Ecological Refugees

 

Let us accept that global warming will lead to ecological damage and that in turn will lead to more refuges. In this posting I want to consider what sort of duties we have to ecological refugees that is those people who become refuges due to climate change. Initially my discussion will be a deontological one involving the right not to have one’s environment polluted by others and the duty to compensate for any such pollution we cause. My discussion will assume that we haven’t any duties to purely economic migrants or to refugees who have destroyed their own environment because we haven’t harmed them. Nonetheless some economic migrants, those whose poverty is caused by climate change can be regarded as ecological refugees.

I will now consider those people we have a duty to accept as refugee s. I suggested above that we don’t owe a duty to purely economic migrants. However some people might become poor due to global warming. For instance some farmers might be unable to reliably grow some traditional crops due to global warming caused by the western world making them poorer. We have harmed these people and as a result have a duties towards them but is one these duties the offer of refugee status? The answer to this question depends on how much damage we have causes and whether it can be rectified. For instance we might find that we can fulfil our duty in other ways than offering refugee status by genuine aid. Providing such aid shouldn’t be regarded as an easy option as it must reflect the views of the people we have harmed. Such aid isn’t charity. However we have a duty to offer refugee status to some people whose home has been destroyed, perhaps by a rise in sea level, or been made uninhabitable by desertification.

I now want to consider what is involved in offering refugee status. I have argued that we have a duty to offer refugee status to those whose homeland has been destroyed or made uninhabitable by global warming. However we also offer refugee status to some who suffer from persecution. Our duty to help those who are persecuted is less clear cut than that we owe to ecological refugees because we haven’t harmed them nonetheless we have a more general duty to aid humanity. Alternatively it is the virtuous thing to do, virtuous people or nations naturally help those who are persecuted. I will return to virtue with regard to ecological refugees later. Let us now consider the differences between what we should offer refugees fleeing from persecution and those damaged by global warming.

Let us accept that offering refugee status shouldn’t be simply an act of charity but should include a consideration of the refugee’s needs. Ecological refugees need a new home whilst those fleeing from persecution need sanctuary. These different needs can be satisfied in different ways. Those fleeing from persecution hope to return to their homelands and only need temporary refugee status and needn’t fully integrate with their hosts. They need support, this can be provided directly or by the right to work. They also might need education for their children but they don’t need the right to vote.

Let us accept that those fleeing from persecution or war need a temporary home and that those fleeing from ecological disaster need a permanent home. Let us also accept that if we partly created the disaster that we have a duty to aid them find a new home. Cara Nine agues that the Lockean proviso means a people who have their homeland destroyed, or made uninhabitable by climate change due to global warming have a theoretical right to a new homeland. She argues that other states have a duty to provide for this homeland by ceding part of their sovereign territory (1). I have previously argued that we don’t have a duty to cede territory for a homeland, see ecological refugees  but I accept we that we have a duty to assist ecological refugees find a new permanent home. In light of the above it would seem that we must accept that this home must be within our own society.

