Meaning, Love and Happiness

In this posting I want to examine the relationship between meaning, love and happiness. Most psychologists seem to believe that there is no relationship between meaning and happiness, see for instance Baumeister, Vohs, Aaker and Garbinsky (1). They often look for such a relationship by asking subjects to complete surveys about how happy they are and how meaningful they find their lives. The subjects are often free to use their own definitions of meaning and happiness. Psychologists usually find there is no relationship between the two. This lack of a relationship leads most psychologists to adopt the separation thesis which holds that meaning and happiness are unconnected. It seems to me that there is a negative relationship which questions this separation thesis. This negative relationship holds that having a life devoid of meaning and being unhappy are correlated.

Before examining this negative relationship we must be clear what concept of meaning we are using. Firstly meaning can be defined in an objective way. This objective sense of meaning holds that certain things on a list give someone’s life meaning. For instance someone’s life might be said to have meaning if he does useful things, has loving relationships and is optimistic. Secondly meaning can be defined in a subjective way. For someone’s life to be meaning is roughly for him to find it meaningful, for her to judge it as meaningful. In what follows I will only be concerned with meaning defined in a subjective way. Whilst I will not pursue the matter further here I believe someone whose life contains certain items from an objective list is more likely to have a happy life than one whose life does not. However let us now consider someone who believes his life to be meaningless. Someone who simply lives from moment to moment. I have suggested in the past such a person would suffer fro the unbearable lightness of simply being, see my posting on riots and the unbearable sense of simply being . I would suggest such a person is a dissatisfied person and as a consequence is not a happy person. It is important to note that I am not suggesting here that satisfaction is linked to happiness, I will do so latter, but I am suggesting dissatisfaction is linked to unhappiness. It might be objected that whilst I have suggested that someone who lives from moment to moment is likely to be unhappy, I have provided no argument to support my suggestion. My objector might now suggest it is perfectly possible for someone to be a ‘happy go lucky person’ who pays no attention to either his past or future. In response I would follow Christine Korsgaard by arguing our nature as human beings means we have a psychic necessity to choose (2). I would further argue that we cannot choose if we don’t care about anything and that we cannot care about anything if we don’t have some sense of meaning in our lives. Someone who is happy go lucky chooses this lifestyle.

Let us accept that someone who has no subjective meaning in life is likely to be a dissatisfied and unhappy person. It follows there is a correlation between meaning and unhappiness. This correlation gives us a reason to at the very least question the separation thesis. Why then should Baumeister and his associates report no correlation between happiness and meaning? Antti Kauppinen argues that this correlation is dependent on the concept of happiness employed. On a purely hedonic account of happiness there is indeed no correlation but with a broader definition there is a correlation. For someone to be happy according to Haybron is,

“for one’s emotional condition to be broadly positive – involving stances of attunement, engagement and endorsement – with negative central affective states and mood propensities only to a minor extent.” (3)

Kauppinen offers a slightly different account of happiness which he calls ‘the affective condition account of happiness’. His account is a multidimensional account comprised of predominantly positive affect, mood, emotion, and hedonic quality together with an absence of negative affect, see Meaning and Happiness . Both of these accounts of happiness seem to allow some room for meaning. Let us assume that Haybron is correct in believing that being happy includes someone endorsing his positive emotional condition. Let us also accept that it is impossible to endorse anything without some sense of meaning. If nothing matters, nothing has meaning, then we have no basis on which to endorse it. It follows if we accept accounts of happiness such as those of Haybron and Kauppinen that the separation thesis is false.

Prior to examining the correlation between subjective meaning and non-hedonic accounts of happiness I want to examine further what is meant by subjective meaning. I defined someone’s life to have subjective meaning above as a life the liver of that life finds meaningful or judges it to be meaningful. I now want to differentiate between someone finding and judging a life as meaningful. Consider a glutton who claims that eating as much as he can gives his life meaning. I would not consider such a person as leading a subjectively meaningful life. A subjectively meaningful life is not one that someone judges or even thinks is meaningful. In the rest of this posting a subjectively meaningful life is one that someone finds or experiences as meaningful. To find something meaningful, is to find something as important, and if something is important it must be loved. In order for someone to have a subjectively meaningful life he must love something.

At this point I must make it clear what I mean by love. I do not simply mean romantic love, romantic love is type of love but does not define all types of love. In my postings I often make use of Harry Frankfurt’s concept of love as caring about and identifying with someone or something. This concept means someone who loves is vulnerable to losses if his beloved is harmed and benefits if his beloved flourishes. The lover is satisfied with his beloved and has no desire to change his beloved. He may of course be dissatisfied with his beloved’s condition. If his beloved is unhappy he will share this unhappiness. If his beloved is an institution in decline then this decline will distress him. According to Frankfurt the fact someone is in love, in this meaning of love, shapes his motivational structure and guides his conduct (4). It might be argued such a concept of love is too simplistic. Bennett Helm argues someone doesn’t love every thing he cares about (5). Does someone really love ice cream or is this just mere rhetoric? Helm argues we love the things we feel pride and shame about. Helm would agree with Frankfurt that we identify with the things we love. However according to Helm identification does not simply require a passive satisfaction but a more active feeling of pride and shame. Perhaps as I have argued elsewhere there are different forms of love, see the structure of love . Or perhaps there aren’t different forms of identification, only different degrees of identification. I would suggest even if there are different forms of love that underlying all forms must be basic form of ‘caring about’ in the way Frankfurt uses the term.

I have argued above that if we accept a concept of happiness such as those of Haybron and Kauppinen that the separation thesis is false. I will now suggest that if we accept Haybron’s concept which includes endorsement that we must also accept that it is a necessary condition for happiness that we love in some basic way. It is important to be clear what I am not suggesting here. I am not suggesting that basic loving is a sufficient condition for happiness. According to Haybron’s account of happiness for someone to be happy means his emotional condition is broadly positive, this means even if loving increases his positive emotional state this increase might be outweighed by other factors. Nor am I suggesting that being loved is necessary for happiness. I do however believe being loved usually increases someone’s happiness. However this is not true in all cases, for instance someone might be loved by another who is not his partner and this love may cause him unhappiness. I am simply suggesting that basic loving is a necessary prerequisite for someone to be actually happy. Once again it is important to note what I am not suggesting. I am not suggesting a disposition for basic loving is sufficient for happiness. A hostage held by terrorists may have a disposition to love, but be far from happy. I am simply suggesting that actual basic loving is necessary for happiness. A disposition for basic loving of course forms part of a disposition to be happy.

If it is accepted that the ability to love is a necessary element of happiness it might be thought that enhancing this element will increase our happiness. I have argued in ‘meaning and happiness’ that this is not so. It is not so because someone cannot simply decide to love someone or something. Love is not a matter of choice. Perhaps the best we can do is to situate ourselves in circumstances in which love might grow naturally.

