Friendship, Love and Happiness

Positive psychologists such as Haidt and Seligman stress the importance of association and friendship in making us happy. Lonely people are often unhappy. It might appear to follow that one way an unhappy lonely person can improve his happiness is by making friends. In this posting I will argue this is not easy. I will argue the nature of friendship means if someone attempts to make friends solely in order to improve his happiness that his attempt will fail. I will however suggest that association can increase our happiness and may lead to friendship.

I will argue first that the nature of friendship means someone cannot simply choose to become friends with someone else. Let us assume that our lonely unhappy person chooses to become friends with someone else simply in order to boost his happiness. Let us further assume he attempts to share his potential friend’s interests and that she shows no inclination to respond. The resulting relationship is not one of friendship. Our unhappy person might be described as an admirer, a hanger on or perhaps even as a fan but certainly not as a friend. Intuitively it makes sense to talk of unrequited love but it makes no sense at all to talk about unrequited friendship, see Helm . Friendship is of necessity a two way relationship. Someone may attempt to become friends with someone else but he cannot choose to become friends with another in order to make himself happier.

Let us now assume that when our unhappy person chooses to become friends with someone else simply in order to boost his happiness that his potential friend reciprocates. The relationship has now become a two way one. However I will once again argue the nature of friendship means that his attempt will still fail. This relationship can be characterised as one in which the unhappy person is simply attempting to use the other as a means to achieve his own ends. According to Kantian ethics this attempt is morally wrong. However I am not interested in morality here. I am interested in whether such an attempt could actually lead to friendship? According to Aristotle the answer to this question would appear to be yes as he includes friends of utility in his classification of types of friends. However I would suggest that intuitively friends must ‘care about’ each other. It is clear that our unhappy person does not ‘care about’ his potential friend, he cares about being happy. It follows if we accept our intuitions then our unhappy person’s attempt to make friends must fail.

At this point let us assume that the unhappy person further modifies his behaviour and attempts to ‘care about’ his potential friend in order to improve his prospects of achieving friendship and hence boost his happiness. Surely at this point our unhappy person has done enough to become friends and hence boost his happiness. Once again I will argue he has not. I will argue that the nature of caring means this attempt will also fail. Frankfurt argues if someone cares about something then he identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced (1). Caring about so defined is a form of love. At this point someone may object that loving and ‘caring about’ something are not equivalent and suggest that whilst I may love my wife that I only ‘care about’ eating ice cream. It is important to have a clear understanding of what it means to ‘care about’. I would suggest I simply like ice cream and point out there is a difference between liking and ‘caring about’. There is also a difference between ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about’. A good nurse must ‘care for’ her patients but she need not ‘care about’ her patients. Indeed it might be argued a good nurse or doctor should not ‘care about’ her patients too much. In a clinical setting a nurse or doctor must remain detached or else she might suffer emotional burnout. However if a nurse is also a mother she should ‘care about’ her children. A good mother should identify with her children and if they are harmed she should feel harmed. Caring about in this way is a form of love. However love is not simply a matter of choice. We cannot simply choose to love someone. It follows we cannot simply choose to ‘care about’ someone. It further follows our unhappy person cannot simply modify his behaviour in order to ‘care about’ his potential friend and so improve his prospects of achieving friendship and hence boost his happiness. This conclusion seems to concur with our intuitions that someone cannot force or simply will friendship.

Even if we cannot simply will or force friendship it nonetheless plays an important part in making us happy. What can someone do if he cannot simply will friendship? He should place himself in circumstances that cultivate friendship. In order to do so he must be active and join in association with others. So doing should increase his happiness irrespective of whether it helps him make friends or strengthen any existing friendships because activity alone seems increase happiness. Activity is a form of engagement and engagement helps increase happiness, see Haybron (2) and see also my previous posting. Secondly even if he cannot simply will friendship then perhaps he can attempt to form limited friendships and this limited form might in the right circumstances lead to full friendship. However if this proposal is to be meaningful it must make sense to talk of limited friendship, see Helm’s idea of ordinary friendship (3). If I play golf once a week with someone and we share an interest in playing golf are we limited friends? I would suggest we are perhaps very limited friends. It is important to note the difference between this limited friendship and the attempted friendship of the unhappy person above. The unhappy person attempts to ‘care about’ someone only in order to improve his prospects of achieving friendship and hence boosting his happiness. By playing golf with my golf partner we share an interest in golf. If it rains and we cannot play golf both his interests and mine are frustrated. We ‘care about’ the same thing however modest this caring may be. The same does not apply to the unhappy person who attempts to make a friend simply boost his happiness. He simply ‘cares about’ being happy. Limited friends are persons who ‘care about’ the same things such as playing golf or doing philosophy. Limited friends have common interests. True friends are persons who ‘care about’ each other in addition to ‘caring about’ each other’s interests. If ‘caring about’ and loving are equivalent then true friends are persons who love each other. True friends have a common interest in each of them flourishing. If limited friends and true friends are as suggested above then it seems feasible that limited friendship may in time become true friendship. It might also help explain what Aristotle meant by the friendship of utility and why it is of value.

