Why a Truly Flourishing Society must give Priority to respecting Autonomous Decisions over Beneficent Care

In my previous posting I concluded that the only belief all must share in a flourishing society is that each of us should be free to do as seems best to himself provided by so doing he does not harm others. Some might find such a conclusion absurd. Surely they would argue a truly flourishing society must foster compassion and aid it’s less fortunate members. Intuitively if someone is about to commit suicide we should rush to stop him. However if my conclusion is accepted it casts doubts on this intuition. Prima facie my detractors appear to be right. Nonetheless in this posting I want to defend my conclusion.

Before defending my position I must make this position clearer. Firstly this freedom should be restricted to sane adults. I believe any adult should be presumed to be sane unless he can be shown to be insane. In addition I believe the grounds of insanity cannot be based on the outcome of someone’s decision. The fact we believe someone to have made a bad or irrational decision is not grounds for even ascribing temporary insanity to him. I do accept that the enormity of some decisions might render someone temporarily insane due to some connected factors; fear for instance. Nevertheless I believe any decision about someone’s sanity must be based on such factors and not the actual outcome of his decision. In the light of the above how should we react if we see someone about to commit suicide? In such a situation speed is usually essential and we do not have time to assess whether there are any factors that render our victim temporarily insane. For this reason we should usually act to save him. However if we not under the pressure of time and are aware that our potential suicide has no factors that would render him insane then we should not try to save him even if he would have been grateful later if we had. For instance I would argue we should not attempt to stop someone who suffers, from a chronic but not necessarily a terminal illness, from committing suicide. The above does not mean we should not care about the victim, I do. However I believe the freedom of a sane adult to do as he seems fit must be given priority to acting beneficently towards others.

My reason for believing we must accept all the decisions of most adults, even if we feel these decisions may be harmful to them when these decisions won’t harm others, is to respect autonomy. In what follows a freely made decision refers to a freely made decision that may be harmful to the agent and his decision won’t harm others. I would argue if we value autonomy we should accept the freely made decisions of others in order protect this autonomy. My objector might immediately raise two objections to the above. My objector might agree with me that we should protect our autonomy and that this might be achieved by accepting all our freely made decisions but he might then suggest this could be done more effectively by accepting only autonomous decisions. I believe his suggestion to be impractical. In everyday life it is simple to recognise a freely made decision. It is not simple to recognise an autonomous decision. Let us assume we respect all freely made decisions which will not harm the agent or others. But let us also assume in a situation which we think the agent’s decision may harm him we will only respect his decision if it is autonomous. In this situation if we are to act in caring way, be sympathetic or compassionate towards someone must we first go through something like the informed consent process to protect his autonomy? Caring is a disposition people have. This disposition is natural though I believe it can also be cultivated. The basis of caring is not a cognitive activity and applying an informed consent process in a caring context seems inappropriate. However my objector might raise a much more serious objection. He might agree autonomy should be protected but argue that I am wrong always to give priority to respecting autonomous decisions over caring. He might point out some autonomous decisions are trivial compared to someone’s real needs. Surely in such situations he might argue priority should be given to caring for someone over respecting his autonomous decision.

In order to answer this second objection we must ask why we value autonomy. It seems to me we should respect all autonomous decisions because we value respecting people. People are distinct persons. I would suggest if we fail give precedence to respecting the autonomous decisions of others over acting beneficently towards them that we fail to respect them as the kind of creatures who can make their own decisions, respect them as persons. My objector might argue that failing to respect all autonomous decisions whilst respecting most autonomous decisions does not mean we fail to respect others as the kind of creatures who can make their own decisions. He might further argue that those decisions, not respected for beneficent reasons, do usually flow from the agent’s real self. In reply to his second argument I would simply follow Berlin by pointing out what is important to us is not some idealised real self but my empirical or actual self (1969, Four essays on liberty, The Clarendon Press page 132). I would point out that failing to respect all autonomous decisions whilst respecting most autonomous decisions means we only respect other people as the kind of creatures who can make most, or even only some, of their own decisions. I’m by no means sure this is showing true respect for persons. Nevertheless I am prepared to concede for the sake of argument that it remains possible that respecting a person might mean respecting most of his decisions and acting a caring way towards him rather than respecting all the decisions he makes.

I will now consider a second reason why we should respect autonomous decisions. Decisions made at random or which are coerced in some way are not moral decisions. For all moral decisions the agent must feel the decision is his own. He cannot be detached or even semi-detached from his decision. It follows it is basic to the idea of morality that a moral agent identifies with his decision. I have argued that any decision an agent cares about, identifies with or is satisfied with is an autonomous decision, see some of my previous postings or Frankfurt (1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press). It follows if we fail to respect someone’s autonomous decision that we narrow the domain of moral agents. Of course morality is not just concerned with moral agents. Children and animals are of moral concern even though animals and young children are not moral agents. Kant believed the heart of morality depends upon the ability of agents to make autonomous choices. I believe any narrowing of the domain of moral agency damages morality in general. Any system of morality in which the number of creatures of moral concern remains constant but in which the number of moral agents decreases is a weakened system. Any system of morality in which moral agents are only part-time agents, because some of their freely made decisions are constrained, is a damaged system. In the light of the above I would suggest any system of morality which gives precedence to acting beneficently over respecting all autonomous decisions makes moral agents only part-time agents and as a result is a damaged system.

