Velleman, Guilt and Love

David Velleman defines guilt as anxiety about being in an indefensible position which means one might be cut off from social interaction. In this posting I will examine this definition. Freud says guilt is anxiety about being punished by the superego. Velleman thinks Freud is on roughly the right lines and seems to suggest that guilt might be connected to the loss of love of one’s conscience (1). I accept guilt is connected to the loss of love but will argue it is not connected to the loss of love of one’s conscience but rather to an inability to love oneself.

Velleman’s definition of guilt, as anxiety about social exclusion, means guilt is not necessarily concerned with morality. Intuitively guilt is not solely concerned with moral matters. If we accept the above it becomes difficult to differentiate between Velleman’s concepts of guilt and shame. Moreover accepting Velleman’s definition would mean excluding guilt from some situations in which we would intuitively feel the feeling of guilt would be appropriate. Because Velleman’s definition does not include these situations I will argue his definition is an inadequate one. My argument is much the same one as the one I employed in discussing his concept of shame; see Velleman and Shame 11/05/10. Let us consider someone on diet who secretly eats a lot of chocolates. Intuitively we feel such a person might feel guilty. Indeed it would seem be completely natural for us to say she has a guilty secret. However she need have no anxiety about social exclusion on account of her guilty secret. If it is accepted our dieter does indeed have cause to feel guilty then because Velleman’s definition of guilt fails to account for this his definition is an inadequate definition.

Even if our dieter is not in the danger of social exclusion due to her secret chocolate eating none the less I would suggest her position seems in some way to be indefensible. I would further suggest it might seem indefensible to her. What is indefensible in this context? Does Velleman’s suggestion that guilt is connected the loss of love of one’s conscience help us to understand what our dieter finds indefensible? In my previous posting I suggested shame might be simply seen as an unease or dissatisfaction with our sense of self as moral persons. My example of our dieter shows guilt is not simply restricted to moral matters. I believe Velleman is correct in connecting love and guilt. However I would not connect guilt to the loss of the love of one’s conscience as Velleman does. I would connect guilt to not loving oneself. As in previous postings I will accept Frankfurt’s position that love is ‘caring about’ when caring about is defined as someone persistently making herself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what she ‘cares about’ is diminished or enhanced (2). I will also accept Frankfurt is correct when he argues that here could not be a person whose self is of no importance to her (3). If something is important to me I must ‘care about’ it, I must love it, it follows if someone must be important to herself she must care about, love, herself to some degree. It is of course true persons need not totally care about themselves, indeed some people often talk of hating themselves, never the less I contend all persons must care about themselves to some degree. If the above is accepted guilt might be defined not as anxiety about social exclusion but rather as anxiety about being unable to truly love oneself. Such a definition might explain the secret chocolate eater’s guilt and as a result is a more complete definition than that of Velleman.

However even if we reject Velleman’s concept of guilt and accept my definition it does not follow that anxiety about being in an indefensible position with regard to society is unimportant. Such anxiety might explain why the secret chocolate eater worries about being unable to love herself. This anxiety might be explained in two ways. Firstly her anxiety may be due to the breaking some accepted social norms even if this breaking is unobservable and done in private. This anxiety might arise because she is breaking social norms which she personally accepts. Secondly her anxiety might arise as her actions are contrary to her image of herself and as a consequence of this image how she should act. This image would I suggest must be partly based on society’s expectations.

1. David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 101)
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press page 83.
3. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 90.

Prisoners serving Life Sentences and Assisted Suicide

In his posting on practical ethics Shlomit Harrosh connects the rights of death row inmates in certain states of the USA to choose the method of their execution and those of terminally ill patients choosing when to die, see Harrosh . Harrosh believes some personal autonomy is important even in the difficult circumstances of death row and that by choosing how to die a prisoner is to some limited degree choosing how to live as an expression of who he is and what he values as an autonomous agent.

“Like the choice of a last meal, the choice of method of execution is a final exercise in personal autonomy. Within limits, it gives prisoners the opportunity to choose the final experiences of their lives and express their values and preferences.”

Harrosh goes on to suggest that by choosing when to die terminally ill patients are making a similar choice.

“Terminally ill patients who choose voluntary euthanasia are similarly choosing how to live. The choice to hasten death is simply a means to an end: ensuring that their remaining time is lived according to their standards of a worthwhile life, expressing their values and preferences.”

Harrosh believes both of these rights have the same basis. He concludes if the right of death row inmates to choose between methods of their execution is permissible it follows that terminally ill patients have the right to choose when to die. I agree with Harrosh’s conclusion even though some might argue choosing when to die is not the same as choosing how to die.

The public at large appears to believe if some murderer, paedophile, terrorist or mass rapist attempts to commit suicide whilst in prison that no attempt should be made to prevent him doing so. In this posting I want to subject this common belief to some philosophical scrutiny. I will initially restrict my consideration to offenders who have committed terrible crimes which mean they will never be released from custody. In what follows offenders will specifically refer to those offenders who never be released from custody unless I specify otherwise. Harrosh makes a connection between the right of prisoners on death row to choose the method of their execution and the right of the terminally ill to choose when to die. I want to connect the right of terminally ill patients to choose when to die and a right of offenders to choose when to die. In what follows I will propose if terminally ill patients possess a right, to choose when to die, then so should these offenders. At the outset I must make it clear this is not an argument in support of capital punishment and that I personally do not believe in such punishment.

