It is
sometimes assumed that shame is an unnecessary emotion. In this posting I want
to challenge this assumption. I will argue that shame is central to both our
character and behaviour. What do we mean by shame? Oxford
Let us
accept that shame is connected to our character rather than our acts.
Nonetheless acts still matter with regard to shame. When I feel ashamed about
some act, the act captures my attention but the focus of my attention is on my
character from which the act flows. For instance a drunkard may feel guilty
about his actions last night. A drunkard may also feel shame about his actions
last night. These actions focus his attention on the fact he is a drunkard. This
focus can have two sub focuses, one on how others see the drunkard’s character
and secondly how the drunkard sees himself. I have previously argued these
different sub focuses give rise to Two
Types of Shame. Type one shame is someone’s anxiety about social disqualification
because of his character. Type two shame is someone’s anxiety about harming the
things he cares about or loves. I will
consider each type of shame in turn.
I will consider type two shame
first. Before proceeding I will briefly consider the nature and the purpose of
the emotions. Michael Brady argues emotions are analogous to alarms (1).
Emotions draw our attention to things which are wrong. Emotions capture and
focus our attention forcing us to reappraise our situation. For instance if I
make a snide remark about someone, my guilt captures and focuses my attention
on whether my remark was wrong and perhaps makes me reappraise the situation
causing me to apologise. However my shame about the remark captures and focuses
my attention on the inadequacies of my character from which my snide remark
flowed. My shame may force me to reappraise my character. Unfortunately
character is hard to change and even if I don’t hide my character from myself I
may seek to hide it from others. A somewhat similar approach is taken by
Bennett Helm. Helm holds that someone’s pride and shame are a kind of attention, a kind
of vigilance, about himself and his identity and that this attention or
vigilance is a form of self-love. Helm argues our values are constitutive of us as
persons. With regards to values he argues,
“what is at
stake in one’s values are oneself and one’s own wellbeing as this person, and
because values involve an implicit understanding of the kind of life it is worth
one’s living, the felt evaluations constitutive of this pattern …. are emotions
like pride and shame.” (2)
It follows
even if our shame is something we may feel we have to hide from others that it
is nonetheless constitutive of us as persons. It follows shame is an extremely
important emotion.
In order to
illustrate the importance of type two shame let us try to imagine someone who
feels no type two shame whatsoever. It might be thought that such a person is a
happy go lucky person who takes life as it comes and as a result leads a
naturally authentic life. Let us accept that someone without type two shame is someone without any anxiety about harming the
things he cares about or loves. I would suggest such a person would be a
selfish person who wantonly disregards both himself and others. It might be
objected that it is possible for someone to care about himself and others without
any anxiety about harming the things he loves. He simply has a natural caring
nature. I am doubtful whether the above is possible. I will now return to a
theme which runs through many posts in this blog. If someone ‘cares about’,
loves, something then he must identify himself with what he cares about. He
makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending
on whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced (3). It seems to me
that someone cannot make himself vulnerable, with regard to the things he
‘cares about’, without experiencing some anxiety about harming these things. It
follows someone who ‘cares about’ or loves anything must be capable of experiencing
some shame. It further follows that someone who cannot experience shame would
be a selfish inconsiderate person. Additionally I would suggest such a person
is in some ways a deficient person. Helm argues that both pride and shame are
constitutive to us as persons. If Helm is correct then someone who can feel no
shame is an unbalanced, deficient person whose personality is not truly formed,
see my discussion of damaging
self-love pride and shame.
It has been assumed that shame is an unimportant emotion because it has
no practical consequences. It has no practical consequences because we are
unable change our character. Let us assume that we are unable change our
character. I will now argue even if this assumption is true that nonetheless
shame is important. Someone who is aware of his character, due to shame, might
decide not to place himself in situations in which his character is challenged.
A drunkard might decide to avoid bars. Moreover someone’s awareness of his
character might also guide his career choice. Some who feels shame at his
cowardice is unlikely to join the army. I will now argue the assumption that we
cannot change our character is false. I accept some of our dispositions have a
genetic basis which we cannot alter. But part of our character is determined by
what we love or ‘care about’. I accept what we love must have some persistence
and cannot be arbitrarily changed by some act of will. However persistence
is not the same as permanence. What we love or ‘care about’ can change
slowly. It follows some parts of our character can change albeit slowly. Shame
might help drive such change.
So far I
have dealt with type two shame but type one shame is also important, especially
in a social context. I now want to use an example to illustrate how type one shame
might work in practice. Recall I defined type one shame as is someone’s anxiety about social disqualification
because of his character. Jennifer Saul argues that we should use
informal methods to combat sexual harassment when more formal means are
inappropriate (4); I agree. One way this might be done is by employing shame.
Let us assume someone makes an offensive sexual remark about someone else. Let
us also assume such a remark is passed off in a joking manner and as such is the
remark should not be dealt with by formal means. Should we just ignore such a
remark? Saul believes we should not. She suggests one way of doing this might
be to withhold our laughter because by doing so we show don’t approve of the
remark. However this lack of approval is not the same as disapproving of the
remark. I would suggest one way of disapproving the remark is to employ shame.
Perhaps we might ask the harasser to repeat his remark; “did you really say
that”. In doing so we are implying such a remark is not the sort of remark
which would flow from a good character. If he says he was only joking he is
being forced to disassociate his remark from his character, he is being
compelled to feel some shame. However care is needed. Sexual harassment is a
moral concern and it seems appropriate to me to use shame to address moral
concerns. The same might not be true of social concerns. For instance should we
employ shame in an attempt to encourage the obese to diet, see Two
Types of Shame .
Is it possible to extend the idea of shaming beyond persons to other
entities? For instance is it possible to shame governments? Could for instance Israel be shamed for its treatment of Gaza
- Michael S. Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role
of Emotional Experience,
- Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self,
- Jennifer Saul, 2014, Stop
Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(3)