Let it be accepted any flourishing society must be a moral society. I have argued any moral society must be based on respect for autonomy; we cannot have a truly flourishing society without universal acceptance of this fact. Unfortunately some people in a flourishing society might not accept the need to care for others. Equally unfortunately some people might reject beneficent care. We may deplore these facts but nonetheless if we want to live in a flourishing society we must be prepared to accept them. It follows caring about others cannot be a necessary requirement of a truly flourishing society, caring is of course desirable. Indeed a society that insists on compulsory caring for others or the compulsory acceptance of beneficent care is not a truly flourishing society. It further follows that the only requirement necessary for a flourishing society is that each should be free to do as seems best to himself provided by so doing he does not harm others.

David Cameron and Social Integration

In my last posting I suggested there is no such thing as a fully integrated society. I further suggested we would be better employed in considering how people function in our society rather than bothering about how well they are integrated into it. In a speech to the Munich Security Conference on 11/02/11 David Cameron argued,
“We have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.” He suggested we have done this separation by encouraging organisations which believe in separation rather than integration, see http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293 . In this posting I want once more to consider the idea of a fully integrated society. I also want to consider which beliefs groups within a society must share in order to function adequately in a flourishing society.

What exactly is meant by a fully integrated society? Is it one in which people share a set of common beliefs or is it one in which people have only a set of some common beliefs? Let us assume a fully integrated society is one in which people share a set of common beliefs. Mill famously argued,
“Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each others to live as good seems to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.” (Mill, 1859, On Liberty, quote from Pelican Books 1974 page 72.)
If it is accepted we can replace the word “mankind” by “society” then I would suggest Mill is arguing a fully integrated society is an impoverished society. I believe we should accept Mill’s argument for two reasons. Firstly if we were to pressurise some members of society to live as the majority see fit by sharing the majority’s beliefs we would diminish these peoples happiness and probably also diminish the overall happiness present in society. Secondly I would suggest any such society becomes closed to new ideas. Any society closed to new ideas becomes a stagnant society and a stagnant society is an impoverished society. It follows if people aim for a fully integrated society as defined above we must accept that they are creating an impoverished society. In what follows it will be assumed people want a flourishing society. The question now becomes can we really think of a society in which people only share some common beliefs as a fully integrated society?

An objector might object the above question only arises because I am talking about integration in totally the wrong way. She might suggest that we should not be considering a fully integrated society but rather simply an integrated one. She might further suggest that when considering integration we should consider whether people feel at home in that society or alienated from it. Intuitively her last suggestion seems to carry a lot of weight. Nevertheless I am reluctant to accept this last suggestion for two reasons. Firstly if we consider whether people feel at home in a society or alienated from that society, which is not fully integrated, it would appear this society is one in which people only share a set of some common beliefs. Intuitively any society in which people only share some common beliefs does not appear to be an integrated society. If our intuitions clash we have grounds not to trust these intuitions.

Secondly how do we judge whether someone is at home in a society or alienated by it? Perhaps we should simply ask them. We might conduct surveys to answer the question. But surveys are expensive to carry out and it is by no means certain that someone’s answers to questions about integration would always reflect how she actually acts in society. Let us assume that if someone identifies with the society she lives in that she must be reasonably well integrated into that society. I believe if someone identifies with something this means she must be wholehearted about or satisfied with what she identifies with. This is a common theme of this blog, see some of my previous postings or (Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, chapter 12.) If I am correct if someone identifies with the society she lives in then she must be satisfied with that society. I would now suggest that whether someone is satisfied with the society she lives in depends on how well she functions in it. If someone is unable to function in a society it would seem to be hard to for her to be satisfied with that society. Conversely if someone functions well in a society it is hard to see what grounds she has to be dissatisfied with that society. Rhetoric about integration into society seems meaningless if we have no means of gauging this integration. In the light of the above we can gauge how well a group is integrated into society by considering how they function in society. However in the light of the above the question, as to whether we can we really think of a society in which people only share some common beliefs as a fully integrated society, seems irrelevant. It follows rhetoric about integration becomes superfluous and we should simply concern ourselves with how different groups function in our society.