Do terminally ill patients have the right to choose when to die? Most people working in applied philosophy would accept this right and as a consequence I will only present a brief argument to support the right. Harrosh believes terminally ill patients have this right because they have the right to choose how to live their lives. I agree with Harrosh and would further argue these patients have the latter right because we should see such patients as the same sort of creatures as ourselves. Harry Frankfurt believes the intrinsic value of our autonomy is connected to the recognition of us by others as the kind of creature capable of determining its own destiny (1). Christine Korsgaard believes that by choosing we determine our identity (2).  If we accept that Frankfurt and Korsgaard’s views are correct then were we to deny terminally ill patients the right to choose when to die then we appear to be failing to accept these patients as the same sort of persons as ourselves. Someone might object this appearance is false and that we do see these patients as the same sort of persons as ourselves even if we deny them the right to choose when to die. He might argue we see ourselves as the sort of persons who can normally choose how to live our own lives but whom, if we became terminally ill, would have this choice restricted. I would counter argue due to our identity being so closely tied to our ability to choose if someone becomes terminally ill and his health is damaged and as a result his choices are restricted then even though he remains a person he is treated as a damaged person. I would suggest damaged health should not automatically mean a damaged person.  My objector might now argue my argument carries little weight because I have failed to adequately specify what I mean by a damaged person. I accept his argument. I suggested above our identity as persons is closely tied to our ability to choose. I would now suggest this ability to choose is not just the ability to make any choice but an ability to make an autonomous choice. The above means a damaged person might be defined as one whose capacity to make autonomous decisions has been damaged. I see no reason why most diseases or injuries must of necessity damage someone’s autonomy, diseases of or injuries to the brain might be exceptions. It follows even if disease or injury damages someone’s health that it does automatically damage him as a person and that we should continue treating him as such. Let it be accepted without any further argument that terminally ill patients do have the right to choose when to die because they have the right to choose how to live their lives. However, it is certainly not true that offenders have the same rights as the rest of us. My objector might now argue even if not all terminally ill patients are damaged persons all offenders are. I would reject such an argument as I have defined damaged persons as people whose capacity to make autonomous decisions has been damaged. I would suggest for the most part these offenders are damaged moral persons rather than damaged persons. Korsgaard would disagree with my suggestion. However I must accept some offenders are damaged persons unable to make autonomous decisions due to physiological or psychological conditions. I believe such offenders should be in secure mental health institutions such as Broadmoor rather than normal prisons. In the light of the above I will limit my discussion further to offenders in a normal prison who will never be released. I believe we should see such offenders as basically the same sort of people as ourselves, autonomous persons. Indeed history teaches us that evil is not usually perpetrated by people who are vastly different from ourselves. The Milligram Experiment further supports this point, see my previous posting. It follows even though these offenders have committed some terrible crimes they are not damaged as autonomous persons. The recognition of such offenders as undamaged autonomous persons means we should accept that they retain some choice about how to live their lives provided these choices will not harm others. For instance they may have the choice of attending religious services, which library books they choose or attending literacy classes. Should these limited choices include the right to choose to die? 

The answer to the above question depends on why we send offenders to prison. We send offenders to prison for three reasons; firstly to protect ourselves, secondly to punish the offender and lastly to rehabilitate him before he is released. We can disregard the last reason in this discussion. Prima facie if we should treat offenders as persons like ourselves then these offenders should retain all choices about how to live their lives provided these choices don’t endanger the public at large or detract from any punishment involved. Clearly giving offenders, who will never be released from prison, the right to choose when to die will not endanger us. The only question that remains to be answered is whether giving such offenders the right to choose to die detracts from their punishment? The answer to this question is not clear cut. Let it be accepted our sense of common humanity, our sense of seeing others as persons rather than monsters, does not permit us the option of cruel punishments such as simply putting an offender in a cell and metaphorically throwing away the key. It follows we must give offenders some quality of life including limited choices about how to live their lives. Provided prisoners must have some quality of life and enjoy certain limited choices it seems to me giving offenders the right to choose to die does not detract from their punishment. In the light of the above it might be concluded because the terminally ill have a right to choose when to die then so do offenders who will never be released from prison. 

I will now consider four objections to the above conclusion. This Blog is concerned with applied philosophy and someone might object it is pointless to give rights to people who will never use them. In particular it might be argued even if such offenders are the given the right to end their lives that in practice they will never avail themselves of this right. However there is some empirical evidence to show that at least some such offenders desire to die. Consider for instance consider the cases of Fred West the Gloucestershire builder who murdered 12 people and Harold Shipman who had 215 murders ascribed to him who both committed suicide in prison. Further evidence is provided by the need to place some prisoners on suicide watch.

Our objector might advance a second objection. He might point out there are a lot of mentally unstable people in prison and invariably among these people there will be some offenders who will never be released. Some of this mental instability may be due to depression. He then might argue if we give these offenders the right to choose to die rather than face life long imprisonment that some of those who exercise this option will not have made an autonomous choice due to depression. Indeed he might still further argue that if this option is made available some of offenders might feel they are being pressurised into taking it. If offenders are simply offered this choice then I believe this is a perfectly good argument. However I believe the argument loses its validity provided some safeguards are introduced. These safeguards must ensure that only offenders capable of making an autonomous decision are offered this choice. Our objector might now introduce a counter argument. He might argue these safeguards would involve counselling the offenders to ensure they can make an autonomous decision and that counselling is expensive. He might then proceed by arguing such offenders do not merit such expense and hence conclude these safeguards should not be introduced. In reply to this counter argument I would make two points. Firstly I would point out keeping people in prison for a lifetime is very expensive. If an offender who will never be released chooses to die his choice saves the taxpayer a great deal of money even if this choice includes expensive counselling. Secondly and I believe more importantly I would question whether these safeguards really need to include expensive counselling. For I would suggest all that is needed for a decision to be autonomous is that it is wholehearted and un-ambivalent. I would suggest if an offender expresses a constant un-ambivalent desire to die over a period of a few months, then his decision is an autonomous one and as such ought to be respected. Our objector might respond that my suggestion means a severally depressed offender might choose to die. In reply I would simply point out being depressed may well be the natural state of affairs for such an offender and suggest his depression does not preclude him from making an autonomous decision to die.

