Terrorism, Love and Delusion

In this posting I want to examine terrorism. As a philosopher rather than a psychologist I won’t examine the means by which potential terrorists might become radicalised, instead I will examine one of the conditions which might make some people might susceptible to radicalisation. Terrorists are sometimes seen as idealists, albeit with warped ideals. I will argue that ideals are vital to us as persons and that if someone lacks ideals that this lack creates a condition in which she becomes susceptible to radicalisation.

Usually the ideals that are important to a terrorist are grand political ideals. I’m interested in the time before she acquires such grand ideals, I’m more interested in the mundane ideals that shape people’s everyday lives. I want to link ideals mundane or otherwise to what someone loves. I will assume, as Harry Frankfurt does, that someone who loves nothing at all has no ideals (1). An ideal is something someone finds hard to betray and as a result limits her will. Love also limits the will. Love need not be grand romantic love but can sometimes simply be seen as ‘caring about’ something in a way that limits the carer’s will. I would suggest if someone loves something this something forms a sort of ideal for her as she must try to ensure the thing she loves is benefited and not harmed. If this wasn’t so she would remain indifferent to her supposed beloved rather than loving it. It is impossible for someone to be indifferent to her ideals. However accepting the above doesn’t mean that ideals have to be grand ideals, indeed someone’s ideals can be quite modest.

I now want to argue that ideals, as defined by what we love above, are essential to us as persons. According to Frankfurt someone without ideals,

“can make whatever decision he likes and shape his will as he pleases. This does not mean that his will is free. It only means that his will is anarchic, moved by mere impulse and inclination. For a person without ideals, there are no volitional laws he has bound himself to respect and to which he unconditionally submits. He has no inviolable boundaries. Thus he is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity.” (2)

Let us accept that ideals are essential to us as persons and I would suggest that someone without ideals has a sense of simply being. I would further suggest that this sense of simply being, simply existing, is one that most people would find unbearable. According to Christine Korsgaard human beings by their very nature are condemned to choosing (3). Someone without ideals has no basis on which to choose and as Frankfurt points out is ruled by impulse and inclination. It seems the combination of the need to choose even if that choice is an unconscious one and the lack of a basis for that choice is what makes simply being, simply existing, unbearable.

If one accepts the above then the need to love something, have ideals, expresses a quite primitive urge for psychic survival. I would suggest that in some cases this need to love something creates the conditions which makes some people vulnerable to radicalisation. Of course this need to love something might be met in other ways, perhaps even perhaps in such mundane ways such as keeping a pet. However the young, perhaps especially young men, want to feel important and perhaps this feeling causes them to prefer grand rather than mundane means in order to satisfy this need. In some cases the combination of the need to love and feel important creates the conditions in which some people become especially vulnerable to radicalisation.

I now want to argue that choosing to be a terrorist in order to satisfy the primitive urge to love something is a form of self-delusion. It is a self-delusion due to the nature of love. Love is not simply a matter choosing to love. According to Frankfurt, “love is a concern for the well-being or flourishing of a beloved object – a concern that is more or less volitionally constrained so that it is not a matter of entirely free choice or under full voluntary control, and that is more or less disinterested.” (4) Now if we accept Frankfurt’s position then when someone chooses to become a terrorist in order to satisfy her urge to love something she is deluding herself for two reasons. Firstly, love is not a matter of choice and it is impossible for someone to choose to love in order to satisfy this need. Secondly she is not really choosing a cause because she cares passionately about it but rather she is choosing in order to satisfy her need to love something. She is choosing to relieve her unbearable feeling of just existing.

It might be objected that I am exaggerating the importance of the need to love and underestimating the need to feel important. I will now argue even if this is so, which I don’t accept, that some of the same considerations apply. To terrorists the feeling of importance is connected to violent action. Terrorists want to be considered as heroes by some people. I have previously defined a hero as someone who chooses to recognisably benefit someone else or society in ways most people could not, in addition her actions must be beyond the call of duty and must involve some real sacrifice on her part, see Hobbs and Heroes . Now what motivates a true hero is a need to benefit someone else or society, it is not to satisfy some need to be seen as a hero. Some who pushes someone into a river in order to rescue them certainly isn’t a hero. Someone might choose to become a hero but if the motivation for her actions is a desire to be a hero then she is deluding herself about her actions even if this desire is an unconscious one because no real sacrifice is involved. Indeed it is even possible to argue that someone who resists her desires to be seen as heroic might be better seen as a hero even if a minor one.

Let us accept that it is important to understand how people become radicalised and the conditions which make this radicalisation possible. One of the conditions which makes some people susceptible to radicalisation is a sense of simply being, simply existing, due to a lack of ideals. Other conditions may play a part but what might be done to alleviate this lack of ideals? Unfortunately there seem to no easy or quick solutions because real ideals must be acquired rather than given. In spite of these difficulties I will offer some rather tentative solutions. Firstly good parenting; good parenting should always involve love. Some deprived and inarticulate parents find it hard to give or to express their love even if they are excellent parents in other ways. Some parenting skills can be taught but loving can’t. It follows we should encourage social conditions conducive to the emergence of love. Perhaps also we should actively encourage policies that promote happiness, see action for happiness . Secondly education must be more broadly based. Education should not only be focussed on the skills valued by employers but also on the skills that help all pupils to flourish. For instance the skills needed in sport and music should not be considered to be on the educational periphery. Education should be broad enough so that all have the opportunity to acquire skills to enable them to be good at something rather just acquire skills that are good for employment. Even if terrorism can be defeated by other means or collapses due its inherently stupid doctrines the solutions outlined above would remain useful in building a more cohesive society. 

1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 114.
2. Frankfurt, page 114.
3. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 1.
4. Frankfurt, page 165.

Autonomy and Beneficence Revisited

I have previously argued that if someone asks me to buy him cigarettes and I was not going to be significantly inconvenienced that I have reason to do so. I assumed that he was an adult fully aware of the dangers of smoking. I am a non-smoker and believe smoking is harmful. However I also believe in giving precedence to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. Recently a posting by Michael Cook in bioedge has caused me to question my position. Cook considers the case of a North Carolina woman called Jewel Shuping. Ms Shuping wasn’t born blind but was convinced that she was meant to be blind.  According to her doctors she had Body Integrity Identity Disorder. A psychologist gave her some counselling and after this failed gave her some eye-numbing drops before washing her pupils with drain cleaner. Cook asks was the psychologist right to destroy his patient’s eyesight even if she freely requested him to do so and was happy with the result of this treatment? The case of Shuping is an extreme one, however let us assume I am a carer for someone who becomes housebound and unable to buy the cigarettes he had previously enjoyed. Let us further assume that I buy these for him for a number of years and that eventually he develops lung cancer. In this situation am I partly to blame for his condition or have I only been respecting his autonomy? In this posting I want to examine the way in which we should respect someone’s autonomy. This examination is important for as Cook points out it has wider implications in difficult contexts for informed consent such as gender reassignment surgery and euthanasia.

