Feldman, Haybron and Happy Dispositions

Normally most people would understand what I meant if I said someone had a happy disposition. In this posting I want to explore the connection between a happy disposition and our concept of happiness. Haybron suggests that,

“Happiness has two components: a person’s central affective states and second, her mood propensity …. What brings these states together, I would suggest is their dispositionality.”(1)

Feldman argues Haybron’s suggestion is untenable because it doesn’t allow for the idea of fragile happiness (2). What is fragile happiness? Someone could be happy whilst being unaware that a tumour will soon end her happiness. Her happiness could be called fragile but this fragility does not rule out her having a disposition to be happy. Feldman uses the example of a Grandma suffering from depression and who takes a drug which allows her to be happy, in this case her happiness is fragile and she does not have a disposition to be happy. It would appear that Feldman is correct in his assertion that someone can be happy and not have a happy disposition.

I am inclined to agree with Feldman that someone can be happy and that she need not have a disposition to be happy. However the question I want to examine is a slightly different one; could someone be a happy person and not have a disposition to be happy? Feldman believes someone is happy now if when we consider all the propositions with which she is currently intrinsically attitudinally (dis)pleased with and we then consider the degree to which she is (dis)pleased with these propositions and find the sum to be positive. Feldman uses this idea of momentary happiness to calculate someone’s happiness over an interval. He suggests that in order to calculate someone’s happiness over an interval we use her momentary happiness over time to plot a graph. The x axis measures time and the y axis the subject’s happiness. The area between the graph line and the x axis can then be used to calculate her happiness over the chosen interval. Areas above the x axis are positive and areas below are negative. The subject’s happiness over the chosen interval is just the sum of these areas. From the above I would construe that Feldman believes someone is a happy person if she is happy over some long term interval. This interval might be five years or even a lifetime. A happy person so defined need not have a happy disposition.

However I have some difficulty in accepting such a definition. Let us assume if someone has a positive balance of happiness over ten years that she can be regarded as a happy person. Let us consider Imogen. Imogen was never either really happy or unhappy during her childhood and adolescence. When Imogen was twenty she meet Tom and was blissfully happy for a year. Let us say throughout that year she experienced 10 units of happiness. Unfortunately at the end of the year Tom left Imogen for her best friend Annabel. Imogen is now thirty and for the last nine years she has constantly experienced -0.5 units of happiness. If I am correct in my construction of a happy person according to Feldman then he would regard Imogen as a happy person. Intuitively I would regard Imogen as an unhappy person.

Let us assume that if someone is a happy person she must have disposition to be happy. If my assumption is accepted then we must also accept Feldman’s Grandma is not a happy person. It might appear this acceptance runs counter to our intuitions. In what follows I will try to differentiate between a happy person and a person who is happy. A person who is happy is simply a person who is currently happy. For instance Feldman’s Grandma is a person who is happy. If someone is a person who is currently happy then this fact alone gives me no reason to assume she will be happy tomorrow. I may of course believe she will be happy tomorrow because tomorrow will be her birthday, but the fact she is happy currently, by itself, gives me no reason to predict her future happiness. If however I believe someone to be a happy person I normally expect her to be happy tomorrow. The fact she is a happy person by itself gives me a solid reason for my expectation. If I accept the fact that someone is a happy person alone gives me a reason to predict her future happiness then this reason must be based on something about her as a person. She might have a happy nature, a happy personality or she might simply be a realistic optimist as suggested by Tiberius (4). Feldman’s Grandma’s personality by itself gives me no reason to believe she will be happy tomorrow. The fact Grandma will continue to take her drugs does give me a reason to predict she will be happy tomorrow but this fact is not part of her personality. I would suggest Grandma is not a happy person. I would further suggest a happy person must have some sort of disposition to be happy.

Haybron hints that if someone is happy there is a link between his happiness and the self that does not obtain in the case of (peripheral) pleasure (5). I am doubtful about his hint due to the fragility of happiness as expounded by Feldman above. However I do think there is a link between a happy person and her self. Haybron suggests there is a link between someone’s happiness and her central affective states. He further suggests what distinguishes “central affective states is that they dispose agents to experience certain affects rather than others”. However before accepting Haybron’s suggestions with regard to persons who are happy I must deal with the problems raised by the fragility of happiness as highlighted by Feldman. Let me make it clear that I believe the fact that someone is a happy person’s happiness remains fragile. Let us recall the happy person whose status as such is threatened by the tumour growing inside her. Nonetheless I would suggest the fact she is a happy person means she could cope better with the difficulties facing her ahead rather than a person, such as Grandma, who is simply a person who is happy. Her happiness is fragile but it is not as fragile as a person who is simply happy. The reason why her happiness is less fragile is that she has a disposition to be happy. Dispositions may vanish but I would suggest they don’t vanish overnight. My suggestion should be open to empirical investigation by psychologists. If my suggestion is correct it follows problems associated with the fragility of happy persons does not mean having a disposition to be happy is unimportant as far as happiness is concerned.