I have argued the reason why we should allow such offenders the right to die is based on their autonomy. I further argued that the basis of autonomy is seeing others as basically the same sort of persons as ourselves. However our objector might mount a third objection. He might argue if we allow these offenders the right to die then we are sending them a message that even at this basic level they are not the same sort of persons as ourselves. He might point out if we saw someone about to jump from a high building we would try and talk him down rather than simply pass by or tell him it’s his choice whether to jump or not. Indeed our objector might accuse us of double standards. The same objection might also be made if we allow terminally ill patients to choose when to die. I would reject his objection by arguing the difference in our attitudes is due to a difference in circumstances rather than a supposed difference in persons. An offender may be depressed and as I have suggested this depression may be both natural and normal considering his circumstances. His depression may be natural because his ongoing circumstances will not significantly change.  Someone about to jump from a building may also be depressed but his depression may not be natural and certainly need not be ongoing as his circumstances might change. These different circumstances mean the offender’s decision, subject to certain safeguards, is an autonomous one whilst the decision of the man about to jump from a high building may not be. An autonomous decision is a constant un-ambivalent decision. If we permit an offender to die we can be fairly certain his decision is an autonomous one because the prison authorities would require that he had expressed an un-ambivalent desire to die over a period of some months. The same requirement cannot be applied to someone about to commit suicide by jumping from a high building.

Our objector might now point out, offenders do not have a handy means of suicide readily available, and that if my conclusion is accepted the means of suicide would have to be approved of and brought into prison by the relevant authorities under strictly controlled conditions. I accept the objectors point. He might then use this point to raise a fourth objection to my conclusion. He might argue accepting my conclusion reintroduces capital punishment by the back door and once again accuse me of double standards due to my stated opposition to capital punishment. In reply I would reject his argument by firstly pointing out capital punishment is imposed and not simply optional. Secondly I am not proposing that the prison authorities kill these offenders even with the offender’s approval. I am proposing that the prison authorities make the means of suicide available to such offenders in controlled circumstances. These circumstances might be the much the same as those in the Dignitas clinic in Geneva. The person committing suicide in this clinic takes an anti sickness drug followed half an hour later by the overdose that kills him. In similar circumstances the offender would not have the drugs administered to him but would have them provided for him to take them himself. The fact that these drugs would be self administered would be an important additional safeguard of the offender’ autonomy, for often someone may believe he should take some course of action but when he tries to implement this action finds he cannot. For as Frankfurt points out someone’s decision only show what he intends to will and that when he attempts implement his decision he might be surprised to find out his decision does not in practice represent his will (3). In the above circumstances it would be hard to characterise the assisted suicide of an offender as capital punishment. Recently in Belgium Frank Van Den Bleeken who is serving a life sentence for rape and murder has been allowed by a court to undergo euthanasia, see bioedge . However I agree with Frankfurt that someone’s decision only show what he intends to will and in practice his decision may not always truly represent his will. For this reason whilst I believe offenders should have the right to commit suicide I would be doubtful whether this right should extend to euthanasia. 

In conclusion it appears all my imagined objector’s objections remain unconvincing. Finally I wish to consider an additional reason to that of the offender’s limited autonomy to support my position. Harrosh suggests if a prisoner on death row chooses a method of execution involving greater suffering that his choice can be a form of atonement. I would extend Harrosh’s suggestion further by suggesting if an offender chooses to die this might also be a form of atonement. In practice I don’t believe the need for atonement would be a major factor in decision making of most these offenders’ decisions to die. Rather it would be a desire to escape from life long imprisonment. None the less I believe it might be a factor in some such cases. Such atonement should be accepted not only because it is an expression of an offender’s limited autonomy but also because the acceptance of responsibility by the offender for his offences is something which may benefit the victim or victim’s relatives.

 

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 163.
2. Christine Korsgaard,  2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press.
3. Frankfurt 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 84

 

Kupperman, the Milligram Experiment and Ethical Principles

Joel Kupperman points out in that western philosophy mainly centres on rules and procedures based on principles whilst eastern philosophy mainly centres on modifying the person in order to make us better people (1). He argues the focus of eastern philosophy is in many ways the more appropriate because not all normally decent people are always good people. To support his position he cites the examples of the Milligram Experiment and the Stanford Prison Experiment. He then goes on to suggest western philosophy should pay greater attention to modifying people in order to make us better individuals as well as continuing to focus on principles. His position is to some degree analogous with that of Aristotle; good or virtuous people naturally do the right thing. In this posting I want to question, even if his suggestion is accepted, whether any successful attempt at self modification can ignore ethical principles.

At the outset I must make it clear that to some degree I agree with Kupperman. It certainly seems clear to me philosophy ought to be concerned with helping us make ourselves into better persons. Furthermore it also seems that a great deal academic ethical philosophy focuses on metaethics and the principles needed to make decisions rather than the persons who make these decisions. What sort of person we are sometimes seems to be irrelevant to the way we decide. Indeed even many virtue ethicists focus more on the nature of virtues rather than the application of actual virtues. A constant theme of Kupperman’s paper is that more emphasis should be placed on self modification and less on ethical principles or metaethics. However can someone’s self modification be totally unconnected to ethical principles? I will suggest there are at least some grounds for thinking it cannot.