1. Roy Baumeister, Kathleen Vohs, Jennifer Aaker & Emily Garbinsky, 2013, Some key differences between a happy life and a meaningful life, The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2013, volume 8(6)
2. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, section 1.1.1.
3. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 147.
4. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford.
5. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 129.

Shame and Character

It is sometimes assumed that shame is an unnecessary emotion. In this posting I want to challenge this assumption. I will argue that shame is central to both our character and behaviour. What do we mean by shame? Oxford dictionaries define shame as “a painful feeling of humiliation or distress caused by the consciousness of wrong or foolish behaviour”. However if we adopt this definition there seems to be no difference between shame and guilt. If someone does something wrong and feels guilty about his actions he may apologise for these actions. Provided his apology is sincere he ought to be forgiven and allowed back into the moral community. It seems harder to apologise for something one is ashamed of. One of the characteristic reactions to shame is to hide our shame rather than apologise for it. The reason for this is I would suggest is that shame is more directly connected to our character rather than our actions. We find easier to apologise for what we have done than to apologise for what we are. Our character is difficult to change. This difficulty leads to shame being seen as an unnecessary emotion for it appears to follow there is no real point in apologising, for who we are, if we cannot change who we are. Shame serves no real purpose.

Let us accept that shame is connected to our character rather than our acts. Nonetheless acts still matter with regard to shame. When I feel ashamed about some act, the act captures my attention but the focus of my attention is on my character from which the act flows. For instance a drunkard may feel guilty about his actions last night. A drunkard may also feel shame about his actions last night. These actions focus his attention on the fact he is a drunkard. This focus can have two sub focuses, one on how others see the drunkard’s character and secondly how the drunkard sees himself. I have previously argued these different sub focuses give rise to Two Types of Shame. Type one shame is someone’s anxiety about social disqualification because of his character. Type two shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves. I will consider each type of shame in turn.

I will consider type two shame first. Before proceeding I will briefly consider the nature and the purpose of the emotions. Michael Brady argues emotions are analogous to alarms (1). Emotions draw our attention to things which are wrong. Emotions capture and focus our attention forcing us to reappraise our situation. For instance if I make a snide remark about someone, my guilt captures and focuses my attention on whether my remark was wrong and perhaps makes me reappraise the situation causing me to apologise. However my shame about the remark captures and focuses my attention on the inadequacies of my character from which my snide remark flowed. My shame may force me to reappraise my character. Unfortunately character is hard to change and even if I don’t hide my character from myself I may seek to hide it from others. A somewhat similar approach is taken by Bennett Helm. Helm holds that someone’s pride and shame are a kind of attention, a kind of vigilance, about himself and his identity and that this attention or vigilance is a form of self-love. Helm argues our values are constitutive of us as persons. With regards to values he argues,

“what is at stake in one’s values are oneself and one’s own wellbeing as this person, and because values involve an implicit understanding of the kind of life it is worth one’s living, the felt evaluations constitutive of this pattern …. are emotions like pride and shame.” (2)

It follows even if our shame is something we may feel we have to hide from others that it is nonetheless constitutive of us as persons. It follows shame is an extremely important emotion.

In order to illustrate the importance of type two shame let us try to imagine someone who feels no type two shame whatsoever. It might be thought that such a person is a happy go lucky person who takes life as it comes and as a result leads a naturally authentic life. Let us accept that someone without type two shame is someone without any anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves. I would suggest such a person would be a selfish person who wantonly disregards both himself and others. It might be objected that it is possible for someone to care about himself and others without any anxiety about harming the things he loves. He simply has a natural caring nature. I am doubtful whether the above is possible. I will now return to a theme which runs through many posts in this blog. If someone ‘cares about’, loves, something then he must identify himself with what he cares about. He makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending on whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced (3). It seems to me that someone cannot make himself vulnerable, with regard to the things he ‘cares about’, without experiencing some anxiety about harming these things. It follows someone who ‘cares about’ or loves anything must be capable of experiencing some shame. It further follows that someone who cannot experience shame would be a selfish inconsiderate person. Additionally I would suggest such a person is in some ways a deficient person. Helm argues that both pride and shame are constitutive to us as persons. If Helm is correct then someone who can feel no shame is an unbalanced, deficient person whose personality is not truly formed, see my discussion of damaging self-love pride and shame.

It has been assumed that shame is an unimportant emotion because it has no practical consequences. It has no practical consequences because we are unable change our character. Let us assume that we are unable change our character. I will now argue even if this assumption is true that nonetheless shame is important. Someone who is aware of his character, due to shame, might decide not to place himself in situations in which his character is challenged. A drunkard might decide to avoid bars. Moreover someone’s awareness of his character might also guide his career choice. Some who feels shame at his cowardice is unlikely to join the army. I will now argue the assumption that we cannot change our character is false. I accept some of our dispositions have a genetic basis which we cannot alter. But part of our character is determined by what we love or ‘care about’. I accept what we love must have some persistence and cannot be arbitrarily changed by some act of will. However persistence is not the same as permanence. What we love or ‘care about’ can change slowly. It follows some parts of our character can change albeit slowly. Shame might help drive such change.

So far I have dealt with type two shame but type one shame is also important, especially in a social context. I now want to use an example to illustrate how type one shame might work in practice. Recall I defined type one shame as is someone’s anxiety about social disqualification because of his character. Jennifer Saul argues that we should use informal methods to combat sexual harassment when more formal means are inappropriate (4); I agree. One way this might be done is by employing shame. Let us assume someone makes an offensive sexual remark about someone else. Let us also assume such a remark is passed off in a joking manner and as such is the remark should not be dealt with by formal means. Should we just ignore such a remark? Saul believes we should not. She suggests one way of doing this might be to withhold our laughter because by doing so we show don’t approve of the remark. However this lack of approval is not the same as disapproving of the remark. I would suggest one way of disapproving the remark is to employ shame. Perhaps we might ask the harasser to repeat his remark; “did you really say that”. In doing so we are implying such a remark is not the sort of remark which would flow from a good character. If he says he was only joking he is being forced to disassociate his remark from his character, he is being compelled to feel some shame. However care is needed. Sexual harassment is a moral concern and it seems appropriate to me to use shame to address moral concerns. The same might not be true of social concerns. For instance should we employ shame in an attempt to encourage the obese to diet, see Two Types of Shame .

