Tuesday, 28 February 2012

Sport, Performance Enhancing Drugs and Character

 

Julian Savulescu argues in a posting in Practical Ethics that “performance enhancement is not against the spirit of cycling; it is the spirit cycling” he goes on to suggest that “we should focus on monitoring the athletes’ health rather than on losing a war on doping”, see Practical Ethics. In this posting I will argue performance enhancement is against the spirit of sport and because cycling is a sport it is against the spirit of cycling. At first hand it might appear that this will be a difficult task for me as I have previously argued that there is nothing wrong with taking cognition enhancing drugs subject to certain safeguards, see cognitive enhancement . I still stand by this position. In addition I would also support the use moral enhancing drugs, once again subject to suitable safeguards. In must be noted drug enhancement is usually not as straightforward as it sometimes seems initially and adequate safeguards are extremely important; for instance nasal sprays containing oxytocin may not be as effective as first thought and in some circumstances may even be counter productive. 

Let us assume certain cognitive enhancing or moral enhancement drugs are as safe as any of the drugs used in medical practice, if this is so I see no reason why someone should not take these enhancement drugs. Prima facie enhancing someone’s cognitive abilities or her capacity to feel empathy will not damage her as a person. Moreover if any enhancement drug is as safe as those used in medical practice and reasonably cheap I can see no reason why this drug should give someone an unfair advantage over others. I will not pursue the argument here. Of course in this situation cognitive enhancing or moral enhancing drugs will have to be tested and approved by some appropriate authority just as the drugs used in medical practice are now. Savulescu, as I read him, believes the above should also apply to cycling. The cycling authorities rather than testing cyclists for drugs should test drugs for cyclists in order to ensure these drugs are safe for cyclists to take. Whether cyclists take advantage of these drugs would be up to them.

Before proceeding with my argument I must make it clear the type of sport which concerns me. My argument will not concern non-competitive sports, for in these sports there seems no spirit to contravene. For instance, if someone is a lone cyclist who cycles either because she simply enjoys it or to keep fit then she is of no concern to me here. If such a cyclist takes performance enhancing drugs in order to cycle faster or further then I see no reason why she should not do so provided these drugs are safe. I hasten to add as a lone cyclist myself I personally can see no good reason to go faster or further than I am normally capable of. My argument is limited solely to competitive sports.

I want to argue that all competitive sports incorporate the ideal of fairness. A cycle race, in which only one competitor was permitted to take enhancing drugs whilst the other riders were forbidden to do so by the cycling authorities and in which the authorities rigorously tested these other riders to ensure their compliance, could not possibly be regarded as fair. Nonetheless could such a race possibly be regarded as sport? I would argue if such a race could be regarded as sport then there is no essential difference between sport and spectacle, between sport and showbiz. Someone might suggest that the demand for tickets at the Olympic opening ceremony by some supposed sports fans shows that in practice there is really no difference between sport and spectacle. I would reject such a suggestion for it seems to me even if sport can be spectacular it cannot be regarded simply as a spectacle. Intuitively the hypothetical race suggested above cannot be regarded as sport. It would appear the idea of fairness is an essential part of sport, but the question remains why? 

I would suggest fairness is an essential part of sport because it engenders what we find admirable about sport. Able bodied Olympians don’t compete with Para-Olympians, heavyweight boxers don’t compete with lightweights and golfers have handicaps to ensure fair competition. It follows what we find admirable about sport must be connected to sports men and women. What we find admirable about sportspersons cannot be that they are winners. If this was so we would not find anything admirable about the vast majority sportspersons. I would now suggest what we find admirable in sportsppersons is linked to their character and this character is connected to certain virtues. Virtues such as determination, dedication, fortitude and courage. If we accept the above then it seem competition between women born as female and women born as male damages sport. Such completion damages sport. These virtues can be best expressed if a sportsperson can compete equally, if sport is fair. Someone might object we don’t find all sportspersons admirable. She might point out we don’t have any reason to find some premiership footballers’ character as admirable. In reply I would argue we only find part of a sportsman’s character admirable. The fact that some footballer shows determination, dedication, fortitude and some courage when playing football is admirable. It may well be true that we find some of his activities off the pitch less than admirable. Nonetheless I would counter argue the fact that a footballer plays football to a high standard makes his character more admirable than if he did not. I would further argue that the same applies to amateur sportspersons who engage in sport purely for the pleasure it brings; engaging in sport may not make someone a good person but it nearly always enhances his character to some degree. Of course there may be a very few people who should not play sport due to their temperament, for instance someone might be unable to control his anger.

Savulescu might accept my argument. Nevertheless he might continue to argue if all professional cyclists could take drugs which are tested and approved by cycling authorities then cycle races would not be unfair and that we could still admire the determination, dedication, fortitude and courage of the cyclists involved. I would suggest he would be wrong to do so because such a situation would be hard to maintain. Let us assume some drugs are tested and approved by cycling authorities. However new drugs which might enhance a cyclist’s performance further might be developed. It follows the cycling authorities will have to continue testing cyclists for these new drugs to promote fairness. It follows that allowing cyclists to take some drugs would only change the current situation slightly. A partial ban on enhancing drugs would mean some drugs are acceptable whilst others are not. It would also seem to mean some new drugs initially unacceptable might, after suitable testing, become acceptable. It follows policing such a fluid situation might be much more difficult than trying to maintain the current position. Savulescu might of course revise his position and insist that cyclists should be free to take any drug and that drug testing should be abolished. It seems entirely possible that in this revised situation argue some enhancing drugs might be developed and only offered to selected cyclists. Real competition would then shift from cyclists to the scientists producing performance enhancing drugs; competitive cycling would be reduced to a mere spectacle.