Kupperman argues the main reason why the Milligram Experiment is so disturbing is that we assume the participants in it were reasonably decent people in their normal lives. Briefly the Milligram experiment took place in 1961. It involved an experimenter, a teacher who was really the participant in the experiment and a learner. The learner, who was really an actor, was supposed to be learning a series of paired words. The teacher would read the first word of each pair and read four possible answers. The learner would press a button to indicate his response. If the answer was incorrect the teacher would administer what he thought to be an electric shock to the learner. The voltage was increased for each wrong answer. The shock was not real and the learner merely responded as if he had been shocked. Milligram’s Experiment showed participants were prepared to deliver large shocks in obedience to the experimenter. For a more detailed account of this experiment see The Milgram Experiment . Let it be accepted that the participants in the Milligram Experiment were indeed normally decent people. It is clear the Milligram Experiment placed these people outside their normal comfort zone. Normally people don’t make reflective decisions but rather make decisions based on habit and inclination. However in the unfamiliar context of the Milligram Experiment normal habits and inclinations appears to give the participants little basis to help them form their decisions. It might be assumed that in unfamiliar situations such as the Milligram Experiment people will think about, reflect, on their decisions. However even if this assumption is correct any reflection by the participants in the experiment did not help them to make good decisions. It might be suggested the reason for this is that these participants lacked some general ethical principles which might have formed a basis for better reflective decision making. It might then be argued, provided the above suggestion is accepted, that people need ethical principles to make good decisions in unfamiliar circumstances. It follows that anyone who attempts to modify himself in order to make himself a better person needs some ethical principles in order to remain a good person in unfamiliar circumstances. Accepting the above leads to the conclusion; any form of self modification, in order to make oneself a better person, should be partly connected to ethical principles.

Accepting the above conclusion means accepting my suggestion that the participants in the Milligram Experiment who were normally decent people behaved as they did because they lacked the ethical principles needed to make good reflective decisions in unfamiliar circumstances. Is there any evidence to support my suggestion? One place to look for evidence is to consider why some people behave well in unfamiliar and difficult circumstances. Some of this evidence appears to undermine my suggestion. For instance it appears helpers of Jewish victims of the Third Reich, who I take it to be were acting in unfamiliar circumstances, did not always help these victims because they possessed some ethical principles but rather because they felt a natural empathy for the human being standing before them. In the light of the above it is interesting to speculate as to whether the participants in the Milligram Experiment would have delivered the same shocks if they had had visual contact with the learner. The above also seems to indicate my suggestion is unsound. In the light of the above it seems reasonable to presume that anyone who attempts to modify himself in order to make himself a better person should cultivate his natural empathy rather than accept some ethical principles. He should act as Kupperman suggests. However recent research casts doubt on this presumption. Let it be accepted that women in general have a greater disposition for empathy than men. It would appear to follow if the above assumption is accepted that in any replication of the Milligram Experiment it might be assumed women would behave better than men. However when Jerry Burger of Santa Clara University replicated the Milligram Experiment this assumed gender difference did not materialise, see Replicating Milgram .

It would appear at the present time the evidence for or against my suggestion that, the participants in the Milligram Experiment might have lacked some general ethical principles which would have enabled them to make better decisions, is not clear. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Perhaps some x-philosopher can devise an experiment in order to test the above suggestion. If such an experiment could be devised we might then be in a better position to say whether any successful attempt at self modification should ignore ethical principles as Kupperman appears to suggest.

1. Kupperman, 2010, Why philosophy needs to be comparative, , Philosophy 85, no 332

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Aliens and Stephen Hawking

Stephen Hawking recently stated on the Discovery channel that alien life forms probably exists somewhere in the Universe and that we should try to avoid contact with them. He suggested that if aliens come into contact with us they might be liable to act as the first Europeans acted on discovering America. He further suggested if they are anything like us they are likely to be aggressive and either exterminate us or pillage our resources. However it seems to me there is a major objection to Hawking’s suggestion. His suggestion seems to depend on the assumption that any alien morality will be much the same as that of the first colonisers of the Americas. I find such an assumption hard to accept because it seems to me, however slow and lagging behind science, there is some moral progress. As evidence of this progress I would argue modern Europeans would not behave in a similar way to their compatriots of Columbus’ time on discovering a further new world. To support this argument I need only draw attention to the fact that most Europeans in Columbus’ times were all quite happy to deal in African slaves. The idea of moral progress is dealt with by Guy Kahane at what intelligent alien life can tell us about morality. . In what follows I will assume moral progress is real. I will argue moral progress consists at least in part in the expansion of the domain of our moral concern. I will further argue any advanced aliens are likely to share this expansion.

Shaun Nichols uses investigations into child development and moral pathology to conclude that all morality includes an affective element including utilitarianism (1). In what follows I am going to assume Nichols view is correct for it seems to me to be highly improbable that any grouping consisting mainly of sociopaths could possibly form a stable or moral society. I am also going to assume the domain of creatures we feel sympathy for defines the domain of our moral concern.

I have assumed above some natural sympathy is necessary for any system of morality. Initially it seems safe to assume this empathy was limited to the people we were close to, our family for instance. With time the domain of our empathy has expanded to include our tribe, country, people who share our culture and more recently animals. How can we explain this expansion in the domain of our sympathy? Firstly it might be explained by physiological changes which increase our capacity to feel empathy. However I would be very doubtful about accepting any such explanation. The reason for my doubts being the expansion that has occurred seems to be too rapid to be explained in purely evolutionary terms. A second explanation might depend on a change in our understanding of other people or creatures. But how could a change in our understanding of others lead to a change in our capacity to feel sympathy as it might be argued we simply feel emotions? I would suggest the emotions we experience depend on both our physiological and psychological states. I would further suggest our psychological state depends to some extent on the beliefs we hold, our understanding. It seems clear sympathy is generated in response to some particular situation. I would still further suggest we naturally feel sympathy for some creature in some particular situation if we believe, we understand, the creature to be capable of experiencing the situation in much the same way we would. Accepting the above means a change in our understanding of other people or creatures might alter the domain of our sympathy. As I have assumed the domain of our sympathy defines the domain of our moral concern. It follows a change in our understanding can alter the domain of our moral concern. It further follows if we come to see some creatures, which we previously believed did not experience some situation as we do does, that there is an expansion in the domain of creatures we believe merit moral concern.