Is it possible to extend the idea of shaming beyond persons to other entities? For instance is it possible to shame governments? Could for instance Israel be shamed for its treatment of Gaza? Could corporations such as Amazon and Starbucks be shamed into paying more tax, see BBC, Tax Shaming . If anxiety about something is an essential part of shame then governments and corporations cannot be shamed. Governments and corporations can’t feel anxiety. However the people who run such organisations might feel anxiety about the nature of their organisation. Recall type one shame means someone feels anxiety about social disqualification because of his character. It seems possible that an executive of some large organisation might feel anxiety about the social disqualification of his organisation due to its nature. Such anxiety might be classed as type three shame. I would be somewhat reluctant to take such a step because if we do so the focus of the shame moves from someone’s character to the nature of an organisation.

1. Michael S. Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.
2. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford, page 109.
3. Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press page 83.
4. Jennifer Saul, 2014, Stop Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(3)

Suicide, Happiness and Meaning

The death of Robin Williams highlighted the prevalence of suicide in our society. In this posting I want to consider ways of reducing this prevalence. To start with I should make it clear that I do not consider all suicide to be problematic. I have argued that for some people suicide may be a rational option. For instance I have argued in past postings that suicide would be a rational option for some terminally ill patients, prisoners serving life sentences and people faced by alzheimers and dementia . Indeed in some cases it might even be the morally right thing for someone to do. I do not believe in capital punishment but suicide might be the right moral option for someone who has committed some terrible crime, for instance a father who murders his wife and children. Nonetheless the vast majority of suicides are harmful. Usually if someone commits suicide he harms those he leaves behind and deprives himself of a life he may well have enjoyed had he been able to overcome his immediate worries. Let us accept that most suicide is harmful in this posting I want to consider what can be done to alleviate this harm. In doing so, I do not want to consider specific treatments to prevent suicide such as counselling or drug treatments. Instead I want to consider the elements in someone’s life that decrease the possibility of his suicide. I want consider happiness and meaning.

I will deal with happiness first. It might be thought that being happy inoculates people from committing suicide. It might be thought that happy people just don’t commit suicide. Such a thought is too simplistic. Let us accept that someone doesn’t commit suicide whilst he is happy but no one is happy all the time. Is it true that happy people don’t commit suicide? I will argue it is not. I will nonetheless later argue that cultivating some forms of happiness do help prevent suicide. What do we mean by a happy person? According to Feldman happiness means hedonistic happiness and a happy person is one who experiences a greater degree of happiness than unhappiness over a long period (1). For the moment let us accept Feldman’s view is correct. Let us now consider someone who was never either really happy or unhappy during his childhood and adolescence. Let assume when he was twenty he meet a lover and was blissfully happy for a year. Let us say throughout that year he experienced 10 units of happiness. Unfortunately at the end of the year his lover left his for his best friend. Such a person is now thirty and for the last nine years he has constantly experienced -0.5 units of happiness. According to a hedonistic account of happiness such a person would be regarded as a happy person. Intuitively I believe he would be regarded as an unhappy person. It seems unlikely such a person would commit suicide during his happy period but it is conceivable that such a person might be prone to do so during his unhappy period. It is even conceivable that someone suffering from bipolar disease might be regarded as a happy person provided the happiness he obtains during his manic periods is greater than his unhappiness during his periods of depression. People suffering from bipolar disease suffer from an increased risk of committing suicide. In the light of the above it seems that simply increasing someone’s hedonistic happiness is unlikely to decrease the overall possibility of his committing suicide. It may of course decrease this possibility in the period when he is actually enjoying hedonistic happiness. The above conclusion seems supported by evidence that people who turn to drink in an attempt to increase their hedonistic happiness are also at increased risk of committing suicide.

In spite of the above I will now argue happy people are less likely to commit suicide. I would not class a person, who is regarded as a happy person using the hedonistic definition above, as a truly happy person. I would regard such a person as a person who is happy some of the time. I have previously argued if we regard someone as a happy person we have reason to expect him to be happy tomorrow, see feldman, haybron and happydispositions . We have no reason to expect that someone who is enjoying hedonistic happiness today will be happy tomorrow. It seems to me that an important element in a happy person is a disposition to be happy (2). It seems possible that because someone who has a disposition to be happy is likely to experience being happy for longer periods of time that he will be less prone to committing suicide overall. How then does someone cultivate a disposition to be happy? One certainly can’t just will a happy disposition. Some might argue we simply can’t change our inborn dispositions but I will now suggest there are ways in which we might attempt to increase our disposition to be happy.

Firstly I would suggest being an optimist might increase our disposition to be happy. By an optimist I mean a realistic optimist as suggested by Tiberius (3) and not some Panglossian optimist who may be less happy. A realistic optimist has an expectation of being happy unless there is evidence to the contrary; a disposition to be happy. I believe being a realistic optimist is particularly important with regard to persons. If we meet someone for the first time we should expect him to possess goodwill. We should also demonstrate we expect him to have goodwill. Experience may of course temper our expectations. It follows that adopting a stance of realistic optimism may make someone less prone to committing suicide. I believe everyone irrespective of whether they have suicidal thoughts or not such adopt a stance of realistic optimism. For some this stance may come naturally but for others its adoption may be long and difficult. Perhaps the best way to foster realistic optimism might be to raise optimistic children, see Martin Seligman's book .

I will now argue that if someone has a meaningful life he will be less prone to depression and less likely to commit suicide. Let us assume someone has meaning in his life. He must care about the things that have meaning for him. It is impossible to imagine something having meaning to someone if he doesn’t care about it at all. If someone cares about something he must be satisfied with what he cares about. According to Harry Frankfurt satisfaction entails “an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change” (4).  It seems to me if someone has meaning in his life that this means he is likely to have less active interest in bringing about a change in his life. It follows he is less likely to commit suicide. According to Daniel Nettles there are three elements to being happy. Firstly there are momentary emotions such as joy or pleasure. Secondly there are judgements about feelings such as satisfaction and lastly the quality of someone’s life over time (5). Let us assume Nettle’s is correct. It follows provided meaning is connected to satisfaction that someone with meaning in life is likely to have more happiness in his life than someone who does not. It seems probable the greater the happiness in someone’s life the less prone he will be to depression and suicide.

In previous posting I have talked about the unbearable lightness of simply being. That is existing without any aims or direction in someone’s life, a life devoid of meaning. Such a person might be cast as a wanton, he has no fixed boundaries and is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity (4). Of course have no fixed boundaries or identity doesn’t make someone commit, someone may drift along in life in an aimless way for years. However I would suggest such a person has less of a defence if suicidal thoughts arise, he has no reason to combat these thoughts. It follows if someone has some meaning in his life that this meaning should act as an antidote to suicidal thoughts.