What is entailed if we accept that we have a duty to provide ecological refugees with a permanent home within our society? What must we offer and how will this change our existing society? Let us accept that in any just society that all competent adults should have equal rights. Afghanistan under the Taliban is an unjust society as women don’t have equal rights. Any society in which any group such as women are denied the rights of others is unjust. It follows if any host nation doesn’t offer ecological refuges the same rights as the rest of its population that it is an unjust nation. These rights include any rights others have to education and healthcare, an immediate right to work and the right to vote. Someone might object that these rights go too far and that they would radically change the host nation, health and education services might be overwhelmed and the right to vote might profoundly change the nature of the existing society. I have two responses to my objector. First I would suggest that the number of ecological refugees we need to offer a new permanent home to won’t be very large. Global warming will cause great ecological damage but it is doubtful if many places will be made completely uninhabitable by rises in sea level or desertification. If this is so and we make an effective effort to aid those we have harmed by global warming then the small number of ecological refugees won’t radically change the society of the host nation. However for the let us assume that the number will be large and that these numbers mean that society in the host nation will be radically changed. In order to alleviate these changes it might be argued that we should only offer limited rights to ecological refugees. I have two responses to the above. First if we only offer limited rights we will create an unjust society, any society which doesn’t offer full rights to all competent members is an unjust one. My objector might respond by arguing we only need provide sanctuary to ecological refugees and not full membership of our society. I would counter argue that we are not offering temporary nut permanent sanctuary and that permanent sanctuary must involve full members of our society. Indeed it might be argued that we shouldn’t offer ecological refugees refugee status but full membership of our society. Membership of society shouldn’t have to be earned but is owed for after all children don’t have to earn membership of the society they live in. My second responses is that the need to change our society to accommodate ecological refugees is not caused by the refugees but by the harm we have caused. The damage our lifestyle has caused creates the need to change our future lifestyle, our society. Lastly I would that if we adopt a deontological approach to our duties connected to climate change we must accept living in a more cosmopolitan society. 

In the light of the above my objector might suggest that we should adopt a caring approach to helping the victims of climate change rather than a rights based one. He might suggest that a caring approach is more natural and better suited to human beings than a deontological one. He might continue by suggesting that if we did so we don’t need to offer full rights to ecological refugees. With a deontological approach it is clear how much is required of us to compensate for the harm we caused. Unfortunately this isn’t true of a care based approach. How is the amount of caring required related to the degree of harm caused? If we offer ecological refugees only limited rights are we really caring? This difficultly might lead my objector to suggest adopting a virtue based approach. Once again he might point out that this is a more natural approach for human beings. It is by no means easy to apply virtue ethics to nations and societies but I will put this difficulty to one side. However even if we adopt a virtue ethics based approach towards  our duty to ecological refugees it is uncertain if doing so would satisfy my objector’s desire to lessen the rights of ecological refugees. Indeed it might increase the burden. I argued above that we don’t have a duty to aid those who have harmed themselves using a deontological approach but if we adopt a virtue ethics based approach then a virtuous person or nation might feel that they have a duty to act beneficently towards such people. Secondly justice is a prime virtue and a virtuous person must act justly. I argued above that if a society doesn’t offer all competent adults equal rights it is an unjust one. It follows that virtuous people and societies must offer ecological refugees living among them equal rights and that this includes the right to vote.

1. Cara Nine, 2010, Ecological Refugees, States Borders and the Lockean Proviso, Journal of Applied Philosophy; 27(4)

Angela's Wedding, Human Enhancement

 

It is the first of May in 2122 and Angela and Ian are getting married on another warm sunny day in Ullapool. A century ago Ullapool was a cold place and marriage seemed to be in terminal decline in the Western world with fewer and fewer bothered to get married. Times have changed. A century ago most couples who married in the West married did so for love, couples fell in love and as a consewuencet got married. Love still matters but now it is of secondary importance now and usually only blossoms after marriage rather than before as it did a century ago. Marriage has fallen in line with  Asian customs. Nowadays marriage is a practical matter and needs a marriage arranger. This change in the way people marry came about shortly after pharmacological and genetic enhancement were banned because of the damage they might do to society. However many parents still wanted to give their children a goof start in life. In order to do so many parents like Angela and Ian have replaced natural selection with conscious rational selection,

Angela decided to marry not because she needed to be loved but because she wanted to have children. A century ago she might have satisfied her desire for parenthood by simply finding a suitable man or sperm donor and raising the child together or by herself. Angela is a clever woman who had clever parents and wants to have clever children as she believes that this will give them a good start in life. In order to help her achieve this desire she employed a marriage arranger called Alex who suggested suitable partners. Ian also employed Alex and he also wanted clever children. Alex takes her profession seriously. First Angela had to submit an advanced CV called a PCV. Next she interviewed Angela to get a clear idea of Angela’s preferences for any future children. Together they gave weights to these preferences and then Alex used AI to suggest suitable matches. She did the same thing with all her clients including Ian. Alex had sent details of Ian and Angela to each other and suggested that they meet. Shortly after Christmas they did so. After a few more meetings Angela and Ian decided to marry and have children. In March they settled the practical details of living together and signed a pre-nuptial agreement. Perhaps such a scenario is unlikely to come about but it isn’t implausible but it might even be argued that the class system is a primitive form of enhancement. I now want to examine its philosophical implications of the above.