If any society is to function it must have some common beliefs. If any community is to function within that society it must share these basic beliefs. Of course some community might theoretically thrive in a society without sharing any of its beliefs but such a community would be parasitic on that society and does not function within it. The question now naturally arises what common beliefs must people share in a flourishing society? The answer according to David Cameron is,
“Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality.”
I believe David Cameron is right and that any flourishing society must share these values. At this point I am going to assume that in the context of our discussion the words “belief” and “value” are interchangeable. My objector might claim at this point even if David Cameron is correct about these being the values our society values that I am wrong to suggest that any flourishing society must share these values. She might point out that China is a flourishing society. I would disagree and whilst I accept a non-democratic country such as China may flourish economically I do not accept such countries are genuinely flourishing, China for instance has changed little politically since the Tiananmen Square massacre. Even if we accept David Cameron’s view as the right one we must nonetheless remain aware that the domain of shared values is limited. Mill argued that,
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.” (Page 68)
If we accept Mill’s view, as I do, then we may not compel others to do things even if we think it is right that they should do so. For example some people believe Muslim women should be banned from wearing the burka in western society; Nicolas Sarkozy in France for instance. I personally do not approve of the burka but nonetheless believe that provided Muslim women freely choose to wear it they should be perfectly free to do so except in certain circumstances in which personal recognition matters; passport control for instance. Accepting this freedom does not mean we must remain passive in respect to the wearing of the burka. Following Mill we may of course criticise, reason with and attempt to persuade Muslim women not to wear the burka but we may not use compulsion which rules out legislation. It follows the only basic belief all must share in a flourishing society is that each of us should be free to do as seems best for herself provided that by so doing she does not harm others. I believe the values David Cameron mentioned come down to this basic belief. Unfortunately for David Cameron it follows we should accept partially integrated communities which behave in ways that run counter to many of our other values. Fortunately for him however this acceptance does not mean we should encourage such communities which already exist, or the immigration of further such communities. Indeed I would argue we should help and persuade such existing communities to function more fully in our society. Nevertheless we must be prepared to accept these communities provided they do not affect our freedom, or the freedom of some their own members, provided their actions do not harm others. In conclusion it seems to me that rhetoric about how well some ethnic communities integrate into our society is irrelevant and all that matters is that these communities function and not prevent others from functioning in society.

Soldiers and Beta Blockers

A large number of soldiers returning from active service in Iraq and Afghanistan suffer from PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) and the military is interested in using beta blockers to help in alleviating this disorder. Beta blockers are drugs commonly used to treat some heart conditions such as angina. Elisa Hurley is concerned that the use of these drugs may have at least one bad consequence (1). In this posting I want examine whether we should share her concern.

Before I start my examination I must briefly summarise Hurley’s argument. Let it be accepted that post battle beta blockers help prevent the formation of painful emotional memories (PEM) in soldiers. Clearly soldiers are required to kill enemy combatants in battle. Equally clearly civilians are required to not kill others. If they do so they may be charged with murder. Hurley suggests this killing in battle separates soldiers from the normal moral community. Some might reject her suggestion but I will accept it here for the sake of argument. She proceeds to argue that after battle soldiers need to be integrated back into the moral community. She then further argues coming to terms with PEM is necessary for this re-integration. She then concludes a bad consequence, of beta blockers preventing the formation of PEM, is that they also prevent this re-integration. Hurley’s argument it seems to me depends on two implicit assumptions. Firstly any normal moral community depends on emotions to some degree. Secondly a moral community must be integrated. I will question these assumptions.

Not all moral systems have an affective component. Some believe that morality is objective and that our moral behaviour should be based on norms. Clearly if we accept a non-affective moral system PEM are not necessary for a soldier to successfully himself re-integrate into such a community. However in practice I would argue that the problems autistic people and sociopaths have in forming moral judgements strongly suggests that morality must include an affective element, see for instance Nichols (2). In what follows I will accept the first of Hurley’s implicit assumptions.

I will now turn to the second of Hurley’s implicit assumptions. It seems clear to me if Hurley assumes a soldier can be reintegrated into a moral community she must also implicitly assume that this community is in some way integrated. I will now give three reasons why I find the idea of such a fully integrated moral society improbable. Firstly I would simply point out we live in a multi-cultural society and that some of the norms people live by differ. I of course accept in any society people must share some norms. Secondly I would argue a fully integrated moral society might become something akin to an exclusive club. For instance a fully integrated society might exclude some people such as schizophrenics from membership. Intuitively provided schizophrenics take drugs to control their condition they ought to be full members of moral society. This intuition is supported in practice. Society holds schizophrenics responsible for their actions provided their schizophrenia is controlled. A further example might be provided by convicted prisoners who by their actions don’t seem to be fully integrated into moral society but whom nonetheless I would argue should nevertheless be regarded as members of moral society to some degree. These examples suggest that we live in a moral society which is not fully integrated. Lastly I would argue to talk too much of integration with respect to any moral society which includes an affective element would be a mistake because we experience emotions to a varying degree. For example Michael Slote believes it might be possible to base our moral society on empathic concern for others (3) . In such society women might be better at dealing with moral problems because of their greater capacity for empathy. It seems to me that such a society would not be fully integrated. It should of course be fully inclusive. For these reasons I would reject Hurley’s second implicit assumption that we live in an integrated moral society. I would suggest it would do better to consider the ability of people to be members of, to function, in a moral society rather than integration.