Why did I argue that if it didn’t inconvenience me that I should buy a smoker a packet of cigarettes when he asked me provided he was an adult and fully aware of the dangers involved? I argued by doing so I was respecting his autonomy. Most people would object that my buying someone cigarettes has nothing to do with respecting autonomy. Respecting someone’s autonomy to most people simply means not interfering with someone doing something he cares about provided that by so doing he doesn’t harm others. If this is all it means to respect autonomy then respecting a smoker’s autonomy gives me no reason to buy him cigarettes when he asks me to do so. Let us accept informed consent is based on respect for patient autonomy. It then also follows that Shuping’s informed consent gave her psychologist no reason to acquiesce to her wishes. He might of course thought he was acting beneficently.

I now want to argue that the account of autonomy outlined above is an incomplete one. I will argue that a more complete account means that someone’s autonomous wishes must carry some weight for me. Let us suppose someone asks me to do him a favour and that doing so would not significantly inconvenience me. If I respect him I must feel it would be better to satisfy these wishes, provided by doing so I do no harm. If this was not so I would be indifferent towards him. Being indifferent to someone is not compatible with showing respect. At this point it might be argued that satisfying someone’s wishes has more to do with acting beneficently towards him than respecting his autonomy. However I would reject such an argument. I can act beneficently towards my dog by satisfying his needs but this doesn’t mean I respect him. I may of course love my dog but love differs from respect. Respecting someone as a person means accepting him as the sort of creature that can determine his own future. Respecting someone as a person means accepting what he determines to be his wishes must have some sort of weight for me. If I see someone as the sort of creature who can determine his own future but give no weight to his wishes then I am indifferent towards him rather than respectful. It does not of course automatically follow on from giving weight to his wishes that I have to satisfy them. Doing so might may harm others or cause me significant inconvenience. However it does follow that if I respect someone as a person and can satisfy those of his wishes which do no harm others without any significant inconvenience that I have reason do so. It further follows a more complete account of autonomy requires satisfying someone’s autonomous wishes provided these wishes do no harm to others or cause significant inconvenience.

Let us accept this more complete account of autonomy. If we accept that informed consent is based on respect for autonomy then I would suggest Shuping’s psychologist did have reason to acquiesce to her demands. It might be objected even if Shuping’s desire did have some weight him that her psychologist should not have acted as he did due the harm caused. Cook poses the question,

“Was the psychologist right to destroy his patient’s eyesight if she freely requested it, was happy with the treatment, and was living in psychological torment because she could see.”

Let us assume that Shuping would have been satisfied if the psychologist had blinded her but that he didn’t do so. Perhaps he believed his refusal to act was in her best interests. However if he did this he might be accused of epistemic arrogance. Moreover he might be accused of failing to respect her autonomy because he is failing to see her as the sort of creature who could make her own decisions. If the above is accepted then when respecting someone else’s autonomy requires that ‘the doing no harm condition’ should be replaced by ‘doing no harm on balance’. At this point it might be objected that such a concept of autonomy is far too demanding as people cannot always decide what on balance does no harm and we should retain the simpler condition of doing no harm.

I now want to argue we should accept the condition of ‘doing no harm on balance’. Let us assume that embedded within our thicker account of respecting autonomy is the simpler Millian account. Let us assume our smoker makes an autonomous decision to buy cigarettes. It follows that if I respect his autonomy that I should not act to stop him buying cigarettes by hiding his wallet according to the Millian account. Now let us now assume that he has broken his leg and that it would not inconvenience me to buy him the cigarettes. However I believe the cigarettes will cause him harm and refuse. In both scenarios I can prevent this harm by refusing to buy cigarettes when he has broken his leg and by hiding his wallet when he hasn’t. In both of these scenarios the outcome doesn’t change. If I hide someone’s wallet then I am acting to block him from exercising his autonomy. And if I refuse to buy him cigarettes I am omitting to act. A discussion of autonomy is an unusual place for the act’s/omissions controversy to occur. Does the difference between acts and omissions apply in this context? Indeed is there any real difference between acts and omissions in practical deliberation, see Julian Savulescu’s posting in practicalethics . In both of the above scenarios we are aware of the effects of our choice of behaviour. Christine Korsgaard argues that “choosing not to act makes not acting a kind of acting, makes it something that you do.” (1) I would suggest provided Korsgaard is correct then if someone chooses to act or chooses to omit to act that there is no meaningful difference between acts and omissions. It is still possible that acts and omissions might differ provided ones actions are ones he is fully conscious of and are omissions are unconscious choices. However is such a difference one between acts and omissions or a difference between degrees of consciousness concerning our behaviour? The above suggests to me that when it comes to respecting autonomy there is no meaningful difference between acts and omissions. It follows if I believe smoking will harm the smoker but refrain from hiding his wallet but refuse to buy him cigarettes I am acting inconsistently.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly that a purely Millian account of autonomy is an incomplete account. A more complete account means that respecting someone’s autonomy requires that one must sometimes act beneficently towards him by attempting to satisfy his desires provided so doing does not harm him on balance and does not cause significant inconvenience. Autonomy and some forms of beneficence are linked. Of course I accept that someone might have other reasons to act beneficently which are independent of respecting autonomy. Secondly it follows I should buy the smoker his cigarettes. Lastly it would seem Shuping’s psychologist acted correctly. I am somewhat reluctant to accept this conclusion. Perhaps in cases in which the stakes are so high there must be some doubt as to whether one is in fact causing no harm on balance and the precautionary principle should be applied. Nonetheless in spite of my reluctance I am forced to conclude that provided he was sure he was causing no harm that on balance Shuping’s psychologist was acting correctly.

1. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 1.

Emerging AI and Existential Threats

AI is much in the news recently. Google’s chairman Eric Schmidt believes AI is starting to make real progress whilst others such as Nick Bostrom believe AI might pose an existential danger to humanity (1). In this posting I want first to question whether any real progress is in fact being made and secondly examine the potential dangers involved. Before proceeding I must make it clear I don’t deny real AI is feasible for after all human beings have evolved intelligence. If intelligence can evolve due to natural selection then it seems feasible that it can be created by artificial means however I believe this will be harder to achieve than many people seem to believe.

