Why I'm not a Stoic

I admire fortitude, detachment and many other stoic virtues but believe full blown stoicism is damaging. Let us accept that for someone living in an extremely deprived environment with limited options that these virtues can help him to survive. An account of how stoicism can help people survive in such circumstance is given by James Stockdale who was shot down in the Vietnam War and detained in Hanoi, see Stockdale . Someone who suffers from a life limiting disease might also find himself in an extremely deprived environment and once again with few options. In these deprived circumstances adopting a stoical perspective seems to be a sensible option.

Fortunately, most of us don’t live in such circumstances. The question I wish to address is this, in more normal circumstances should we lead a stoic life? Some stoics believe that the only thing that always makes us happy in life is leading a life of virtue.

“The only thing that always contributes to happiness, as it is necessary and sufficient for the condition, is virtue. Conversely the only thing that necessitates misery and is “bad” or “evil” is the corruption of reason, namely vice.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Perhaps virtue is the only thing that always makes us happy but I will argue there are some things which even if they don’t always make us happy are nonetheless essential for a happy life. Certain things such as fame and material goods might make us happy temporarily.  However, we can’t always attain these goods and once attained these goods might not always make us happy. Let us accept that the excessive pursuit of these goods can damage our happiness in three ways. Firstly, we might be disappointed if we fail to obtain these goods, secondly even if we do obtain them they might fail to meet our expectations once again leading to disappointment, lastly the pursuit of these goods might divert us from the one thing that always makes us happy namely virtue. Let us consider the harm done by disappointment first. A stoic would argue that in order to avoid such disappointment that whilst we might prefer such goods we should remain indifferent to them. I would suggest that with regard to disappointment stoicism is a philosophy of pessimism by rejecting hope. A stoic shouldn’t hope because hope would make him vulnerable to disappointment. Let us assume that the excessive pursuit of fame or material goods hinders us from pursuing the only thing that always makes us happy, virtue. A stoic would argue we should always pursue virtue and as a result we not pursue those things which damage this pursuit. Let us agree with our stoic that we should first of all pursue virtue. Let us also agree that the excessive pursuit of fame or material goods damages this pursuit. However, it is by no means clear that using balanced Aristotelian moderation in pursuit of these goods will damage our pursuit of virtue. Accepting the above means that in normal circumstances that we have no clear reasons to accept or reject Stoicism.

 

At this point someone might object I am misunderstanding the stoic idea of happiness. I am confusing stoic ideas with Epicurean ones. An Epicurean is concerned with hedonistic happiness whilst to a Stoic happiness is concerned to living our lives in accordance with essential nature as rational creatures. For the sake of argument let us accept my objector’s point. Let us also accept that stoics believe that if someone leads his life in accordance with his essential nature that he will flourish.

 

I now want to examine what is meant by flourishing. Flourishing is a slippery concept. For instance, could it really be said that a creature, which leaves behind plenty of descendants, flourishes? Using a Darwinian idea of flourishing it certainly does. Moreover, it might be argued evolution means leaving behind plenty of descendants is selected for and hence is part of the nature of all living things. However, a Darwinian idea of flourishing, at best, plays only a small part in most people’s idea of flourishing. A stoic idea of flourishing seems to depend on the essential nature of a creature which defines it. For instance it is part of the nature of bees to collect nectar to make honey and a bee flourishes if it makes lots of honey. It is part of bee eater’s nature to eat bees and it flourishes if it eats lots of bees. The stoics emphasise it is an essential part of human nature to act rationally. According to the stoics a human being who acts completely rationally should flourish. Let us now consider a rational person who is virtuous, ratiomal, rich and healthy but lacks any positive affection for any of these things. According to a stoic this person flourishes. However intuitively we would not say such a person was flourishing. Indeed, we might feel that there is something defective about him. He lacks something that is necessary for flourishing. Perhaps one of the things he lacks is happiness and we should leading a stoic life can lead to happiness. I won’t pursue this point any further here. However, I would suggest one of the things a stoic lacks is a caring attitude to things in general.