Hurley posed the question does the taking of beta blockers damage a soldier’s reintegration into society after battle. I have suggested above there is no such thing as a fully integrated moral society. I have further suggested that it would do better to consider the ability of people to function in a moral society than integration. If my suggestions are accepted then Hurley’s question needs to be refined. Her original question might be refined as follows; does the prescription of beta blockers to soldiers affect their ability to function in society? It seems clear many ex-soldiers find it hard to function in our everyday society. According to James Treadwell a lecturer in criminology at the University of Birmingham statistics suggest that between 3% and 10% of the British prison population are ex-forces personnel. Former soldiers the highest occupational culture claimed by prisoners, see Howard League for Penal Reform . This situation might be partly explained by the experience of soldiers witnessing or being party to traumatic events while in the services, and then later developing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

At one time most schizophrenics found it hard to function in society and many were confined to asylums. Recently advances in drugs have allowed most schizophrenics to function in society. The taking of these drugs does not damage a schizophrenic’s ability to function in society, indeed it makes it possible. Let it be accepted PEM prevents soldiers from fully functioning in society. Let it be further accepted beta blockers dampen a soldier’s PEM after battle and that this helps prevent PTSD. It might then be argued by analogy beta blockers do not damage soldiers’ ability to function in society but instead enhance it. For these reasons it might be thought that I am in favour of soldiers taking beta blockers provided these prevent PTSD. In practice I share Hurley’s concern about the use of these drugs

My concern is not about the successful re-integration of soldiers back into society after battle but rather the integration of a soldier’s life with his sense of self. Consider a non-swimmer who through no fault of his own fails to rescue a child from a swollen river. Let us assume the child drowns and this person is traumatised by memories of her screams. Let us further assume there is a drug which would erase all memories of this incident from this person’s mind and hence eliminate his trauma. Some might argue there is no problem here and that the trauma victim should take the drug. I am not so confident that there is no problem. If we accept there is no problem in the above case then perhaps we should also accept there would be no problem if we took the same drug every night when we are sleeping to erase all painful memories of the day before. Such a situation would be similar that which occurs in the film “Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind”. In such a scenario some past events in a person’s life appear to have little effect on a person’s sense of self; the person loses some important connections to his personal history. I would suggest any disconnection between someone’s personal history and his sense of self is damaging for at least two reasons. Firstly anyone who has a sense of self with only a selective view of his history seems to have a diminished sense of self. I would further suggest such a diminished sense of self is damaging to the individual concerned. Secondly the idea of forgiveness can play an important part in our lives. For somebody to be forgiven he must accept responsibility for his actions. However if drugs dull or pervert his memories of his actions it is hard to see how he can genuinely accept such responsibility. The idea of forgiveness is particularly important in the context of war. After a war has ended there is often a need for a soldier to become reconciled with his former enemies. It would seem to me reconciliation is impossible without accurate recollection. For the above reasons I would suggest that the taking of beta blockers to dull a soldier’s painful memories post battle is damaging.

An objector might claim that nevertheless the damage done by PTSD to a soldier’s ability to function in society may well outweigh any damage to his sense of self or need for reconciliation. He might then use this claim to conclude that the use of beta blockers post battle is acceptable. I would reject such a claim. However even if the objectors claim is accepted I don’t think his conclusion automatically follows. It is clear that schizophrenics who take drugs to successfully control their condition can function in society. Indeed in most cases it seems probable that taking these drugs is the only way they can function in society. But the situation is different with regard to soldiers. Soldiers can be treated in different ways to relieve PTSD, cognitive therapy for instance. I would suggest, provided it is accepted that beta blockers damage the connection between a soldier’s sense of self and his history, that these drugs should not be used to treat PTSD.

1.  Elisa Hurley, 2010, Combat Trauma and the Moral Risks of Memory Manipulating Drugs, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27(3)
2. ShaunNichols, 2004, Sentimental Rules, Oxford University Press.
3. Michael Slote, 2007, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Routledge

What’s Wrong with Addiction to Video Games

In a posting on addiction Bennett Foddy points out whilst we universally regard addiction to tobacco as bad we are more ambivalent with regard to badness of addiction to video games, see http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/. In this posting I want to examine what’s wrong with addiction to video games. Before I carry out this examination it is necessary to understand the different types of harm caused by addiction.

However if we are to understand the harm of addiction we must have a satisfactory definition of addiction which is both useful and captures our intuitions. Smoking is clearly addictive. Smoking is harmful because it damages our health. But overeating might also be regarded as harmful if it leads to obesity which damages our health. Yet we don’t regard all overeating as an addiction. I am of course not denying there are some cases of overeating which might be regarded as addiction. It follows physiological harm cannot be used in isolation to define addiction. Addiction might be defined as someone not having control over doing, taking or using something, to the point that it may be harmful, see www.nhs.uk/conditions/addictions .