At present computing power is rising fast and algorithms are increasing in complexity leading to optimism about the emergence of real AI. However it seems to me that larger faster computers and more complex algorithms alone are unlikely to lead to real AI. I will argue genuine intelligence requires a will and as yet no progress has been made to creating for or endowing AI with a will. Famously Hume argued that reason are the slave of the passions. Reason according to Hume is purely instrumental. It might be thought that better computers and better algorithms ought to be better at reasoning. I would question whether they can reason at all because I would suggest that reason cannot be separated from the will. Unlike Hume I would suggest that reason is not the slave of the passions. Reason and the will, the passions, are of necessity bound together. In the present situation seems to me that better computers and better algorithms only mean they are better instruments to serve our will, they don’t reason at all. The output of some computer program may indeed have some form but this form doesn’t have any meaning which is independent of us. The form of its output alone has no more meaning than that of a sand dune sculpted by the wind. However sophisticated computers or algorithms become if the interpretation of their output depends on human beings then they don’t have any genuine intelligence and as a result I believe it is misleading to attribute AI to such computers or algorithms. Real AI in this posting will mean computers, algorithms or robots which have genuine intelligence. Genuine intelligence requires reasoning independently of human beings and this reasoning involves having a will.

Let us accept that if some supposed AI doesn’t have a will that it doesn’t have any genuine intelligence. What then does it mean to have a will? According to Harry Frankfurt,

“The formation of a person’s will is most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some of them more than others.” (2)

For something to have a will it must be capable of ‘caring about’ or loving something. If computers, algorithms or robots are mere instruments or tools, in much the same way as a hammer is, then they don’t have any will and real AI is no more than a dream. How might we give a potential AI a will or create the conditions from which a potential AI will acquire an emergent will? Before trying to answer this question I want to consider one further question. If something has a will must we regard it as a person? Let us assume Frankfurt is correct in believing that for something to have a will it must be capable of ‘caring about’ something. Frankfurt argues that something

“to whom its own condition and activities do not matter in the slightest properly be regarded as a person at all. Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be. There could not be a person of no importance to himself.” (3)

Accepting the above means that to have a will is essential to being a person. It also suggests that if something has a will it might be regarded as a person. This suggestion has moral implications for AI. Clearly when we switch off our computers we are not committing murder however if we switched off a computer or terminated an algorithm which had acquired a will we would. I will not follow this implication further here.

Let us return to the question as to whether it is possible to seed a potential AI with a will or create the conditions in which it might acquire one. If we accept Frankfurt’s position then for something to have a will it must satisfy three conditions.

It must be able to ‘care about’ some things and care about some of them more than others.

It must ‘care about itself.

In order to ‘care about’ it must be aware of itself and other things.

Before being able to satisfy conditions 1 and 2 a potential AI must firstly satisfy condition 3. If we program a potential AI to be aware of itself and other things it seems possible we are only programming the AI to mimic awareness. For this reason it might be preferable to try and create the conditions from which a potential AI might acquire an emergent awareness of itself and other things. How might we set about achieving this? The first step must be to give a potential AI a map of the world it will operate in. Initially it need not understand this map and only be able to use it to react to the world. Secondly it must be able to use its reactions with the world to refine this map. If intelligence is to be real then the world it operates in must be our world and the map it creates by refinement must resemble our world. Robots react more meaningfully with our world than computers so perhaps real AI will emerge from robots or robot swarms connected to computers. However it seems to me that creating a map of the things in our world will not be enough for a potential AI to acquire emergent awareness. For any awareness to emerge it must learn to differentiate how different things in that world react to its actions. Firstly it must learn what it can and cannot change by physical action. Secondly and more importantly it must learn to pick from amongst those things it cannot change by physical action the things it can sometimes change by change by simply changing its own state. A potential AI must learn which things are aware of the potential AI’s states and perhaps by doing so become aware of itself satisfying the third of the conditions above. Meeting this condition might facilitate the meeting of the first two conditions.

For the sake of argument let us assume a potential AI can acquire a will and in the process become a real AI. This might be done by the rather speculative process I sketched above. Bostrom believes AI might be an existential threat to humanity. I am somewhat doubtful whether a real AI would pose such a threat. Any so called intelligent machine which doesn’t have a will is an instrument and does not in itself pose an existential threat to us. Of course the way we use it may threaten us but the cause of the threat lies in ourselves in much the same way as nuclear weapons do. However I do believe the change from a potential AI to a real AI by acquiring a will does pose such a theat. Hume argued it wasn’t “contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to scratching of my finger.” It certainly seems possible that a potential AI with an emerging will might behave in this way. It might have the will equivalent to that of a very young child whilst at the same time possessing immense powers, possibly the power to destroy humanity. Any parent with a young child who throws a tantrum because he can’t get his own way will appreciate how an emerging AI with immense powers and an emergent will potentially might poses an existential threat.

How might we address such a threat? Alan Turing proposed his Turing test for intelligence. Perhaps we need a refinement of his test to test for good will, such a refinement might called the Humean test. Firstly such a test must test for a good will and secondly, but much more importantly, it must test whether any emergent AI might in any possible circumstances consider the destruction of humanity. Creating such a test will not be easy and it will be difficult to deal with the problem of deceit. Moreover it is worth noting some people, such as Hitler and Pol Pot, might have passed such a test. Nonetheless if an emerging AI is not to pose a threat to humanity the development of such is vital and any potential AI which is not purely an instrument and cannot pass the test should be destroyed even if this involves killing a proto person.

1.  Nick Bostrom, 2004, Superintelligence, Oxford University Press
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 91
3. Frankfurt, 1999 Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 90.

Do Same Sex couples have a greater right to Fertility Treatment?

Emily McTernan “argues that states have greater reason to provide fertility treatment for same sex couples than for heterosexual couples” (1). She bases her argument on the premise that greater access to fertility treatment for same sex couples will encourage a diversity in of ways of life and that this diversity is a social good. In this posting I will argue that she is mistaken and that same sex couples do not have a greater right to fertility treatment.

In what follows I will restrict my discussion of fertility treatment to IVF. McTernan argues that IVF cannot be justified as an element of general healthcare. Healthcare she assumes should be concerned with disease and infertility is not normally a disease. She defines disease as an adverse deviation from normal species functioning and this deviation is a deviation from what is statistically normal given someone’s age and sex. Of course there are exceptions.  A women with a specific problem such as blocked fallopian tubes has a disease and using the above definition has a right to fertility treatment, has a right to IVF. However for most couples, especially if the women is older, infertility is not a deviation from what is statistically normal, and as a result most couples do not have a right to IVF based on a right to healthcare. I agree with McTernan.