1. Daniel Haybron, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Oxford, page 138.
2. Fred Feldman, 2010, what is this thing called Happiness? Oxford, page 29.
3. Feldman, page 118.
4. Valerie Tiberius, 2008, The Reflective life, Oxford, chapter 6.
5. Haybron, page 130.

Olympic Ideals and Winning

The Olympic Games are upon us and it is often claimed what really matters in the Olympics and sport in general is simply participating rather than actually winning. In this posting I want to differentiate between participating and competing and will defend the claim that winning is an essential element of any sport. My starting point for this posting will be the actions of Megan Vogel who when competing in a race in Ohio was running last but when about to pass Arden McMath, who had collapsed, stopped and helped her across the line; see Megan Vogel  . Megan’s action has rightly attracted much praise and many would suggest her action can be seen as demonstrating that what really matters in sport is taking part rather than winning.

I will begin by arguing Megan’s action was not part of sport. I do not intend to define sport precisely as I could offer several differing definitions. However prima facie it seems safe to assume any meaningful definition of sport must include the idea of competition and a set of rules. Some might question this assumption as it would rule out rock climbing and hunting as sports but might include chess. Megan’s action was certainly not competitive. Nor did her action have anything to do with the rules of athletics and as a result I would suggest had nothing to do with sport. Someone might object that even if her actions did not directly involve sport they did involve the ethos of sport, or sportsmanship. Once again as with sport I do not want to offer a precise definition of sportsmanship. I will however assume any definition must include the ideas of fairness, respect for other competitors and a degree of graciousness in accepting the result of any contest. Megan’s actions appear to have little to do with any of these assumptions. Helping Arden had nothing to do with fairness, respect for fellow competitors or graciousness in accepting the result of the race. My objector might now suggest Megan’s action demonstrated respect for Arden. I would counter suggest Megan’s action had very little to do with respect for Arden, though of course she may well have respected her, but instead demonstrated empathy. Empathy is not a necessary part of either sport or sportsmanship. I would further suggest Megan’s action demonstrated there are some things more important than sport or sportsmanship.

I have assumed that the concept of sport must include the idea of competition and a set of rules. The idea of competition is a meaningless one without the idea of winning. If someone objects I would ask her to think of any sort of competition without a winner or winners. My objector might now suggest even if sports must involve competition not all sportsmen or women are competitors. She might point to mass marathons such as those of London or New York in which the majority of participants stand no chance of winning to support her suggestion. She might then proceed to further point out these participants don’t even have intention of competing with the elite athletes. I will agree with my objector that these participants are taking part in a sporting event but I will argue many are still competing rather than just taking part in some mass ramble attached to a sporting event. Of course these participants are not competing with the elite athletes but they are seeking to achieve some goal. This goal may be a personal best, beating a friend or perhaps simply finishing the course. Achieving these goals means competing with the clock or a personal friend. However can achieving some purely personal goal such as simply finishing a marathon course be seen as some form of competition? I suppose I could make some contrived attempt to argue that achieving a personal gaol can be seen as a competition with some elements within the inner self. I will not make such an attempt and accept that achieving some personal athletic goal is not a form of competition. My objector might now argue that because all participants in a marathon are sportsmen or women and some of those are not taking part in any meaningful competition that competition is not an essential element of sport. I don’t accept my objectors premise that all participants in a large scale marathon are sportsmen or women. I would suggest there is a difference between being simply a participant and a competitor. Not all participants are competitors. It follows the concept of a sportsman or woman is not an all or nothing concept but rather a graduated one. I would further suggest that the degree to which someone should be considered a sportsman or woman depends on the amount of genuine competition involved. It follows that this objection to my prima facie assumption that sport must include the idea of competition and winning is unsound.

I have argued that competition and winning are an essential element of sport and those who merely participate in a sporting event such as a mass marathon are not really sportsmen or women. It follows what is important to being involved with sport is competing rather than merely participating and competition involves winners. Merely taking part, participating in a sporting event is not what really matters indeed it is irrelevant as far as sport is concerned.

One reason why the idea that participating in a sporting event may seem to be as important as competing in the event is that many of the virtues needed by someone to compete in an event such as a marathon race are the same as those needed by someone merely to complete the event. In order to compete or participate in a marathon someone needs to be dedicated, determined, have a little practical wisdom and a degree of temperance. This is a limited set of virtues. If someone is to have a sense of sportsmanship she needs to augment this set by adding a sense of fairness and respect for others. This set is a slightly larger set of virtues but still remains a limited set. Earl Spurgin argues we should not expect sports stars to be role models as this invades their right to privacy (1). The above suggests a further reason; the virtues needed by sports stars are a limited set and the set of virtues possessed by role models should be larger including humanity based on empathy or sympathy such as that exhibited by Megan Vogel.

1. Earl Spurgin 2012 Hey, How did I become a Role Model? Privacy and the Extent of Role Model-Obligations. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29(2)