Is the above definition a satisfactory definition? Let us assume someone is greedy and who because of his greed becomes obese damaging his health. Intuitively such a person need not be addicted to food, being a glutton is not the same as being an addict. However if we were to use the above definition a glutton would be classed as an addict. A glutton lacks control over food because he is greedy not because he is compelled to. Let us compare the case of a glutton with that of a smoker. In the case of a smoker as opposed to a glutton his lack of control is due to compulsion. A compulsion caused by nicotine. In the light of the above my initial definition of addiction might be modified as follows. Addiction is not having control due to some of compulsion over doing, taking or using something, to the point that it may be harmful. It is important at this point to be clear that not all compulsive behavior is a case of addiction. A mother may feel compelled to love her child, she may feel she can do no other, but nonetheless intuitively we would not regard her as addicted to either her child or love. It is of course possible for some people to become addicted to something that resembles love. However I believe it is impossible to become addicted to love for reasons I will give later.

Let us accept the above definition of addiction. There are two elements to this definition. Firstly the harm caused by the addiction and secondly the agent’s lack of control due to compulsion. I will examine the harm element first. The harm element of addiction might be physiological or psychological. I will now argue any physiological harm is not part of the harm peculiar to addiction. Let us once again consider our mother who feels naturally compelled to love her child. Let us assume this mother is a single mother who works long hours to enable her to care for her child to the best of her ability. As a result of these long hours she becomes overtired and harms her physiological health. As I have pointed out intuitively this mother is not an addict. Next let us consider two patients with damaged livers. Let us assume the physiological harm, the damage to the liver, is identical in both cases. Let us also assume that in the first case this damage is caused by disease and in the second by alcohol addiction. However it seems to me the harm caused to the alcoholic’s liver is not a peculiar type of harm connected to addiction. Viruses may cause identical damage to someone’s liver as that caused by alcohol abuse. We should of course try to eradicate addictions that cause physiological harm just as we should try and eradicate diseases which cause harm but the peculiar harm of addiction does not seem to be captured by the nature of any physiological harm.

I will now consider two forms of non-physiological harm that might be particular to addiction. Firstly a virtue ethicist might suggest that addiction damages someone’s ability to act as a moral agent. Traditionally the cardinal virtues are wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance. Let us accept that an addict is not a temperate person. It follows provided you accept virtue ethics that someone’s addiction harms him by affecting his ability to act as a moral agent. However, even if one accepts virtue ethics, it does not seem to me that a lack of temperance is a peculiar harm to addicts. After all someone may be a temperate person before he suffers a stroke and become intemperate after.

I now want to consider a second non physiological harm that might be particular to addiction. I will now argue that addiction harms the addict by harming his status as an autonomous agent. Before making this argument I must make clear what I mean by autonomy. Autonomy is not just simply the ability to choose. A wanton may be free to choose whatsoever he wants but his will is anarchic, moved by mere impulse and inclination, see Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition and Love, Cambridge University Press. Intuitively someone whose will is moved simply by impulse and inclination is non-autonomous because autonomy involves self-government. Someone might argue that the exercise of autonomy involves an agent freely making rational choices rather than simply being free to choose. Adopting this definition means that because an addict’s choices are compelled by his addiction he cannot freely make rational choices. It then follows such an agent is unable to exercise his autonomy. Before we can decide whether we should accept either this definition or the conclusion that follows from it we must be sure about what is precisely meant by rational and freely. Firstly does rational mean logical or does rational simply mean the agent chooses what seems appropriate to him? I would suggest being autonomous means an agent must be free to choose what seems appropriate to him. Secondly does the freedom to choose involve freedom from both external and internal compulsions? I would suggest in this case being autonomous need only involve being free from external compulsions. For instance a devout Christian might feel compelled to profess his faith even if he is free from all external compulsions but few would regard his profession as non-autonomous. In the light of the above an autonomous decision might be more precisely defined as one in which is the agent’s decision is free from external compulsions and is one which feels appropriate to him. Clearly if this definition of autonomy is accepted it means any external compulsion such as drug addiction damages an agent’s ability to make autonomous choices.

Accepting the above definition means addiction damages an agent’s autonomy. Someone might now suggest that this definition is incomplete because it does not cover all forms of addiction. He might then point out the above definition appears to exclude some gamblers, compulsive consumer’s of pornography and many others as addicts. He might further point out that such intuitive addictions are caused by internal compulsions. I fully accept his point that some internal compulsions cause addiction. But I would reject his suggestion that the above definition is incomplete by arguing any agent would see such internal compulsions as inappropriate. A lover may feel compelled to love his beloved. However love is not an addiction because the lover identifies with his beloved and is satisfied by his compulsion. In other words he finds his love appropriate. On the other hand a compulsive consumer of pornography may feel compelled to consume pornography but is unlikely to totally identify himself with this consumption or be satisfied with it. He is in other words unlikely to feel his consumption is appropriate. It follows addictions caused by internal compulsions with which the agent fails to identify damage his ability to make autonomous choices. It does not follow my above definition of autonomy is incomplete. The damage addictions cause to an agent’s ability to make autonomous choices may vary. In some circumstances mild addiction may do very little damage to someone’s status as an autonomous agent. In others his addiction may mean he is unable to make decisions he identifies with and which satisfy him. In these circumstances he may suffer psychological harm and in extreme cases his sense of identity may be damaged.