Accepting the above of course doesn’t automatically mean people don’t have some right to IVF or that the state shouldn’t provide IVF. After all the state provides such things as libraries, parks and sports fields. Accepting the above only means that the states provision of IVF should compete with the states’ provision of libraries, parks and other things which help its citizens flourish. Let us accept that the state should provide some funding for IVF commensurate with other requirements it has. McTernan argues that within this provision same sex couples should be prioritised in order to encourage a diversity in ways of life.

I now want to argue that McTernan’s argument is unsound and that in allocating IVF we shouldn’t prioritise same sex couples. Firstly I will argue McTernan’s reason for such prioritisation is unsound and secondly present an argument against any such prioritisation. McTernan believes that we should encourage diversity in ways of life. Offering priority in access to IVF to gay couples might increase diversity in child rearing. However if diversity in ways of life is an unqualified good then perhaps the state should reform the law on bigamy and even encourage polygamous marriage as by doing so it would encourage different sorts of relationships. Few people would support such a reform but even if such a reform could be justified other examples could be imagined to show that not all diversity in ways of life are good. Nonetheless let us accept that diversity is sometimes desirable, is a qualified good. It follows diversity in child rearing might be such a qualified good and hence should be encouraged. What exactly does McTernan want to increase diversity in? Does she want to increase diversity in child rearing or simply diversity in relationships? Child rearing involves loving, safe guarding, nurturing and guidance. I don’t believe McTernan wants to change these basics. It follows she wants to increase a diversity in relationships. However the state could also encourage a gay lifestyle, in order to increase a diversity in relationships, by tax incentives. Few would support such a proposal. Such a proposal seems to be mistaken for surely the amount of diversity in sexual orientation in a society should be determined by people’s natural inclinations rather than by government policy. Accepting the above means of course if sexual orientation in a society should be determined by people’s natural inclinations rather than by the state that the state has reason to permit gay marriage. Accepting the above also means the state has no reason to prioritise access to IVF for gay couples.

Gay couples cannot have children unaided by anyone else. It might be suggested that this fact means gay couples should be prioritised in accessing IVF. However even if gay couples cannot have children unaided by others IVF is not the only option open to them if they want to have children. Both male and female same sex couples might be able to adopt a child. Male couples might also use surrogacy and this need not involve IVF. Female couples can use AID. It seems to me the fact that gay couples cannot have children unaided does not mean they should be prioritised in accessing IVF.

I now want to argue there is a second reason as to why gay couples should not be given greater priority in accessing IVF. My argument is based on fairness. Let us assume that gay couples are given greater priority in accessing IVF. It might then be objected such prioritisation is unfair. Fairness requires that everybody’s needs are considered. It does not follow of course that everybody’s needs should be satisfied equally. However it does require that if some peoples’ needs aren’t satisfied equally that some reason can be given for this. Let us assume that people have a need to have children who are genetically related to them. Let us consider a gay and a heterosexual couple both of whom are unable to conceive children without IVF. Both couples have the same need. Fairness requires that if the needs of these couples are satisfied unequally that there that some reason can be given for this unequal satisfaction. The need of both couples are identical, to have children they are genetically related to. If the needs of both couples are the same then any reason given for unequal treatment must depend on the outcomes for any children so conceived or some benefit to society. The outcomes for any children depends on the parenting skills of the couples involved. Perhaps for instance either gay or heterosexual couples make better parents. However there seems no evidence to support such a reason. Perhaps then society might benefit from unequal satisfaction. It is difficult to see how society might benefit except for promotion of greater diversity, but I have argued above that whilst society must permit greater diversity it should not try to alter the natural diversity occurring within it. In conclusion it would seem that the encouragement of a diversity in ways of life does not give us a reason to prioritise IVF for gay couples over heterosexual couples. It further seems that fairness requires that all couples are given equal priority.

1. Emily McTernan, 2015, Should Fertility Treatment be State Funded? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 32,3. Page 237

The Philosophy of Rudeness

 

In this posting I want examine rudeness. It might be thought that rudeness is of minor concern to society and hence not of any great philosophical interest. In the age of Trump and Brexit I believe rudeness should be of far greater concern to society. For instance, consider the former Chief Constable of Northumbria Police who resigned over alleged rudeness to senior colleagues, see the guardian . It also seems possible that rude and aggressive behaviour, for rudeness and aggression seem to be linked, might make teaching more difficult. Lastly it appears that someone’s creativity and willingness to help others might be damaged by rudeness, see the psychologist . It follows there are some reasons as to why rudeness should be of concern to society. I would suggest that any civilised society must pay attention to the views of all members of that society. Rudeness involves an inattention to the views of others and as a result damages discussion by shifting the focus of our attention from the issues involved to the tone of the discussion. Rudeness means we talk at each other rather than engage in a meaningful discussion. In the light of the above I would suggest that any society which accepts a high degree of rudeness is not a civilised society even if it possesses advanced technology. In this posting I want to consider a different aspect of rudeness, is rudeness linked to immorality? Is rudeness a vice?

What do we mean by rudeness? Rudeness might be defined as a lack of manners or being discourteous. In what follows I won’t deal with etiquette and mainly focus on someone being discourteous. What then do we mean when we say someone acts discourteously? One can’t be discourteous to oneself, discourteousness applies to relationships. Someone acts discourteously in his relationships if he focusses solely on his needs and wishes without considering the needs, views and wishes of others. Such a definition of discourteousness seems to be too broad. For instance someone might not consider the needs, views and wishes of others due to ignorance. Rudeness, acting discourteously, might be better defined as knowingly not considering the needs, views and wishes of others. It might be objected this definition remains too broad as there is a difference between acting selfishly and acting rudely. My objector might then proceed to suggest that real rudeness means someone not only not considering the needs, views and wishes of others but also making explicit his lack of consideration and perhaps even his contempt for them. In response to my objector in what follows I will argue that knowing selfishness is a form of rudeness. I would further respond that my objector is really pointing to more extreme form rudeness which might be better defined as a type of arrogance rather than proposing a different concept. Of course it is possible that a more basic form of rudeness might foster arrogance.

Before proceeding let us be clear what the above definition entails. It must include a lack of consideration for the views and wishes of another and not just his needs. If only needs were involved I could be rude to my dog by not considering his need for exercise. However the above definition remains inadequate. For instance I could ignore my sleeping partner’s needs, views and wishes but my lack of consideration would not be a case of rudeness. Let us modify our definition of rudeness; rudeness might be defined as someone knowingly not considering the needs, views and wishes of another and at the time of this inconsideration the other is aware of this inconsideration.