Let us accept that having some meaning in someone’s life means he is less likely to commit suicide. How then do we encourage people to have meaningful lives? It seems to me meaning and love are connected. By love I don’t mean romantic love; I mean caring about something. Caring about doesn’t just mean liking. Someone can like an ice cream but this doesn’t mean he cares about it. Someone cares about something if he identifies himself with what he cares about and is hurt when what he cares about is damaged and is benefited when what he cares about flourishes (6). I would suggest that for a meaningful life someone must cultivate loving something. This something need not be a person; it might be a cause, a country or even a love of knowledge. Unfortunately someone just can’t decide to love; can’t just decide to have a meaningful life. However someone by cultivating friendships and paying attention to life might find love grows naturally even if this growth is somewhat slow.

To conclude I want to deal very briefly with friendship. I have suggested if we want to love and perhaps be loved we should cultivate friendship. Robin Dunbar believes we can have at most 150 friends, see Wiki Dunbar's number . However the friends I am concerned are not just people whom we know and know us, not just people we know on Facebook. Friends are people we love. We identify with such friends and are hurt when they are hurt and feel pleasure when they are benefited. Moreover because such friends are people we love we can’t simply choose these friends in the way we choose friends on Facebook, we come to have such friends by sharing aims and ideals. We have to pay attention to the friends we love and this limits the number of such friendships we can have. Cultivating friends we love is not easy but doing so may decrease our propensity to commit suicide which might not be true of cultivating a larger circle of friends.

1.      Fred Feldman, 2010, what is this thing called Happiness? Oxford, page 29

2.      Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 138.

3.      Valerie Tiberius, 2008, The Reflective life, Oxford, chapter 6.
4.      Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge

5.      Daniel Nettle, 2005, Happiness; The Science Behind Your Smile, Oxford, page 8.

6.      Frankfurt, page 114.

The Structure of Love and Anti-Love Drugs

Brian Earp wonders whether it might be right for someone in certain situations to take an anti-love drug, see should we take anti love drugs? For instance a battered woman in an abusive relationship might take such a drug to help her restore her autonomy and independence. Such an anti-love drug might be seen as an enhancement on a welfarist account of enhancement, see frontiers in neuroscience , because it enhances someone’s overall welfare. I have suggested any such interventions should be treated with the greatest caution as diminishing love involves great dangers. For instance in the above scenario the woman in question might have children and diminishing her love for her abusive partner might also diminish her love for her children. In this posting I will argue that prior to considering any artificial means of diminishing love we must first consider what love is. In particular I will suggest we should consider whether love has some sort of structure.

What does it mean to love? One way of examining what it means to love is to examine what we can love. Someone might love a building, a particular piece of countryside or being a scientist. A mother may love her children and her children love their parents and siblings. Someone may love his friends. Lastly someone may love her beloved in a romantic way. The question I want to pose is this, do we love all these things in much the same way or are there varieties of love and perhaps even completely different ways of loving? What is the nature of the lover’s concern in all the above? According to Harry Frankfurt it is connected to caring about,

“It is in the nature of a lover’s concern that he is invested in his beloved. That is, he is benefited when his beloved flourishes; and he suffers when it is harmed. Another way of putting it is that the lover identifies himself with what he loves. This consists of accepting the interests of his beloved as his own.” (1)

If we agree with Frankfurt then a lover’s concern is compatible with him loving all the above. Someone might be harmed mentally if a building he loves is burnt down. A mother may suffer if her child suffers. A romantic lover will experience pleasure at the success of her beloved. The above suggests that all forms of love have a common basis, the ability to care about and identify with something, and this common basis rules out completely different ways of loving.

Let us accept that all forms of love must include Frankfurt’s basic idea of caring about and identification. Let us also accept that our ancestors possessed the capacity for this basic form of love, they had the capacity to love themselves and their offspring. At this point someone might object that our ancient ancestors didn’t have the capacity to actively identify themselves with what they loved. She might then proceed to argue even today most people don’t actively identify themselves with what they love. In response Frankfurt might argue even if someone doesn’t actively identify himself with what he loves that nonetheless he demonstrates his identification by his satisfaction with what he loves (2). Bennett Helm would argue someone identifies with what he loves by taking pride in what he loves (3). Intuitively there are different forms of love. How might we account for this diversity? Firstly as our ancestors’ lives became more complex the domain of what they loved expanded. That is the basic form of love remained the same but they started to love more things. Perhaps as their increased brains expanded their cognitive powers they simply became aware of the need to love or care about more things. Nonetheless they loved these things in the same way. Secondly as their lives became more complex evolution added or grafted on additional ways of loving onto this basic form. Love acquired some form of structure.

It might be thought that whilst such considerations have considerable theoretical interest they have no practical implications. Such a thought would be wrong. Let us return to the taking of anti-love drugs to enhance an abused women’s life. Now if love has changed simply by expanding the domain of love by cognitive means then any such supposed enhancement would be likely to be counter productive. For as I have remarked above any such so called enhancement would lead her to love her children and things in general, including herself, less. In this context I would suggest that the use of anti-love drugs would be unacceptable.

Intuitively I do not love the place I live in the same way as I love my children. I can feel empathy towards my children but it would be nonsensical to say I can feel empathy for the place I live. Some forms of love might have a structure. This structure consists of the basic capacity to care about and identify with something or someone, plus the capacity to feel empathy. Earp considers love to be based on ancient neurochemical systems that evolved to serve our ancestors' reproductive needs. I have suggested that love has a wider basis. It follows these neurochemical systems served wider needs, the need to love those things that helped us to survive. Nonetheless let us accept that our basic capacity to love is based on a neurochemical system. Let us also accept that our love is defined by a basic capacity to love as I have suggested above plus the capacity to feel empathy. It is possible that the neurochemical system underlying our capacity to feel empathy is distinct from neurochemical system underlying our capacity for basic love. However even if this situation pertains, the use of anti-love drugs would remain unacceptable. Taking an anti-love drug that affects someone’s basic capacity to love would affect her capacity to act as a person. An abused woman taking an anti-love drug which affects her capacity for empathy would damage all her relationships.

However romantic love seems to differ from other forms of love. Most forms of love seem to have more persistence than romantic love. Romantic love might be different from other forms of love. If the above is accepted then some forms of love might have the following structure. Love might consist of the basic capacity to care about and identify with something or someone, plus the capacity to feel empathy, plus the capacity for romantic love. It might then be possible that the neurochemical system underlying our capacity to feel romantic love is distinct from neurochemical systems underlying our capacity for basic love and empathy. If love has this form then it might be possible for an abused woman to take an anti-love drug which affects her capacity for romantic love without damaging her other loving relationships. The above assumes an abused woman’s love for her abusive partner depends on romantic love. In practice many abused women suffer abuse for many years suggesting their love may not be wholly based on romantic love.

I have not been able to answer the specific question as to whether it would be permissible to take anti-love drugs in certain situations. The above however suggests that before we attempt to answer this question we need firstly to investigate whether love has a structure and secondly provided it does investigate whether the neurochemical systems underlying the different elements of this structure are distinct enough to permit the use of these drugs.