Throughout this posting I have assumed that friendship helps make someone happy. I have argued that love or ‘caring about’ is an important element of friendship. I have also argued above limited friends or friends of utility may be of value because they lead to true friendship. What is it about friendship that makes someone happy? I would suggest it is because he loves or ‘cares about’ his friend. I would further suggest that loving something makes someone happy. This last suggestion would explain why people keep pets. Accepting these suggestions might mean friendship is important not because it makes someone happy directly but rather because it gives him something, or in this case someone, to love. Loving something is what really makes us happy not friendship. If we accept the above then two things follow. Firstly limited friendship or friendships of utility assume greater importance because they give us an opportunity to love. Secondly accepting the above tells us something about our concept of happiness. Or the relative importance of the various components of happiness. Daniel Nettle suggests that there are three levels to happiness. First there are momentary emotions such as joy or pleasure next there are judgments about feelings such as satisfaction and lastly the quality of someone’s life over time (4). Let us assume what is important for happiness is loving rather than friendship and that loving is connected to satisfaction. Someone can’t love something that dissatisfies him. It appears to follow that satisfaction is more important than momentary emotions such as joy or pleasure and even the quality of life in making someone happy.

1. Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 83.
2. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 114.
3. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford, page 282.
4. Daniel Nettle, 2005, Happiness; The Science Behind Your Smile, Oxford, page 8.

Does our Concept of Happiness change as we Age?

It is generally accepted that happiness is important in our lives. However, in philosophy there is a great deal of disagreement about exactly what exactly is meant by happiness, about the concept of happiness. As we age different things make us happy as compared to when we were younger. However, there is an additional question does the way in which we are happy also change? In other words what it means to be happy changes with age; the concept of happiness applicable to us changes with age. Clearly different things please different people. I’m getting old and the things that make me happy differ from those that make my grandchildren happy. The question I wish to address does not concern such differences. The question I am concerned with in this posting is this; are people of all ages happy in the same way but with their happiness focussed on different things or is the way in which people of different ages are happy differ?

Let us firstly examine this question from a psychological perspective of happiness. According to Martin Seligman happiness consists in someone having positive emotions, being engaged with life or having flow, having meaning, achieving something and having friends (1). It is possible to question whether meaning, achieving something and having friends are an essential part of the concept of happiness or are simply one of the things which make us happy. I have suggested that meaning, love and happiness are all inescapably intertwined, see meaning, love and happiness . Clearly both my grandson and I experience positive emotions and each of us has our own friends. My grandson who is seven, goes to school and I believe he achieves things there which satisfy him. For me writing this blog is some sort of small achievement. Whilst writing it I am engaged and sometimes achieve some pleasure. I believe my grandson obtains a sense of achievement, even if this is only when he is playing minecraft. Let it be accepted that both of us find some sort of achievement in our lives either by playing the game well or in my case by writing about happiness. It follows provided we accept Seligman’s definition of happiness that my grandson and I are both happy in much the same way even if we are happy about different things. However, my grandson has a baby brother who is clearly happy at times. His baby brother has positive emotions but has no sense of meaning or achievement and has no friends because he is still a baby. Does it follow that he is happy in a different way to his elder brother and me? Using Seligman’s definition of happiness suggests the answer is yes. I however would suggest as of now he is happy in an incomplete way. I would further suggest that as he matures he will develop and become happy in a more complete way.

 

I now want to examine whether the concept of happiness applicable to people changes as they age from two different philosophical perspectives. Firstly Fred Feldman regards happiness as attitudinal hedonistic happiness (2). Basically attitudinal hedonistic happiness consists not only of sensory pleasures but also consists in our being pleased or displeased about some states of affair. Basically this means someone could be happy when eating a good meal but she could also be happy because she believes it is cooked by someone she loves. If we accept Feldman’s position then it seems all people young and old are happy in the same way even if they are happy with different things. Feldman’s position also accounts for the different ways my grandsons experience happiness. The younger clearly has sensory pleasures but as yet he takes no pleasure from states of affairs.

