Let us agree that uncontrollable anger is bad for us
because it harms us and damages our relationships. Young children often exhibit
uncontrollable anger but as they grow up they learn to control it.
Uncontrollable anger might be acceptable in toddlers and their parents might
even find it amusing but it isn’t acceptable in teenagers and adults. Controlling
our anger matters. Agnes Callard points out that when philosophers argue about
how we should control our anger they are often talking about refining our raw
anger by losing certain elements of our original raw anger rather than simply
controlling it. (1) Some limit our anger to indignation or resentment whilst
others such as Martha Nussbaum suggest that we should transmute our anger into
searching for a way to right the original wrong. Callard argues in doing so
they lose the raw feeling of anger. In this posting I want to consider whether our
raw feeling of anger matters and whether we have reasons to completely refine
our raw anger provided of course this is possible.
What does Callard mean by the dark feeling of raw anger?
When we become angry we undergo certain physiological changes. For instance our
heartrate increases. Many of these feelings could also apply to rage but it is
important not to confuse anger with rage. We can rage against events or animals
but it seems our anger is always directed at persons. Whilst our anger is
directed at persons it is focussed on some moral wrong. Moral wrong in this
context might simply mean a failure in moral concern by others who fail to
respect or consider us. Because our feelings are focussed on some wrong these
feelings involve a sense of grievance and a desire for revenge. It would be
impossible to feel anger without at least some sense of grievance but some can
people can feel aggrieved without feeling angry. It follows a sense of
grievance is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for anger. Revenge
seems more central to our idea of anger and is also a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for raw anger. Some authors such as Nussbaum use the term
payback instead of revenge but this seems to be yet another attempt to refine
anger. For this reason I will continue
to use the term revenge when referring to raw anger. In this posting raw anger
will be defined as a combination of physiological changes which we interpret
negatively together with a sense of grievance against the offender and a desire
for revenge.
Let us now consider Callard’s example of someone who robs
us making us angry. After our initial angry reaction should we refine it and
seek to rectify the situation? It might be suggested that if the situation
doesn’t change that we have no reason to do so. However let us assume that
after some time the offender makes a sincere apology and recompenses us for our
losses. In this situation should we let our raw anger go? Callard presents two
arguments to show that we still have reasons to retain our raw anger. The first
is her argument for grudges. According to Callard,
“Once we have reason to be angry we have reason to be angry
forever” (2)
If we had reason for a grievance that reason remains even
if the offender apologises his apology doesn’t remove the reason for our grievance.
Of course a sincere apology might give us reason to attach less importance to
our grievance and alter our behaviour but according to Callard it doesn’t
eradicate the grievance. The example of rape seems to support Callard’s
position. Even if the rapist sincerely apologises and vows never to do so again
and the victim forgives the rapist her sense of grievance might remain and
would remain and seem to be fully justified. Callard’s second argument is the
argument for revenge. According to Callard,
“The Argument for Revenge is simply that revenge is how we
hold one another morally responsible” (3)
We do so according to Callard by,
“you make my wronging of you into a general principle and
then “educate” me by imposing it on me.” (4)
This argument might be roughly summarised as follows. A
harms B. It follows that A believes it is good for him to harm B. If he thought
it bad for him he wouldn’t do so. B makes A’s behaviour into a norm. B harms A
and B learns harming others is bad. Of course the possibility of revenge might
simply deter someone from wrongdoing but revenge can also teach an offender that
his actions are wrong. Let us accept Callard’s two arguments for retaining our
raw anger.
However even if we accept that we have some reasons to
retain our raw anger this doesn’t automatically mean we should do so. We might have
even stronger reasons to refine our anger. A permanently angry society would be
a violent one. Let us first consider our desire for revenge. We are no longer a
tribal society so it might be suggested that we should let go of our desire for
revenge in order to create a less violent society. Two objections might be
raised to this suggestion. Firstly it might be objected that if we do so that
we damage both our self-respect and the respect others have for us. We might be
seen by others and ourselves as pushovers. This would occur if we simply
repressed or lost all anger. However if we refine rather than simply lose our
anger we might retain our respect. According to Nussbaum if we shift our focus
from how we feel to the cause of our anger our focus also shifts to a set of
projects aimed at improving both society and the offender. (5) If we refine our
anger by losing our desire for revenge then we aren’t acting passively,
shouldn’t be seen as pushovers and the objection fails. Secondly it might be
objected that if we refine our anger by losing our desire for revenge that we
deprive the offender of some benefit. Callard argues that if we give up our
desire for revenge that we would be failing to hold someone as morally responsible
and failing to educate him as to what is morally required. In response I would
suggest that our desire for revenge is mostly a desire to educate the offender
that we aren’t pushovers, to teach him a lesson in moral behaviour. Nonetheless
let us agree with Callard that our desire for revenge also holds someone as
responsible for his actions and educates him to some degree about what is
required morally by society. In a tribal society we might well have good reason
to pursue revenge. However we don’t live in a tribal society and any educational
benefits of revenge might be achieved by other means. For instance it is
perfectly possible to withhold trust without feeling any need for revenge.