1.      Harry Frankfurt, 2006, Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, page 41.

2.      Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 103

3.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford.

Meaning and Happiness

In a recent posting in practical ethics Hannah Maslen considers happiness meaning and well-being. Let us accept that happiness and meaning in life are both part of well-being. There is usually a positive correlation between happiness and meaning. Usually happy people have a more meaningful life and vice versa. However some research by Roy Baumeister, Kathleen Vohs, Jennifer Aaker and Emily Garbinsky shows this correlation is not always positive (1). Maslen wonders if when this occasional incompatibility occurs whether we must make a decision about which of these two goods to pursue. In what follows I will consider this question. I will however use a slightly different approach to what is meant by meaning in life.

Before examining Maslen’s question I must consider what is meant by meaning in life. Firstly I must make it clear I am not going to consider what a meaningful life is from some objective viewpoint. I am going to consider what living a meaningful life actually means to the person who lives that life. According to the researchers’ results meaningfulness involves doing things that express and reflect the self and in particular doing positive things for others. This involvement can increase someone’s stress, worries, and anxiety. Secondly meaningfulness involves being a giver more than a taker. Lastly meaningfulness integrates past, present, and future, and sometimes meaningfulness means feeling bad. I agree with Maslen that these results rule out a purely hedonistic life as a meaningful life. Moreover these results seem to be incompatible with a meaningful life being based on desire fulfilment. For as Maslen points out stress, worry and anxiety are associated with frustrated desire, rather than desire fulfilment. It might be thought that a meaningful life is one that includes a number of objective items, items such as friendship and good health. Personally I believe such items may well contribute to a meaningful life but that they do not define it.

I now want to return to a common thread of this blog. I want to suggest that in order for someone to have a meaningful life he must ‘care about’ or love something. Indeed I would go as far as to suggest that for someone, whose life is totally devoid of any ‘caring about’, he has a life totally devoid of any meaning and as a result is not really a person at all. He is simply a wanton, see (2). In what follows I will treat the terms ‘caring about’ and ‘loving’ as interchangeable in much the same way as Harry Frankfurt does. Someone who ‘cares about’ or loves something identifies himself with what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about flourishes or is harmed (3). The researchers’ results showed meaningfulness involved doing things that express and reflect the self. Caring about something means identifying with what is cared about. Identification involves doing things that express and reflect the self. Secondly the researchers’ results showed that meaningfulness can increase someone’s stress, worries and anxiety. Caring about something makes someone vulnerable and so can also increase his stress, worries and anxiety. Lastly these results show meaningfulness integrates past, present, and future. According to Frankfurt caring about involves consistency, steadiness of behaviour, and some degree of persistence (4). It follows caring about must integrates past, present, and future to some degree. In the light of the above it appears accepting that, meaning is imparted to someone’s life by what he cares about or loves concurs very well with the researchers’ results.

Let us accept that meaning in someone’s life is dependent on what he loves or cares about. If someone’s beloved flourishes then he is susceptible to the benefits of this flourishing. He is happy. It is important to be clear that someone’s beloved can refer to things as well as people. Someone’s beloved might for instance be a cause, his religion, or a place. If someone’s beloved is harmed then he is harmed. He is unhappy. At times caring about or meaning is incompatible with our ideas about being happy. Some positive psychologists such as Martin Seligman might disagree. Seligman would incorporate meaning into the meaning of happiness, see PERMA . In such cases happiness seems to mean well-being. Such a meaning seems at odds with our intuitive ideas of happiness and in what follows ‘happiness’ will refer to these intuitive ideas. Let us return to Maslen’s question, must we sometimes make a decision about whether we should pursue happiness or meaning? I will now argue the question is meaningless because if meaning depends on what we love or ‘care about’ we cannot make such a decision.

We cannot make such a decision because we cannot make a decision to love. Someone cannot simply decide to love someone or something. According to Frankfurt the will of a lover is not free. On the contrary he, because of the very nature of loving, is captivated by his beloved and his love. The will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter of choice (5). It follows if meaning depends on what we love that we cannot simply choose to have less meaning in our lives in order to be happier. This conclusion has important consequences for any pursuit of happiness. This pursuit is limited at least for our intuitive ideas of happiness. This limitation means that whilst we may of course seek to modify our life in order to be happier, that these modifications cannot be based on consciously altering or lessening the meaning in our lives. Of course I accept that what matters, what we love or what has meaning, may change over time but this change is not a matter of our own volition. I also accept even if we cannot simply will love we can nonetheless sometimes situate ourselves in situations in which love might grow.

1. Roy Baumeister, Kathleen Vohs, Jennifer Aaker & Emily Garbinsky, 2013, Some key differences between a happy life and a meaningful life, The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2013, volume 8(6)
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 114.
3. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 83.
4. Frankfurt, 1988, page 84.
5. Frankfurt, 1999, page 135.

Prisoners serving Life Sentences and Voluntary Euthanasia

In previous postings I have suggested that prisoners serving life sentences have a right to be assisted to commit suicide, see Prisoners serving Life Sentences. In this posting I will argue that this right should only apply to assisted suicide and should not extend to euthanasia. Before commencing my argument I will make some definitions I will use clear. Euthanasia means someone deliberately ends another’s life to end his suffering. Involuntary euthanasia means this is done when he does not consent. Non voluntary euthanasia means this is done when he is incapable of giving consent. Voluntary euthanasia means this is done with his consent. Assisted suicide means someone deliberately provides the means for another to end his own life. I will assume without any further argument that involuntary and non voluntary euthanasia are inapplicable to prisoners serving life sentences. In what follows I argue voluntary euthanasia should also be inapplicable to such prisoners.

Let us consider a prisoner serving a life sentence for some gruesome murder of an innocent person. Let us further assume this prisoner decides he wants to die. Why if he fully consents shouldn’t someone end his life? One reason might be that, unless the prisoner was suffering, doing so would not be a case of voluntary euthanasia. Moreover, unless the prisoner was suffering, it is not clear what would be the motive of whoever carried out the act. The motive could not be one of punishment for punishment should not depend on the wishes of the prisoner. However let us now assume our hypothetical prisoner is suffering. Why in these circumstances, provided the prisoner fully consents, shouldn’t someone end his life? One reason might be that the prisoner’s suffering could and should be relieved by other means. If his suffering is caused by poor penal conditions then these should be addressed. Voluntary euthanasia should never be used to tackle poor penal conditions; even if it tackles overcrowding! Let us now further assume that the prisoner’s suffering is not caused by poor penal conditions. Perhaps his suffering is caused by mental health problems. If a prisoner suffers from a physical illness such as diabetes then his suffering should be addressed by medical means. Similarly I would argue if a prisoner suffers from mental problems his suffering should be addressed by mental health experts. Voluntary euthanasia should not be used to address mental health problems. Lastly let us consider a scenario in which the prisoner’s suffering is not caused by penal conditions or any mental health problems. Perhaps he simply does not want to spend the rest of his days in prison or more unlikely perhaps he suffers from remorse because of the terrible crimes he committed. Surely if assisted suicide is permissible in such circumstances then so should voluntary euthanasia? I will now argue that voluntary euthanasia should also remain inapplicable even in these circumstances.

