If a Lion could Speak

According to Wittgenstein, “if a lion could speak, we could not understand him.” (1) It is by no means clear what  Wittgenstein meant by this remark and I will suggest two possible explanations. Firstly, there might exist some languages which cannot be translated into any other. Secondly some minds might be so radically different from ours that the thoughts in those minds might be so radically different to our own that we couldn’t conceive them. It might appear that whilst the soundness of these propositions might be of academic interest it is of no practical importance. I would suggest that this appearance is mistaken. Suppose that some advanced AI, robots or even aliens could speak could we understand them? The answer to this question might help support or provide some evidence against Bostrom’s orthogonanlity thesis. Recently Facebook abandoned an experiment after two artificially intelligent programs appeared to be chatting to each other in a strange language only they understood, see the Independent . Stephen Hawking believes if we are ever contacted by aliens we should think very carefully before replying due to the dangers involved. I am extremely dubious about whether we will ever be contacted by aliens but the possibility exists as long as we are unsure of how life evolved in the universe. The first possible danger posed by our inability to communicate with aliens formed the subject matter of the 2016 film Arrival, might powerful minds with which we cannot communicate pose a threat to us? Besides the above possibility there also exists the possibility that alien minds might be so radically different from ours that they might consider us of no importance and even consider us as dangerous. This second possibility might also be posed by some advanced form of AI. On a more practical level if Wittgenstein is correct then Turing tests are pointless for we might be unable to converse with fully intelligent conscious entities.

Let us accept that language can be roughly defined as a system of communicating information. However, there is an important difference between language processors and language users. If language is simply a system of communication then ‘computer languages’ such as Java, C and Python are languages in much the same way as are English, Mandarin and Sign Languages used by the deaf. I would suggest that however fast a computer runs or however much information it can handle that if this is all it can do then it cannot be said to be a language user. What does it mean to be a language user? I would suggest that for some entity to be considered as a language user this entity must determine the use it puts language to.  At the present time computers, robots and AI don’t determine how the information they process is used and as a result aren’t language users. It follows that at the present time that any dangers posed by computers, robots or AI are due to our misuse or misunderstanding of them rather than some imagined purpose such entities might acquire. It might be objected by someone that accepting my suggestion means that because animals don’t determine the use the language they use that they also aren’t real language users. It would appear to follow that chimpanzees and clever crows which appear to communicate with us are really language processors in much the same way as computers rather than users. I would argue this objection is unsound. Animals might simply use language but the use of the language is put to, unlike the use of computers, is determined by the animals’ needs and wants. Accepting the above means accepting that certain animals are primitive language users. The rest of this posting will only be concerned with language used by language users as defined above.

 

Let us consider the possibility that we might be unable to understand the language of aliens or some advanced form of AI. It is possible that any AI, however advanced, must remain a language processor rather than a language user. Nonetheless because we are uncertain as to how we became language users the possibility of some advanced AI becoming a user cannot be completely ruled out. Let us now consider whether some language might be untranslatable into any other. By untranslatable I don’t mean some language which is difficult to translate but rather that some language is impossible to translate. Of course we may not capture all the nuances of some language in translation but is there any language that cannot translated at least to some degree? In order to answer this question, we must ask another what is meant by a language?  Let us accept that language is a system of communicating information among language users as defined above. Information about what? Information must include knowledge of things in the world shared by the language users. The world of language users must be a world of things. These things might include such things as, physical objects, descriptions of behaviour in the world and emotions among others. If any world was a completely undifferentiated one with no distinct things existing in it there could be no speech and no need for language users. Our original question might now be reframed. Is it possible for the users of one language to talk about a set of totally distinct things from the users of another language? This would only be possible if the world of one set of language users was totally separate from that of another set. This might be possible if language defines the world we live in, language could also help us make sense of the world we live in. Let us assume for the sake of argument that lions could talk. Would this talk define a lion’s world or help lions make sense of the world they live in? I would suggest language must touch the world rather than define it and that this world is shared by all of us to some degree. I don’t believe Wittgenstein would agree. It follows that if lions could talk they would talk about some things common to our world. For instance they might talk about being hot or cold, hunger or being content. It follows lions could speak that we should be able to understand them even if the translation proved to be difficult in practice and we couldn’t understand all the nuances of their language. However, would the same be true for some more fanciful language users such as advanced AI, robots or aliens? I would suggest the same argument can be applied and that all language users share the same universe to some degree and it is impossible for the users of one language to talk about a set of totally distinct things from the users of another language. Because language must touch the world any two sets of language users must talk about some of the same things. It follows we should be able to partly translate the language of any language users who share our world even if this might prove to be difficult in practice.