It might be doubted by some, even if they accept the domain of morality naturally expands, that we have nothing to fear from alien contact. I will now examine some of these doubts. Firstly some might question whether aliens need have a system of morality at all. Accepting the above means even if it is agreed the domain of morality naturally expands this fact is irrelevant in any of our considerations about what to do in the case of alien contact. However it seems inconceivable that any group of creatures could expand throughout the universe without some form of co-operation among themselves. Such co-operation would be a form of morality. An objector might suggest that aliens might possess only an alien form of morality. Aliens they might argue just don’t have an affective form of morality like us. I find his suggestion difficult to accept. First I find it difficult to imagine either how any group of creatures who don’t care about anything could possibly want to expand throughout the universe. And secondly as I will now argue I believe any creatures that care about each must have an affective system of morality.

I concur with Frankfurt’s belief that if some creature cares about something that it must identify itself with what it cares about and as a result make itself vulnerable to any losses connected to this caring (2). It is important to be clear Frankfurt does not connect this vulnerability to the emotions. Frankfurt connects this vulnerability directly to an absence of satisfaction with a state of affairs connected to whatever the creature identifies with. Frankfurt further holds that an absence of satisfaction with a state of affairs of whatever the creature cares about is sufficient to motivate it to act. I would agree with Frankfurt that an absence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction motivates us to act. However I, unlike Frankfurt, would argue an absence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction about the affairs of something we care about naturally leads to certain emotions, albeit faint emotions. I would suggest it is these emotions that give us reason to act. Accepting this suggestion means any advanced alien must care about something and this caring about means it must have some sort of emotions. It might be objected that the fact that an alien has emotions is not a sufficient condition for it being moral creature or for that matter even being capable of being a moral creature. After all sociopaths do have some emotions but these are not the sort of emotions needed for morality. Sociopaths live in our society, our civilization, and I am doubtful if a civilization of only sociopaths is possible. If we accept the above then any civilization, alien or not, might contain sociopaths but it can't be a civilization of sociopaths. It follows any aliens capable of expanding throughout the universe must have some form of morality  and that this morality must have an affective basis based on sympathy. 

I have argued aliens capable of travelling across space must have some sort of civilization and this means that they must feel some sort of sympathy. The fact that aliens feel sympathy by itself of course does not guarantee they will feel any sympathy towards us. Perhaps they might only feel empathy towards other aliens. I suggested above we naturally feel sympathy for some creature in some particular situation provided we believe, we understand, the creature to be capable of experiencing the situation in much the same way as we would. It appears to follow that any aliens will only naturally care about other aliens and closely related species which they believe to experience the world in much the same way as they do. I have argued above that if we come to understand others as experiencing the world as we do our domain of sympathy naturally expands. I have also argued above that aliens must “care about”, love, something as I believe persons must also do. It therefore seems probable if aliens come to understand us as at least partly experiencing the world as they do by “caring about” that the domain of their sympathy must naturally expand to include some sympathy towards us. In the light of the above it might be concluded Hawking’s suggestion that aliens are likely to be aggressive and either exterminate us or pillage our resources seems to be highly improbable.

It might be objected the way Europeans conquered and colonised the Americas is evidence that the above conclusion is unsound. It might be pointed out to me that these Europeans had a natural empathy together with a reasonable understanding of the world yet they still behaved dreadfully towards the Native Americans. I accept these Europeans had a natural sympathy but would argue their understanding of others did not encourage an expansion of the domain of their sympathy as far as ours. I have assumed moral progress in expansion of our natural sympathy is real. However, even if the expansion of natural empathy is real it is still feasible that aliens might contact us at an early stage in this expansion and behave as the European colonisers did in the Americas. Hawking’s believes the following scary scenario is possible,

“We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.”

This scenario is indeed a theoretical possibility. The film Independence Day  depicts such a scenario. I would argue in practice such a scenario is extremely unlikely. It is hard to see how creatures, which are capable of the understanding needed to build massive ships capable of crossing the vast distances of interstellar space, failing to sufficiently understand other caring creatures to permit a natural expansion in the domain of creatures they feel some sympathy for. A more likely scenario seems to be one in which advanced aliens are at worst indifferent towards us as depicted in Arthur Clarke’s  Rendezvous with Rama  . If we accept the above then we have little reason to fear aliens even if some caution is advisable. Perhaps the real reason we feel threatened by aliens is fear feeling inferior. Lastly it seems to me many of my comments here apply equally to any emergent superintelligence.

1. Shaun Nichols, 2004, Sentimental Rules, Oxford.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988,The Importance of What We Care about, Cambridge University Press, page 83.

Velleman and Shame

In this posting I want to examine the concept of shame. In particular I want to consider David Velleman’s ideas on shame. Velleman defines shame as “anxiety about social disqualification constitutes the emotion of shame” (1). I will argue Velleman’s definition does not easily concur with out intuitions and suggest an alternative definition.