In my previous postings I have argued that a prisoner should retain some limited autonomy. Part of that limited autonomy is the right to commit suicide. As the state deprives a prisoner of the means to commit suicide it should provide him with these means in a controlled environment. The prisoner’s right to be assisted to commit suicide depends on his ability to make an autonomous decision. At this point an objector might point out voluntary euthanasia also involves an autonomous decision. She might proceed to argue, if I use a prisoner’s retention of limited autonomy to justify assisted suicide that, the same justification could apply to voluntary euthanasia.

I have two responses to my objector’s argument. Firstly I would suggest we have no need to kill someone provided he can be assisted to commit suicide. My objector might respond by suggesting that there is no real moral difference between killing and assisting someone to die. This is simply a variation of the acts and omissions problem and I will not deal with his suggestion here. My second response carries more weight. I would suggest we can never be completely certain whether someone’s decision is an autonomous one or not. I will then argue we can be more certain that someone has made an autonomous decision to commit suicide than when he gives informed consent to voluntary euthanasia. I will base my argument on the importance of what we care about when making autonomous decisions, see (1). Frankfurt argues autonomous decisions are decisions the agent cares about. I have suggested that autonomous decisions are decisions which are not discordant with what the agent cares about, see autonomous decisions . However I would agree with Frankfurt by suggesting an agent’s actions are better indicators of his autonomous decisions than the choices he makes or what he decides to do. The choices he makes and what he decides to do are only intentions. Sometimes when we come to act we find we cannot carry out our prior intentions because it was not clear to us what we really care about until we came to act. A prisoner giving informed consent to voluntary euthanasia is making a choice and deciding what would be best for him. His intentions are of course an indicator of an autonomous decision. However in the light of the above a prisoner’s actions in committing assisted suicide are a much better indicator of his autonomous decision.

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 84.

Pornography and the Corrosion of Character

David Cameron the British Prime Minister has declared war on pornography, see telegraph . He believes pornography corrodes childhood. He therefore proposes that every internet user in the UK will be asked whether they wish to receive pornography and that the default position will be they do not. In this posting I will not consider the effectiveness of his proposal or consider it’s implications on our freedom. I agree pornography corrodes but would argue this corrosion is not limited to children. In this posting I will argue that pornography might damage someone’s sense of personhood, that it might mean he is a deficient sort of person and that it always corrodes character.

In a thoughtful piece in the Independent Archie Bland says he is pretty confident that he is able to keep fantasy and reality distinct. I now want to examine this split. Of course we must be able to split fantasy from reality or else we would go round in a dream state. Moreover there is nothing wrong with some fantasies. There is nothing wrong with someone fantasying about what he would do if he won the lottery provided of course such a fantasy did not come to dominate his life. I will now argue not all fantasies are the same. Fantasies such as becoming rich need not harm others even if they became true. In such cases if the split between fantasy and reality becomes blurred or ceases no harm is done. The split between fantasy and reality is not essential. This is not true of much of pornography. In what follows for the sake of simplicity I will assume that men are the main users of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst being aware some women may also use pornography. I will also assume women are the objects of pornography unless stated otherwise, whilst again being aware that many other forms exist. Much of pornography portrays women as being dominated or harmed. These forms of pornography would be harmful if the fantasies involved became true. I will accept some forms of pornography in which women or others are not dominated or harmed may not be harmful to third parties. In the rest of this piece pornography will refer to pornography which involves fantasies which imagine dominating or harming others unless stated otherwise. It follows for these forms of pornography any blurring of the split between fantasy and reality might be harmful to others. In this context the maintenance of the split between fantasy and reality is absolutely essential. The maintenance between fantasy and reality may also be essential in another context. There now an increasing use of sexbots. Sex with a robot is a kind of fantasy. If this fantasy involves domination and harm then once again any blurring of the split between this fantasy and reality might be harmful to others.

Bland is confident that he is able to keep fantasy and reality distinct but this might not be true for all men. It appears to follow the use of pornography is dangerous and a case can be made for the state attempting to control pornography in order to limit this danger. Of course it might be argued the state should not do so as any such attempt would limit personal freedom. I will not pursue this argument here as I am mainly concerned with the type of harm pornography causes. It might be objected at this point that men who are already likely to harm women use pornography, rather than pornography causes some men to become more likely to harm women. Personally I am extremely doubtful about my objector’s point. Nonetheless I must accept that whether pornography causes harm to women or men who use pornography harm women is an empirical question which can only be settled by good evidence and not by philosophy. However even if my objector is right I still believe splitting fantasy and reality is damaging to the user of pornography.

I suggest the use of pornography by a man damages his relationships with women in general. Firstly the use of pornography may limit his real engagement with women. Perhaps more importantly someone, who may be able to maintain the split between fantasy and reality so he will not harm women, will nonetheless find that this split taints his engagement with women. He sees women both as objects that may be used as he wills and creatures who are essentially the same as himself and limit his will. At this point my objector might suggest there is a distinction between fantasy women who may be used and real women who limit a man’s will and it is possible for someone to completely separate the two in his mind. If this is so my objector might conclude we have no reason to believe a man’s use of pornography will taint his engagement with real women. In theory my objector may be correct but as above I remain extremely doubtful. Moreover in this case there seems to be some evidence to support my doubts. If the separation between fantasy women and real women is complete then there is no reason why a man who uses such pornography should keep it secret. If his partner asks him if he uses such material he has no reason to lie. I would argue he has two reasons to lie. Firstly let assume he is truthful. If he is truthful it seems probable his relationship with his partner will be damaged. His partner is unlikely to believe he can maintain the separation between fantasy and real women in his mind and as a result sees him as someone who sees her as someone who can be used. Secondly the man involved will not be truthful because he feels ashamed. But why should he be ashamed if the separation between fantasy women and real women is complete? I have previously argued there are two types of shame . One type of shame is anxiety about social disqualification as suggested by Velleman, see (1). Another type of shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves. Because pornography is regarded socially as reprehensible it follows a user of pornography may fear social disqualification even if he is able to maintain the split between fantasy and reality. He might also feel shame because deep down he feels this separation is incomplete.

