Wednesday, 22 May 2019

Redesigning People

In China a scientist has created two gene edited babies using CRISPR-cas9 in order to prevent HIV infection. These babies are usually referred to as designer babies. In this posting I will use the term redesign rather than design because people have already been designed by their genes and this design is shaped by nature and evolution. I will consider whether we should attempt to improve on that design by redesigning people and in what circumstances it would be permissible to do so. If we redesign a kettle we hope the redesigned kettle will be an improvement on the previous one. Intuitively it might be thought if we redesign a person the result will automatically be an improved person. However we must be wary of our intuitions and whilst it might be pointless to redesign a kettle which isn’t an improved kettle the same does not hold for persons. A kettle is designed for a single task persons aren’t. Someone might redesign a person to serve a specific purpose and such a redesigned person needn’t necessarily be an improved person when considered more broadly. Perhaps a person might be redesigned to be a better soldier such a redesigned person need only be a better soldier not a better person. Prior to considering specific wrongs which might arise if we redesign persons I want to consider the different ways in which redesigning might be wrong.

Redesigning persons might be wrong in three circumstances. Firstly we aren’t competent to redesign persons. Persons unlike kettles are highly complex and perhaps we just don’t have the expertise to carry out such redesign. If we accept the above then it would be unacceptable to redesign persons unfortunately in these circumstances we should be open to the rather unpalatable option that others such as aliens or even some advanced AI might be able to redesign us even if we can't do so. Secondly it might be suggested that whilst we don’t have the expertise to redesign persons now that we might acquire such expertise in the future. If we accept this option then whilst it would be unacceptable to redesign persons now it might become acceptable in the future and it would be sensible to debate the consequences of doing so now. Lastly it might be suggested that the act of redesign must always damage the redesigned person. Danaher explores two objections raised by Jurgen Habermas to redesigning persons in which the act of redesign damages the designee. Habermas argues redesigning a person would of necessity damage her because it would compromise her autonomy and status of equality. I will now consider the specific ways in which redesigning persons might be damaging. Firstly I will briefly consider how redesigning persons might cause damage to both persons and society by creating inequality. Secondly I will consider how redesigning a person might damage that person by compromising her autonomy.

Let us accept that Kant was right to insist that treating someone simply as a means and not an end in herself is morally wrong. It follows that if we accept that creating someone to serve our ends is equivalent to using someone to serve our ends then redesigning a person to serve the ends of another is wrong. It also follows that if someone redesigns another to serve her ends that there is a lack of equality between the designer and the designee. The choice of available ends to the designer and the designee are unequal. However why should we want to redesign a person to serve our needs? It seems probable that if our technology becomes advanced enough to redesign persons that it would also become advanced enough to design robots which aren’t, as yet, persons to serve the same needs. In this situation if we want an improved soldier, a robotic soldier would seem to be a better option than a redesigned person. Personhood would be an unnecessary extravagance and might even make the soldier less effective. The same seems true of most servants with one possible exception. Currently there is some interest in sex robots (1). However is sex with a robot genuine intercourse? I have argued that sex isn’t simply friction and as a result sex with a robot is really only an enhanced form of masturbation sex with robots . It is possible that in this situation someone might want to redesign a person to serve her sexual desires. It follows that it is conceivable that in some limited circumstances someone might want to redesign a person to serve her own ends. Such redesigning creates a person designed for the ends of another making her less equal. It follows redesigning someone to serve the ends of another is morally wrong because it creates inequalities between persons. Now let us consider whether redesigning someone in order to benefit that person might also create inequalities in society. Any society which contains both enhanced and unenhanced persons is likely to be an unequal one. It follows that we might have reason not redesign persons based on the potential damage it might do to society. How strong these reasons are will depend on the cost and availability of redesign. It is possible that redesigning persons won’t damage society. I now want to consider other reasons why redesigning persons might be wrong.