Let it be assumed that I am the last person left alive on earth after some plague. Let it be further assumed that because I have a stoical character I have retained my mental stability. Let it be still further assumed the rest of nature is unaffected by this plague and perhaps even benefits from it. Finally let it be assumed that it is within my powers to prevent damage the environment. Hume famously pointed out that “Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger” (2). Let it be accepted Hume is basically correct. It follows in the above scenario, if I am not inclined to stop oil spilling into the environment perhaps because I prefer simply sitting at ease in a chair when only a little more effort would mean I could close a valve to prevent this environmental damage, then there is no rational reason for me to question my decision. It seems to me in such a scenario I might feel ashamed of my laziness and that this sense of shame would force me to question this laziness and act otherwise. However if we accept Velleman’s concept then in this situation I need have no fear of social disqualification and hence will feel no shame. Intuitively I believe in such a scenario I would feel shame. Velleman might object my above scenario is too far removed from reality for me to genuinely speculate as to whether I would feel shame. However I would point out almighty monarchs can feel shame and moreover the above considerations would be applicable in many more mundane situations. I would suggest it is possible to feel shame in a situation in which my actions would be undetectable by others. It therefore seems clear to me that fears about social disqualification offer at best only a partial explanation of shame.

I now want to argue our sense of shame is connected to our sense of self and that it is perfectly possible to feel shame without feeling any fear of social disqualification. If my argument is to be accepted then it should be possible to account for my shame predicted in the above scenario. Someone might point out to me that shame is a moral emotion and that there is a social aspect to shame. She might then argue my attempt to connect shame to a sense of self will fail because it fails to account for these social and moral aspects. I would argue that moral aspects must include both moral agents and those things, such as animals, which are of moral concern. I accept shame is a moral emotion. However I do not accept that shame cannot be connected to a sense of self if it is a moral emotion. Our sense of self is a sense of ourselves as embodied persons having certain attributes. For most of us, sociopaths excepted, this includes a sense of ourselves as moral persons. I would argue this sense of self as a moral person can only grow and flourish in a social setting. I would further argue whilst this sense of ourselves as moral persons may not be a source of great pride or self satisfaction that none the less it is important to us. We care about it. Harry Frankfurt believes caring about something means being satisfied with what we care about. He further believes this satisfaction is not some smug feeling but rather simply no active interest in bringing about a change in affairs (3). In the light of the above I would suggest shame might be simply seen as an unease or dissatisfaction with our sense of self as a moral person.

It seems to me using the above definition of shame it is possible to offer an explanation of my shame in the last man scenario outlined above. In this scenario I have previously acquired a sense of myself as a moral person in a social setting. When I become the last person alive I do not automatically lose this sense and hence still retain a disposition to feel shame even if I have no reason to fear social disqualification. In the light of the above hypothetical example I believe my definition of shame is better able to account for some of our moral intuitions than that of Velleman.

1. David Velleman 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95.
2. David Hume, 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, Book II, Section III, page 416, originally published 1739 – 1740).
3. Harry Frankfurt, Necessity Volition and Love, 1999, Cambridge University Press, page 103.

The Privatisation of Marriage

In his paper “What Lies Beyond Same Sex-Marriage” Andrew March argues for the privatisation of marriage (2010, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27(1)). He argues marriage should become the preserve of organisations other than the state. He believes the state should only recognise civil partnerships. He suggests if this was done then religious and other organisations could sanction their own concepts of marriage. Accepting his suggestion might mean some of the issues concerning “gay marriages” might be bypassed and each organisation sanctioning a marriage could set out the conditions a couple must meet if it is to sanction their marriage. It might be thought that this is a radical proposal but in some ways it suggests a partial return to past practice. For instance in England and Wales prior to the marriage act of 1836 only marriages conducted by the Church of England or Quaker and Jewish marriages were recognised by the state. Prima facie March’s suggestion is attractive. However in the UK the Conservative party and David Cameron far from believing in the privatisation of marriage believe the state should actively encourage the institution. In this posting I will argue the state should both sanction and encourage marriage.

In my posting of 05/06/09 I pointed out the idea of marriage arose because it benefited both individuals and society. Historically the most important of these benefits were mutual support, sexual exclusivity to ensure the paternity of any children born and support in the raising these children. More recently society has conferred on married couples a raft of legal and material benefits. In his paper March argues that in a liberal society which accepts moral pluralism there is an obligation
“to justify public coercion and exclusion in terms accessible to all members of morally and culturally diverse society.” (Page, 40)
It follows from the above if some couples are to be excluded from some of the benefits of marriage it must be possible to justify this exclusion. In what follows I will firstly argue that not all unions, “marriages” are identical. Secondly I will argue the state is fully justified in differentiating between different types of “marriage” in terms accessible to all adult members of society. If my arguments are accepted then it appears that March’s suggestion that the state should only concern itself with civil unions for all is mistaken.

Some might argue the state should be unconcerned with people’s domestic relationships and as a result should not be concerned with either civil unions or marriage. March disagrees and believes the state should be only be concerned with civil unions. I also disagree and believe the state should be concerned with both civil unions and marriage. In order to understand why I believe March is wrong to suggest the state should only recognise civil unions. In order to understand why I believe March is wrong it is first necessary to understand why the state should be concerned with peoples’ personal relationships. Once this understanding is achieved it is then possible to argue that the state should recognise different types of unions. Let it be accepted any modern liberal state only exists to benefit, however imperfectly, its citizens. It might be argued in theory a state should be a minimal state and only benefit its citizens by protecting them from coercion and enforcing un-coerced contracts. However in practice most liberal states gives its citizens a wide range of benefits such as education, highways and healthcare. Prima facie it seems reasonable that a state should give certain couples certain benefits if these couples provide some benefits that would otherwise have to be provided by the state. All modern liberal states are concerned with the education of children. It follows a modern liberal state is concerned with the rearing of its children. If all its citizens behaved like Rousseau, by sending their children to foundling hospitals, the state would have to assume responsibility for these children. It therefore seems reasonable that the state should provide couples with children with certain benefits and that these benefits should be unavailable to those couples without children.