For the sake of arguments let us assume that this scenario creates three main breeding groups. Angela’s group values intelligence, a second values physical and sporting prowess and lastly the traditional group who don’t prioritise any particular attributes, who still marry for love and don’t use marriage arranger. These groups aren’t races but might be classes as breeding groups of humans who mostly breed among themselves. Of course these breeding groups can interbreed but in most cases they don’t. However in a limited number of cases marriage arrangers such as Alex might recommend couples choose a partner from outside their own group in order to introduce hybrid vigour. The society which has been created seems to be a naturally created analogue of the one envisioned by Plato in his Republic. Few people would welcome such a society and this was the main reason why pharmacological and genetic enhancement were banned. At this point it might be objected that such a change in society is highly unlikely and that I have exaggerated the effectiveness of selected breeding. In response I would suggest that the Russian silver fox domestication experiment lead by Dimitry Belyayev showed that selective breeding can bring about large changes in a relatively short time, see  fox experiment . What are the consequences of accepting the above as a plausible, even if unlikely, future scenario?

First because such a scenario seems unpalatable to us because it seems to regard people as breeding animals we might take steps to prevent it occurring. Of course we are breeding animals and conscious rational selection would not make us into purely breeding animals. The breeders and those breeding are the same. Nonetheless such a scenario still seems an unpalatable one and steps might still be taken to prevent it from occurring. Unfortunately these steps would have to include measures limiting people’s ability to have children with whomsoever they please. Steps would have to be taken to control what happens in the privacy of people’s bedrooms. Such measures might be possible in a totalitarian society, China had a one child policy, but such measures would be impossible in a free society. It follows if we value our right to reproduce by natural means with anyone we choose to do so, with exception of incestuous relationships, that we must accept the possibility of the unpalatable scenario even if this is only because it is the less unpalatable option.

If we accept that enhancement could take place naturally by conscious rational selection then even if we ban pharmacological and genetic methods then perhaps we should question whether we should introduce such a ban in the first place. Such a ban would fail to fully address the problems it was meant to solve. It might be argued such a ban would delay the process giving us more time to consider how we might better mitigate some of its worst consequences for society. Perhaps but banning artificial enhancement doesn’t prevent enhancement by other means and I would suggest our energies would be better employed in regulating artificial enhancement so it takes place in a safe way. Perhaps for instance we should always take steps to enhance empathy in conjunction with any other enhancement. Perhaps also some of the harms of enhancement, which ever way they are caused, might be outweighed by some of the benefits. For instance those who are enhanced might have better health and be more able to control their destiny better.

If the unpalatable scenario came into existence one bad consequence would be that equality of opportunity might seem to be impossible. Perhaps if we accept that equality of opportunity doesn’t occur now and won’t occur in the future then we should be less concerned and concentrate on other goods. For instance we might concentrate on protecting personal autonomy and toleration. Some might argue that if we make artificial enhancement available to all that my worry about enhancement damaging equal opportunity is unfounded. Enhancement might actually increase equal opportunity.

Lastly I want to consider a much more fanciful consequence of enhancement which like climate change pose an existential threat to humanity. In the ‘Time Machine’ H G Wells envisions humanity evolving into two distinct species the Eloi and the Morlocks by natural selection. It is important to note that these are species who can’t interbreed rather than races. Might in the far distant future enhancement by artificial means or conscious rational selection lead to human speciation? Two enhanced species competing for control might pose an existential threat to humanity.

