In his paper “What Lies Beyond Same Sex-Marriage” Andrew March argues for the privatisation of marriage (2010, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27(1)). He argues marriage should become the preserve of organisations other than the state. He believes the state should only recognise civil partnerships. He suggests if this was done then religious and other organisations could sanction their own concepts of marriage. Accepting his suggestion might mean some of the issues concerning “gay marriages” might be bypassed and each organisation sanctioning a marriage could set out the conditions a couple must meet if it is to sanction their marriage. It might be thought that this is a radical proposal but in some ways it suggests a partial return to past practice. For instance in England and Wales prior to the marriage act of 1836 only marriages conducted by the Church of England or Quaker and Jewish marriages were recognised by the state. Prima facie March’s suggestion is attractive. However in the UK the Conservative party and David Cameron far from believing in the privatisation of marriage believe the state should actively encourage the institution. In this posting I will argue the state should both sanction and encourage marriage.
In my posting of 05/06/09 I pointed out the idea of marriage arose because it benefited both individuals and society. Historically the most important of these benefits were mutual support, sexual exclusivity to ensure the paternity of any children born and support in the raising these children. More recently society has conferred on married couples a raft of legal and material benefits. In his paper March argues that in a liberal society which accepts moral pluralism there is an obligation
“to justify public coercion and exclusion in terms accessible to all members of morally and culturally diverse society.” (Page, 40)
It follows from the above if some couples are to be excluded from some of the benefits of marriage it must be possible to justify this exclusion. In what follows I will firstly argue that not all unions, “marriages” are identical. Secondly I will argue the state is fully justified in differentiating between different types of “marriage” in terms accessible to all adult members of society. If my arguments are accepted then it appears that March’s suggestion that the state should only concern itself with civil unions for all is mistaken.
Some might argue the state should be unconcerned with people’s domestic relationships and as a result should not be concerned with either civil unions or marriage. March disagrees and believes the state should be only be concerned with civil unions. I also disagree and believe the state should be concerned with both civil unions and marriage. In order to understand why I believe March is wrong to suggest the state should only recognise civil unions. In order to understand why I believe March is wrong it is first necessary to understand why the state should be concerned with peoples’ personal relationships. Once this understanding is achieved it is then possible to argue that the state should recognise different types of unions. Let it be accepted any modern liberal state only exists to benefit, however imperfectly, its citizens. It might be argued in theory a state should be a minimal state and only benefit its citizens by protecting them from coercion and enforcing un-coerced contracts. However in practice most liberal states gives its citizens a wide range of benefits such as education, highways and healthcare. Prima facie it seems reasonable that a state should give certain couples certain benefits if these couples provide some benefits that would otherwise have to be provided by the state. All modern liberal states are concerned with the education of children. It follows a modern liberal state is concerned with the rearing of its children. If all its citizens behaved like Rousseau, by sending their children to foundling hospitals, the state would have to assume responsibility for these children. It therefore seems reasonable that the state should provide couples with children with certain benefits and that these benefits should be unavailable to those couples without children.
In practice most states give some benefits to all married couples regardless of whether they have children or not. For instance a widow has the right to inherit her late husband’s estate. In this posting I will not question whether such a policy is justified. However provided the state only provides such benefits to married couples March is correct to point out it must be possible to justify excluding other types of couples in terms accessible to all adult members of society. I find it difficult to see such any such a justification. It follows provided the state provides some benefits to all married couples that it should provide the same benefits to all long term partnerships regardless of the gender or sexual orientation of the partners involved. It further follows if the state is to benefit certain long term partnerships that it must officially recognise these partnerships in some way. If the state does not recognise and differentiate between partnerships then perhaps any relationship however transient, perhaps even a one night stand, might be a reason for the conferment of these benefits.