I have argued that we should be able to partly translate any language in our universe even if this might prove to be difficult in practice. This argument presumes that all language users share the same universe, share some common understandings. Lions and human beings all understand what is meant by trees, sleep and hunger but only humans understand what is meant by a galaxy. The above appears to suggest that there is a hierarchy of understanding and that some things can only be understood once a creature has understood some more basic things. The above also seems to suggest that there is a hierarchy of languages with simple ones only touching the more basic things in the world whilst more complex languages are able to touch a wider domain. In the light of the above it seems possible that aliens or some advanced AI might be able to talk about things we are unable to understand. Is it possible that our inability to fully understand the language of such entities might pose us with an existential threat?

Our failure to understand such entities means that we cannot completely discount the above possibility, however I will now suggest that we have some reasons to believe such a threat is unlikely to be posed to us by aliens. Language use is not simply a cognitive exercise. Any communication between entities that don’t have a will is not language use but language processing, language users must have a will. For something to have a will means it must care about something. If something cared about nothing, then it would have no basis on which to base decisions and all its decisions would be equally good meaning decisions could be made at random. The domain of our moral concern has expanded over time. Slavery is now unthinkable, women in the western world are considered of equal worth when compared to men and our moral concern extends to animals, all this is very different to ancient world. What has caused this increase in the domain of our moral concern? I would suggest this increase is due to an increase in our projective empathy. This increase is not simply driven by an increase in our ability to feel emotion. It is driven by our ability to see others as sharing with us some features of the world. Slaves can have a will even if the exercise of this will is restricted, animals can also feel restricted and pain. This ability is due our increase in our knowledge of the world rather than any increase in either cognitive ability or empathy. In the light of the above I would suggest that any aliens are unlikely to pose an existential threat to us. Language users must have a will. Having a will means caring about something. It seems probable that any aliens which might threaten us would have an advanced basis of knowledge, without such a basis it is difficult to see either how they would contact us or how they might threaten us. If some entity has an ability to care about and advanced knowledge basis, then it seems probable that it will have a wide domain of moral concern and that we would be included in that domain. I have argued above that if aliens ever contact we should be able to partly understand them. In the light of the above it seems that any failure on our part to fully understand possible aliens would not pose an existential threat to us.

Does the above apply to advanced AI or robots. If such entities don’t have a will then any threat posed by such entities would be due our failure to understand how such entities function or a failure to set them clear goals. The possibility exists that we might create some bio-hazard by failing to fully understand what we are doing. The threat posed by advanced AI or robots without a will is similar. However, provided we are extremely careful in how we set the goals of such entities this hazard can be minimised. I am extremely doubtful whether advanced AI or robots can acquire a will, nonetheless because we don’t fully understand how consciousness originated such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out. I have argued that it is unlikely that our inability to understand any possible aliens would pose an existential threat to us, however I would suggest any such failure to fully understand some advanced AI which is in the process of acquiring a will might pose such a threat. The threat might be due to an emerging primitive will being akin to that of a child. Perhaps the fact that some such emerging entity has a primitive will might mean it wouldn’t prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of its metaphorical finger, but it might prefer the destruction of humanity rather than refraining from such scratching. It follows if the possibility exists that advanced AI or robots can acquire a will that we should take seriously the possibility that if this will starts happening that such emerging entities might well pose us with an existential threat. Any failure on our part to fully understand such entities would compound such a threat. Perhaps if such entities can fully acquire a will the threat will recede.