I am now in a position to answer the question posed at the beginning of this posting, what is wrong with addiction to video games? I have argued the harm done by addiction may be physiological or psychological. The physiological damage of smoking is large and well documented. I have argued the psychological damage done to us by addiction is damage done to our autonomy. In the light of this I would suggest the psychological harm caused by addiction to tobacco is minimal. Smokers may prefer not to be a smoker but in all other respects they can exercise their autonomy in much the same way as non-smokers. The harm done by addiction to video games is different. The physiological damage done by addiction to video games would appear to be minimal in contrast to the damage smoking causes. However the psychological damage done to game’s addicts may be much larger than the minimal psychological damage caused by smoking. Games addicts may prefer to play these games less just as smokers may prefer not to smoke. However unlike smoking which causes minimal damage to the smoker’s autonomy the games addict’s ability to make autonomous decisions may also be limited by the time taken in the playing of these games. In addition some young children who become addicted to video games appear to become aggressive and this also may hinder their personal development and ability to make autonomous decisions, see for instance www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/aggr/articles/... . Four conclusions follow from the above discussion. Firstly it might be concluded that the addictions of tobacco and video games cause different types of harm. Secondly the harm peculiar to addiction is harm to the agent as an autonomous agent. Thirdly the harm caused by addictive video games, though different, may be every bit as serious as that caused by smoking, perhaps even more serious. Lastly far from celebrating the addictiveness of certain games we should see this addictiveness as potentially very harmful.

Ecological Refugees

Cara Nine argues in that the Lockean proviso means a people who have their homeland destroyed, or made uninhabitable by ecological disaster, have a theoretical right to a new homeland. Global warming increases the probability of this happening. Nine argues that other states have a duty to provide for this homeland by ceding part of their sovereign territory (1). The Lockean proviso roughly means we have unlimited rights to any resource provided there is enough of this resource left for others. If however the resource becomes limited we must share this resource. For instance if people A have their water resources provided by river B and people X have equally good water resources provided by river Y then people A can have exclusive rights, to own, the water resources provided by river B. However according to the proviso if resources become scarce and river Y dries up people A cease to have exclusive rights to B and should share their water resources with people X. Does it follow from accepting the above that if people C lose their homeland due to ecological disaster that people D should cede part of their territory to people C? I will argue it does not.

Let it be accepted the Lockean proviso does mean other states should share some resources by offering food, shelter and a home to ecological refugees whose homeland has become uninhabitable. Does this sharing of resources extend to ceding the territory needed to permit these refugees to continue living in the same state albeit in a different place? Nine believes the Lockean proviso depends on a natural duty to promote the preservation of humankind (2). Let us assume these refugees come from a state which denies women equal rights and persecutes minorities. Allowing the creation of a similar state by ceding territory rather than simply aiding these refugees by offering food, shelter and a new home does not seem to promote the preservation of humankind. For instance should the territory of North Korea become uninhabitable due to radioactive fallout because of this regime’s nuclear policy it would be ridiculous for any country to cede land in order to allow the continuation of the current regime. It follows the Lockean proviso does not apply to all states. Nine argues provided we accept that if the people of current legitimate states have the right to self-determination then we should also accept the loss of a state’s territory does not destroy the right of its people to self-determination. In what follows I will only consider refugees who come from a legitimate state which permits self-determination. The question now becomes if a legitimate state which permits self-determination becomes uninhabitable due to ecological disaster then does the accepted sharing of resources required by the Lockean proviso extend to including the ceding of land by unaffected states to permit the refugees to live in the same state albeit in a different place?

I believe the answer to the above question is no for two reasons. Firstly if we are required to share water or food due to drought or famine then each of us as individuals should take a little less to help those suffering. However no such equitable solution is available if we were to try to resettle an entire state displaced by ecological disaster on new land. If we are to stick strictly to the Lockean proviso then all of the states unaffected by the disaster should cede a small part of their territory. In such a scenario it seems ridiculous to say the land ceded permits these refugees to live in the same state albeit in a different place. Clearly any state with a formerly unified territory which becomes split over a hundred far flung pieces of land is not the same state it was. If we accept the Lockean proviso must have an equitable solution then it cannot even theoretically apply states which are destroyed by ecological disaster.

