In the near future it seems probable that some people will
have sex with robots, see the rise of the love
droids . In this posting I will discuss some of the problems this possibility
raises. I will divide my discussion into two parts. For the most part my
discussion will consider sex with robots which are simply machines before
moving on, and much more fancifully, to discussing sex with robots which might
be considered as persons.
Let us consider someone having sex with a robot which isn’t
a person, is simply a machine. Human beings have created objects to be used for
sexual purposes such as vibrators and other sex toys. If a robot isn’t a person,
then it might appear that someone having sex with a robot is unproblematic in
much the same way as is the use of these artefacts. I now want to argue that
this appearance is false. But before making my argument I want to consider the
nature of sex. Sex among humans isn’t simply a matter of reproduction. Human
beings enjoy sex. Neither is this enjoyment a purely mechanical thing.
According to Robert Nozick,
“Sex is not simply a matter of frictional force. The
excitement comes largely in how we interpret the situation and how we perceive
the connection to the other. Even in masturbatory fantasy, people dwell upon
their actions with others; they do not get excited by thinking of themselves
whilst masturbating. “(1)
If we accept that Nozick’s view what does having sex with a
robot really mean to the person having sex? Provided a robot has been supplied with
the appropriate genitalia would someone might want to have sex with it? I would
suggest it does not in many cases. Let us assume that a robot has the
appropriate genitalia, four legs, one arm and several detachable eyes. I would
suggest very few people would want to have sex with such a machine. Nozick
argues even when masturbating someone is imaging having sex with another person
and I would suggest much the same applies to having sex with a robot. If
someone has sex with a robot, he would want it to look like a beautiful person
because he is imagining having sex with such a person.
What are the implications of accepting the importance of such
imagining? First I would suggest having sex with a robot is just an enhanced
form of masturbation. Masturbation isn’t wrong because it doesn’t harm others.
Having sex with any robot which is purely a machine doesn’t harm others and so
by analogy also isn’t wrong. Indeed, in some circumstances masturbation might
be an acceptable choice for those who are physically or emotionally
incapacitated and perhaps also for those who are incarcerated. However even if
we accept the above masturbation isn’t ideal and neither would be sex with a
robot. Someone having imaginary sex with a person is having inferior sex
because what he desires is real sex.
I have argued that the first reason why someone might want
to have sex with a robot is that he cannot have sex with another person and
that there is nothing wrong with his actions. Anyone having sex with a robot
knows he cannot harm the robot. This gives rise to a second reason why someone
might want to have sex with a robot. Someone might know that the type of sexual
activity he wants to indulge in might be harmful to another human being and
because he knows he cannot harm a robot he prefers to indulge in this activity
with a robot. Does acting on such a preference matter for after all he isn’t
harming anyone else? Kant argued we shouldn’t be cruel to animals as this might
make us cruel to human beings. Might it be then if someone engages in such sexual
activity with a robot that this activity might make him more likely to engage
in harmful sexual acts with other human beings? At present there is no conclusive evidence to
support Kant’s argument that if someone is cruel to animals that this cruelty
makes him more likely to be cruel to other people. If this is so it seems
doubtful that if someone engages in such sexual activity with a robot that his activity
would not make him more likely to do so with another human being. The above is
an empirical question and cannot be settled by philosophical analysis. However,
someone engaging in sex with a robot, which would be harmful to a human being
might harm himself. I have previously argued that for the users of pornography
there is a split between fantasy and reality, see wooler.scottus
. I further argued in the case of sexual practices which might harm others that
the maintenance of the split between fantasy and reality is absolutely
essential. I have argued above that someone having sex with a robot imagines he
is having sex with a person. It follows for someone engaging in sex with a
robot, which might harm another human being, that the maintenance of the split
between fantasy and reality is also essential. I further argued that if someone
uses pornography that this split threatens the unity of his will which is
damaging to his identity. It follows that someone engaging in sex with a robot,
which would be harmful to a human being might harm himself by damaging his
identity.
Some people assume at some time in the future some robots
might become persons. I am extremely sceptical about this possibility but
nonetheless I will now consider some of the problems of someone having sex with
such a robot. However, before I do so I will question whether anyone would want
sex with such a robot. Let us accept Nozick is correct in his assertion that
“sex is not simply a matter of frictional force. The excitement comes largely
in how we interpret the situation and how we perceive the connection to the
other.” How do we perceive the connection to a robot which is also a person? I
suggested above that a robot can take many forms. Would anyone want to have sex
with a robot with four legs, one arm, several detachable eyes, appropriate
genitalia even if it could be considered as a person? Persons are partly
defined by the actions they are capable of enacting and these actions are
partly defined by their bodies’ capabilities. Robots can have very different
bodies from us. A robot with a different body structure might be capable of
very different actions to us, such a robot even if it is considered as a person
might be very different sort of person to the sort we are. The same might also
be true of a robot with similar structure which is constructed from different
materials. If someone or something is very different to us then the connection
between us and that someone or something becomes tenuous. Would someone want to
sex with any robot with which he had only a tenuous connection, I doubt it. Of
course someone might want to have sex with such a robot provided it looked like
a beautiful human being. But if this is so isn’t he really imaging having sex
with a person and the problems associated with having sex with a robot which is
purely a machine once again become relevant.
In conclusion I have argued that someone would not harm others by having sex with a robot and his actions would not be morally wrong. However, I argued whilst it might not be wrong to have sex with any robot which is purely a machine that it might nonetheless be damaging to the user’s identity, in much the same way as pornography, by splitting character. Lastly questioned whether anyone would really want to have sex with any robot which might be considered as a person.
- 1. Robert Nozick, 1989, The Examined Life, Touchstone, page 61