If the above is accepted then in practice, with certain exceptions such as incestuous partnerships, the state should be willing to recognise all long term partnerships. Such recognition should, as March suggests, take the form of civil partnerships. Let it also be accepted that the state should provide certain benefits only for couples with children. It would be completely compatible with the above for the state only to recognise civil unions and financially reward couples with children in some way, perhaps through tax breaks. If the above is accepted then March may well be correct in believing the state should privatise the recognition of marriage. However I would argue that the state is not just concerned with any child rearing but good child rearing and this means the state should be concerned with traditional marriage. Empirical evidence suggests that children from traditionally married couples are likely to be more confident and succeed better in life than the children of cohabiting couples for various reasons. Firstly it seems clear that children benefit from parental stability. According to Benson “unmarried parents are four times as likely to split up as married parents. By the child’s fifth birthday 9% of married couples have split up compared to 35% of unmarried couples.” See http://www.bcft.co.uk/2010%20Family%20policy,%20breakdown%20and%20structure.pdf
Secondly it would appear the children of parents who simply cohabit have significantly more mental health problems. See www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_health/summaryreport.pdf
In addition to the above there also appears to be some evidence that the children of traditionally married parents are less likely to offend and take drugs. Some may dispute some or all of these findings and suggest there is no difference in the way the children of traditionally married and cohabiting couples flourish. This dispute should be resolved by evidence and experiment not philosophy, see my previous posting concerning Trout. However, returning to philosophy, prima facie it might be concluded that provided the evidence shows the children of traditionally married couples enjoy certain benefits when compared to the children of cohabiting couples then the state should specifically recognise and encourage the idea of traditional marriage. I would argue if this conclusion is not to be accepted it is up to the opponents of the conclusion to justify their position in terms accessible to all adult members of a morally and culturally diverse society.
If the above is accepted then it might be suggested by some that for reasons of simplicity the state should not only recognise traditional marriage for heterosexual couples but extend this recognition to gay and lesbian pairings thereby dispensing with the need to recognise civil partnerships. I would reject such a suggestion. Moreover I believe my reasons for this exclusion satisfy March’s requirement that my reasons should be accessible to all adult members of morally and culturally diverse society. I would firstly argue if traditional marriage was to encompass gay and lesbian couples that these couples might believe they have a right to be helped to conceive or adopt children. I argued in my posting of 05/06/09 such couples should not have this right. In this posting I argued some loving relationships are distorted by bringing only loving being loved to a relationship rather than a genuine form of disinterested love. I further argued this distortion is particularity likely to apply to gay couples with relation to children. Such couples might be especially prone to loving having children rather than simply loving children. It might be objected to above such a distortion could equally apply to heterosexual couples. My response to this objection would be to point out that nature gives most natural parents a natural empathy with their children making it is more probable that they will love their children in a purely disinterested way. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude the state should only recognise traditional marriage for heterosexual couples but that it should in addition recognise civil partnerships.
However there is a major problem with my above account. What exactly is meant by a traditional marriage? Indeed someone might point out if it is impossible to define what is meant by a traditional marriage my argument that the state should recognise two forms of marriage is impractical. It might then be argued that March is correct to suggest the state should privatise the recognition of marriage and only recognise civil unions. One possible solution to this problem might be to define a traditional marriage as a religious marriage. In this way even if the state does not actually privatise the recognition of marriage it contracts out this recognition. Such a solution might have been possible in the past, in a more religiously homogenous state than our present multicultural one, but seems impractical now. For instance it is by no means clear religious polygamous marriages benefit children. It follows even if the state should recognise and encourage traditional marriages in addition to civil partnerships, because the former benefits children in some way, that the state has no reason to recognise polygamous marriages. I have argued above a child benefits from being loved for herself rather than being loved for being someone’s child. I further argued that this disinterested form of love comes more naturally from heterosexual parents. It would suggest a traditional marriage might be defined as one in which a heterosexual couple make some long standing commitments to each other. Accepting the above would means it is possible for the state to recognise traditional marriages in addition to civil unions.