Secondly let us assume that a more unified state might be created in one state from all the other states. I myself find the possibility of such a scenario as highly doubtful because of doubts as to whether the compensation could be equitable. However putting my doubts to one side and assuming we can equitably create such a state does the Lockean proviso give us a reason to create of such a state? I would argue in this revised scenario the Lockean proviso gives us no reason to do so. In her paper Nine assumes “that the loss of existing territorial domain due to ecological disaster does not eliminate this right of self-determination (3). I agree with Nine. However the loss of someone’s state and her subsequent resettlement in a different state which permits self-determination does not eliminate her right to self-determination. Nine’s argument seems to depend on a second assumption. Nine assumes the loss of someone’s state and her subsequent resettlement in a different state, albeit a state which permits self-determination, would damage her self-determination. Her argument seems to be based on the idea that the Lockean proviso requires that we must seek to repair this damage. This second assumption seems doubtful. It is of course true a refugee’s resettlement might alter the way her self-determination is expressed but alteration is not the same as damage. Indeed an altered way of self-determination may be an improvement. It seems the Lockean proviso only applies when resources are lost, become sparse or are damaged. The Lockean proviso does not apply to altered resources provided these resources are adequate. If the above is accepted then the Lockean proviso of course means accepting we have a duty to resettle ecological refugees. It does not follow from the above that this resettlement must include the ceding of territory by other states in order to permit these refugees to continue living in the same state albeit even if this state is in a different place. However even if Nine is mistaken about the need for states to cede territory a further important implication follows from the Lockean proviso. Provided the Lockean proviso involves restoring a right to self determination then a host state should grant full civic rights, such as the right to vote, to ecological refugees. Such a conclusion might be hard for many to accept in the Western world.

1. Cara Nine, 2010, Ecological Refugees, States Borders and the Lockean Proviso, Journal of Applied Philosophy; 27.
2. Nine, page 361.
3. Nine, page 359.

Hobbs and Heroes

At the BBC radio 3’s free thinking festival at The Sage in Gateshead Angie Hobbs posed the question do we need heroes? In her discussion Hobbs used a working definition of a hero as “someone who does something of outstanding and recognised benefit to society or culture which most people would find impossible to perform”. The Cambridge online dictionary defines a hero as someone “who is admired for having done something very brave or having achieved something great”, the italics are mine. It would appear Hobbs’ definition and that of the dictionary roughly concur. In this posting I will argue such definitions are incomplete.

 

Hobbs used a thought experiment to tease out our intuitive ideas of who is a hero. She imagined someone standing on a swollen river bank. A child falls into the river and the person jumps in to save the child. She then refined this situation to explore further our intuitive ideas about who counts as a hero. For instance is the potential rescuer a hero if she cannot swim and has only a minimal chance of saving the child? Is she a hero if her desire for heroism means standing around on riverbanks for hours hoping to rescue someone? Or is she a hero if her desire for heroism means she pushes someone who is a much better swimmer out of the way so she can rescue the child? In the light of Hobbs’ examples I want to question if the person standing on the riverbank who rescued the child was Superman whether we would consider his action as heroic. Someone might object that my question is simply a no-brainer arguing because Superman is a superhero it automatically follows his action is heroic. However I would suggest the fact that Superman is regarded as a ‘superhero’ rather than simply as a hero gives us some grounds to question his heroism.

 

Is a superhero just someone who is super at being a hero or someone who differs from normal heroes in a more significant way? It seems to me it is difficult for someone with super powers to be a hero, it's hard for superman to be a hero I now want to argue that Superman’s action in saving the child lacks an essential element needed for his action to be regarded as heroic. Superman when he rescues the child is fully confident he is going to succeed. I would suggest Superman is only doing his duty and that heroes are people who go beyond the call of duty. Let it be assumed I am standing on the side of a pond into which I can wade with no danger to myself. Let it be further assumed this pond is deep enough to drown a small child. Into this pond falls such a child. In this situation I would suggest because someone has a need for my services, the child, services which I could provide at very little cost to myself, getting wet, that intuitively I have a duty to provide these services. Furthermore I would suggest there is something drastically wrong with me as a person if I fail to feel some empathy for the drowning child. If we accept a caring ethic and I fail to save the child because my actions fail to reflect or exhibit or express an absence of empathic concern for the child then I am acting wrongly. I am also failing to do my duty from a consequentialist and deontological viewpoint. For these reasons I would argue in the above situation I should be blamed if I did not rescue the child and that whilst the child’s mother may be grateful for my actions that nonetheless these actions do not merit praise because I only doing my duty. I would further argue superman’s position on the riverbank is analogous to mine on the side of the pond. If superman fails to rescue the child at relatively little cost to himself then intuitively he fails to do his duty. Moreover any failure on his part to rescue the child reflects an absence of empathic concern and also means he fails to do his duty. I would suggest in the light of the above that a more complete definition of a hero is as follows. A hero is someone who chooses to recognisably benefit someone else or society in ways most people could not, in addition her actions must be beyond the call of duty and must involve some real sacrifice on her part. Accepting the above raises some interesting questions. Could the ‘someone’ in the above definitions be a young child be a hero or even some sorts of animals? Clearly very young children or animals cannot knowingly benefit society. However young children and perhaps animals can love someone else. If a child concurs his fears and goes into the street knowing it is dangerous to seek help for his unconscious mother who has fallen down stairs a hero? I would suggest young children can be heroes. Is a sniffer dog who fearfully enters a building only because he loves his handler brave and perhaps a kind of hero? The answer to this question depends on whether love can be a reason to be heroic.