Altering someone’s status within society by the withdrawal of trust might
educate an offender about what is morally required. It follows even if revenge
might deliver some benefits that these benefits might be more effectively by
other means and that the possible benefits delivered by revenge do not give us
reason not to refine our raw anger.
According to Callard the holding of a grievance or grudge
is an essential element of anger. I have argued above that the withdrawal of
trust might achieve much the same benefits as revenge. Let us accept that if we
lose our desire for revenge but retain our sense of grievance that we have
refined our anger to some degree. However some would argue that we should go
further in refining our anger by also letting go of our sense of grievances.
Let us accept that Callard is correct in her assertion that once we have a
grievance that we have reason for our grievance forever. It follows it might be
impossible to refine our anger further. In the real world it would be very
difficult for someone who has been raped to give up her sense of grievance even
if she can give up her desire for revenge. According
to Nussbaum traditional anger can transmute into transitional anger,
“quickly puts itself out of
business, in that even the residual focus on punishing the offender is soon
seen as part of a set of projects for improving both offenders and society.” (6)
If we accept Callard is
correct then raw anger cannot be totally refined. Nonetheless it might be
possible to move on. Even if the rape victim cannot let go of her grievance she
can take part in a set of projects for improving both the offender and society,
she can move on by moderating her behaviour whilst retaining her sense of
grievance. Our behaviour isn’t determined by a single reason but by a set of
reasons. Individual reasons within this set are weighted, some are more
important than others. We can retain a reason to act whilst the weight given to
this reason is changed by additions to the set of our reasons. If the rapist
genuinely apologises and seeks to reform the rape victim might give less weight
to her grievance whilst still retaining it.
In the above it has been assumed above that Callard is
correct when she argues that if a victim has a reason for a grievance that she
has that reason forever. I now want to argue that if a victim has a reason for
a grievance that she doesn’t always have this reason forever. Callard assumes
that that a victim has a grievance because of some past event and that she has
reason for this grievance forever because the past cannot be changed. Of course
the past cannot be changed but a grievance isn’t simply concerned with some
past event but must of necessity be directed at someone. To make this clearer
let us return to our rape example. Let us assume that the rapist is an adult
but has the mental age of a five year old. In this situation the victim
has been wronged but would she be justified in holding a grievance with the offender? I would suggest she won’t. It would seem that
whether someone can have a grievance with some offender depends on the internal
make-up of the offender. I have argued
elsewhere that emotions serve as alarms by maintaining our focus on some
potential danger. A grievance maintains
our focus on the fact that someone might harm us. If we accept the above then a
victim may have a reason to maintain a grievance with an offender because it
alerts her to danger but that if the offender changes the danger might cease
and she loses her reason to maintain her grievance. Let us once again return to
our rape victim. Let us assume that the victim has been violently raped and that
her grievance alerts her to the dangers posed by the offender. Let us now
assume at some later date the offender has a severe stroke which leaves him in
a vegetative state. In this new situation the victim might still be unhappy and
hurt but she has lost her reason to hold onto her grievance with the
offender because it maintains her focus on danger. It follows that Callard isn’t
correct when she argues that all victims who have a reason for a grievance have
those reasons forever. All victims have been wronged forever but not all victims have reasons to hold onto their grievances forever.
How do we differentiate between those victims who have
reason to maintain their grievances and those who don’t? I have argued above
the focus of our anger is on some wrong but that it is directed at the
offender. I have further argued that if the offender changes in some radical
way that we sometimes have reason to lose a grievance. Lastly I argued that the
reason we have to maintain a grievance against an offender because it focusses
on our need for caution in our dealings with him. It follows if the offender
changes so that we no longer have to be so cautious in dealing with him that we
lose our reason for our grievance. In my above example because the rapist has a
stroke and poses no further threat to the victim she loses her reason to
maintain her sense of grievance. In the above example it is clear that the
offender has changed but in more general cases how do we know the offender has
changed and that as a result we have lost our reason for maintaining our grievance
with him? Perhaps if the offender makes a sincere apology and takes steps to
repair the damage done then we should try to lose our sense of grievance.
However if the offender doesn’t change we have reason to maintain our grievance
and shouldn’t unconditionally forgive him.
- Agnes Callard, 2020, On Anger, Boston Review Forum, page 15.
- Callard, page 18
- Callard, page 18
- Callard , page 19
- Martha Nussbaum, 2015, Transitional Anger. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, page 51.
- Nussbaum, page 51
