Different Degrees or Different Types of Rape?

Rape is an offence which can vary greatly in the degree of its seriousness. Unlawful killing is split into two different offences, manslaughter and murder. In this posting I want to examine whether it might also be beneficial to split rape into two different offences or continue to accept a single definition. If we continue with the later course then because the seriousness of the rape can vary greatly this variability might lead to some less serious cases not being prosecuted. Perhaps if we allow for different types of rape these less serious cases might become more likely to be prosecuted. Perhaps also if we define different types of rape it might be clearer to some potential rapists that cases which might be considered as borderline cases under a single definition are indeed forms of rape.

I want to start my examination by considering four examples which are all very different. These differences suggest that our concept of rape is really an umbrella one. These examples highlight the differences involved. The first case was used by Mike LaBossierre.

“They’d now decided — mutually, she thought — just to be friends. When he ended up falling asleep on her bed, she changed into pyjamas and climbed in next to him. Soon, he was putting his arm around her and taking off her clothes. ‘I basically said, “No, I don’t want to have sex with you.” And then he said, “OK, that’s fine” and stopped. . . . And then he started again a few minutes later, taking off my panties, taking off his boxers. I just kind of laid there and didn’t do anything — I had already said no. I was just tired and wanted to go to bed. I let him finish. I pulled my panties back on and went to sleep.” talking philosophy

My second example is that of 78 year old man who had sex with his wife who was suffering from Alzheimer, see Hastings Center  . She didn’t resist his advances but was incapable of giving any form of consent. My third example is of someone who is violently raped by a stranger. My last example is that of a paedophile having sex with an underage child.

Do these examples suggest any ways in which how different types of rape might be defined? Firstly it might be suggested that different types of rape might be differentiated by the amount of violence is involved. If we accept the above suggestion then my first two examples would be considered as a less serious type of rape and my third example a more serious type. Unfortunately my fourth example shows any such a suggestion to be unsound. Consider a paedophile having sex with a child who is neither forced nor unwilling. If we accept that rape can be differentiated by whether violence is involved then this case might be classed as a less serious type of rape. However this seems to be a clear example of extremely serious rape. It follows that different types of rape cannot be differentiated by the use of violence.

Next it might be suggested that different types of rape might be differentiated not simply by the violence involved but by the actual harm inflicted. Let us accept that not all the harm involved in rape need be physical harm. Accepting the above would mean that my example of the paedophile need not be considered as a less serious type of rape. Let us now consider this suggestion using my other examples. In my third example the victim would suffer physical harm and great psychological trauma. However the victims in my first two examples wouldn’t suffer the same degree of harm. The student in my first example suffered no physical harm and only believed she was raped in retrospect and so any psychological trauma would seem to be slight whilst in my second example we are even unable to say if any trauma took place at all. In spite of the above I would be reluctant to accept that different types of rape might be differentiated by the harm involved for two reasons. Firstly theft is not split into different types based on how much the thief steals, theft is theft, and I can see no obvious reason why rape should be different in this respect. Secondly the old man having sex with his demented wife might not be considered as a less serious form of rape but not an example of rape at all.

Lastly might different types of rape might be defined by differences in the refusal of consent. In what follows I will assume that a refusal of consent can not only be verbal but take the form of active resistance to sexual intercourse. According to the Oxford English Dictionary rape is,

“Typically committed by a man, of forcing another person to have sexual intercourse with the offender against their will.”