In practice most states give some benefits to all married couples regardless of whether they have children or not. For instance a widow has the right to inherit her late husband’s estate. In this posting I will not question whether such a policy is justified. However provided the state only provides such benefits to married couples March is correct to point out it must be possible to justify excluding other types of couples in terms accessible to all adult members of society. I find it difficult to see such any such a justification. It follows provided the state provides some benefits to all married couples that it should provide the same benefits to all long term partnerships regardless of the gender or sexual orientation of the partners involved. It further follows if the state is to benefit certain long term partnerships that it must officially recognise these partnerships in some way. If the state does not recognise and differentiate between partnerships then perhaps any relationship however transient, perhaps even a one night stand, might be a reason for the conferment of these benefits.

If the above is accepted then in practice, with certain exceptions such as incestuous partnerships, the state should be willing to recognise all long term partnerships. Such recognition should, as March suggests, take the form of civil partnerships. Let it also be accepted that the state should provide certain benefits only for couples with children. It would be completely compatible with the above for the state only to recognise civil unions and financially reward couples with children in some way, perhaps through tax breaks. If the above is accepted then March may well be correct in believing the state should privatise the recognition of marriage. However I would argue that the state is not just concerned with any child rearing but good child rearing and this means the state should be concerned with traditional marriage. Empirical evidence suggests that children from traditionally married couples are likely to be more confident and succeed better in life than the children of cohabiting couples for various reasons. Firstly it seems clear that children benefit from parental stability. According to Benson “unmarried parents are four times as likely to split up as married parents. By the child’s fifth birthday 9% of married couples have split up compared to 35% of unmarried couples.” See http://www.bcft.co.uk/2010%20Family%20policy,%20breakdown%20and%20structure.pdf
Secondly it would appear the children of parents who simply cohabit have significantly more mental health problems. See www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_health/summaryreport.pdf
In addition to the above there also appears to be some evidence that the children of traditionally married parents are less likely to offend and take drugs. Some may dispute some or all of these findings and suggest there is no difference in the way the children of traditionally married and cohabiting couples flourish. This dispute should be resolved by evidence and experiment not philosophy, see my previous posting concerning Trout. However, returning to philosophy, prima facie it might be concluded that provided the evidence shows the children of traditionally married couples enjoy certain benefits when compared to the children of cohabiting couples then the state should specifically recognise and encourage the idea of traditional marriage. I would argue if this conclusion is not to be accepted it is up to the opponents of the conclusion to justify their position in terms accessible to all adult members of a morally and culturally diverse society.

If the above is accepted then it might be suggested by some that for reasons of simplicity the state should not only recognise traditional marriage for heterosexual couples but extend this recognition to gay and lesbian pairings thereby dispensing with the need to recognise civil partnerships. I would reject such a suggestion. Moreover I believe my reasons for this exclusion satisfy March’s requirement that my reasons should be accessible to all adult members of morally and culturally diverse society. I would firstly argue if traditional marriage was to encompass gay and lesbian couples that these couples might believe they have a right to be helped to conceive or adopt children. I argued in my posting of 05/06/09 such couples should not have this right. In this posting I argued some loving relationships are distorted by bringing only loving being loved to a relationship rather than a genuine form of disinterested love. I further argued this distortion is particularity likely to apply to gay couples with relation to children. Such couples might be especially prone to loving having children rather than simply loving children. It might be objected to above such a distortion could equally apply to heterosexual couples. My response to this objection would be to point out that nature gives most natural parents a natural empathy with their children making it is more probable that they will love their children in a purely disinterested way. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude the state should only recognise traditional marriage for heterosexual couples but that it should in addition recognise civil partnerships.

However there is a major problem with my above account. What exactly is meant by a traditional marriage? Indeed someone might point out if it is impossible to define what is meant by a traditional marriage my argument that the state should recognise two forms of marriage is impractical. It might then be argued that March is correct to suggest the state should privatise the recognition of marriage and only recognise civil unions. One possible solution to this problem might be to define a traditional marriage as a religious marriage. In this way even if the state does not actually privatise the recognition of marriage it contracts out this recognition. Such a solution might have been possible in the past, in a more religiously homogenous state than our present multicultural one, but seems impractical now. For instance it is by no means clear religious polygamous marriages benefit children. It follows even if the state should recognise and encourage traditional marriages in addition to civil partnerships, because the former benefits children in some way, that the state has no reason to recognise polygamous marriages. I have argued above a child benefits from being loved for herself rather than being loved for being someone’s child. I further argued that this disinterested form of love comes more naturally from heterosexual parents. It would suggest a traditional marriage might be defined as one in which a heterosexual couple make some long standing commitments to each other. Accepting the above would means it is possible for the state to recognise traditional marriages in addition to civil unions.

Trout and Autonomy

In this posting I want to consider the way individual autonomy interacts with a proposed expansion of the domain of our natural empathy as suggested by J D Trout in (THE EMPATHY GAP, 2009 Viking). Trout argues any expansion of our natural empathy requires good options and the capacity for good decision making. He further argues the poor sometimes don’t have good options they can care about. He still further argues any expansion of our natural empathy is made difficult by our psychological biases such as favouring the status quo, overestimating our capabilities and discounting our future in decision-making. For example most people fail to save adequately for their old age because they over discount the future. Lastly he argues we are sometimes faced by complex decisions for which we don’t have the necessary capabilities needed to make a good decision. Consider for example the controversy surrounding the MMR vaccine, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MMR_vaccine_controversy .