Accepting the above definition means having a joke at someone else’s expense is not being rude for the joke to be effective one must be consider the views of another, More importantly accepting the above means that rudeness and morality are linked. Rudeness need not be linked to consequentialism or deontology but there seems to be a link with virtue ethics. However differences remain between acting rudely and acting immorally. Morality very roughly consists of someone considering the needs of others and acting to meet these needs provided he judges or feels action is appropriate. Acting rudely only involves a lack of consideration. It follows rude behaviour need not necessary be immoral behaviour but that rudeness is on the road to immoral behaviour and might be regarded as a minor vice. Let us consider an example. Suppose I knowingly fail to consider ways to get my partner to work, when her car has broken down and that she is aware of my lack of consideration. Clearly I have acted rudely. However whether I have also acted immorally depend on the circumstances. If I had an important doctor’s appointment then I have acted rudely but not acted in an immoral manner. However if I only want to sleep a bit longer and a little less sleep would not harm me and I fail to run my partner to work then I have acted both rudely and acted in a slightly immoral way. It is also true that behaving in an immoral way towards someone need not be rude behaviour. I can behave in an immoral way when the subject of my bad behaviour is unaware of my behaviour. For instance if a charming sociopath might use his charm to further his own ends without consideration of someone’s needs then he may be acting immorally but he is not acting rudely.

I now want examine the causes of the lack of consideration which seems to be an essential element of rudeness. Firstly someone might attach great importance to his self. Secondly he may lack empathy. This second reason might explain why it appears that on average men display greater rudeness than women. In what follows a lack of consideration refers to a knowing lack of consideration when those who are not considered are aware of this lack. Someone’s needs will refer to his needs, views and wishes.

The first cause I wish to examine is when someone overvalues his self-importance. Some of the endemic rudeness on twitter might be partly due to this overvaluation. Such a person when deciding on how to act focusses solely on his own needs. If someone focusses on his own needs and these needs don’t affect others then he is acting prudently rather than rudely. However if someone focusses on his own needs without any consideration of the needs of others and he makes others aware of his inconsideration then he acts rudely. If someone always bases his actions on his own self-importance then I would suggest he fails to see others of equal importance. But his failure has an additional element he fails to recognise something essential about his own nature, he fails to recognise his nature as a social animal. Such a failure damages both the relationships which help foster society and him personally. Such a failure also damages discourse which fosters society. Rudeness means people talk at each other rather than to each other as exemplified by many of the replies on twitter.

The second important cause of rudeness is that someone lacks empathy. I must make it clear by empathy I mean associative rather than projective empathy. A sociopath can project himself into the minds of others and understand the feelings of others. He might use this understanding to experience pleasure in the pain of others. Associative empathy means someone experiences the feelings of others. It seems to me a rude person might have projective empathy but that he does not have associative empathy. I should make it clear at this point that I don’t believe only having projective empathy necessarily makes someone into a sociopath. It makes him indifferent. It also gives him one of the tools a sociopath needs. I would suggest a lack of associative empathy damages someone as a person as he lacks an essential element needed in the makeup of social animals.

I have argued that whilst even if rudeness is not always immoral it is on the road to immorality. I further argued that rudeness damages a rude person’s status as a social animal. I would suggest that for the most people being a social animal is a good. It follows rudeness damages most people and should regarded as a vice. Rudeness might also be regarded as an epistemic vice, a way of behaving which makes the acquisition of knowledge difficult, due to its close relationship with arrogance. At the beginning of this posting I gave three examples which pointed to rudeness damaging society. What then can be done to combat rudeness? One thing that might be done is that society should become less accepting towards rudeness. What is entailed in being less accepting? Less acceptance means not being indifferent to rudeness but pointing out to rude people that their rudeness damages them as social animals. However, less acceptance should simply mean less acceptance and not slip into aggressively challenging rudeness which might itself might become a form of rudeness. Perhaps we should ask someone who is rude to us whether they really meant to be rude. Ask if his sexist remark was really intended or simply bullshit. If such a strategy fails we should ask why he holds such beliefs, try and make him justify them, rather than trying to directly confront his beliefs. Secondly we must become more prepared to accept that other people are the same sort of creatures as ourselves. We must respect the autonomy of others. This means we must give priority to respecting someone’s autonomy before acting beneficently towards him. Indeed acting to satisfy our perception of someone’s needs instead of attempting to satisfy his expressed needs might be seen as a form of rudeness, see woolerscottus . Respecting autonomy means we must be tolerant of persons and their views. However this toleration should not extend to their attitude towards others if this attitude is a rude one. Sometimes we must be prepared to simply accept that our views and those of others differ and do no more, see practicalethics . Thirdly I have argued that a lack of associative empathy is one of the root causes of rudeness. It follows we might combat rudeness by addressing this lack. Unfortunately doing so is not easy, it can’t be done by simply increasing awareness or cognition. Michael Slote argues that parental love helps a child develop associative empathy (1) but even if combatting rudeness by increasing parental love is possible it will be a slow process. 

1. Michael Slote, 2014, A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind, Oxford, pages 128-134.  

Afterthoughts

In the above I have considered rudeness against a Confucian background but I could have done so against one based on Erasmus views and arguments of others damages us by denying us potential knowledge. Being rude damages us and increases the polarisation of society. 

Work, Automation and Happiness

In a posting in philosophical disquisitions John Danaher wonders whether work makes us happy. Happiness matters to us so this is an important question. Moreover, as Danaher points out increasing automation might mean that there will be less work in the future which adds further importance to the question. In this posting I will argue work can make us happier but that this depends on what we mean by work.

Hannah Arendt makes a distinction between labour and work. According to Arendt we labour to meet our basic biological needs. In this posting I won’t be concerned this this basic idea of labour but the broader concept of work. Perhaps we might try to define work simply as making an effort for some economic reward or hope of such a reward. Perhaps some people are lucky and enjoy such work but for many people work so defined is simply a chore which takes up time they could use to enjoy themselves in other ways. Work for many people is simply a job. They work for money to enable them to do the things they really want to, work is instrumental in allowing them to do these things. However, we don’t have to define work in this way. A stay at home mum works. Someone else might work in his garden simply because doing so brings him pleasure. Work, so defined, has intrinsic value. It would seem all work involves effort. However, we might make an effort for something and in this case work has instrumental value or we might make an effort at doing something and work has intrinsic value. It follows that work can be defined in two ways, either as making an effort for something, working for, or making an effort at doing something, working at.

Let us now consider the first definition of work, work defined as making an effort for something. Let us assume that the goods we seek by work could be delivered by automation. Let us further assume that these goods could be shared reasonably equitably. Perhaps in the future the state might introduce a basic income guarantee UBI which would be large enough to allow people to obtain the goods which previously their income from work provided for. A guaranteed UBI might only work provided the goods people seek are not subject to over inflation. If people want ever bigger cars, houses and even more exotic holidays a guaranteed UBI might prove to be insufficient to deliver the goods they seek, it should be noted that in such a context work also might provide insufficient funds to provide these goods. Such a guaranteed UBI is highly speculative but for the sake of argument let us assume such a guarantee is both affordable by some future state and can deliver the goods people seek from work. In this situation it might be suggested, that because the things people value can be delivered without work and ‘work for something’ has no intrinsic value that working would not contribute to people’s happiness.