The second perspective from which I wish to examine the question of aging and happiness is from that of Daniel Haybron. According to Haybron,

“To be happy then, is for one’s emotional condition to be broadly positive – involving stances of attunement, engagement and endorsement – with negative central affective states and mood propensities only to a minor extent.” (3)

According to Haybron someone’s emotional condition is not just characterised by her emotions but also by her moods and dispositions. He regards being happy as a state of psychic affirmation. I believe his definition has some features in common with Seligman. Both definitions include engagement and endorsement might be seen to involve meaning. However, Seligman seems to be concerned with all affective states whilst Haybron makes a difference between central and peripheral affective states. He hints at a link between happiness and the self that does not apply in peripheral cases (4).  Intuitively Haybron seems to be justified in making a distinction between central and peripheral affective states for it seems probable that a mother would obtain more happiness from watching her child playing on a swing than from the ice cream she is enjoying whilst doing so. Being a mother is a central affective state whilst enjoying an ice cream is peripheral one. 

Let us accept that Haybron is correct and that someone’s happiness is linked to her sense of self. It might then be suggested that because we are all different, each self is different, that different concepts of happiness ought to be applied to different people. In particular, it might be suggested that because there are differences between the young and old that different concepts of happiness are applicable to the young and old. It follows that my initial suggestion that the concept of happiness changes as we age might be justified. In order to examine the plausibility of this suggestion we must understand examine how the self is linked to happiness. Firstly, let us assume that the self is linked to happiness simply because the self determines what makes someone happy. However, if this assumption is accepted then there is no real concept of happiness. If people can be happy in radically different ways, rather than each person simply determining the things that make her happy, then there would be no real meaningful concept of happiness. It follows the concept of happiness applicable to us does not change as we age because we simply don’t have such a concept. Secondly let us assume that the self is linked to happiness because the things that make us happy help define the self. If the self is linked to our happiness by the things that make us happy then as we age once again there is no reason why the concept applicable to us should change. The things that make us happy might change as we age but the way we are happy does not. Once again it appears my initial worry that the way in which we are happy might change with age is unjustified.

However, it might be objected that it is ridiculous to assume all the things that make someone happy help define her self. My objector might proceed to point out the fact a mother enjoys an ice cream while watching her child play on a swing surely doesn’t help define her self. Haybron would surely agree with the above. In reply I would suggest if a mother usually enjoys an ice cream whilst watching her child that this does indeed help define her self even if only to a very minor degree. Haybron suggests it is only central affective states that are linked to the self. Haybron further suggests what distinguishes central affective states from peripheral ones is that someone has a disposition to act on the former and no disposition to act on the latter (5). I would suggest that a central affective state means someone must have a disposition to experience that state. However, having a disposition to experience a certain affective state alone does not mean it is a central affective state. I would argue what also matters is the strength of any disposition. For instance, our mother may well have a disposition to enjoy ice cream causing her to buy ice cream as well as a disposition to care for her child. Perhaps her disposition to enjoy ice cream even defines her as a person to some minor degree as suggested above. However, if her child falls from the swing she rushes to help her child rather than finish her ice cream. Her disposition to care for her child is far stronger than her disposition to enjoy ice cream. Her disposition to care for her child defines her far greater degree as a particular person than her disposition to enjoy ice cream. It seems to me the all the affective states someone has a disposition to experience help to define her as a person but their importance in defining her depends on the strength of the disposition. If the above is accepted then once again my initial worry that, even if the things that make us happy change as we age the way in which we are happy also changes as we age, remains unjustified.

At this point my I will suggest even if our concept of happiness does not change as we age that nonetheless the relative weights of the elements within that concept do change. For instance, if we accept Feldman’s concept of attitudinal happiness it seems possible that the pleasure we obtain from our attitudes may increase whilst our sensory pleasures decrease as we age. For instance, an older mother might take pleasure when considering her children who have grown up, left home and are now prospering by themselves. Such an attitude is unavailable to a younger mother. I believe such an attitude might be regarded as satisfaction with that part of her life. Feldman holds that being satisfied is not part of happiness. In the rest of this posting I will be primarily concerned with Haybron’s concept of happiness. Let us recall that that someone is happy if her emotional condition is broadly positive and that this involves her in general being attuned to, engaged with and endorsing her emotional condition. Haybron believes that attunement is more important than engagement and that engagement is more important than endorsement with regard to our happiness. I suggest this priority might change as we age.