I have argued that in a free society that human enhancement is inevitable. If we accept this then instead of thinking about banning enhancement we should consider how we might mitigate some of its worst effects.

Cholbi and Grief

 

In his book on grief (1) Michael Cholbi argues that in the long term it is good to grieve. He concludes that grief serves a useful purpose. This is an excellent book and I recommend it to anyone interested in the topic. In this posting I will outline Cholbi’s arguments before moving on to offer an alternative as to why it is good to be able to grieve.

Cholbi argues that grief is paradoxical. He points out that grieving is painful and even harms us for no apparent benefit yet we would recommend others0 to grieve. Surgery hurts us but in the long term benefits us but the same doesn’t appear to be true of grief. Cholbi uses two examples to make his point. First he considers C S Lewis who terribly tormented by the death of his wife Joy. He then considers a fictional example. He considers Meursault in the book ‘The Stranger’ by Camus who remains completely emotionally indifferent to the death of his mother. Cholbi argues that the paradox of grief arises because we want to recommend Lewis’ torment rather than Meursault’s indifference whilst apparently having no reasons to do so. A Stoic might argue that we don’t have any reasons and commend Meursault’s indifference.

I will now outline Chobi’s reason for recommending Lewis’ torment before moving on to offer an alternative explanation. He points out that grief is a collection of negative emotions on the death of another. However this other can’t be anyone it must be someone who is close to us. Following Korsgaard he argues that those who are close to us help form our practical identity. It follows that the death of someone close to us damages our practical identity. Moods might be purposeless but emotions aren’t. Let us accept that purpose of emotions is to hold our attention on something important, see for instance Michael Brady. (2) Cholbi argues that the purpose of grief is to hold our attention on reshaping our relationship with the deceased and that this also involves reshaping our practical identity. He suggests that the grieving person needn’t be consciously aware of the purpose of his grief.

I agree with Cholbi that our practical identity is connected to grief. What we love is connected to our practical identity and I will now argue that grief is an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love. Before proceeding I must make it clear what I mean by love. To love doesn’t simply mean romantic love but to care about something as defined by Harry Frankfurt. According to Frankfurt love isn’t simply an emotion but a matter of the will. There seem to be three important features of ‘caring about’ or love so defined. First love makes the lover vulnerable to the fortune and fate of the loved one. If I appear to love someone or something and it is harmed and I remain indifferent, as Meursault did, then my love isn’t real. Secondly love must have persistence. IF I appear to love someone or something and five minutes later become indifferent to its fate thenonce again my love isn’t real. Of course love may fade over time, it needn’t be permanent, but it must have some persistence. Lastly love must motivate action. If I appear to love something but fail to act to prevent harm to the loved one when it is in my power to do so then once again my love isn’t real.

I now want to argue that our personal or practical identity can be defined by what we love. Someone whose actions are only guided by his emotions might be classed as a wanton because his life has no direction due to emotions having no persistence. Such a person doesn’t have a practical identity. If someone’s has a practical identity, rather than being a wanton, then his life must have some consistency and if this consistency cannot be achieved by his emotions then this might be done by his values or ideals. Our ideals and values have persistence, compel us to act and when our ideals are damaged we are damaged. It follows our values are determined by what we love or ‘care about’ and if our practical is defined by our ideals and values then our practical identity is defined by what we love.

If we accept this concept of practical identity then the paradox of grief disappears. Let us recall that the paradox of grief contends that grief is painful and even harms us for no apparent benefit yet we would recommend it to others in the right circumstances. Cholbi resolves the paradox by arguing that grief does have a purpose and it benefits us. However if we accept Frankfurt’s ideas on practical identity then if we love someone who dies we are harmed and this harm persists because of love’s persistence. If someone we love dies then grief is inevitable and it makes no sense to recommend the inevitable. The late Queen Elizabeth was right when she said grief is the price we pay for love. The paradox of grief is an illusion.