Let us consider my first and third examples. Let us assume in my third example that the victim fought back and maintained her refusal of consent provided she wasn’t prevented from doing so. In my first example the victim refused to consent but it might be questioned whether her actions maintained that refusal. She wasn’t prevented from maintaining her refusal to consent but didn’t do so. It might be suggested that type one rape should be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent and that whilst undergoing sexual intercourse maintained her refusal or is prevented from doing so. Type two rape might be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent but whilst undergoing sexual intercourse but fails to maintain her refusal whilst remaining capable of doing so. This division of rape into two different types might appear attractive because by allowing these two different types might mean some cases of rape might be prosecuted as type two rapes which wouldn’t have been prosecuted if we retain a unified concept of rape. However these are incomplete definitions because they fail to deal with cases in which the possibility of consent doesn’t exist such as in my second and fourth examples. It might be suggested that this difficultly might be avoided if we define type one rape as one in which the victim is unable to give valid consent or if she is able give consent refuses to so and whilst undergoing sexual intercourse maintains her refusal or is prevented from doing so. Initially his suggestion seems to be an attractive for one for in most cases in which sexual intercourse taking place without the possibility of consent are serious cases. Sex with children or adults unable to give consent due learning difficulties are serious offences. Unfortunately my second example gives us a reason to question adopting this approach provided we accept that the old man having sex with his demented wife was a form of rape. Intuitively it seems wrong to class his rape as the same type of a rape as that of a violent rapist for whilst we might still blame the old man for his actions we can also pity him. We would have no such pity for the violent rapist. Perhaps then we should include cases in which consent is impossible with type two rapes. Type two rape might now be defined as rape defined cases in which the victim is unable give valid consent or if she is able do so refuses to consent and her refusal of consent is not maintained whilst undergoing sexual intercourse when it is possible for her to do so. Unfortunately my fourth example shows the difficulties with adopting this approach. It would seem to be wrong to put a paedophile having activity with a child in the same class of rape as that of someone having activity with a victim who only comes to realise that she has been raped in retrospect. At this point it might be objected that my first example isn’t a less serious type of rape, it isn’t a type of rape at all. Underlying my definition of both types rape is the idea that consent can sometimes be implicit rather than explicit. It might be argued that the student in my first example by not maintaining her refusal of consent was in practice giving implicit consent. Perhaps if the student in question hadn’t initially refused consent then her actions might be construed as giving implicit consent. I would suggest that explicit and implicit consent cannot be mixed up and that an explicit refusal of consent can only be changed by the explicit giving of consent. Explicit consent is stronger than implicit consent. It follows the student was indeed raped. Her failure to maintain her refusal of consent doesn’t show she wasn’t raped but I would suggest it does show her rape was a less serious type of rape than some others. It also illustrates why the idea of type two rape could be a useful concept.

In the light of the above it seems my initial intention to split rape into two types fails. It fails because of difficulties in accommodating cases in which no consent is involved within either of these two types. When I started writing this posting my intention was to show that rape should be split into two types, the above shows that in philosophy one must always be prepared to change one’s mind. Can anything be salvaged from the above discussion? Perhaps if we want to prosecute an increased number of rape cases then rapes might be split into three types. Category one rape might be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent and whilst undergoing sexual intercourse maintains her refusal of consent or is prevented from maintaining her refusal. Category two rape might be defined as one in which the victim refuses consent but whilst undergoing sexual intercourse fails to maintain her refusal of consent whilst remaining able to do so. Category three rape might defined as any form of sexual intercourse in which the victim is unable to consent. What might be the consequences of adopting these three different types? One consequence might be a greater number of prosecutions for rape. Cases such as the student in my first example might be prosecuted whilst he might not have been prosecuted using the current definition. Splitting rape into three types would have an effect on sentencing. The sentencing of rapists guilty of category one rapes would remain unchanged. The sentencing of rapists guilty of category two rapes might be best dealt with by restorative justice. It might be objected that restorative justice doesn’t deal with the serious of the crime. In response I would point out restorative justice is not easy for the offender. The offender doesn’t simply have something done to him but has to seriously address behaviour, doing so means confronting the sort of person he is and learning to make changes. One of the aims of restorative justice is not just to make the offender feel he has done wrong but also feel the wrongness itself. I would also point out that whilst category two rape isn’t a trivial offence it is a much serious offence than category one and should be considered as such. I have suggested that the severity of sentencing for category one and two rapes should have a fairly tight domain the same isn’t true of category three. A paedophile might attract expect a severe sentence whilst the old man having sex with his demented wife is to be pitied and simply needs to learn his actions were wrong.