In the rest of this posting I want to examine whether such a change in priorities can occur. Haybron believes engagement involves exuberance or vitality and sometimes involves flow (6). I would suggest as someone ages her exuberance or vitality decreases which means her engagement also decreases as she ages. Next I will deal with endorsement. Haybron believes endorsement involves feelings of joy or sadness (7). To me endorsement involves satisfaction. Moreover, it might be argued satisfaction does not need to involve any emotion. Some might argue that satisfaction simply entails an absence of restlessness in someone to change whatever satisfies her, see Frankfurt (8). However, if we accept Haybron’s position that endorsement requires feelings of joy and sadness and that these feelings decrease as someone ages then the importance of endorsement might decrease also. Haybron deals with attunement at some length (9). To him attunement involves a certain tranquillity and lack of anxiety. Attunement also involves a settled confidence and lack of stress making for a more confident person. It seems to me attunement has two distinct meanings according to Haybron because tranquillity does not of necessity increase confidence. I will only deal with the first meaning here. Attunement involves a certain tranquillity and lack of anxiety. I see no reason as to why someone should become less tranquil or less anxious as she ages simply because she is aging. It appears to follow there is no reason why the priorities between someone’s attunement and endorsement should change as she ages but perhaps endorsement may become more important to her than engagement.

Haybron considers tranquillity as a form of settledness (10). If he is correct then because tranquillity is part of attunement, attunement might be seen partly as a form of settledness. I would suggest a sense of settledness is a sense of acceptance. I now want to differentiate between our ideas of acceptance and satisfaction. I have suggested above that an older mother, who takes pleasure, when considering her children who have grown up and left home and are now prospering, is experiencing satisfaction. Let us now consider another mother who smothered her continually crying child whilst suffering from severe post natal depression. For years this mother has suffered from feelings of guilt. However recently she has become more settled and simply accepts what has happened together with the fact she was not to blame. If satisfaction simply means an absence to change anything to do with what satisfies someone then acceptance, or settledness, is the same as satisfaction. It follows the mother who smothered her child could look back with satisfaction to what happened. I don’t believe this is possible. I believe that there is a difference between being satisfied with and simply accepting some past event. The above example seems to show that being satisfied must involve some positive affective state. I have used the term positive affective state here rather than positive emotion as I believe someone can be in a satisfied mood.

One consequence of accepting that being satisfied must involve some positive affective states means satisfaction shares some features with endorsement as defined by Haybron. Haybron believes endorsement involves joy and sadness. However, I see no reason why satisfaction need involve joy, Joy seems to be too strong an emotion to be a necessary element of satisfaction. Moreover, sadness seems to be connected to someone’s concept of her self and she can be dissatisfied with things that are unconnected to her concept of self. It follows sadness is also not a necessary element of satisfaction. I also see no reason why endorsement need involve joy and sadness. Endorsing something can just mean being satisfied with it. It seems clear to me that as people age acceptance and satisfaction with their past assume greater importance in their emotional condition. It follows if endorsement is defined by being satisfied with something and endorsement is part of someone’s emotional condition then the priorities attunment, engagement and endorsement play in being happy might change as we age.

Someone might object that if the pleasure of satisfaction is a weak positive emotion unlike joy then it is unlikely to come to play a more prominent part in our emotional condition as we age unless older people don’t feel strong positive emotions. My objector might proceed to point out the joy felt in orgasm, for at least some older people can feel orgasmic, far outweighs the pleasure associated with satisfaction. In reply I would argue what matters with regard to satisfaction is not only the degree of pleasure experienced but also the fact that satisfaction involves a disposition to experience that pleasure again and again. Martin Seligman believes achievement is an important element of the concept of happiness, see above. Let us assume that achieving something involves satisfaction. It follows if being satisfied is part of happiness then it possible to explain why achievement is one of the things that make us happy.

In conclusion it seems that my initial worry that our concept of happiness should change as we age is unfounded. However, the relative importance of the various elements in the concept of happiness seem to change as we age.

1. Martin Seligman, 2011, Flourish, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, Chapter 1.
2. Fred Feldman, 2010, What is this thing called Happiness? Oxford, chapter 6.
3. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 147.
4. Haybron, page 130.
5. Haybron, page 130.
6. Haybron, page 114.
7. Haybron, page 113.
8. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press. Page 103.
9. Haybron, pages 116 to 120.
10. Haybron, page 116