 

Let us accept that stoics belief it is our nature to be rational. I have suggested above that such a belief is too simplistic and that other things are an essentIAL part of our nature. I will now present two arguments in an attempt to show that caring about things is An essential part of our nature. First, let us accept that someone’s ideals are defined by what he cares about. Now according to Harry Frankfurt,

“a person without ideals, there are no volitional laws he has bound himself to respect and to which he unconditionally submits. He has no inviolable boundaries. Thus he is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity.” (1)

Someone without fixed shape or identity is still of course a human being but she isn’t really a person. Almost all human beings develop into persons. Being a person is part of our nature. It follows caring about something must also be part of our nature. Secondly let us assume that caring about things is not part of our nature. If this is so being rational becomes pointless. It is impossible to apply rationality unless we care about something; it is impossible for rationality to get any purchase if we don’t care about anything. All our rational decisions are equally good and we have no basis to choose between competing options. It follows if caring about something is not an essential part of our nature then it isn’t possible to act rationally without caring about some things. Rationality is one of these things but isn’t sufficient. In the rest of this posting I will assume that caring about something is an essential part of our nature.

 

Even if we accept that caring about things is an essential part of our nature this give us reason why we should reject stoic ideals. A stoic might point out that he cares about virtue and rationality. The question is not whether a stoic cares about things but whether he cares about enough things. I will argue that he doesn’t. In order to make my argument I must make it clear what I mean by ‘care about’. David Hume famously argued reason is the slave of the passions. However, I want to argue what we care about doesn’t simply means that we feel passionate or emotional about something. Indeed, I would agree with the stoic idea that reason can control our emotions, at least to some degree. Reason can sort out our conflicting emotions and add stability to our sense of ever changing emotions. However, let us accept that reason alone cannot cause us to act. Our actions are based on what we will which is based on what we care about. According to Frankfurt “the formation of a person’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others” (2). Also according to Frankfurt cares about’ something then he, “identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced”. (3) A similar but slightly different approach concerning identity is taken by Bennett Helm who argues we are identified by what we love (4). If we accept the above definition of ‘caring about’ it can be regarded as a form of loving. In the rest of this posting I will use the word love to mean ‘caring about’ as defined above. It is important to note the use of the word love in this way is using a broader definition of love than simple romantic or erotic love. Let us accept that loving is an essential part of our nature, let us now also accept that to love something or someone means to identify oneself with that thing or persin and that to identify with something makes one vulnerable.

 

I want to argue that if someone leads a stoic and limits his love to virtue and rationality that he stunts himself and denies himself of the opportunity to lead a good life. First however I must introduce the stoic idea of an indifferent. Sometimes being indifferent to something may be the only sensible attitude. I for instance am indifferent to my grandson’s Aspergers, see Aspergers, Autism and Love . Sometimes being indifferent can be admirable as when a patient bears his illness with great stoicism. However, I will argue someone cannot remain indifferent to some things without causing serious damage himself as a person. What then is an indifferent? If we accept the above then a stoic only really cares about virtue and being rational and he tries to be indifferent to everything else. Stoics of course don’t deny other things such as health and even wealth might help us to flourish.  However even though these other things usually contributed to someone’s flourishing they might not do so in all circumstances. Stoics split indifferents into two types. Things such as health and wealth, which usually contributed to flourishing, are called preferred indifferents. Dispreferred indifferents are things that usually damage our flourishing such as disease or poverty.

 

The idea of a preferred indifferent appears at first sight to be nonsensical. How can someone prefer something but be indifferent to it at the same time? The answer is of course he can’t. Nonetheless it is possible to prefer something in some circumstances and be indifferent to it others. For instance, someone may prefer cream cakes normally but not if he is on a diet. I will now argue that whilst the idea of preferred indifferents may make sense when applied to cream cakes that it makes no sense when applied to the things we care about or love.

 

Let us consider a mother fleeing across the Sahara desert from persecution together with her children. Let us assume on the way one of her children dies from lack of water. A stoic would argue that this mother should be indifferent to her child’s fate. He might point out that in these circumstances the mother cannot change the fate of her child so reason dictates she should indifferent towards its fate. Of course in different circumstances she would have preferred her child to live. However I would argue such a mother cannot suddenly become indifferent to her child’s fate because she loved him and still loves him because love doesn’t suddenly die. Moreover because she loves him she identifies herself with him and someone cannot change her identity suddenly. Lastly because she loves him she makes herself vulnerable to what benefits and harms him. She feels grief. According to a stoic grief is both harmful and pointless. I have argued that love is impossible without the possibility of grief and that if we seek to limit our ability to grieve we limit our ability to love, see grief . It follows if we love something we cannot suddenly become indifferent towards it even if its circumstances change and we cannot alter these circumstances.