Trout argues the twin pillars of any great society are creating the conditions in which we can be happy whilst at the same time allowing others a fighting chance to achieve this state, see page 39. He argues our limited capacity for long range empathy makes these goals difficult to achieve in practice. He believes our decision making might be changed to increase this limited capacity. In order to achieve this he believes the state must play a part in improving our decision making. He suggests the state might do this in two ways. Firstly it might improve our decision making by limiting some of our options. For instance he argues drivers who don’t wear seat belts or motorcyclists who don’t wear helmets have psychological biases that underestimate the probability of injury and overestimate their ability to cope once they are injured. To combat these biases he argues the state should simply prohibit such behaviour. Some of the ways he believes the state might limit our behaviour are quite sophisticated. For instance he believes all, who can, should be compelled to save for their old age. He argues this saving should come from wage increases rather than existing income in order to counteract our natural psychological bias to over discount the future. Secondly Trout suggests our decision making would be improved if when faced with complex decisions, for which we don’t have the necessary capabilities needed to make a good decision, we limit our decision making by accepting the accepted wisdom of experts. He believes this suggestion should apply especially to policy makers who should help formulate the aims of society; but should accept the advice of experts in how to best implement these aims. Trout believes if these two suggestions are adopted people would quickly adapt and accept them, see page 180.

I have a great deal of sympathy with Trout’s aims, nevertheless I now want now to consider whether his suggestions would affect our autonomy. I believe for all practical purposes Trout believes his suggestions would not damage most people’s autonomy. I believe Trout would argue even if for some people some options become unavailable that this loss would be more than compensated for by other people having their options increased by better education and a reduction in poverty. Trout it seems to me takes a purely instrumental view of the value of autonomy. I do not share this view and believe the intrinsic value of autonomy is also important. I now want to examine how our apparently different views about the value of autonomy might affect the acceptability of any limitations on our freedom of choice.

Prior to commencing this examination I want to make it clear I agree with Trout’s second suggestion. There are certain situations in which we cannot make truly autonomous decisions and I believe it does not damage our autonomy if in such situations we delegate decision making to experts. For instance in a medical context patients giving informed consent are supplied with a great deal of information which many find hard to understand. Moreover patients are often stressed and may be squeamish about learning about all the details of their condition. It seems clear to me provided a patient can articulate what she hopes treatment can achieve for her and these hopes are realistic that she can make a genuine autonomous decision to delegate all decisions as to her actual treatment to her doctors. It further seems to me that if such a patient is more fully informed she might not really understand the information provided and hence not be able to make a genuinely autonomous decision. In the light of the above I would argue, as does Trout, once policy makers have set out a policy, such as ones concerning our future energy requirements or reducing greenhouse gases, they should delegate the way the actual policy is to be implemented to the agreed experts. I would further argue such delegation does not damage our status as autonomous persons and may even enhance it.

Trout is concerned with good decision making. Moreover it seems he believes if our ability to make good decisions is not damaged then neither is our autonomy. In this blog I have frequently argued an autonomous decision is one we are wholehearted about and that being wholehearted simply involves an absence of desire or any restlessness to change that decision. I also argued in my posting of 01/07/08 that autonomous decisions are decisions that satisfice us rather than the best the best possible decision. It follows any improvement in our decision making whilst it may well improve our capacity for autonomy does not of necessity change the value of our autonomy. A down to earth concept of autonomy is provided by Waller.

“Genuine autonomy requires options available within our actual environment, options chosen on the basis of our conditional preferences and changing circumstances; not mysterious alternatives that transcend all causal and environmental influences. This natural biological view of autonomy with its mundane alternatives, has special value in the medical environment.” (2001, Patient Autonomy Naturalised, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44(4), page 584)

In his paper Waller points out in a medical context limitations on a patient’s decision making may lead to passivity that threatens both her physical and psychological well-being, see page 585. It might then be argued, in a more general setting, any limitations placed on our ability to make some decisions also damages our well-being in the same way. Trout might respond to the above by pointing out that in many cases our apparent ability to make decisions is already severely limited or even illusory due to our psychological biases. In reply to such an objection I would point out what affects our physical and psychological well-being is not our actual ability to make decisions but rather our perception of ourselves as decisions makers. Trout appears to concur with the above, see page 57. It follows any limitations placed on some of the decisions we can make may well damage our well-being.

Trout might well further respond that whilst limitations on some of the decisions we can make may indeed damage our well-being in certain areas this damage is more than compensated for by increases in our well-being in other areas or over time. For instance if the autonomy of parents is limited by requiring them to ensure their children are educated this loss is more than balanced by an increase in their children’s well-being over time. Few if any would question such a limitation. However I will still believe any limitations imposed on our autonomy should be a cause of concern. In order to understand this concern we must try to understand why any limitations imposed on our autonomy affect our physical and psychological well-being. I would suggest it is because these limitations may affect our perception of the kind of person we are. This perception is tied to the intrinsic value of autonomy. Dworkin argues autonomy has both instrumental value and intrinsic value.

“But there is a value connected with being self-determining that is not a matter of either of bringing about good results or the pleasure of the process itself. This is the intrinsic desirability of exercising the capacity for self-determination. We desire to be recognized as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destiny”. (1988, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press,
page 112.)

I would argue the intrinsic value of autonomy is fundamental and that our capacity to make decisions, good or bad, becomes meaningless without this value, without us perceiving ourselves and being perceived as the kinds of creature capable of determining our own destinies. In the light of the above I would suggest priority must be given to recognising us as the kind of creatures, who perceive ourselves as being capable of making our own decisions, rather than any attempt to improve our decision making by limiting our ability to make certain decisions in an effort to overcome our harmful psychological biases. My suggested priority does not mean we cannot limit some of the decisions open to us. Further my suggested priority does not mean we can be autonomous without having meaningful choices. It seems obvious if people are to have meaningful choices that they must have a minimal standard of living to enable them to make these meaningful choices. It follows any disagreement between Trout and myself is to a certain extent a matter of degree. It does however mean we should not limit any decisions open to us if by limiting these decisions we might damage the intrinsic value of our autonomy. It might even be open to experiment to see how many limitations on the decisions people can accept without damaging their perception of themselves as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destinies.