Friday, 3 February 2012

Acting from Duty, Caring For

In this posting I want to consider acting from duty. My starting point is an example given by Thomas Hurka. He asks us to imagine, 

“that you’re in hospital recovering from a painful operation and a friend comes at considerable inconvenience to visit you. When you say how much you appreciate her visit and concern for you it shows, she says it isn’t that she cares for you; she just knew that as a friend, she had a duty to visit.”(1)

Hurka uses this example to argue that in some situations acting out of duty seems to be an inferior way of acting when compared to caring. Hurka’s argument has personal interest to me. A few years ago when my father was getting old and was not as capable as he once had been I found myself travelling to see him every day and helping him out as best I could. I told my wife I was acting out of duty at the time and a few years on after reflection I still believe for the most part this was true. Should I regret acting mostly from duty? I do not. More generally is acting solely from duty in some way inferior to acting because you care?

Intuitively we seem to accept Hurka’s argument. However everyone, including Hurka’s hospital visitor acts because they care about something. Perhaps the hospital visitor only cares about doing her duty. At this point I want to make a distinction between two ways of caring. To ‘care about’ someone means the carer identifies himself with the person she cares about and becomes vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether who she cares about is diminished or enhanced. This definition is based on that of Harry Frankfurt which I use regularly in this blog. To ‘care for’ someone means to understand someone’s needs and to respond to them in an appropriate way. In the light of this distinction I will assume Hurka’s hospital patient wants his visitors to ‘care about’ him but that he wants his nurses to ‘care for’ him. A nurse who cared a ‘great deal’ about his patients but was not very good at ‘caring for’ them would not be a very good nurse. In practice most caring is a combination of ‘caring about’ and ‘caring for’. However it is possible in theory to ‘care for’ someone but not ‘care about’ him. Caring for someone is related to duty and as the example of nurse shows caring for is also important. If Hurka’s hospital visitor is acting out of duty she must ‘care for’ the patient. If for instance she simply went to the hospital and did her SuDoku next to the patient each day during visiting time few people would think she was doing her duty. She must address the concerns of the patient. The hospital visitor acting out of duty must ‘care for’ the patient but it seems what the patient really wants her to do is ‘care about’ him. My original question now becomes this. Is the patient right in believing it would be better if his visitor cared about him rather than for him? Is acting from duty by ‘caring for’ someone in some way inferior to acting because you ‘care about’ him?

If someone acts from duty she must make a real effort to do her duty. Feeble attempts and gestures at doing one’s duty are not doing one’s duty, doing one’s duty is quite demanding. What must the hospital patient’s visitor do when doing her duty? She must ‘care for’ the patient. She must attempt to understand the patient’s needs and to respond in an appropriate way. Clearly she cannot respond to the patient’s medical needs and such needs must be met by the medical staff. She can and should respond to the patient’s practical and emotional needs when she can. One of the emotional needs of the patient is to be ‘cared about’, loved. It follows if the visitor is serious about doing her duty she must make an attempt whenever possible to ‘care about’ the patient. Just bringing him his paper and the fruit he asked for yesterday and then settling down to do her SuDoku for the rest of the visiting time is not doing her duty. It follows doing one’s duty need not be divorced from ‘caring about’.

Let us assume the patient’s friend cannot visit tomorrow and in her place comes his son. His son comes purely out of a sense of duty because he suffers from Aspergers syndrome. People with Aspergers are often extremely conscientious about acting from duty because they have difficultly with empathy or ‘caring about’ as I have defined it above, see Simon Baron-Cohen (2). Acting from duty is central to the lives of some people if they are to act morally. According to Neema Trivedi-Bateman there is a link between moral emotions and offending behaviour in young people, see the conservation . Her research shows that young people are more likely to carry out violent acts if they have weak empathy, shame and guilt. Unfortunately for autistic people empathy, shame and guilt are hard to acquire perhaps because they cannot read other people’s emotions. For higher functioning autistic people acting from duty is of great importance it is essential to acting morally. Parents of such children should try to inculcate a sense of duty in them rather than the moral emotions which they might find impossible to assimilate. Returning to our hospital visitor, he now has had two visitors both visiting from exactly the same sense of duty. If our patient thinks his first visitor is acting in an inferior way does he also think his son is similarly acting in an inferior way? I would guess not. Does then he then come to the view that his first visitor is not acting in an inferior way? Once again I would guess not. What reason might he advance for not changing his mind? He might suggest that whilst his son only has the option of acting out of duty his other visitor can ‘care about’ him.

Is this a reasonable suggestion? I will now argue it is not. The patient believes his visitor has the option to care for him, I believe she may not. I would argue ‘caring about’ or having empathy for someone involves loving her. A mother’s love of her child would be a good example of ‘caring about’. But as Frankfurt points out, love is not a matter of choice (3). One cannot choose to love someone. It might of course be possible to place oneself in a position so that one comes to love someone else. A successful arranged marriage might be an example of so doing. However even in these circumstances love grows and is not chosen. I do believe it is commendable for someone to cultivate the circumstances in which love can flourish. Moreover I do not deny it is good to be loved for the beloved but I do not believe a lover’s love is a matter for praise.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly acting from duty is not an inferior way of acting. Indeed for many people, such as higher functioning autistic people, it is perhaps the only way to act morally. Secondly whist caring about is good and should encouraged it isn’t always praiseworthy whilst acting from duty might be.



  1. Thomas Hurka, 2011, The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters in LifeOxford, page 127.
  2. Simon Baron-Cohen, 2011, Zero Degrees of Empathy, Penguin, page 65.
  3. Harry Frankfurt. 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 135.

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