 

If we accept the above then stoics have a problem with love because as I have argued loving is essential to being a person. A stoic might respond that stoics can love but that this love is restricted to virtue and reason.I accept that someone who only loves virtue and reason could be a person. But I would suggest she would be a deficient or incomplete sort of person. She would lack true friends because to have friends you must love your friends see Helm (4).She might of course have friends of utility, people she uses, or friends of pleasure, people who please her, but I would not class these as true friends. A stoic might respond that she can love other things but I would argue the same problem remains. For instance if a stoic loved a childhood home in which she was happy she cannot immediately become indifferent towards it if it is burnt down..

It seems to me in trying to make themselves less vulnerable to fate stoics damage that which makes us persons; the ability to love. Persons are by their very nature vulnerable and if we try to remove this vulnerability we damage our personhood. We become soulless people somewhat akin to virtuous robots. Accepting the above would explain why a stoic who loves only virtue is a deficient or incomplete sort of person. The stoic belief that the only thing which is necessary and sufficient for someone to flourish is for her to be virtuous is wrong, for someone to flourish she must be able to love. It would appear that sometimes stoic ideas damage persons.  A stoic might respond to the above by pointing out that our turbulent emotions are equally damaging to our personhood. She might then suggest that because stoicism dampens down our turbulent emotions without the need for drugs such as anti-depressants that far from damaging our personhood stoicism actually enhances it. I have two responses to my stoic First, I would suggest that most people should be cautious about dampening down their emotions and should instead use their rationality to judge how appropriate they are and if nessary to control them. Secondly I would suggest experiencing emotions is part of being a person as we regard sociopaths as being deficient persons in some way.

In conclusion I have argued that in most circumstances the stoic’s quest to reduce or eliminate his unhappiness damages his capacity to love which in turn damages his ability to experience happiness and I wouldn’t recommend a stoic life. However for a few people who live in extremely deprived circumstances a stoic life might be the best option,

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 114
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 91.
3. Frankfurt, 1988, page 83.
4. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love Friendship & the Self, Oxford University Press, page 122.
5. Bennett Helm, chapter 8.

Physician Assisted Suicide and the Slippery Slope Argument

Permitting physician assisted suicide for those with terminal illnesses seems to be becoming acceptable in some countries. However many remain opposed to assisted suicide and employ two main arguments against the practice. First, there are the Deists who believe it is wrong to help someone die because only God should be able to do so. I won’t address this argument in this posting. Secondly there are those who believe that permitting assisted suicide for the terminally ill would lead to a slippery slope which would over time lead to assisted suicide becoming accepted in areas in which it shouldn’t be permissible. In the past I have argued that prisoners serving life sentences and those who are going to suffer from Alzheimer’s disease have a right to assisted suicide. It might be suggested my own arguments show that assisted suicide does indeed lead to a slippery slope. In this posting I will argue that provided our underlying motivation for the introduction of assisted suicide doesn’t change that its introduction should not lead to a slippery slope.

Before proceeding we need to be clear about exactly what we mean by a slippery slope. According to the Cambridge English Dictionary a slippery slope is “a bad situation or habit that, after it has started, is likely to get very much worse.” The starting point of the slippery slope is itself bad. If we accept this definition it by no means clear that we can use a slippery slope argument when discussing assisted suicide. Let us agree that a terminally ill patient who desires to die is in a bad situation, but assisted suicide isn’t of necessity bad in this situation, even if assisted suicide can’t remedy the bad situation it might bring it to an end peacefully. I find this definition unsatisfactory and a better definition of a slippery slope might be employed. According to the Oxford Dictionary a slippery slope is “a course of action likely to lead to something bad or disastrous.” I will adopt this definition in the rest of this posting. Adopting this definition means that the starting point of the slippery slope need not be in itself bad. For instance it might be argued that allowing terminally ill patients to die peacefully is a good thing by itself, but if this slips into permitting assisted suicide for terminally ill children, adults who have mental illness, dementia patients and those who are simply tired of living, it becomes a bad thing, see Daniel Callahan in Hasting Centre's blog . A consequentialist might respond by arguing that provided the initial good outweighs the anticipated bad that assisted suicide can be justified even if it leads to a slippery slope. I won’t pursue this argument here. Instead I will argue that if motivation for permitting assisted suicide for the terminally ill remains constant then we have no need to worry about any slippery slope.

