some evidence from Zak’s experiments that such enhancement may only increase our empathic concern for those we already feel some empathy for, rather than expanding the domain of our empathic concern.
I have considered using increased empathy like a vaccine to combat the spread of evil caused by either deference to authority or an inability to resist the herd instinct. However I have suggested increasing empathy may not increase our sense of responsibility. In addition men as a whole feel less empathy than women. Lastly there are some people are incapable of feeling any empathy at all. In the light of these facts are there then any other means of combating the spread of evil? It is possible that increasing individuality might help in combating the spread of evil. I would suggest seeing ourselves as individuals rather than part of a herd increases our ideas of responsibility. Individuality can only flourish in a tolerant society and it might appear that a tolerant society is simply one accepting Mill’s dictum “that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” However as with the domain of empathic concern mentioned above there might be a problem with the domain of ‘civilised community’. For instance a large number of whites in apartheid
In conclusion I would suggest the methods discussed above can control the spread of evil acts to some degree. Unfortunately I believe these methods will do less to prevent the occurrence of evil acts such as those committed recently in Norway by Anders Behring Breivik.
Monday, 27 June 2011
Knobe, Erler and our ‘True Self’
In this posting I want to consider the comments by Alexandre Erler in Practical Ethics on an article by Joshua Knobe in the New York Times concerning personal identity see http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2011/06/what-is-my-true-self/#more-1548. Knobe uses the example of the evangelical preacher Mark Pierpont who encourages homosexuals to seek a “cure” for their sexual orientation. Pierpont himself was a homosexual and continues to battle his continuing homosexual urges. Knobe uses him as an example to question what is meant by someone’s ‘true self’. He firstly presents two common concepts of self. The first concept is an unreflective one in which our true self is determined by our nature, our urges. The second concept, as advocated by such as David DeGrazia, holds that our true self is defined by our commitments, values, and endorsements. Knobe suggests both of these concepts are challenged by the case of Pierpont. He further suggests that people regard the traits they value in someone as part of that person’s true self. In this posting I want to question whether the concept of someone’s true self as opposed to simply self is a useful concept.
To whom might the concept of a true self be useful? Firstly it might be useful to someone deciding what to do. She might ask what her true self would do in this situation when making some important decision. She might ask herself if she is acting authentically; to her own self being true. Secondly another may question what, is someone else’s true self, before ascribing praise or blame and predicting what that person will do. Intuitively it seems to me these two uses of the idea of true self are distinct and that a different concept might be useful in each case. I will deal with the second case first.
Knobe suggests that others regard the traits they value in someone as reflecting her ‘true self’. I would suggest any such concept of ‘true self’ should not help them ascribe praise or blame and it is not very useful in predicting the actions of others. Praise and blame seem to be more naturally connected to someone’s autonomy rather than her ‘true self’. Of course I accept that someone’s ‘true self’ may be connected to her autonomy. Nonetheless I believe the ascription praise and blame depends directly on someone’s autonomy and that there is no need to involve the concept of ‘true self’. It is plausible that understanding a person’s values might be useful in predicting her actions. However if our concept of ‘true self’ is limited to the values we approve of then this concept will be useful in predicting what we think someone should do rather than what she actually will do. For these reasons Knobe’s suggested concept of someone’s ‘true self’ does not seem to me to be a useful one when applied to others. Erler suggests that our ‘true self’ might be a composite of the two concepts Knobe introduced initially; our natural idea of a ‘true self ‘and an idea of a ‘true self’ being defined by our values and commitments. Is then Erler’s suggested composite concept any more useful than that of Knobe in this context? Once again I would suggest the ascription of praise and blame should be concerned with the idea of someone’s autonomy rather than her ‘true self’. Erler’s suggested concept may well be more useful in predicting someone’s actions but I wonder whether there is any useful difference in this particular context between the concepts of self and ‘true self’.
Is then any concept of a ‘true self’ useful to someone making a decision? Most ordinary decisions are largely unreflective and we just act without questioning our motives too much. However for some big decisions such as whether to pursue a particular career or start a family much more reflection is usually involved. Perhaps in these cases we might question what our ‘true self’ would do; what is the authentic thing to do. It seems clear to me if someone accepts her ‘true self’ is defined only by the values others value in her and she acts in accordance with this concept then she isn’t acting authentically. Knobe’s suggestion about true self is not useful in this context either. Let us return to the second concept of ‘true self’ initially introduced by Knobe. I would argue our deeply held commitments, values, and endorsements are what we ‘care about’. According to Harry Frankfurt if someone ‘cares about’ something she identifies herself with what she cares about and makes herself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending on whether what she cares about is diminished or enhanced, see (1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 83.) Prima facie it might be assumed this concept of ‘true self seems to be a useful concept for someone to employ when deciding how to make some big decision and there is no need for Erler’s composite definition. Prior to making that decision they ask themselves what they really ‘care about’. It would further seem when Pierpont encourages homosexuals to seek a “cure” for their sexual orientation he is acting in accordance with this concept of his ‘true self’. He is acting authentically.
I believe it is certainly true people act with respect to what they ‘care about’. This concept of ‘true self’ determines their actions. However even if it is accepted that one’s ‘true self’ determines one’s actions it does not automatically follow that one’s true self is useful in deciding what to do. What someone intends to do and what he ‘cares about’ need not be identical.
Wednesday, 1 June 2011
Sexually Coercive Offers
Tuesday, 24 May 2011
Roboethics and Autonomy
- Wendell
Wallach, Colin Allen, 2009, Moral
Machines, Oxford University Press, page 20.
Engaging with Robots
In an interesting paper Sven Nyholm considers some of the implications of controlling robots. I use the idea of control to ask a different...
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In his posting on practical ethics Shlomit Harrosh connects the rights of death row inmates in certain states of the USA to choose the met...
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According to Max Wind-Cowie shame should be liberated rather than legislated for. By this I take Wind-Cowie to mean that shame should pl...
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Kristjan Kristjansson argues too much attention is paid to promoting an individual’s self esteem and not enough to promoting his self res...