There are differences in our attitude to grief depending on whether we see grief as having a purpose or being an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love. Cholbi uses a thought experiment to illustrate the paradox. He imagines a situation in which a pill, which is completely safe to use becomes available, which takes away our grief. He argues that we shouldn’t take the pill as grief serves a useful purpose. However if grief is an unwanted side effect of our capacity to love we should. Caution is needed here. If such a pill only took away our grief then we should take it but if it also damaged our capacity to love we shouldn’t. Damaging our capacity to love would harm us. It is good to be the sort of person with a disposition to love even if this means we will sometimes grief and that this grieving will harm us. It seems possible to me that seeking to limit their capacity to grieve stoics limit their disposition to love, see Why I'm not a Stoic

I now want to briefly consider some of the consequences of accepting that grief is simply an unwanted consequence of our disposition to love. It seems if we accept this account then because we can love a great variety of things that we must also be able to grieve for a great variety of things and that some of these things aren’t persons or even living. Someone might love other people, dogs, a way of life and even a landscape or particular building. Does it make sense to say we can grieve for the last  things? Old people who live alone can become very attached to dogs and it is sensible to say that they grieve on their loss. It also seems to say someone can grief for a lost way of life, perhaps a new city dweller night grieve for his former existence. Lastly in some circumstances it makes sense to say someone can grieve for a building, perhaps the Dean of some ancient cathedral might grieve for it if it was burnt down. If we accept that we can grieve for a wide variety of things then this suggests grief is connected to love.

In the light of the above we might ask whether only humans can grieve. Can some animals grieve? Some might suggest a dog can grieve for their deceased owner and elephants appear to grieve for a dead herd member. Whether animals can experience a primitive form of grief or just exhibit grief like behaviour is an interesting question but the answer to it gives us some pointers to the nature of grief. Let us assume that no animal has a practical self. It follows if animals can grieve that the purpose of grief cannot solely be to reshape our practical identity.

I have argued that grief is an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love. I now want to row back a bit. Let us accept that grief is an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love and that it is unavoidable. Let us also agree with Cholbi that grief is connected to our practical identity. However I will still maintain that we cannot recommend grief to others. Let us further accept that most human beings ‘care about’ or love many things and that when we act we must be able to prioritise or rank these things, if we couldn’t our lives would be lives of inaction or chaos. Lastly let us also accept the things we love, ‘care about’, together with how we prioritise these things shapes our practical identity.  If we lose one of the things we love we should try to reshape our practical identity to reflect the change in reality. The bundle of emotions we experience during grief unconsciously draws out attention to the need to reshape our relationship with the deceases and our identity. These emotions are unavoidable and a failure to grieve involves a failure to love in the first place. Let us return to Camus’ Meursault. Meursault failed to grieve for his mother because he didn’t love her. Moreover it would be pointless suggesting to Meursault that he should grieve for his mother as this would require him coming to love her. People can’t simply come to love someone or something because they want to especially in retrospect. Coming to love is a natural process and cannot be willed. It follows that we have no reason to recommend grief to others and that the paradox of grief is an illusion. Nonetheless even if we have no reason to recommend grief to others we do have a reason to recommend that they lead a life which makes grief inevitable in the appropriate circumstances.

Even if the above is interesting does it have any practical consequences? First I would that grief counsellor’s should help the bereaved slowly overcome their grief by helping them reshape their identity. They should focus on how the changed relationship between the deceased and the bereaved requires that the latter needs to reshape her relationship with the deceased and by doing so her practical identity. Secondly it suggests that a stoic by seeking to eliminate her grief deprives herself of a useful tool which helps her maintain her focus on the need to reshape her practical identity. A reason to be wary of fully blown stoicism, see why I'm not a stoic . Lastly and somewhat controversially becausr people with autism have problems with empathy do they also have problems with grief?

 

 

1.Michael Cholbi, 2022, Grief: A Philosophical Guide, Harvad University Press.

2.  Michael Brady, 2016,Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.