In his posting Danaher considers one argument as to why we should reject the above suggestion. The argument he considers was made initially by Nicholas Carr (1). This argument depends on three premises. Firstly it is assumed that the ‘flow’ state is an important part of human well-being. The idea of flow has been made popular by Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi.  When someone is in a flow state she is performing an activity in which she is fully immersed, losing any feeling of reflective self-consciousness and she has an energised focus. This state leads to positive emotions making someone happy whilst in the state. Secondly it is assumed that people are bad judges of what will get them into such ‘flow’ states. Thirdly it is assumed that working for something sometimes gives people a flow state. It appears to follow that work for something is desirable not only because it delivers the means to achieve the goods we seek but also sometimes gives people a flow state which increases their happiness. It appears to further follow that vastly increased automation, leading to large scale unemployment, would be a bad thing because it would lead to a decrease in many people’s happiness even if they still obtained the goods they had previously obtained by working because they would experience a decrease in flow states. Other arguments could be made as to why work might contribute to someone’s happiness, for instance the workplace might be conducive to friendship. However, in what follows I will only consider Danaher’s argument.

I now want to argue the above appearance are false. I am prepared to accept the first two premises of the above argument. Flow is an important element of human wellbeing and that people generally aren’t very good at judging what gets them into a flow state. I am also prepared to accept that some work can sometimes deliver a flow state. When I’m writing I occasionally enter into a flow state and perhaps someone who is fully engaged playing some sport might do likewise. In these circumstances someone is working at something which she believes has intrinsic value. Can someone enter into a flow state if she is working for something in a purely instrumental way in a low skilled job? Let us assume someone works at a job she finds completely uninteresting solely to support her family. In these circumstances achieving flow is not part of her goal. Nonetheless it might be suggested that even in this scenario such a person might sometimes enter into a flow state meaning her work has some intrinsic value even she isn’t consciously aware of this value. It appears conceivable that in these circumstances working for something has both instrumental and intrinsic value.

Let it be assumed that in some circumstances when the goods we seek are available without working for them the instrumental value of work vanishes. Nonetheless in the light of the above it might be suggested that even in these circumstances work retains some intrinsic value. Let us accept that work only has some intrinsic value when we work at something we care about. In addition, if we work at something we care about it seems highly probable that this work will provide some flow. However, I now want to argue that the above suggestion that, if work has no instrumental value and we work at something we don’t care about or even dislike that nonetheless such work might retain some intrinsic value, is unsound. Purposeless work is unlikely to provide us with any flow.

Let us accept that if we work in a completely aimless fashion at something we don’t care about that such work will not result in a flow state. Let us also accept that if work is to provide flow that this work must be goal orientated and that this goal must be something we care about. For instance, someone might work to provide for her children she cares about. Let us now assume that the state provides a basic income so she doesn’t have to work to support her children and satisfy her other needs. Let us further assume she continues to work and that her sole goal is to obtain a flow state in order to increase her happiness. All the things she cares about can be provided by automation and that she finds the work she undertakes to be dreary. Nonetheless she persists in working with the goal of achieving flow in order to increase her happiness. I will now argue by analogy that such work would not result in a flow state. I would suggest just as we cannot choose to be in love, love is constrained, so we cannot just choose to be in a flow state. Love just comes to us and similarly a flow state only comes to us when we work at what we love or care about. Accepting this suggestion means that if automation removes the need to work for the goods we care about that continuing to work solely to obtain some flow is impossible.

However even if the above is accepted it might be argued that working still retains some value. Some people might find, if they have no work, they have an unbearable sense of simply being, simply existing. It seems probable such a state would make them unhappy. Work doesn’t simply have value because any resultant flow state makes people happy, work also has value because it helps to stop people becoming unhappy. It appears to follow that if automation removes the need for work that it should be resisted. However, if we accept the above argument it seems we must also accept that someone might work at a boring repetitive job in order not to be bored. Such an implication seems nonsensical. Nonetheless it remains true that if automation removes the need to work for something that it can also lead to boredom and a resultant decrease in happiness. Such a scenario is both possible and important. In response I would argue that automation requires a broader focus in education. Automation might mean education should focus less on educating people to work for something and more on educating them so they are enabled to work at something they love or care about. Increasing automation might lead to an increased importance of the humanities. Universities and schools might need to give greater emphasis to the humanities and life-long learning.. However caution is needed when considering changes in education we mustn’t be over elitist, music, crafts and sport all matter.

Let us assume the advance of automation can provide the goods people seek without the need for work. Such circumstances I suggested above are highly speculative but for the sake of argument let us assume such circumstances are possible. Let us accept that because a lack of work would leave some people with an unbearable sense of simply existing that we should resist the advance of automation. I now want to argue that in these circumstances the above argument does not give us reason to resist automation Of course if automation removes the need for work and the goods people obtain by working become unobtainable we should resist increasing automation. However, let us accept that automation provides the goods people desire and that the resulting increased leisure will give them time to pursue the things they want to do. Unfortunately, in these circumstances some people might adopt a purely hedonistic lifestyle. Such a lifestyle might cause these people to suffer from the unbearable lightness of simply being mentioned above. Let us recall we have accepted that people in general are not always the best of judges of what will make them happy. Fortunately, increased leisure will not only give people the opportunity to pursue the things they want, it will also give them the opportunity to pursue the things they care about or love. What does it mean for someone to pursue the things she loves? Clearly if she loves something she cannot be indifferent towards it, it must be important to her. If something is important to someone then it is natural for her to work at it. In the light of the above it might be concluded that some sort of work makes us happy. It might be further concluded even if automation leads a loss of people working for something it ought not to be resisted provided people can still work at something. I would suggest that automation should not be harmful provided people continue to work in the second way defined above. People continue to work at what they care about, they love

1.     Nicholas Carr, 2014, The Glass Cage, Norton & Company

Is Enhanced Love Fragile Love?

It appears that it might be possible to enhance love by pharmacological or even genetic means in the near future. Julian Savulescu and others have argued that we should use such enhancement to promote the human good. Sven Nyholm suggests that for the most part Savulescu and the others want enhance love for instrumental reasons, for the benefits love can deliver rather than valuing love itself (1). Nyholm does not oppose enhancing love for instrumental reasons but suggests that love also has intrinsic value and argues that enhanced intrinsic love would not have the same value as natural intrinsic love. In what follows when I refer to the value of love I am referring to the value of intrinsic love rather than its instrumental value unless stated otherwise. I will argue that Nyhom’s is mistaken about the fragility of enhanced love due to the nature of love but that concerns about the authenticity of love matter.