What conclusion can be drawn from the above? Clearly splitting rape into three different types is a messy business. However life is sometimes a messy business and this messiness might be a price worth paying if it leads to the prosecution of some cases which might not otherwise be prosecuted and a clearer understanding of what it means to rape someone. Should we do so? I’m not sure

The Logic of Relieving Suffering and Voluntary Euthanasia

Recently a seventeen year old Dutch girl, who had been repeatedly raped as a child and who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, anorexia and depression, starved herself to death. This was widely reported as an example of euthanasia, see BioEdge . Simply starving oneself to death isn’t euthanasia. It was unclear in this case whether her doctors helped to control her suffering. In this posting I want to explore whether doctors who relieve the suffering of a patient who starves himself to death should be regarded as assisting in suicide. In order to make my argument I will first explore what can be considered as the legitimate use of medical skills. Let us start with the premise that the decreasing of someone’s suffering is a legitimate use of medical skills. However accepting this premise is too simplistic. Surgery might actually increase someone’s suffering in the short term and surgery is clearly a legitimate use of medical skills. Let us revise the premise so that decreasing someone’s overall suffering is always a legitimate use of medical skills when this is possible.

Let us now agree that decreasing someone’s suffering is usually a legitimate use of medical skills but is it always so? I now want to examine two arguments suggesting it isn’t. Firstly it might be argued that some people deserve to suffer and that it would be wrong to alleviate their suffering due to dessert. Consider a convicted rapist who became infected with HIV when committing his crime. Let us assume that he is now serving his sentence in relative isolation due to the hideous nature of this crime and as a result is unable to infect others. Would treating him for his HIV would be an illegitimate use of medical skills? What reason could be advanced for illegitimacy of treatment in this case? It might possibly be argued that in this case the rapist deserves to be HIV positive and that as a result treating him for this state should be an illegitimate use of medical skills. This extreme example might concur with many people’s intuitions but seems to run counter to the caring ethos of medicine. I would argue linking the legitimacy of the use of medical skills to dessert is problematic in all circumstances. Accepting that it is illegitimate to treat some people whilst it is legitimate to treat others because of dessert appears to imply that it is legitimate to use medical skills to achieve dessert. The domain in which the employment of legitimate medical skills is extended from simply treating suffering to treating suffering and ensuring just dessert. We might link suffering and dessert together but nonetheless they remain independent conditions. Someone can suffer without deserving to do so and someone may deserve to suffer without actually doing so. If we accept that the legitimate use of medical skills is linked to dessert in addition to suffering then provided a death sentence could be considered as just it would be a legitimate use of medical skills to carry out this sentence. An interesting account of the death penalty and the proper ends of medicine is to be found can Silver (1).

Secondly it might be argued that medical professionals have no duty to alleviate suffering when this is caused by self-harm and the sufferer is fully aware his behaviour is the cause of his suffering. In practice accepting this argument might mean that there is less of a duty to treat conditions when these conditions are caused by alcoholism, obesity and anorexia. Clearly alcoholics, the obese and anorexics suffer even if this suffering is caused by their own behaviour. What reason could be advanced as to why treating them would be regarded as an illegitimate use of medicals skills? One reason might be that because their suffering is self-imposed they can simply stop the suffering by changing their behaviour and there is no need to employ medical skills. I’m doubtful whether the eating habits of anorexics or the obese can simply change their behaviour and alcoholism is an addiction.  However let us assume that someone’s suffering is self-imposed and that can change his behaviour and he will cease to suffer. In this context is the use of medical skills to alleviate his is an illegitimate use? It might be suggested he deserves to suffer because his suffering is self-imposed. However if we accept this suggestion it would re-introduce all the problems of dessert outlined above. Both of the above arguments as to why medical professionals don’t always have a duty to alleviate suffering when this is possible appear to be unsound. It follows that we should accept the premise that the decreasing someone’s overall suffering is always a legitimate use of medical skills when this is possible. It is of course possible that there are other legitimate uses of medical skills, see Cosmetic Surgery, Enhancement and the Aims of Medicine . 

I now want to consider the relationship between the relief of suffering and voluntary euthanasia. In particular I want to focus on the relief of suffering of those people who voluntary stop eating and drinking (VSED). Most people who adopt VSED do so because they have a terminal illness but this isn’t true in all cases as the Dutch girl shows. Let us assume that the relief of someone’s suffering caused by VSED is assisting in voluntary euthanasia. I have argued above that decreasing someone’s overall suffering is always a legitimate use of medical skills. It follows relief of someone’s suffering caused by VSED is a legitimate use of medical skills. It further follows that assisting in voluntary euthanasia is a legitimate use of medical skills. Some might be unhappy to accept these conclusions but being unhappy about these conclusions has nothing to do with the logic of the argument or the validity of the conclusions. 