A proponent of the slippery slope argument might be prepared to accept that allowing terminally ill patients assisted suicide is in itself is a good thing but argue that this initial good is outweighed by the bad things it introduces. For instance he might argue whilst helping someone with terminal cancer die peacefully by itself is indeed a good thing, however if the slippery slope means helping grandma to die because she feels she is a burden to her family, it becomes a bad thing. The slippery slope means any good done is outweighed by the inevitable bad. I now want to question exactly what is slipping, changing. I am going to suggest what is slipping in such cases is our underlying motivation for supporting assisted suicide. Let us consider the above example. What motivates us to support assisted suicide for someone suffering from a terminal illness? Our motivation might be based on caring about the patient’s suffering or our sense of empathy caused by this suffering. Let next consider the motivations underlying grandma’s desire for assisted suicide. Grandma doesn’t want to be burden to anyone. It seems to me if we aid grandma commit assisted suicide that our motivation is different from our motivation for aiding someone with a terminal illness to die peacefully. Our motivation for helping someone with a terminal illness die with dignity is that we care about him if our motivation remains the same for grandma then because we care about her we aren’t going to help her commit suicide because we care about her. If we accede to grandma’s wish what has changed is our motivation. I will now argue that if the motivation for permitting assisted suicide for the terminally ill doesn’t change then permitting assisted suicide will not lead to a slippery slope.

One possible motivation for assisting someone to die is that we care about their suffering. We care about the suffering of someone who is suffering from a terminal illness. One response to our caring about might be to assist him to die peacefully. However there is another possible response, perhaps palliative care might permit him to end the last days of her natural life peacefully. I’m doubtful whether palliative care can always reduce suffering to an acceptable level. It seems to me that some supporters of palliative care try to derive ‘an is from an ought.’ For instance some might believe we ought not to permit assisted suicide, for various reasons, and because of this belief also come to believe that palliative care can always reduce suffering to acceptable levels. If palliative care cannot always reduce suffering then the fact that we care about someone’s suffering due to a terminal illness means we have reason to permit assisted suicide. Our motivation is based on our caring about someone suffering or feel empathy for her. I have argued that provided our motivations don’t slip opponents of assisted dying cannot appeal to the slippery slope argument.

However it might be objected the above conclusion flies in the face of the facts. Anywhere where assisted suicide has been introduced for the terminally ill has led to an expansion of the domain of assisted suicide, see for instance a report of the American Medical Association . Indeed I might be accused inconsistency by previously arguing that some prisoners serving life sentences should also have the right to assisted suicide. I now want to argue that simply expanding the domain of those who should be able to avail themselves of assisted suicide is not an example of a slippery slope. Let us recall our definition of a slippery slope as a course of action likely to lead to something bad or disastrous. If a prisoner has committed some terrible rape and murder which torments him and for which he will spend the rest of days in prison wishes to die is helping him to do so a bad or disastrous thing? Is preventing an unhappy 104 year scientist, see bioedge , from dying peacefully also bad and disastrous? If we accept that the above aren’t bad and disastrous then we can’t say they are examples of the slippery slope in action. It follows simple expansion of the domain in which assisted suicide might be applicable does not automatically lead to a slippery slope. For some course of action to be part of a slippery slope it must lead to some bad or disastrous consequences, mere expansion of the domain by itself won’t do the job. Of course extreme care must be taken to ensure that assisted suicide doesn’t lead to bad or disastrous consequences but this isn’t the same as a simple expansion of its domain. I have argued that our reason to permit assisted suicide is that we care about those suffering from terminal illness. Provided our motivation remains the same then any expansion of the domain of assisted suicide should not lead to bad and disastrous consequences and any attempt to apply a slippery slope argument to such an expansion is a failure to grasp fully the definition of a slippery slope.