In what follows it will be accepted that to design a person in order to serve the needs of another is wrong. It will also be accepted that redesigning persons might be wrong if it creates unacceptable inequalities in society. It will also be assumed that if we redesign someone that we do so in order to benefit her. If we redesign someone in order to benefit her then this redesign is a form of enhancement. I now want examine whether redesigning someone in order to enhance her might damage her personally? Let us start our examination by considering a specific example. Some potential mothers suffer from mitochondrial disease and these mothers will normally have babies who will suffer from the same disease. Using IVF an egg taken from such a mother might be fertilised. The nucleus of this egg is then transferred to an egg with its nucleus removed which has been donated by another woman from which the nucleus has been removed creating a three parent baby. This is a clear case of redesign and it is hard to see in this case how being designed damages the designee. It also seems to answer one of the questions raised above as to whether we can effectively redesign someone, the answer is that we can at least in some cases. If we accept the above then redesigning persons is both possible and doesn’t always damage the persons involved. However are there some circumstances in which designing a person damages the designed person?

Let us recall we have excluded cases in which we redesign someone in order to serve the purposes of another and are only considering redesign in circumstances in which the redesign is intended to benefit the redesigned person. Such a redesign is a form of enhancement. Let us first consider the possibility that we can enhance only one capability and leave the rest of the designed persons capabilities unchanged. Perhaps someone might be redesigned to be stronger or have a better memory. Human beings are animals and it is hard to see from the viewpoint of an animal how such enhancement might damage the animal involved. Being stronger or remembering the hiding places of predators should give any animal an evolutionary advantage. Let us accept that enhancing a single instrumental capability whilst leaving the rest of some designed person’s capabilities unchanged doesn’t damage her physically. Much the same reasoning can be applied to enhancing several capabilities provided the remaining capabilities are unchanged. However human beings aren’t simply animals they are potential persons. Does the fact that some capacity or capacities have been chosen by another for enhancement damage her as a person? I now want to consider whether the redesigning of a person in order to enhance her damages her autonomy.

Let us return to my example in which we redesign someone to be stronger. How can being stronger damage someone’s autonomy even if this choice was made for her by another? It might be suggested that by making someone stronger we are enhancing her capacity for athletic prowess. It might then be further suggested that by enhancing her athletic prowess she becomes more likely to choose an athletic career and as a result we have limited her choices and compromised her autonomy. The same argument could be applied to redesigning someone in order to enhance other skills such as an improved memory. It might be suggested that such redesign is analogous to parents who encourage a child’s athletic prowess and that they too damage her ability to choose and as a result compromise her autonomy. In practice we accept parents who encourage their children’s athletic prowess.  After all what can be wrong with encouraging prowess in something which is beneficial? It might then be further argued that if we are prepared to accept encouraging parents who encourage athletic prowess that we should be prepared to accept parents who seek to increase this prowess by redesign. It seems to me that this argument is unsound because the analogy is not a close one as children can reject parental encouragement but they can’t reject redesign.

I have suggested that parents who encourage their children to excel in some activity don’t damage their children’s autonomy because their children can reject their parent’s choices whilst parents who redesign their children to excel in some activity might do so because their children can’t reject the enhancement. I would be unhappy to accept this suggestion for two reasons. Firstly I accept that whilst most parents who encourage their children to excel don’t damage their children’s autonomy some might. Parenting is about guidance and some parents try to direct rather than guide their children, such parents do some harm to their children’s autonomy, see parenting and excessive guidance . Secondly my objector is suggesting that the enhancement of certain capacities of someone makes it more likely that she will choose some option and that this increased probability damages her autonomy. I accept that enhancing someone’s capacity might make her more inclined to make certain choices but I want to argue this doesn’t damage her autonomy in all circumstances. Let us return to my example of parents who enhance their child so that she has greater strength. These parents have no specific life plan for their child in mind and only want their child to be stronger. Let us assume that the child decides to become a gymnast. Let us accept that her increased strength makes it both easier and more probable that she will choose this option. Does the fact that some option has been made both easier to choose and more probable to be chosen by someone due to her enhancement by others mean that her autonomy has been damaged? I would suggest that in these circumstances it doesn’t. In these circumstances our potential gymnast hasn’t been coerced and it is difficult to see how her greater strength could possibly alter her capabilities to make an autonomous choice. Making it easier for someone to choose some option isn’t the same as making her choose that option. It follows redesigning a child so she has greater strength doesn’t damage her autonomy. I would now suggest that the same argument could be applied to all her instrumental capacities including cognitive abilities such as an improved memory or quicker reasoning. The fact that someone else has chosen which capacities to enhance seems irrelevant in these circumstances as far as enhanced person’s autonomy is concerned. Accepting the above leads a the conclusion that redesigning someone so that she has certain enhanced instrumental cognitive or physical capacities which were chosen by others and these capacities make it more likely that she will choose a particular option doesn’t damage her autonomy in circumstance in which this redesign doesn’t affect her remaining capacities and should be permissible. If this wasn’t so then any educational establishment which offered a bursary to a student, which might make it more likely she would pursue an academic career could be said to be damaging her autonomy.