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, Blackwell, page 223

Afterthoughts

Assuming that we can understand a lion AT/Alien to some degree the question arises what sort of things might we understand. Goals, intentions or reasons? Perhaps even if we understand the goals and intentions of some advanced AI we might be unable to understand its reasons. But we don't understand all our reasons, reasons run out according to Wittgenstein.  The question becomes how many reasons we need to understand and how many can we do.

What do We Mean by Work?

It is always important to be clear about what we are talking about when discussing philosophical questions. What we mean by work is important because it raises some interesting philosophical questions. For instance, John Danaher wonder whether work makes us happy, Tim Douglas wonders whether the future is workless (1), or perhaps robots will mean that in the future we will have no need to work. In this posting I want to consider what we mean when we discuss work.

The Cambridge online dictionary defines work as “an activity, such as a job, that a person uses physical or mental effort to do, usually for money.” Work seems tied to the idea of a job. In might appear that we could improve our definition of what we mean by work by considering what we mean by a job. Unfortunately, what we mean by a job, is like that of work, far from clear, moreover sometimes the definitions of work and a job seem to be intertwined. For these reasons I will restrict my discussion to what we mean by work. Let us consider an old fashioned couple, the husband works on a farm providing them with an income whilst his wife does the housework in their home. This example raises several interesting questions. Are both doing the same thing at some basic level? If they aren’t it would appear that there is a family of related definitions of what we mean by work.  Examples of members of such a family are easy to imagine, working for a wage, housework, schoolwork and someone working on improving her game or garden. Indeed it would seem perfectly natural for someone to say she is going to work in her garden. If we accept such a family of meanings do all members of this family have equal worth or does the value of work vary depending on which member of the family we are considering?

I want to reject the idea that the meaning of work is really a family of related meanings for two reasons. First, the apparent appearance of a family of different meanings might be an illusion. It seems entirely plausible that work might have only one meaning and that the appearance of a family of meanings is not due to any difference in meaning but rather to the different domains work is carried out in. Farmwork is not conceptually different from housework, the apparent difference is due to the different domains each is carried out in. Secondly let us assume that what we mean by work is a family of related meanings. If we accept the above, then it should be possible to say something about the relationship between family members. However, if we can say something meaningful about this relationship between family members then perhaps what we say could form the basis of a common definition for all forms of work.

Let us accept that there is something common to the meaning of work in different domains. Work is different from play. If considering what is meant by a job doesn’t help us to define work, then perhaps considering the differences between work and play might do so. Both are forms of work and most forms of play can be fun but play is never serious whilst all work is serious. What do I mean by serious? If someone plays at something she can simply stop playing at will because play isn’t serious. If someone works at something she can’t simply stop working for no reason because work is serious. Of course she might dislike work and be glad to stop working but work matters to her and she must have a reason to stop working. If we accept the above, then even if professional footballers are playing a game they are also working. Indeed, someone whose garden matters to her might be said to working in her garden.

Let us accept that work must matter to the worker. Accepting the above doesn’t mean the worker must like her work. Indeed, in some circumstances the worker might hate her job. I have suggested someone can simply stop playing and that stopping has no important consequences for her. The same is not true of work. Someone might well stop working at her dead end job but stopping has consequences for her that matter. Her work matters even if this is only for instrumental reasons, these reasons might simply be making a living or buying the things she values. For someone who loves her garden stopping gardening might mean the garden she loves becomes neglected. Work was defined by the Cambridge online dictionary as “an activity, such as a job, that a person uses physical or mental effort to do, usually for money.” In light of the above work might be better defined as an activity requiring physical or mental effort and that activity matters to the worker. Adopting the above definition would mean working for a wage, housework, schoolwork and playing professional sport could all be regarded as work in the same way and need not be regarded as a family of loosely connected definitions and any apparent differences could be due to the different domains the work is carried out in.

