Knobe, Erler and our ‘True Self’

In this posting I want to consider the comments by Alexandre Erler in Practical Ethics on an article by Joshua Knobe in the New York Times concerning personal identity see http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2011/06/what-is-my-true-self/#more-1548. Knobe uses the example of the evangelical preacher Mark Pierpont who encourages homosexuals to seek a “cure” for their sexual orientation. Pierpont himself was a homosexual and continues to battle his continuing homosexual urges. Knobe uses him as an example to question what is meant by someone’s ‘true self’. He firstly presents two common concepts of self. The first concept is an unreflective one in which our true self is determined by our nature, our urges. The second concept, as advocated by such as David DeGrazia, holds that our true self is defined by our commitments, values, and endorsements. Knobe suggests both of these concepts are challenged by the case of Pierpont. He further suggests that people regard the traits they value in someone as part of that person’s true self. In this posting I want to question whether the concept of someone’s true self as opposed to simply self is a useful concept.

To whom might the concept of a true self be useful? Firstly it might be useful to someone deciding what to do. She might ask what her true self would do in this situation when making some important decision. She might ask herself if she is acting authentically; to her own self being true. Secondly another may question what, is someone else’s true self, before ascribing praise or blame and predicting what that person will do. Intuitively it seems to me these two uses of the idea of true self are distinct and that a different concept might be useful in each case. I will deal with the second case first.

Knobe suggests that others regard the traits they value in someone as reflecting her ‘true self’. I would suggest any such concept of ‘true self’ should not help them ascribe praise or blame and it is not very useful in predicting the actions of others. Praise and blame seem to be more naturally connected to someone’s autonomy rather than her ‘true self’. Of course I accept that someone’s ‘true self’ may be connected to her autonomy. Nonetheless I believe the ascription praise and blame depends directly on someone’s autonomy and that there is no need to involve the concept of ‘true self’. It is plausible that understanding a person’s values might be useful in predicting her actions. However if our concept of ‘true self’ is limited to the values we approve of then this concept will be useful in predicting what we think someone should do rather than what she actually will do. For these reasons Knobe’s suggested concept of someone’s ‘true self’ does not seem to me to be a useful one when applied to others. Erler suggests that our ‘true self’ might be a composite of the two concepts Knobe introduced initially; our natural idea of a ‘true self ‘and an idea of a ‘true self’ being defined by our values and commitments. Is then Erler’s suggested composite concept any more useful than that of Knobe in this context? Once again I would suggest the ascription of praise and blame should be concerned with the idea of someone’s autonomy rather than her ‘true self’. Erler’s suggested concept may well be more useful in predicting someone’s actions but I wonder whether there is any useful difference in this particular context between the concepts of self and ‘true self’.

Is then any concept of a ‘true self’ useful to someone making a decision? Most ordinary decisions are largely unreflective and we just act without questioning our motives too much. However for some big decisions such as whether to pursue a particular career or start a family much more reflection is usually involved. Perhaps in these cases we might question what our ‘true self’ would do; what is the authentic thing to do. It seems clear to me if someone accepts her ‘true self’ is defined only by the values others value in her and she acts in accordance with this concept then she isn’t acting authentically. Knobe’s suggestion about true self is not useful in this context either. Let us return to the second concept of ‘true self’ initially introduced by Knobe. I would argue our deeply held commitments, values, and endorsements are what we ‘care about’. According to Harry Frankfurt if someone ‘cares about’ something she identifies herself with what she cares about and makes herself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending on whether what she cares about is diminished or enhanced, see (1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 83.) Prima facie it might be assumed this concept of ‘true self seems to be a useful concept for someone to employ when deciding how to make some big decision and there is no need for Erler’s composite definition. Prior to making that decision they ask themselves what they really ‘care about’. It would further seem when Pierpont encourages homosexuals to seek a “cure” for their sexual orientation he is acting in accordance with this concept of his ‘true self’. He is acting authentically.