At this point my objector might point out not all pornography is used by heterosexual men, homosexuals also use pornography. Moreover some homosexual pornography portrays others as being used and harmed. He might question whether lesbian pornography portraying women being used and harmed damages the relationships of women who use it with other women. If it does not he might then ask why only pornography used by men which portrays women being used or harmed damages the user’s relationships with women? At the present time I cannot provide a satisfying answer my objector’s question, perhaps someone else can. I would now simply suggest that the use of pornography damages the user’s relationships with others because he/she is likely to lie about his/her use for the reasons outlined above.

I now want to argue the use of pornography damages the user even if it doesn’t damage his relationship with others. A common theme in my postings is that someone’s identity is defined by what he cares about. As always in my postings to ‘care about’ means someone identifies with what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Frankfurt argues that caring about oneself is essential to being a person and that someone who doesn’t care about himself can’t really be considered as a person

.

“Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be. There could not be a person of no importance to himself.” (2).

Let us accept someone’s identity is defined by what he cares about. Frankfurt goes on to argue that ambivalence is a disease of the will,

“the health of the will is to be unified and in this sense wholehearted. A person is volitionally robust when he is wholehearted in his higher order attitudes and inclinations, in his preferences and decisions, and in other movements of the will.” (3).

Now pornography forces someone to maintain a split between fantasy and reality. If someone uses pornography this split threatens the unity of his will and is damaging to his identity. I would further suggest a user of sexbot risks damaging his identity for the same reason.

My objector might raise two objections to the above. Firstly he might argue a user of pornography might not really care about pornography and as a result its use plays no part in forming his identity. It just a something he has a taste for much the same as ice cream. In my last posting I suggested that an autonomous decision need not be one an agent cares about but any decision he makes which is not discordant with what he cares about. I further suggested if someone continually buys ice cream that his liking for ice cream plays a part, albeit a small part, in the creation of his identity. So in reply to my objector I would suggest if someone continually uses pornography this use forms part of his identity to some degree. Secondly my objector might accept that a user of pornography cares about its use but argue this use does not damage his identity. He might point out we all compartmentalise our lives and the user of pornography may put his usage into a safe compartment. He might point out Frankfurt believes that the formation of someone’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others (4). He might then argue if someone is able to order the things he cares about by how much he cares about them that his use of pornography need not harm his identity. At this point I must accept that the use of pornography may, at least in theory, not damage the user’s identity as a person provided he is able to fully order the things he cares about. However I believe this would be hard to achieve in practice and for this reason the use of pornography remains dangerous to someone’s identity.

Let us accept that for someone to be a person of any sort he must care about something. But according to Helm such an account of a person is incomplete and for someone to be a person he must have some values (5). I would argue this means he must care about what he cares about. According to Helm such meta-caring about must involve feelings of pride and shame. I believe the simple ability to care about is all that is necessary for someone to be a person. Nonetheless I believe that most people do care what they care about. They care not just about being a person but being a good person and this caring does involve feelings of pride and shame. Let us accept without argument that it is better to be a good person than simply a person who cares about things but has no pride or shame in what he cares about. It follows someone who doesn’t care about what he cares about is in some way a deficient person.

Let us accept that someone who doesn’t care about what he cares about is in a deficient kind of person. Let us also return to pornography which portrays women as being used or harmed and consider a man who uses such pornography. Let us assume this man cares what he cares about. It seems to me such a man must wish he didn’t care about pornography. Because by using pornography he is caring about using and harming others. Anyone who cares about what he cares about must have some conception of the good. He must also care about the good. I would suggest any conception of the good must exclude using or harming others for no benefit. I would further suggest this exclusion must include imaginary harm. It follows such a man is likely to feel shame at his use of pornography. This is not the type of shame as anxiety about social disqualification. It is anxiety about harming the things he cares about, in this case his conception of the good. In the light of the above I would suggest that the user of pornography, who cares about what he cares about, sees himself as a deficient person as he fails to be the sort of person he aspires to be. The character he aspires to be is corroded.

1.      David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95.

2.      Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 90.

3.      Frankfurt, page 100.

4.      Frankfurt, 1988, The importance of what we care about, Cambridge University Press, page 91,

5.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship, & the Self, Oxford University Press, page 128.

More Autonomy

In Melbourne Australia Harry Kakavas lost $20.5 million to a casino. He sued the casino arguing it should have known he was a pathological gambler and as a result not taken his money. He lost his case in the Australian High Court. The Court ruled that Kakavas did not show that he suffered from a disability, special to him, which was exploited by the casino. What sort of disability is relevant in such a case? It would seem in this particular case that Kakavas did not have the ability to make meaningful decisions, decisions which were in his own interests, whilst gambling. Gambling affected his autonomy. The Kakavas case raises questions about the nature and extent of autonomous decisions. In this posting I will examine both of these questions. I addition I will consider when we have a duty to intervene when someone makes a non-autonomous decision; provided of course we have the power to do so as the casino involved with Kakavas did,

Which of the decisions we make are autonomous? It might be thought that these decisions must be important decisions which we make only after careful consideration. A patient giving informed consent might be seen a paradigmatic example of such an autonomous decision. If this is so someone making a decision without appropriate reflection might be said to be making a non-autonomous decision. It might then be argued we can safely ignore her decision because it does not represent her ‘real self’, see Berlin (1). It is not a decision she would have made if he had more adequately reflected on it. I would suggest such an attitude is one of moral arrogance.

I now want to argue almost all of the decisions we make are autonomous. A common theme throughout all my postings is that someone’s autonomy depends on what she ‘cares about’. Caring about in this context means not merely wanting something; it means someone’s identity, her ‘real self’, is dependent on what she cares about. Moreover I have argued in previous postings what someone ‘cares about’ is defined by what she is satisfied with. Satisfaction in this context simply means no resistance to a decision, no restlessness with that decision (2). There is no desire to change the decision. It is important here to be clear satisfaction with a decision does not equate with being happy about a decision. As I have argued before someone with a terminal illness may decide to commit suicide and be completely satisfied with her decision but nonetheless her satisfaction does not imply she is happy about it. Accepting the above means if someone is satisfied with some decision and has no inclination to change her decision that her decision is an autonomous one. I would suggest that people are satisfied, as defined above, with almost all of their decisions. The above leads to the tentative conclusion that almost all of the decisions we make are autonomous.

