The Structure of Love and Anti-Love Drugs

Brian Earp wonders whether it might be right for someone in certain situations to take an anti-love drug, see should we take anti love drugs? For instance a battered woman in an abusive relationship might take such a drug to help her restore her autonomy and independence. Such an anti-love drug might be seen as an enhancement on a welfarist account of enhancement, see frontiers in neuroscience , because it enhances someone’s overall welfare. I have suggested any such interventions should be treated with the greatest caution as diminishing love involves great dangers. For instance in the above scenario the woman in question might have children and diminishing her love for her abusive partner might also diminish her love for her children. In this posting I will argue that prior to considering any artificial means of diminishing love we must first consider what love is. In particular I will suggest we should consider whether love has some sort of structure.

What does it mean to love? One way of examining what it means to love is to examine what we can love. Someone might love a building, a particular piece of countryside or being a scientist. A mother may love her children and her children love their parents and siblings. Someone may love his friends. Lastly someone may love her beloved in a romantic way. The question I want to pose is this, do we love all these things in much the same way or are there varieties of love and perhaps even completely different ways of loving? What is the nature of the lover’s concern in all the above? According to Harry Frankfurt it is connected to caring about,

“It is in the nature of a lover’s concern that he is invested in his beloved. That is, he is benefited when his beloved flourishes; and he suffers when it is harmed. Another way of putting it is that the lover identifies himself with what he loves. This consists of accepting the interests of his beloved as his own.” (1)

If we agree with Frankfurt then a lover’s concern is compatible with him loving all the above. Someone might be harmed mentally if a building he loves is burnt down. A mother may suffer if her child suffers. A romantic lover will experience pleasure at the success of her beloved. The above suggests that all forms of love have a common basis, the ability to care about and identify with something, and this common basis rules out completely different ways of loving.

Let us accept that all forms of love must include Frankfurt’s basic idea of caring about and identification. Let us also accept that our ancestors possessed the capacity for this basic form of love, they had the capacity to love themselves and their offspring. At this point someone might object that our ancient ancestors didn’t have the capacity to actively identify themselves with what they loved. She might then proceed to argue even today most people don’t actively identify themselves with what they love. In response Frankfurt might argue even if someone doesn’t actively identify himself with what he loves that nonetheless he demonstrates his identification by his satisfaction with what he loves (2). Bennett Helm would argue someone identifies with what he loves by taking pride in what he loves (3). Intuitively there are different forms of love. How might we account for this diversity? Firstly as our ancestors’ lives became more complex the domain of what they loved expanded. That is the basic form of love remained the same but they started to love more things. Perhaps as their increased brains expanded their cognitive powers they simply became aware of the need to love or care about more things. Nonetheless they loved these things in the same way. Secondly as their lives became more complex evolution added or grafted on additional ways of loving onto this basic form. Love acquired some form of structure.

It might be thought that whilst such considerations have considerable theoretical interest they have no practical implications. Such a thought would be wrong. Let us return to the taking of anti-love drugs to enhance an abused women’s life. Now if love has changed simply by expanding the domain of love by cognitive means then any such supposed enhancement would be likely to be counter productive. For as I have remarked above any such so called enhancement would lead her to love her children and things in general, including herself, less. In this context I would suggest that the use of anti-love drugs would be unacceptable.

Intuitively I do not love the place I live in the same way as I love my children. I can feel empathy towards my children but it would be nonsensical to say I can feel empathy for the place I live. Some forms of love might have a structure. This structure consists of the basic capacity to care about and identify with something or someone, plus the capacity to feel empathy. Earp considers love to be based on ancient neurochemical systems that evolved to serve our ancestors' reproductive needs. I have suggested that love has a wider basis. It follows these neurochemical systems served wider needs, the need to love those things that helped us to survive. Nonetheless let us accept that our basic capacity to love is based on a neurochemical system. Let us also accept that our love is defined by a basic capacity to love as I have suggested above plus the capacity to feel empathy. It is possible that the neurochemical system underlying our capacity to feel empathy is distinct from neurochemical system underlying our capacity for basic love. However even if this situation pertains, the use of anti-love drugs would remain unacceptable. Taking an anti-love drug that affects someone’s basic capacity to love would affect her capacity to act as a person. An abused woman taking an anti-love drug which affects her capacity for empathy would damage all her relationships.

However romantic love seems to differ from other forms of love. Most forms of love seem to have more persistence than romantic love. Romantic love might be different from other forms of love. If the above is accepted then some forms of love might have the following structure. Love might consist of the basic capacity to care about and identify with something or someone, plus the capacity to feel empathy, plus the capacity for romantic love. It might then be possible that the neurochemical system underlying our capacity to feel romantic love is distinct from neurochemical systems underlying our capacity for basic love and empathy. If love has this form then it might be possible for an abused woman to take an anti-love drug which affects her capacity for romantic love without damaging her other loving relationships. The above assumes an abused woman’s love for her abusive partner depends on romantic love. In practice many abused women suffer abuse for many years suggesting their love may not be wholly based on romantic love.