Lastly let us assume that the relief of someone’s suffering caused by VSED isn’t assisting in voluntary euthanasia. If this is the case then there would seem to be no reason to be unhappy about the deployment of medical skills to alleviate someone’s suffering caused by VSED. However I find hard to see how alleviating someone’s suffering, when this suffering is caused by a desire to die, shouldn't be regarded as a case of physician assisted suicide without using the principle of double effect.

1. Silver D, (2003) Lethal Injection, Autonomy and the proper ends of Medicine, Bioethics 17(2), pp. 205-211.

Redesigning People

In China a scientist has created two gene edited babies using CRISPR-cas9 in order to prevent HIV infection. These babies are usually referred to as designer babies. In this posting I will use the term redesign rather than design because people have already been designed by their genes and this design is shaped by nature and evolution. I will consider whether we should attempt to improve on that design by redesigning people and in what circumstances it would be permissible to do so. If we redesign a kettle we hope the redesigned kettle will be an improvement on the previous one. Intuitively it might be thought if we redesign a person the result will automatically be an improved person. However we must be wary of our intuitions and whilst it might be pointless to redesign a kettle which isn’t an improved kettle the same does not hold for persons. A kettle is designed for a single task persons aren’t. Someone might redesign a person to serve a specific purpose and such a redesigned person needn’t necessarily be an improved person when considered more broadly. Perhaps a person might be redesigned to be a better soldier such a redesigned person need only be a better soldier not a better person. Prior to considering specific wrongs which might arise if we redesign persons I want to consider the different ways in which redesigning might be wrong.

Redesigning persons might be wrong in three circumstances. Firstly we aren’t competent to redesign persons. Persons unlike kettles are highly complex and perhaps we just don’t have the expertise to carry out such redesign. If we accept the above then it would be unacceptable to redesign persons unfortunately in these circumstances we should be open to the rather unpalatable option that others such as aliens or even some advanced AI might be able to redesign us even if we can't do so. Secondly it might be suggested that whilst we don’t have the expertise to redesign persons now that we might acquire such expertise in the future. If we accept this option then whilst it would be unacceptable to redesign persons now it might become acceptable in the future and it would be sensible to debate the consequences of doing so now. Lastly it might be suggested that the act of redesign must always damage the redesigned person. Danaher explores two objections raised by Jurgen Habermas to redesigning persons in which the act of redesign damages the designee. Habermas argues redesigning a person would of necessity damage her because it would compromise her autonomy and status of equality. I will now consider the specific ways in which redesigning persons might be damaging. Firstly I will briefly consider how redesigning persons might cause damage to both persons and society by creating inequality. Secondly I will consider how redesigning a person might damage that person by compromising her autonomy.

Let us accept that Kant was right to insist that treating someone simply as a means and not an end in herself is morally wrong. It follows that if we accept that creating someone to serve our ends is equivalent to using someone to serve our ends then redesigning a person to serve the ends of another is wrong. It also follows that if someone redesigns another to serve her ends that there is a lack of equality between the designer and the designee. The choice of available ends to the designer and the designee are unequal. However why should we want to redesign a person to serve our needs? It seems probable that if our technology becomes advanced enough to redesign persons that it would also become advanced enough to design robots which aren’t, as yet, persons to serve the same needs. In this situation if we want an improved soldier, a robotic soldier would seem to be a better option than a redesigned person. Personhood would be an unnecessary extravagance and might even make the soldier less effective. The same seems true of most servants with one possible exception. Currently there is some interest in sex robots (1). However is sex with a robot genuine intercourse? I have argued that sex isn’t simply friction and as a result sex with a robot is really only an enhanced form of masturbation sex with robots . It is possible that in this situation someone might want to redesign a person to serve her sexual desires. It follows that it is conceivable that in some limited circumstances someone might want to redesign a person to serve her own ends. Such redesigning creates a person designed for the ends of another making her less equal. It follows redesigning someone to serve the ends of another is morally wrong because it creates inequalities between persons. Now let us consider whether redesigning someone in order to benefit that person might also create inequalities in society. Any society which contains both enhanced and unenhanced persons is likely to be an unequal one. It follows that we might have reason not redesign persons based on the potential damage it might do to society. How strong these reasons are will depend on the cost and availability of redesign. It is possible that redesigning persons won’t damage society. I now want to consider other reasons why redesigning persons might be wrong.