At this point an objector might be prepared to accept that for a decision to be autonomous it must be based on what we care about. However she might be unwilling to concede that it naturally follows that almost all of our decisions are autonomous. My objector might argue we can only know what we care about after adequate reflection. She might then further argue that because most of our decisions are non-reflective that most of our decisions are non-autonomous. If my objector’s argument is to carry any weight then she must accept one of two options. Firstly someone may make an autonomous decision based on what she cares about and be dissatisfied with her decision. Or secondly she must accept that being satisfied with a decision is a necessary condition for that decision to be an autonomous decision based on what the agent cares about but argue it is not a sufficient condition. Let us examine the first option. An agent can make an autonomous decision and be dissatisfied with it. I accept an agent can make an autonomous decision she’s not happy with, see above, but I can’t accept she can make an autonomous decision she’s not satisfied with. Let us accept satisfaction with a decision does not simply mean the agent has some smug feeling but means she has no resistance to her decision, no restlessness to change it. It follows if an agent is dissatisfied with a decision that she either resists the decision or seeks to change it. She is ambivalent about her decision. I don’t accept that any decision someone is ambivalent about and seeks to change can be an autonomous decision. It follows an agent cannot make an autonomous decision she is dissatisfied with.

Let us consider my objectors second option that being satisfied with a decision is a necessary condition for that decision to be an autonomous one based on what the agent cares about but that it is not a sufficient one. My objector might suggest that for a decision to be an autonomous one not only must the agent be satisfied with it but that she must have reflected on it. This suggestion would mean most decisions we make are non-autonomous. Of course for many of the decisions we make this doesn’t matter. No one is really concerned whether someone’s decision to have an ice cream is an autonomous one or not. However let us consider a family on a summer’s day sitting on the bank of a fast flowing river eating ice cream. Let us assume one of the children falls into the river and without any thought the mother jumps in and saves the child. Was this a non-autonomous decision? I would argue it was an autonomous decision. Indeed the mother might feel hurt if someone suggested afterwards her actions were mindless. She might say she minded very much, she loved her child, and that she couldn’t act any other way, reflection was pointless. The above suggests for a decision to be autonomous all that matters is that the agent cares about it. It suggests that caring about a decision is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for that decision to be autonomous in conditions in which the agent has been neither coerced nor deceived. Of course sometimes an agent may have to reflect on what he cares about but it is caring about rather than reflection that guarantees a decision is autonomous. Indeed it might be argued the fact that an agent feels a need to reflect on a decision make the autonomy of the decision less certain.

My objector might accept that for a decision to be an autonomous one the agent must care about her decision but suggest we don’t really care about many of our decisions. For instance she might point out my decision to buy an ice cream on a sudden whim is not based on what I really care about in the way we have been using the term. We only care about important decisions and only these decisions can be autonomous or non autonomous, mere whims don’t count. I believe this might be the position Frankfurt would adopt, see (3). I however would adopt a slightly different position. I would suggest an autonomous decision need not be one an agent cares about but any decision he makes which is not discordant with what he cares about. If my suggestion is accepted then most of the decisions we make, including my whim to buy ice cream, would be autonomous. At this point my objector might point out my suggestion seems to weaken the connection between autonomy and personal identity. Frankfurt argues our identity is linked to what we care about.

“Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the indispensably activity through which provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives. Regardless of whether its objects are appropriate, our caring about things possesses for us an inherent value by virtue of its essential role in making us the distinctive kind of creatures that we are.” (4).

I agree our identity is connected to what we care about. It might appear that because identity and autonomy are connected that autonomous decisions must be decisions we care about. I believe appearance is unjustified. I have suggested above that autonomous decisions are connected to what we care about, our identity, by being decisions which are not discordant with what we care about, our identity. Of course when making most decisions we don’t reflect about our identity. Nonetheless I would suggest our identity is always present even if only in the background. I would further suggest this presence gives continuity and coherence to our lives. If autonomous decisions are any decisions which are not discordant with what we care about then not all autonomous decisions play an equal part in defining our identity. Indeed some like my decision to have an ice cream may play no part. Nonetheless if I continually buy ice cream I may be said to be someone who likes ice cream and this plays a small part of my identity. In the light of the above it appears an agent caring about her decision is not necessary for her decision to be an autonomous one. Moreover someone’s being satisfied with her decision is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the decision to be an autonomous one in circumstances in which she has not been deceived or coerced.

I have argued that most of the decisions we make are autonomous decisions. In addition I believe we should always accept an autonomous decision even if this decision harms the decision maker provided of course the decision does not harm others. I believe we must give precedence to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. It seems to me someone’s identity is tied to her autonomy, tied to what she finds appropriate, what satisfies her. If we fail to respect someone’s autonomy we fail to respect her. Let us consider an example. Personally I detest is smoking. Moreover smoking harms smokers. Let us assume I one of my friends is a smoker who on hearing I am going to a shop asks me to buy her some cigarettes. As I am going to the shop anyway I will not be inconvenienced if I buy her cigarettes. Let us also assume she is completely satisfied with her decision, she will not smoke in my presence or that of other non-smoker and that she fully understands the dangers of smoking and is not deceiving herself. Let us further assume I refuse to buy her cigarettes because I believe these will harm her. I am helping her to prevent harming herself by not respecting her autonomous request even though satisfying her request would not inconvenience me. I am giving priority to acting beneficently over respecting her autonomy. I would suggest in this example I am merely paying lip service to respecting her as a person. Perhaps I might console myself that I am respecting her real self, but this real self is really an ideal self created by me. In this example I believe I could justly be accused of some sort of arrogance.

If we accept we should respect autonomy over acting beneficently and most decisions we make are autonomous in the sense used above then we have to accept a large number of decisions which are unwise or even foolhardy. Kakavas’ decision to gamble in the casino was certainly an unwise one but was it also a non-autonomous one? If it was an autonomous one then the casino should respect his decision however unwise it was. In theory it seems there might be completely satisfied gamblers. However in practice most gamblers feel guilty about their gambling and have some resistance to their compulsion to gamble. It follows most gamblers’ decisions to gamble are non-autonomous decisions. It seems probable that Kakavas’ decision to gamble was a non-autonomous one. It follows the casino could not justify, allowing Kakavas to continue gambling, on respect for his autonomy.

In normal life we generally accept peoples’ decisions, even if many of these are not autonomous decisions, provided we have no reason to suspect that these decisions will harm the decision maker. Kakavas’ gambling clearly harmed him. How could a casino possibly justify allowing Kakavas to gamble if his gambling was both non-autonomous and harmed him? One possible justification concerns the nature of the harm involved. Kakavas’ gambling harmed him financially but it might have done only limited harm to his capacity to make autonomous decisions. Kakavas’ capacity to make autonomous decisions was impaired whilst gambling but perhaps it remained unimpaired at other times. He could have made an autonomous decision not to go to the casino in much the same way a recovering alcoholic makes a decision not to go to a bar. The casino might argue even if Kakavas was harmed it was respecting his autonomous decision to go gambling and it was justified in respecting this decision because respecting autonomy should take precedence over acting beneficently. I would accept the above argument. However I would be some what sceptical about a gamblers ability to make a decision she knows will make her feel guilty without any resistance to her decision.