I believe it is certainly true people act with respect to what they ‘care about’. This concept of ‘true self’ determines their actions. However even if it is accepted that one’s ‘true self’ determines one’s actions it does not automatically follow that one’s true self is useful in deciding what to do. What someone intends to do and what he ‘cares about’ need not be identical. Frankfurt argues someone might be unable to carry out her intentions. She might discover, when the chips are down, that she simply cannot bring herself to pursue the course of action which she has decided upon (page 85). For instance a single mother might intend to have her baby adopted. She might believe he would have a better life if this was done. She might further believe this is what she ‘cares about’. However when the time comes for the adoption she finds she cannot go through with the adoption; it is not what she really ‘cares about’. The reason for the mother’s false belief is the way Frankfurt links ‘caring about’ to wholeheartedness and satisfaction. Frankfurt defines satisfaction as an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be willing to accept a change in her condition, but she has no active interest in bringing about a change (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 103). Our mother may not be able to accurately predict what will satisfy her prior to her actually having to hand over her child for adoption. It follows the concept of our true self defined by our deeply held commitments, values, and endorsements may not be as useful in making big decisions as I assumed above. It might of course be that I am wrong to equate our deeply held commitments, values, and endorsements with Frankfurt’s ideas on ‘caring about’ or that I have misinterpreted Frankfurt’s ideas on wholeheartedness and satisfaction. Nevertheless it seems to me in making a big decision someone should consider what she ‘cares about’ in conjunction with her nature and urges. It follows Erler’s composite idea of true self’, may be more useful than a concept based purely on ‘caring about’ when making major decisions.

Sexually Coercive Offers

James Rocha asks what is wrong with the following coercive offer.

“Hal is Vera’s supervisor at food services company which is expanding into the global market. The company decides to staff its international offices with workers from the US. Hal must send one of his employees to the new Paris or Bucharest office. Vera, while happy to accept a new foreign assignment with much higher pay, would much prefer Paris. Unfortunately the company has randomly assigned her to Bucharest. Hal, knowing the contents and strength of Vera’s preferences, offers to change her to Paris in exchange for sex. If Vera refuses, she will simply be assigned to Bucharest, which has the benefit not only of higher pay, but gets her away from Hal” (2011, The Sexual Harassment Coercive Offer, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 28(2)).

Rocha connects the wrongness of Hal’s action to his disrespect for Vera’s autonomy. He states it is possible to respect an agent’s autonomy whilst changing her actions to a more preferable autonomous action, page 206. I have argued in this blog that autonomy is not simply about choices. Autonomy concerns what the agent cares about or values. I have also argued respecting autonomy means simply respecting the choices autonomous agents make about provided these choices do not harm others. Rocha argues Hal disrespects Vera’s autonomy by inserting influence over her sexuality standards, page 210. Caring about something means you identify yourself with that thing and that this identification must have persistence. It seems to me provided Vera cares about her sexual standards Hal’s offer is unlikely to influence these standards. It follows provided Hal accepts any decision Vera makes he does not disrupt her autonomous decision making.

Nevertheless there seems to be something morally wrong about Hal’s offer. Before continuing to consider disrespecting autonomy I will briefly point out two of these. Firstly Hal seems to have no natural sympathy or empathy for Vera. Slote defines a morally wrong action as one that reflects or exhibits or expresses an absence (or lack) of a fully developed empathic concern for (caring about) others on behalf of the agent. If Hal felt empathic concern for Vera he might offer her the Paris posting unconditionally. Secondly a virtue ethicist might point out Hal’s proposed offer is simply not one a virtuous man would make.

Rocha argues what is disrespectful in connection with autonomy in Hal’s offer is that it seeks to alter Vera’s ends. I would agree with Rocha that Hal’s offer is disrespectful to Vera’s autonomy but would argue this disrespect is not primarily connected with Hal seeking to alter Vera’s ends; it is connected to Hal failing see Vera as an end in herself. Hal sees Vera primarily as a means to his own sexual gratification. We respect autonomy because it has value. Autonomy has both instrumental and intrinsic value. According to Dworkin,

“there is a value connected with being self-determining that is not a mater of either of bringing about good results or the pleasure of the process itself. This is the intrinsic desirability of exercising the capacity for self-determination. We desire to be recognized as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destiny.” (1988, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge University Press page 112)

I have argued Hal’s offer is unlikely to disrupt Vera’s decision making. It follows in practice Hal’s offer is unlikely to disrupt the instrumental value of Vera’s autonomy. Perhaps then Hal’s offer does not disrespect the instrumental value of Vera’s autonomy. However Hal by making his offer fails to see Vera as the kind of creature who can fully determine her own future. Hal’s offer means he disrespects the intrinsic value of Vera’s autonomy and as a consequence fails to truly respect her as a person. I would suggest we value being truly respected as a person more than we desire good options to choose from. My suggestion is open to empirical investigation. However provided my suggestion is correct then the real harm Hal’s offer does to Vera’s autonomy is that he fails to respect its intrinsic value.