In what follows it will be accepted that to design a person in order to serve the needs of another is wrong. It will also be accepted that redesigning persons might be wrong if it creates unacceptable inequalities in society. It will also be assumed that if we redesign someone that we do so in order to benefit her. If we redesign someone in order to benefit her then this redesign is a form of enhancement. I now want examine whether redesigning someone in order to enhance her might damage her personally? Let us start our examination by considering a specific example. Some potential mothers suffer from mitochondrial disease and these mothers will normally have babies who will suffer from the same disease. Using IVF an egg taken from such a mother might be fertilised. The nucleus of this egg is then transferred to an egg with its nucleus removed which has been donated by another woman from which the nucleus has been removed creating a three parent baby. This is a clear case of redesign and it is hard to see in this case how being designed damages the designee. It also seems to answer one of the questions raised above as to whether we can effectively redesign someone, the answer is that we can at least in some cases. If we accept the above then redesigning persons is both possible and doesn’t always damage the persons involved. However are there some circumstances in which designing a person damages the designed person?

Let us recall we have excluded cases in which we redesign someone in order to serve the purposes of another and are only considering redesign in circumstances in which the redesign is intended to benefit the redesigned person. Such a redesign is a form of enhancement. Let us first consider the possibility that we can enhance only one capability and leave the rest of the designed persons capabilities unchanged. Perhaps someone might be redesigned to be stronger or have a better memory. Human beings are animals and it is hard to see from the viewpoint of an animal how such enhancement might damage the animal involved. Being stronger or remembering the hiding places of predators should give any animal an evolutionary advantage. Let us accept that enhancing a single instrumental capability whilst leaving the rest of some designed person’s capabilities unchanged doesn’t damage her physically. Much the same reasoning can be applied to enhancing several capabilities provided the remaining capabilities are unchanged. However human beings aren’t simply animals they are potential persons. Does the fact that some capacity or capacities have been chosen by another for enhancement damage her as a person? I now want to consider whether the redesigning of a person in order to enhance her damages her autonomy.

Let us return to my example in which we redesign someone to be stronger. How can being stronger damage someone’s autonomy even if this choice was made for her by another? It might be suggested that by making someone stronger we are enhancing her capacity for athletic prowess. It might then be further suggested that by enhancing her athletic prowess she becomes more likely to choose an athletic career and as a result we have limited her choices and compromised her autonomy. The same argument could be applied to redesigning someone in order to enhance other skills such as an improved memory. It might be suggested that such redesign is analogous to parents who encourage a child’s athletic prowess and that they too damage her ability to choose and as a result compromise her autonomy. In practice we accept parents who encourage their children’s athletic prowess.  After all what can be wrong with encouraging prowess in something which is beneficial? It might then be further argued that if we are prepared to accept encouraging parents who encourage athletic prowess that we should be prepared to accept parents who seek to increase this prowess by redesign. It seems to me that this argument is unsound because the analogy is not a close one as children can reject parental encouragement but they can’t reject redesign.

I have suggested that parents who encourage their children to excel in some activity don’t damage their children’s autonomy because their children can reject their parent’s choices whilst parents who redesign their children to excel in some activity might do so because their children can’t reject the enhancement. I would be unhappy to accept this suggestion for two reasons. Firstly I accept that whilst most parents who encourage their children to excel don’t damage their children’s autonomy some might. Parenting is about guidance and some parents try to direct rather than guide their children, such parents do some harm to their children’s autonomy, see parenting and excessive guidance . Secondly my objector is suggesting that the enhancement of certain capacities of someone makes it more likely that she will choose some option and that this increased probability damages her autonomy. I accept that enhancing someone’s capacity might make her more inclined to make certain choices but I want to argue this doesn’t damage her autonomy in all circumstances. Let us return to my example of parents who enhance their child so that she has greater strength. These parents have no specific life plan for their child in mind and only want their child to be stronger. Let us assume that the child decides to become a gymnast. Let us accept that her increased strength makes it both easier and more probable that she will choose this option. Does the fact that some option has been made both easier to choose and more probable to be chosen by someone due to her enhancement by others mean that her autonomy has been damaged? I would suggest that in these circumstances it doesn’t. In these circumstances our potential gymnast hasn’t been coerced and it is difficult to see how her greater strength could possibly alter her capabilities to make an autonomous choice. Making it easier for someone to choose some option isn’t the same as making her choose that option. It follows redesigning a child so she has greater strength doesn’t damage her autonomy. I would now suggest that the same argument could be applied to all her instrumental capacities including cognitive abilities such as an improved memory or quicker reasoning. The fact that someone else has chosen which capacities to enhance seems irrelevant in these circumstances as far as enhanced person’s autonomy is concerned. Accepting the above leads a the conclusion that redesigning someone so that she has certain enhanced instrumental cognitive or physical capacities which were chosen by others and these capacities make it more likely that she will choose a particular option doesn’t damage her autonomy in circumstance in which this redesign doesn’t affect her remaining capacities and should be permissible. If this wasn’t so then any educational establishment which offered a bursary to a student, which might make it more likely she would pursue an academic career could be said to be damaging her autonomy.