I have argued that any enhancement in circumstances which only enhances some of someone’s instrumental capacities whilst leaving her remaining capacities unchanged doesn’t damage her autonomy and that such a redesign should be permissible. However it is possible to enhance someone’s non-instrumental capacities. I now want to consider whether enhancing these capacities might damage someone’s autonomy. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that there is a need for widespread moral enhancement in order to counter the existential dangers which our modern world poses (2). Perhaps in order to counter these dangers we should redesign persons so that they have an increased capacity for empathy.  Would such a redesign damage someone’s capacity for autonomy? It might be argued that if we increase someone’s capacity for empathy that this increased capacity would lead to an increased desire to help others which in turn might lead to a decrease in her ability to fully exercise her cognitive abilities. Her increased empathy overwhelms her ability to make autonomous decisions to some degree. If we accept the above then enhancing someone’s capacity for empathy might damage her capacity to make autonomous decisions. What is important in these circumstances is not simply that someone has chosen which capacity to enhance but that by choosing she has altered the relationship between the enhanced person’s capacities to choose or damaged one of them. If we accept the above then it might be concluded that if enhancing some of someone’s capacities alters her remaining capacities to choose or damages them then this enhancement damages her autonomy and this redesign should be impermissible.

Whether we should accept the above conclusion depends on the account of autonomy employed. There are many different accounts of autonomy and I will only consider two accounts here because most other accounts fall somewhere between these accounts for our purposes here even if the details differ. First an autonomous decision might be regarded as a good decision based on what the agent cares about together with some widely accepted norms. If we accept this account then if someone’s enhanced capacity for empathy compromises her ability to accept certain norms then her autonomy is damaged. If we accept this account of autonomy then we might limit any damage to someone’s autonomy by employing a dual enhancement that enhances both empathy and cognition which might lead to increased empathy across a wider domain, see widespread moral enhancement. Secondly an autonomous decision might be regarded as simply as one which accords with what an agent cares about. Clearly if we accept this account and redesign someone in order to increase her empathy we won’t damage her autonomy. I have argued elsewhere that we should adopt this second primitive account of autonomy because if we don’t autonomous decisions simply become good decisions and that we have no need for a separate account of autonomy. If we accept this second account of autonomy then we have no reason based on damaging someone’s autonomy not to enhance her capacity for empathy even if her enhanced empathy overwhelms some of her cognitive capabilities. However in these circumstances doing so would still damage her as a person. Persons have some capacity for reasoning and if we overwhelm this capacity we damage the person involved.

I have summarised the main conclusions which can be drawn from the above below.
·       It should be unacceptable to redesign a person to serve the needs of another.
·       Redesigning persons might create unwarranted inequalities in society. Whether these inequalities mean redesign should be impermissible will depend on the cost and availability of the redesign.
·       Redesigning persons in order to enhance one or more of their capacities whilst leaving the remaining capacities the same does not compromise their capacity for autonomy and should be permissible. Making some option easier to choose is not the same as damaging someone’s capacity to make autonomous decisions.

·       Redesigning persons in order to enhance one or more of their capacities when this enhancement means altering the relationship between her capacities involved in decision making might damage her as a person even if it doesn’t damage her capacity to make autonomous decisions and should be impermissible.


  1. Danaher, Mcarthur, and Migotti, 2017 Robot Sex: Social and Ethical Implications, MIT Press
  2. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.


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