I have argued the definition of work above means that we don’t have to accept a family of loosely connected definitions. The definition I have adopted above depends on the idea that work matters, work is something we care about. Accepting this definition means we had workers before our modern ideas about workers, a Neanderthal hunter might be regarded as a worker. However, even if work might be defined one way we might care about work in two ways. First, someone might work in order to make a living or to obtain the things she desires. Work matters to her for instrumental reasons. Someone working solely to make a living would be a good example of the instrumental value of work. Secondly, someone might work at something because this something matters directly to her. Work has a kind of intrinsic value to her. Someone working in a garden she loves would be good example of such work. Work might matter for what it enables us to obtain or work might matter because we care about what we are working at. Someone working solely to make a living and someone working in a garden she loves are extreme examples and many forms of work might matter to someone because of both values. For instance, someone might drive a bus in order to make a living whilst also take pride in her driving abilities.

Let us accept that work might be defined as an activity requiring physical or mental effort that matters to the worker and that work might matter to the worker for two reasons or some combination of the two. What are the consequences of accepting the above? The first of these is that we must reject the idea that work is a family of loosely related definitions. Of course there are different kinds of work, the work of a banker is different to that of the cleaner in the bank. However, at a basic level both are undertaking some activity, requiring physical or mental effort, which matters to both of them. Of course the complexity of the activity and the domain in which the activity is carried out matter, but these considerations don’t affect this basic definition. Secondly if work must of necessity matter to someone, work isn’t play, then work must be of some value in her life. I argued above that work can have instrumental or intrinsic value, we can work for something or work at something. If someone works at something simply because it matters to her then work gives her life meaning. Moreover, the reason why it matters does not alter the fact that working at something gives someone’s life meaning. For instance, someone might work at providing relief to the starving because she believes it’s a good thing to do whilst someone else might work at studying quasars simply because she finds quasars interesting. Both of these persons work at something for different reasons, but for both of them their work has intrinsic value giving their lives meaning. Let us now consider someone who works for its instrumental value. If someone simply work for something, then this something permits her to pursue the things that matter in life to her, the things that give her life meaning. If someone works as a cleaner, then this might enable her to feed the family she loves. Lastly let us assume that work gives our lives meaning and that automation might destroy many jobs. What are the likely consequences of accepting these assumptions and how should we deal with them? Let us first consider those workers who work instrumentally to obtain the things that matter to them. Clearly some will be unable to make a living which might lead to social unrest. One solution to the above could be the introduction of some sort of universal basic income (UBI). I would suggest that in such circumstances even capitalism has an interest in introducing UBI as it is dependent on some sort of social cohesion. Unfortunately, even if automation does destroy jobs and a UBI is introduced this introduction by itself might be insufficient to maintain social cohesion. If people become bored and little matters to them then social cohesion might become eroded. Boredom in this situation wouldn’t be a minor matter but of major concern both to individuals and society. One way of dealing with this concern might be to refocus the way people work. Perhaps people should focus on working at rather than working for. Such a refocussing would accord better with stoic ideals. Someone’s ability to work at something is less dependent on her having a job. Nonetheless such a refocussing of the way we work is not straightforward as many people would need to be helped to change their focus from working for to working at. I have suggested in a previous posting that such a refocussing might be helped by a refocussing of our education system, see work, automation and happiness . The focus of education might be broadened from simply preparing people for work to helping them to lead a good life.  Such a shift might be aided by placing greater emphasis on the humanities. Once again such a change in emphasis would accord better with stoic ideals. It might be objected that I am adopting a somewhat elitist attitude. I accept this objection and offer two suggestions to combat such elitism. First, the focus of education might be broadened still further to enabling some people learn a craft. Crafts sometimes allow the craftsperson to enter a flow state giving her life some meaning. Secondly in ancient Greece the elite lead a life of leisure in which sport and the gymnasium were important. Perhaps sport participation should play a greater part in any society which finds its cohesion damaged by automation. I have suggested above that a professional footballer might be regarded as a worker if we accept the above definition an amateur footballer might be said to work at his game. Like UBI such participation would be expensive but these costs might be partly offset by health benefits.

1. Tim Dunlop, Why the future is workless, New South Publishing.