Michael Cook questions whether psychopaths
should be morally bio-enhanced. This posting will examine his
question. In attempting to answer Cook’s question I will attempt to answer
several related questions. A psychopath might be roughly defined as someone who
lacks feelings for others and has no remorse about any of his actions, past or
present. A psychopath is someone, who even if he understands moral
requirements, does not accept these requirements. In this posting it will be
assumed that moral bio-enhancement should be focussed on this non acceptance. The
first related question I want to address is whether a psychopath’s non
acceptance of moral norms is a form of disability? Secondly I will consider
whether any moral bio-enhancement of psychopaths should be mandatory, I will
argue it shouldn’t. Thirdly I will consider whether we have a moral duty to
offer moral bio-enhancement to someone convicted of some crime due to his non
acceptance of moral norms, I will argue we do. Lastly I will suggest if it is
permissible to offer moral bio-enhancement to psychopaths there is no reason
not to permit moral bio-enhancement more generally.
Let us accept that if someone suffers from a disability and
we can mitigate the effects of his disability that we have a prima facie duty
to do so provided the costs associated with so doing are not too onerous. Let
us also accept that some form of safe moral bio-enhancement becomes possible,
such safe enhancement is unavailable at the present time. It appears to follow in
such circumstances provided that a psychopath’s failure to accept moral norms
is a form of disability that we have a prima facie duty to mitigate the effects
of this disability. It further appears to follow that if we can only mitigate
this disability by bio-enhancement that we have a duty to do so provided such
enhancement is safe. Is a psychopaths non acceptance of moral norms a disability?
Most psychopaths are able to understand moral requirements and so their failure
to act in accordance with these requirements is not caused by an inability to understand
moral norms. It appears to follow that a psychopath’s non acceptance of
moral norms is not a disability. This appearance is too simplistic. Let us
accept that most psychopaths can understand moral norms even if they don’t
accept these norms. Perhaps this lack of acceptance might be due to an
inability to feel the force of moral norms and that this inability to feel
should be classed as a disability. It follows that a psychopath’s failure to
accept moral norms might be regarded as a disability.
Does this moral disability matter? I will now argue whether
it matters depends on the context. It has been suggested that some CEO of some
large companies have psychopathic tendencies. Having psychopathic tendencies
might be seen as enhancing by a CEO whilst the same tendencies might be seen as
a disability by someone if they lead to him being imprisoned for some crime. I
argued above that if someone suffers from a disability and that we can mitigate
the effects of his disability then we have a moral duty to do so, provided the
costs associated with doing so are not too onerous. It follows if a psychopath
lives in circumstances in which his condition might be classed as a disability he
should be morally bio-enhanced. This enhancement should only take place subject
to the provision that means used are safe and costs involved aren’t too
onerous.
The above conclusion needs some clarification. A psychopath
who is the CEO of a large company might not want to be morally enhanced even if
his condition disables him in some social contexts. I would suggest that we
only have a duty to offer moral enhancement to psychopaths. It might be
objected that my suggestion is too weak. My objector might point out that some
psychopaths damage society and other people. He might proceed to argue that for
such people moral enhancement should be mandatory rather than voluntary due to
the need to protect society. I accept that we need to protect people and
society from psychopaths but I do not accept we must do so by means of mandatory
biomedical moral enhancement. We can protect society from those psychopaths who
harm it by restricting their freedom. Let us assume there is a safe bio-medical
form of enhancement which prevents psychopaths from committing crimes due to
their condition. My objector might now argue that mandatory moral
bio-enhancement is both a cheaper and a more humane way of treating psychopaths
who have committed crimes than detention. Mandatory moral bio-enhancement would
be better for both psychopaths and society.
I would reject such an argument which could easily be
extended to include paedophiles. Let us accept most psychopaths retain their
autonomy. Unfortunately, whilst exercising their autonomy some psychopaths damage
society. My objector wants to limit the damage done to society by removing some
of a psychopath’s capacity for autonomy. Is it possible to remove some of
someone’s capacity for autonomy? We can of course restrict the exercise of
someone’s autonomy but this is not the same as removing some of someone’s capacity
for autonomous action. I would suggest that we should limit the damage psychopaths
do to society by limiting his ability to exercise his autonomy rather than
modifying his autonomy for autonomous action. Some might question whether there
is a meaningful difference between these two approaches. I now want to argue
there is. If someone’s ability to make autonomous decisions is modified, then
he is changed as a person. If someone’s ability to exercise his autonomy is
removed, then he is not changed as a person even though the exercise of his
will is frustrated. Does the difference between changing someone as a person
and frustrating his will matter? If we change someone as a person we treating
him simply as a thing. We are treating him in much the same way as something we
can own and can do with it as we please. Psychopaths may differ from most of us
but they are still human beings and should be treated as such, they should not
be treated in the same way as something we own, should not be treated in the
same way as an animal. If we frustrate a psychopath’s will by detaining him, we
are not treating him as something we own but merely protecting ourselves. We
are still accepting him as a person, albeit a damaged person. In the light of
the above I would suggest that the mandatory moral bio-enhancement of
psychopaths would be wrong. I also would suggest that psychopaths should be
offered voluntary moral bio-enhancement. It seems probable most psychopaths
would accept such enhancement on a voluntary basis if the alternative might be
compulsory detention. Accepting the above would mean that we are still respecting
the autonomy of those psychopaths who need to be detained.
I have argued that we should offer voluntary moral
bio-enhancement to psychopaths but it is feasible that the exactly the same form
of enhancement might be offered to people in general. Prima facie such an enhancement would not be
regarded as correcting some disability. It might then be argued that because
such enhancement is not correcting any disability that it cannot be argued by
analogy that a more general moral bio-enhancement is desirable. I would reject
such argument because I don’t believe the prima facie assumption stands up to close
examination. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu suggest we are unfit to face
the feature as our morality has not developed enough to permit us to cope with technological
progress (1). What exactly does unfit mean? I would suggest being unfit means
we are unable to counter some of the dangers created by our technology. If we
are unable to do something in some circumstances, then we have an inability, in
these circumstances we have a disability. It is conceivable that prior to our
most recent technological advances our morality was fit for purpose. It might
be argued our morality remains fit for purpose but that these advances have
made it difficult for us to accept the full implications of our moral norms
disabling us in much the same way psychopaths are disabled. It follows that the
prima facie assumption that a more general moral enhancement by bio-medical
means should not be regarded as correcting some disability is unsound. It might
be concluded that if technological changes make our morality unfit for our
purposes by morally disabling people that it can be argued by analogy that more
general moral enhancement by bio-medical means is desirable. It might be
objected that this conclusion is not the only option available in these
circumstances, we might try to change our current circumstances. My objector
might suggest that instead of a more general moral enhancement we should reject
our most recent technological advances and seek to return to circumstances in
which we accept the norms of our evolved morality. Such a suggestion seems
impractical for two reasons. First, once the genie is out of the bottle it is
hard to put it back in. Secondly I am doubtful if our morality was ever fit for
purpose once we ceased being hunter gatherers.
We live in a dangerous
world, provided safe moral bio-enhancement becomes available should such
enhancement be mandatory? In the light of the dangers we face such an option
seems to be an attractive one, but I would somewhat reluctantly reject it.
Mandatory moral bio-enhancement would damage our autonomy. Our autonomy forms
the basis of us being moral agents and damaging our agency would also damage
our moral systems. If safe moral bio-enhancement becomes available, then it
should encouraged, perhaps subsidised, but it should remain voluntary.
- Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2012, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE, Oxford University Press.