I have argued that permitting assisted suicide does not lead to a slippery slope provided our motivation is one of caring. It follows that provided our motivations don’t change, don’t slip, the slippery slope argument is an ineffective argument against the permissibility of physician assisted suicide for the terminally ill.

Two Types of Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement

It is suggested by Anders Sandberg that the use of cognitive enhancing drugs under medical supervision might achieve more overall learning and academic achievement and this is preferable to being driven into illicit use by bans, see practical ethics . In a previous posting I argued that the use of cognition enhancing drugs in examinations should be permissible subject to two conditions, see cognition enhancing drugs . In this posting I will firstly argue that there are two types of pharmacological enhancement. I will then consider such enhancement should be permissible, I will suggest that they should in some circumstances. Some of my conclusions might also apply to brain zapping, trans-crainial direct current stimulation, which might increase memory and as a result enhance cognition. I will not consider brain zapping directly.

Let us assume some drugs effectively enhances cognition. Any such drugs need to satisfy two further conditions for its use to be permissible.

1. Any cognition enhancing drugs must be safe to use without any major side effects. In certain circumstances some of these drug must be safe for long term use.
2. In certain circumstances the users of a cognition enhancing drugs must be prepared to continue using these drugs.

Commenting on Sandberg’s posting Dennis Tuchler worries about how long the effect of cognition enhancing drugs will last. He worries if cognition enhancers only work for a short time that their use will mislead employers and graduate schools about someone’s cognitive abilities. For instance let us assume someone gains a job in the diplomatic service due to her superb powers of concentration. Let us further assume that these powers are due to her taking cognitive enhancers. Lastly let us assume that once she gains this position she stops taking the enhancers and her powers of concentration fall away. In these circumstances someone else who failed to obtain the post due to the drug takers previous powers of concentration might feel he has been treated unjustly. Moreover the diplomatic service might be disappointed with the appointment. Whether Tuchler’s worries are justified depends on exactly what is involved with cognitive enhancement. Cognitive enhancement might occur in two ways. Firstly cognitive enhancement might be an ongoing process and secondly cognitive enhancement might be the end result of a process. It follows there are two types of cognitive enhancer. The first type of enhancers would result in an ongoing change in the user even after she has ceased to take the drug. Let us call such an enhancer type 1. An example of type 1 enhancer might be some drug which increases our ability to remember and what we remembered is retained even after we cease taking the enhancer. Type 1 enhancers might be likened to a scaffold round a building, the scaffolding supports the building during construction but once the building is finished there is no further need for the scaffolding and it can be removed. The second type of enhancers would require their ongoing use to be effective, let us call this type of enhancer type 2. An example of a type 2 enhancer might be some drug which helps our brains to concentrate. In the case of type 2 enhancer if use of the enhancer ceases the enhancement disappears, if the scaffolding is removed the building falls down.

Let us first consider the use of type 1 cognitive enhancers briefly. Let us assume that type 1 enhancers increase our power of memory. Sandberg believes memories enhanced by drugs will presumably endure regardless irrespective of whether the enhancer continues to be taken. Whether Sandberg’s belief is correct is open to experiment and cannot be answered by doing philosophy. However provided Sandberg’s belief is confirmed experimentally and a type 1 enhancer has no untoward side effects then philosophically there appears to be no reason why someone shouldn’t take such an enhancer. Indeed Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord’s reversal test seem to support this conclusion (1). According to this test if we accept that giving someone a drug to diminish her cognitive ability is wrong and we argue giving someone a drug to enhance her cognitive abilities is also wrong then we must be able to explain why enhancement is wrong or be accused of having a status quo bias. It appears to follow that provided a type 1 cognitive enhancer is safe that we have no reasons to prohibit the use of such an enhancer. Such a conclusion is premature and reasons might be found to support the status quo. If such an enhancer is prohibitively expensive and available only to a few due to cost then it might lead to social injustice. For instance if the use of cognition enhancing drugs was useful in the diplomatic service and these drugs were prohibitively expensive then people from disadvantaged backgrounds might be discriminated against in their attempts to join the service. The above conclusion might be amended as follows. If a type 1 cognitive enhancer is safe and not prohibitively expensive then we have no reasons to prohibit the use of such an enhancer.