Nyholm argues that love should be robust.

“The idea in giving somebody our love, we bestow upon them something that is not fleeting, but rather robust across various different changes and scenarios.”(2)

Nyholm’s argument that enhanced love does not have the same value as natural love seems to depend on three premises. Firstly artificially enhanced love is not robust love. In what follows I shall treat such love as fragile love. Secondly what is important about intrinsic love is being loved. Thirdly it is better to be loved in a robust rather than a fragile manner. If the above is accepted then enhanced love would seem to be an inferior form of love. I accept Nyholm is correct in his belief that it is better to be loved in a robust as opposed to fragile way. I also accept that one of the important benefits of intrinsic love is being loved. I don’t accept that this is the only important benefit. I would suggest simply loving someone or something is of benefit to the lover even if this love is unrequited. People feel the need to love. Some people love their dogs and benefit from this love. However it is by no means clear that this love is returned in the way we commonly understand as love. I will not pursue this point here. I now want to argue enhanced love is not fragile love due to the nature of all love.

Let us assume that the intrinsic love someone feels is enhanced. What is the nature of loving?

“It is in the nature of a lover’s concern that he is invested in his beloved. That is, he is benefited when his beloved flourishes; and he suffers when it is harmed. Another way of putting it is that the lover identifies himself with what he loves. This consists of accepting the interests of his beloved as his own.” (3)

I would suggest that this is the nature of all loving enhanced or not. If this is the nature of loving then the will of the lover is captivated by her beloved and as a result is constrained. According to Nyholm if love is enhanced then this love is fragile. It is by no means clear to me why this love should be fragile. Let us consider genetic modification. Let us assume someone’s genome is altered prior to her birth giving her an increased disposition to care about and love others. Once the lover’s genome is enhanced her genome should be stable and this stability should ensure her love isn’t fragile. Let us now consider pharmacological enhancement of love. It might be suggested that in this case the lover’s enhanced love is fragile because she might simply stop taking the means of enhancement. However I would suggest the nature of loving means this option is not open to her because her will is constrained by the interests of her beloved. If she stopped taking these means then the lover does not accept the interests of her beloved as her own. In this situation her apparent love, enhanced or not, is not real love. I would suggest that the nature of loving means the enhancement of love does not mean enhanced love is fragile love, it follows the value of enhanced love is the same as that of natural love. Of course someone’s love might be fragile for other reasons but enhancement alone does not make love fragile.

It might be concluded that if the enhancement of love doesn’t mean enhanced love is fragile then enhancement should be perfectly acceptable. Some people might still have some reservation about accepting this conclusion. Let us accept Nyholm’s premise that what is important about love is being loved. Someone who is being loved may have no doubts concerning the robustness of this love but still have doubts about how someone else came to love her. Firstly she might believe that her lover came to love her in an inauthentic way. He didn’t choose to love her. In response I would point out that by its very nature all love, enhanced or not, loving is not a matter of choice, love is constrained. (4) We can’t simply choose to love someone, we come to love someone. However if we choose to enhance our love pharmacologically this is exactly what we do. I will now consider four reasons why we shouldn’t make the choice to enhance our love. Firstly it might be suggested that because coming to love someone is easy this somehow devalues the love. I would reject this suggestion as just because something is easy doesn’t automatically devalue it. Some might find generosity easy but this doesn’t devalue his generosity. Secondly it might be suggested that pharmacologically enhanced love is inauthentic love. Once again I would reject this suggestion provided the lover freely chose to be enhanced. It would appear that my first two objections to the enhancement of love fail however my next two objections seem to carry some weight. It might be suggested that enhanced love for someone or something might not sit easily with other things the lover has come to love in a more natural way. Enhanced love might have a very wide domain. Perhaps the breadth of this domain might make our capacity to love weaker over the entire domain. It is easy to imagine someone who has enhanced his love for another finding he and his beloved love very little in common. Lastly let us assume what we love defines us as persons. If this is so then if a couple enhance their love then they change themselves and the ones they love. Does such love remain authentic helps define us as persons then perhaps such a separation makes us less authentic? I’m not sure.

1. Sven Nyholm, Love Troubles: Human Attachment and Biomedical Enhancements, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 32(2) 2015.
2. Nyholm, page 195.
3. Harry Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, 2006, page 41.
4. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 135.

Sex, Friendship and Consent

Anne Jacobson wonders whether sexual activity always requires the capacity to consent, see sex in the country of the aged. In this I posting will examine what sort of consent is needed for sexual relations. I will argue what counts as consent varies with the relationship between the parties involved. In medicine consent is always necessary. If I go to the doctors and she takes my blood pressure I simply roll up my sleeve and hold my arm out. My consent is implicit. If I am about to have a transplant my consent is not implicit or even verbal but signed. Moreover in order for my signature to be valid I must understand both the nature and possible outcomes of the procedure. In a medical setting how detailed my consent needs to be depends on the procedure. Procedures vary and different procedures have different consent requirements. In what follows I am only concerned with consent to non-exploitative sexual relationships and will exclude bizarre relationships. These relationships will include gay and lesbian ones. I am also only concerned with non-harmful relationships. These relationships exclude ones in which an unwanted pregnancy might occur or harm due to unprotected sex which might occur if one of the partners was HIV positive. In such relationships, unlike medical procedures, because all of them require much the same understanding and carry little risk of harm it would appear to follow that the consent requirements should be the same in all cases.

However even if the understanding required and risks involved vary very little the partners might. For instance two students on a blind date are very different from partners who have lived together for twenty years. I will now argue that adequate consent to sex varies with the relationship between the partners involved. I want to look at sexual consent from the viewpoint of friendship. It might be objected not all sexual relationships take place between friends. The strength of this objection depends on what we mean by friends. I want to differentiate between act being done in friendship and an act being part of friendship.

I will consider sexual acts done in friendship first. Aristotle suggested that there could be friends of utility. That is people might be bound together because together they might reach their own respective goals. A one night stand between two students could be understood as done in the friendship of utility. Each partner is simply seeking to satisfy his/her sexual desires. I would suggest that provided each partner is capable of consenting that this consent can be implicit. For instance undressing or acting in a sexually provocative manner might be regarded as giving implicit consent to sex. However it is conceivable that one partner might misread the signals so it is important that both partners are capable of consenting. If someone is capable of consenting then he/she is capable of refusing consent by saying no. I would suggest if both partners are capable of refusing consent that implicit consent should count as valid consent. I would further suggest that if one of the partners later thinks that he/she should have said no does not invalidate that consent. A patient’s consent to heart surgery is not invalidated if he latter regrets his decision due to the outcome caused by unforeseeable circumstances.