I have argued that any enhancement in circumstances which only enhances some of someone’s instrumental capacities whilst leaving her remaining capacities unchanged doesn’t damage her autonomy and that such a redesign should be permissible. However it is possible to enhance someone’s non-instrumental capacities. I now want to consider whether enhancing these capacities might damage someone’s autonomy. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that there is a need for widespread moral enhancement in order to counter the existential dangers which our modern world poses (2). Perhaps in order to counter these dangers we should redesign persons so that they have an increased capacity for empathy.  Would such a redesign damage someone’s capacity for autonomy? It might be argued that if we increase someone’s capacity for empathy that this increased capacity would lead to an increased desire to help others which in turn might lead to a decrease in her ability to fully exercise her cognitive abilities. Her increased empathy overwhelms her ability to make autonomous decisions to some degree. If we accept the above then enhancing someone’s capacity for empathy might damage her capacity to make autonomous decisions. What is important in these circumstances is not simply that someone has chosen which capacity to enhance but that by choosing she has altered the relationship between the enhanced person’s capacities to choose or damaged one of them. If we accept the above then it might be concluded that if enhancing some of someone’s capacities alters her remaining capacities to choose or damages them then this enhancement damages her autonomy and this redesign should be impermissible.

Whether we should accept the above conclusion depends on the account of autonomy employed. There are many different accounts of autonomy and I will only consider two accounts here because most other accounts fall somewhere between these accounts for our purposes here even if the details differ. First an autonomous decision might be regarded as a good decision based on what the agent cares about together with some widely accepted norms. If we accept this account then if someone’s enhanced capacity for empathy compromises her ability to accept certain norms then her autonomy is damaged. If we accept this account of autonomy then we might limit any damage to someone’s autonomy by employing a dual enhancement that enhances both empathy and cognition which might lead to increased empathy across a wider domain, see widespread moral enhancement. Secondly an autonomous decision might be regarded as simply as one which accords with what an agent cares about. Clearly if we accept this account and redesign someone in order to increase her empathy we won’t damage her autonomy. I have argued elsewhere that we should adopt this second primitive account of autonomy because if we don’t autonomous decisions simply become good decisions and that we have no need for a separate account of autonomy. If we accept this second account of autonomy then we have no reason based on damaging someone’s autonomy not to enhance her capacity for empathy even if her enhanced empathy overwhelms some of her cognitive capabilities. However in these circumstances doing so would still damage her as a person. Persons have some capacity for reasoning and if we overwhelm this capacity we damage the person involved.

I have summarised the main conclusions which can be drawn from the above below.

·       It should be unacceptable to redesign a person to serve the needs of another.

·       Redesigning persons might create unwarranted inequalities in society. Whether these inequalities mean redesign should be impermissible will depend on the cost and availability of the redesign.

·       Redesigning persons in order to enhance one or more of their capacities whilst leaving the remaining capacities the same does not compromise their capacity for autonomy and should be permissible. Making some option easier to choose is not the same as damaging someone’s capacity to make autonomous decisions.

·       Redesigning persons in order to enhance one or more of their capacities when this enhancement means altering the relationship between her capacities involved in decision making might damage her as a person even if it doesn’t damage her capacity to make autonomous decisions and should be impermissible.

1. Danaher, Mcarthur, and Migotti, 2017 Robot Sex: Social and Ethical Implications, MIT Press
2. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.