Let us now examine the use of type 2 cognitive enhancers. If this type of enhancer is to be effective it must continue to be taken. Such an enhancer would affect one or more of our physiological processes and this affect would result in increased cognitive ability. Drugs that affect our physiological processes seem to require continuous use. For instance someone taking a drug to reduce his blood pressure must continue to do so. A drug which enhances someone’s ability to concentrate would be an example of a drug that has a temporary physiological affect which temporarily enhances her cognitive capabilities. It might be argued Bostrom and Ord’s reversal test gives us no reason to ban type 2 cognitive enhancers. However once again reasons might be found to support the status quo.

Perhaps the use of type 2 cognitive enhancers might mislead employers or universities about someone’s cognitive capabilities. For instance the examination grade obtained by a student taking a type 2 cognitive enhancer might not accurately reflect his cognitive abilities if he ceases taking the enhancer. However if he continues taking the enhancer then the examination should reflect his cognitive abilities in a similar way to how examinations reflect students abilities without the use of cognitive enhancers of any sort. It appears possible that the use of type 2 cognitive enhancers might be permissible subject to certain conditions. The first of these conditions is that the user of type 2 enhancers must continue taking the enhancer or else any supposed benefit will be illusory. The second condition is that the use of type 2 enhancers will not lead to social injustice.

I will deal with each of these conditions in turn. If we are to permit the use of type 2 cognitive enhancers we must be able to assure ourselves that users of these enhancers continue taking them. How might this be achieved? Let us consider this question in conjunction with safety. I will consider the question first in cases where the issue of safety is clear cut. If such an enhancer has major safety issues then its use should simply be prohibited. If such an enhancer is completely safe and the cost is reasonable then I would question if we need any such assurance. Someone with hypertension will take a safe drug to control his condition without a second thought because it benefits him and carries minimal risk. He has a reason to take the drug and no reason not to. It might be argued by analogy that much the same applies to someone taking completely safe cognitive enhancers. It seems safe to assume if someone has a reason to continue taking a cognitive enhancer and none not to that he will continue to do so. Unfortunately not all cases are so clear cut and most drugs have some side effects. In these circumstances Anders Sandberg suggestion that the use of cognitive enhancing drugs should only occur under medical supervision seems sensible. If the use of type 2 cognitive enhancers takes place under medical supervision then once again we have no reason to question their continued use. It appears to follow that provided type 2 cognitive enhancers are completely safe or only used under medical supervision that we have no reason to question their continued use.

I now want to consider whether the use of type 2 cognitive enhancers might lead to injustice? Someone opposed to cognitive enhancement might argue that the prohibitive cost of such enhancers might make them unavailable to some people leading to social injustice. I will consider this objection in two specific contexts, first jobs depending on good cognitive skill such as the diplomatic service and secondly in higher education. First let us consider type 2 cognitive enhancers in the context of jobs requiring high cognitive skills. It is in employers’ interests to provide employees with the tools to work efficiently. It seems probable that if type 2 enhancers increase efficiency in some contexts that in these contexts it is in the interests of employers to provide them for free. Of course some might not do so. If a significant number of employers do not provide type 2 cognitive enhancers for free when these enhancers have been proved to be safe and increase efficiency then some legislation might be necessary. A similar argument might be advanced with regard to higher education. Universities provide students with the tools to help them learn, libraries, lectures halls and lecturers. If type 2 cognitive enhancers are safe but too expensive for most students then provided they are a useful learning tool perhaps universities should supply them.

The above leads to some tentative conclusions which might need modifying in the light of experience. Firstly provided a type 1 cognitive enhancer is safe and not prohibitively expensive then we have no reasons to prohibit the use of such an enhancer. Secondly even if the cost of type 2 cognitive enhancers is high the use of such enhancers should be permissible in higher education and jobs requiring high cognitive skills. The permissibility of more widespread type 2 cognitive enhancers is dependent on the availability and price of these enhancers.

1. https://nickbostrom.com/ethics/statusquo.pdf