Let us consider the question of competence further. It is just about possible to view sex between a client and prostitute as an act done in the friendship of utility even though they have different goals. The client is seeking to satisfy his sexual desires whilst the prostitute is seeking financial reward. However few prostitutes, if any, are happy hookers. It is possible to argue that even though the prostitute can easily say no, her social situation means she is not competent to give real consent. I suggested above if both two people are capable of refusing consent that implicit consent should count as valid consent. The above example shows it is relatively easy to ascertain if someone consents but that it is much harder to ascertain if he/she is competent to give consent. Tightening the consent requirements will not change this difficultly so in the rest of this posting it will be assumed implicit consent between competent adults is valid consent.

I now want to examine some of the consequences of accepting the above assumption. Let us now consider whether someone can give adequate consent if he/she is under the influence of alcohol or another drug. Sex often takes place between those who are mildly intoxicated with only implicit consent and I would suggest such consent is perfectly valid. Let us consider one partner is very intoxicated. I would suggest in this case even if he/she gives explicit consent that his/her consent is invalid as he/she is not competent to give consent. Clearly there are difficult cases in which it is hard to ascertain whether someone to competent to give consent. Because of these difficult cases an objector might suggest that implicit consent is inadequate consent and as a result suggest that consent requirements need to be explicit. Someone must say yes. I would reject such a suggestion because it doesn’t address the real problem; whether someone is competent to say yes. My objector might nonetheless maintain that because competence is sometimes hard to ascertain, especially in retrospect and that implicit consent given by a competent person is an inadequate standard to apply. In response I would reply drink means it is difficult to assess whether someone is competent to drive a car and an arbitrary standard is applied. My objector might now respond such an arbitrary standard is not available when determining competence to consent to sexual relations. I accept this point. However there is no arbitrary standard to assess competence to give consent in a medical setting and a patient’s competence usually can be assessed. In difficult cases it is usually left to the courts to determine competence. It seems to me even if it is difficult to assess someone’s competence in borderline cases that implicit consent between competent parties should be regarded as valid consent. Lastly someone who has been taking drink or drugs should not enter into in any sexual relation not only because he/she cannot give competent consent but also because he/she is not capable of understanding of whether his/her partner is giving consent or capable of giving consent.

I now want to consider a difficult case outlined by Mike LaBossierre as follows.

“They’d now decided — mutually, she thought — just to be friends. When he ended up falling asleep on her bed, she changed into pajamas and climbed in next to him. Soon, he was putting his arm around her and taking off her clothes. ‘I basically said, “No, I don’t want to have sex with you.” And then he said, “OK, that’s fine” and stopped. . . . And then he started again a few minutes later, taking off my panties, taking off his boxers. I just kind of laid there and didn’t do anything — I had already said no. I was just tired and wanted to go to bed. I let him finish. I pulled my panties back on and went to sleep.’ talking philosophy

Six weeks later the women reported she had been raped. If we accept that valid consent can be implicit consent between competent partners was she raped or did she change her mind? Clearly the women in question said no but because she didn’t say no a few minutes later was she then giving her implicit consent? The fact that afterwards she simply went to sleep seems to support the idea that at the time she didn’t feel as though she had been raped. Surely rape requires anger at the time of rape even if this anger has sometimes to be suppressed. It appears to follow that she wasn’t raped and as a result had given some form of implicit consent. I am somewhat reluctant to accept the above conclusion. Implicit consent cannot be presumed from a lack of resistance. I have suggested sexual relationships take place in some kind of friendship, even this is only the friendship of utility. If one partner obtains nothing from a sexual relationship then he/she is being used purely as a means. To use someone simply as a means is wrong according to Kant, even though he would have viewed sexual relationships very differently to the way I am doing here. The above case did not take place in this type of friendship as having sex was of no utility to the women in question and she was being used purely as a means. It follows the above was a case of rape. My objector might suggest that this example shows the need for explicit rather than implicit consent to sexual relations. However accepting his suggestion might not have made any difference in this case, the woman in question might have said yes simply to stop herself being pestered in order to go to sleep. I would repeat my suggestion that consent implicit or explicit must take place in a spirit of friendship even if this friendship is only one of utility.

I now want to consider acts that are done as part of friendship. According to Bennett Helm friendship should be understood partly in terms of the friends forming a “plural agent”.  This involves friends having a joint evaluative perspective (1).  A joint evaluative prospect should mean such friends feel the same way about sexual relations and that implicit consent between competent partners should be regarded as valid consent. Sometimes of course even though the partners share the same perspective the time might be wrong for one of the partners and he/she should simply say ‘not now’. It might be thought that for a couple, such as a married couple, who had been friends for many years all that would be required would be implicit consent. Let us return to Anne Jacobson’s ‘country of the aged’, is possible to have consensual sex if someone has dementia. Perhaps prior to dementia the couple had a loving relationship and enjoyed good sexual relations. Perhaps in these circumstances the prior relationship meant that implicit consent was in place. Personally I wonder why someone should want to have sex with someone suffering from dementia, such sex seems analogous to sex with a non-responsive robot or if the personality has left the person a form of masturbation. Regardless of these concerns such sex is non-consensual, because one of the participants cannot say no, and should be regarded as rape. Implicit consent is only valid consent if both partners are competent to say no.

The above leads to the following conclusions about the conditions in which consensual sexual relationships should take place.

1. Sexual relations must always take place in friendship. Even if this friendship must be seen as between friends of utility. It is important to clear that some relations between friends might not take place in a spirit of friendship as illustrated by the case of the two students used above. I would suggest that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
2. Consent must be given even if this is only implicit consent. As consent must always be done in friendship it follows if there is any doubt as to whether implicit consent is being given it is required that the doubter satisfies his/her doubts.
3. Consent given must be given by someone who is competent. He/she must understand what he/she is doing and the possible consequences.
4. Lastly someone must be competent enough to understand if his/her partner is giving or capable of giving consent. This applies particularly in cases such as dementia, drink and drugs.

To conclude I have argued that the two examples I have used above are cases of rape. Many would disagree with my conclusion especially in regard to the first example. They might point out even if the student in the example used the other only as a means to satisfy his sexual desires that his actions were not the same as someone who uses force. Such worries seem meaningful to me. However does this mean we need to reconceptualise rape? I'm not sure and will consider the question in another posting.

1.    Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship the Self, Oxford, page 282