 

Accepting the above definition means we have no reason to regard football stars as heroes even if they are capable of doing things on the football field we would find impossible to perform. In practice it seems we already do this by referring to sportsmen and women as ‘sporting heroes’ rather than simply as heroes. It also follows we have no reason to regard most soldiers fighting in Afghanistan against the Taliban as heroes. These soldiers are brave but it is part of a soldier’s duty to be brave and bravery need not of necessity involve sacrifice. However the question might still be posed must a more meaningful definition of a hero include the fact that she does something brave? It is certainly true that in the ancient world a hero had to be brave because the domain of heroes was restricted to soldiers prepared to sacrifice themselves for their country. However over time the domain of heroes has expanded to include all men, women, and children. Does this expansion mean that a hero must still be brave? I would suggest it does but that the domain of what is a brave action also needs expanding. To be brave someone must be prepared to do something that makes her vulnerable, she must be prepared to sacrifice herself for some commonly perceived good.

The Roots of Cruelty

Paul Bloom writing in the New Scientist of 16/10/10 states the following “It is no surprise that modern humans can be selfish and cruel, but this kindness poses a deep puzzle.” Personally I am not puzzled by human kindness nor am I surprised by selfishness or cruelty. However even if I am not surprised by cruelty I am puzzled by this phenomena and it is this puzzlement I wish to explore in this posting.

The reason for my puzzlement lies in the fact that whilst it seems possible to give evolutionary reasons for the roots of empathy and in certain contexts selfishness, I can see no evolutionary reasons for the roots for cruelty. Cruelty can be defined as cruel behaviour or actions. The Cambridge online dictionary defines such actions as extremely unkind and unpleasant causing pain to people or animals intentionally. The way we define and use words is important as our definitions partially determine our reactions and for this reason I want to be more precise about the above definition. It is quite common to talk of nature or animals being cruel, but we never speak of nature or animals being unkind or unpleasant. In what follows I will regard being unpleasant as a mild form of unkindness. Perhaps being unkind is not an essential element of cruelty. In practice we censure cruel people but don’t censure animals. In addition we don’t censure surgeons who intentionally cause us pain. It follows we have two different concepts of cruelty. The first concept does not involve unkindness and for that reason is philosophically uninteresting. In what follows I will only consider the second concept.

If I am going to be unkind to someone I must understand him to some degree. I must have a theory of mind. Accepting the above means cruelty cannot have a long evolutionary history. It follows most animals, with a few possible exceptions such as chimpanzees, cannot be cruel in my second sense. Nevertheless natural selection does select for some features which only have a short evolutionary history. For instance it seems clear natural selection would favour creatures possessing a theory of mind. A theory of mind appears to have a short evolutionary history. A theory of mind appears to be a precondition for a capacity to feel empathy. Someone might object to the above by suggesting dogs feel empathy for their owners and argue dogs do not have a theory of mind. I would question whether dogs feel genuine empathy and would suggest dogs merely react their owner’s feelings in an appropriate way. It therefore seems probable that the capacities for feeling empathy and acting cruelly only became possible at around the same time in our evolutionary history. It is now becoming generally accepted that natural selection favours creatures with a disposition to feel empathy. A disposition for empathy appears to clash with a cruel disposition. Someone might now argue because of this clash natural selection cannot favour creatures with a capacity for empathy and also favour or be indifferent to creatures with a disposition for cruelty. A moment’s reflection shows his argument to be unsound. Consider a peacock. A peacock’s tail feathers clash with his survival but are nonetheless selected for by natural selection because of their usefulness in attracting mates. It follows even if natural selection favours creatures with a capacity for empathy it is still possible that it might also favour or be indifferent to creatures with a capacity for cruelty.

However until very recently in human history I see no obvious reason why natural selection should select for cruelty. Indeed until the emergence of large societies it is possible to argue natural selection would select against a trait for cruelty. Before the emergence of large societies people lived as hunter gathers. Research has shown these societies were largely non hierarchical and had an egalitarian structure, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-gatherer . In such societies being cruel to gain power or amass wealth would be pointless. Prima facie in such societies cruelty appears to offer no advantages to individuals. Indeed being cruel would appear to be a disadvantage. In the light of the above it is far from obvious that cruelty is deep rooted in us due to natural selection. In practice of course no one can deny cruelty exists and perhaps given the society we live in I should not be puzzled by this. However my argument suggests the roots of this cruelty lie in our society and not our nature. Moreover if we do not have a natural inclination for cruelty I see no reason why our society must of necessity have a Hobbesian or Machiavellian nature. Accepting my suggestion permits the comforting belief that the roots of cruelty are shallow and we need not accept cruelty as inevitable.