I have not been able to answer the specific question as to whether it would be permissible to take anti-love drugs in certain situations. The above however suggests that before we attempt to answer this question we need firstly to investigate whether love has a structure and secondly provided it does investigate whether the neurochemical systems underlying the different elements of this structure are distinct enough to permit the use of these drugs.

1.      Harry Frankfurt, 2006, Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, page 41.

2.      Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 103

3.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford.

Effectiveness Enhancement and Motivational Enhancement

Hannah Maslen asks the question as to whether there is an important difference between the enhancement of effectiveness and the enhancement of motivation; see marathon mice and the will to work . In this posting I will examine Maslen’s question and will conclude there is. I will further conclude even if the artificial enhancement of effectiveness is unacceptable that the artificial enhancement of motivation may be acceptable.

In order to examine this question we must first examine what is meant by motivation. Intuitively motivation simply means how much effort we put in to achieving our goals. The greater the effort we put in, the greater our motivation. What do we mean by our motivation? Is motivation something we possess in much the same way as we might possess such things as strength or intelligence? Let us accept there are some means of enhancing our strength and intelligence which are acceptable; after all athletes enhance their strength through training and scholars their intelligence through learning. Let us also accept motivation is something we possess in much the same way as we possess strength or intelligence. Prima facie it follows there are some ways of enhancing our motivation which should be perfectly acceptable.

The above is of course too simplistic. For the sake of argument let us now assume there are some means enhancing strength and intelligence which are unacceptable such as artificial means. If this is so we might agree with Leonard Kass,

“Yet in those areas of human life in which excellence has until now been achieved only by discipline and effort, the attainment of those achievements by means of drugs, genetic engineering, or implanted devices looks to be “cheating” or “cheap.” We believe – or until only yesterday believed – that people should work hard for their achievements. “Nothing good comes easily.” See Beyond therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement .

Basically it seems to me that Kass’ argument might be summarised as follows. He argues that if we obtain certain goods without any real determination that in so doing we devalue determination in general. In addition, for his argument to work he must believe the damage this does to our determination is not offset by the value of any goods obtained. For the moment let us accept this argument. Let us also assume it is possible to artificially enhance our motivation. It follows there is an important difference between the enhancement of effectiveness and the enhancement of motivation. Enhancing our effectiveness devalues our motivation whilst it is hard to see how enhancing our motivation could devalue motivation. More generally if something is worth enhancing then it must have some value and enhancing this something can only enhance this value. Of course if such an enhancement devalues other goods this devaluation might supply us with a reason not to proceed with the proposed enhancement. For instance Kass believes it would be wrong to enhance our intelligence or strength by artificial means because these enhancements would devalue and eventually damage our motivation. Let us accept that increased determination is a good thing. It follows from the above that it would not be wrong to artificially enhance our determination and hence our motivation provided this enhancement does not damage some other goods. In the case of enhancing our motivation what sort of other goods might we damage? Our determination to be determined? It seems it would be possible for Kass to endorse artificially enhancing our motivations whilst at the same time maintaining it would be wrong to artificially enhance more general goods such as our strength or intelligence and still remain consistent. Personally I doubt that Kass would make such an endorsement.

What sort of objection to the above might an objector such as Kass raise? He might suggest that artificially enhancing someone’s motivations would damage her authenticity as a person. What does it mean to be authentic? Intuitively an authentic person is one who is true to her self. An authentic person is someone who is not easily swayed by short term emotions or the views of others. I have argued in previous posts that a person is defined by what she cares about, what she takes pride in. It follows that anyone who is a person must care about or love something. I would suggest how authentic a person is depends on how she acts with regard to what she cares about or takes pride in. Enhancing someone’s motivation, her determination, does not change what she cares about. Moreover enhancing someone’s motivation increases her disposition to act with regard to what she cares about. It follows enhancing someone’s determination does not damage her authenticity. Accepting the above means it might even be argued enhancing someone’s motivation does not damage her authenticity and might possibly enhance it.

However my objector might respond by pointing out I have been treating our motivation in a purely instrumental way. He might proceed to suggest our motivations form part of who we are. He might then maintain accepting the above means that artificially enhancing our motivations might still damage our authenticity as a person. I am inclined to accept our motivations are part of who we are. Our motivations might have both intrinsic and instrumental value to us. Personally I hope I am a reasonably determined person and take some pride in my determination. I would argue if someone is proud of some personal attribute then she must care about that attribute and as a result that attribute helps define her as a person. If someone fails to act in a determined way when she cares about something she will be ashamed of herself. Let us accept that our motivations are not purely instrumental but have some intrinsic value for us. Let us further accept that some people care about their motivations and that this means these motivations help to form them as persons. It follows our motivations can be part of our authentic self. Does this acceptance mean we shouldn’t artificially enhance our motivation? People seek to change themselves by enhancing themselves by training or learning. I can see of no reason why people changing themselves by these means will render themselves in-authentic. Perhaps, as suggested above, we shouldn’t do this by artificial means because doing so might damage our motivation. However I can see no reason why someone shouldn’t change herself by artificially enhancing her motivation because doing so might damage her authenticity. In practice I have some remaining doubts but perhaps these might be based on some unjustified arrogance on my part.