Wednesday, 24 March 2010
Tuesday, 2 March 2010
Trout and Autonomy
In this posting I want to consider the way individual autonomy interacts with a proposed expansion of the domain of our natural empathy as suggested by J D Trout in (THE EMPATHY GAP, 2009 Viking). Trout argues any expansion of our natural empathy requires good options and the capacity for good decision making. He further argues the poor sometimes don’t have good options they can care about. He still further argues any expansion of our natural empathy is made difficult by our psychological biases such as favouring the status quo, overestimating our capabilities and discounting our future in decision-making. For example most people fail to save adequately for their old age because they over discount the future. Lastly he argues we are sometimes faced by complex decisions for which we don’t have the necessary capabilities needed to make a good decision. Consider for example the controversy surrounding the MMR vaccine, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MMR_vaccine_controversy .
Trout argues the twin pillars of any great society are creating the conditions in which we can be happy whilst at the same time allowing others a fighting chance to achieve this state, see page 39. He argues our limited capacity for long range empathy makes these goals difficult to achieve in practice. He believes our decision making might be changed to increase this limited capacity. In order to achieve this he believes the state must play a part in improving our decision making. He suggests the state might do this in two ways. Firstly it might improve our decision making by limiting some of our options. For instance he argues drivers who don’t wear seat belts or motorcyclists who don’t wear helmets have psychological biases that underestimate the probability of injury and overestimate their ability to cope once they are injured. To combat these biases he argues the state should simply prohibit such behaviour. Some of the ways he believes the state might limit our behaviour are quite sophisticated. For instance he believes all, who can, should be compelled to save for their old age. He argues this saving should come from wage increases rather than existing income in order to counteract our natural psychological bias to over discount the future. Secondly Trout suggests our decision making would be improved if when faced with complex decisions, for which we don’t have the necessary capabilities needed to make a good decision, we limit our decision making by accepting the accepted wisdom of experts. He believes this suggestion should apply especially to policy makers who should help formulate the aims of society; but should accept the advice of experts in how to best implement these aims. Trout believes if these two suggestions are adopted people would quickly adapt and accept them, see page 180.
I have a great deal of sympathy with Trout’s aims, nevertheless I now want now to consider whether his suggestions would affect our autonomy. I believe for all practical purposes Trout believes his suggestions would not damage most people’s autonomy. I believe Trout would argue even if for some people some options become unavailable that this loss would be more than compensated for by other people having their options increased by better education and a reduction in poverty. Trout it seems to me takes a purely instrumental view of the value of autonomy. I do not share this view and believe the intrinsic value of autonomy is also important. I now want to examine how our apparently different views about the value of autonomy might affect the acceptability of any limitations on our freedom of choice.
Prior to commencing this examination I want to make it clear I agree with Trout’s second suggestion. There are certain situations in which we cannot make truly autonomous decisions and I believe it does not damage our autonomy if in such situations we delegate decision making to experts. For instance in a medical context patients giving informed consent are supplied with a great deal of information which many find hard to understand. Moreover patients are often stressed and may be squeamish about learning about all the details of their condition. It seems clear to me provided a patient can articulate what she hopes treatment can achieve for her and these hopes are realistic that she can make a genuine autonomous decision to delegate all decisions as to her actual treatment to her doctors. It further seems to me that if such a patient is more fully informed she might not really understand the information provided and hence not be able to make a genuinely autonomous decision. In the light of the above I would argue, as does Trout, once policy makers have set out a policy, such as ones concerning our future energy requirements or reducing greenhouse gases, they should delegate the way the actual policy is to be implemented to the agreed experts. I would further argue such delegation does not damage our status as autonomous persons and may even enhance it.
Trout is concerned with good decision making. Moreover it seems he believes if our ability to make good decisions is not damaged then neither is our autonomy. In this blog I have frequently argued an autonomous decision is one we are wholehearted about and that being wholehearted simply involves an absence of desire or any restlessness to change that decision. I also argued in my posting of 01/07/08 that autonomous decisions are decisions that satisfice us rather than the best the best possible decision. It follows any improvement in our decision making whilst it may well improve our capacity for autonomy does not of necessity change the value of our autonomy. A down to earth concept of autonomy is provided by Waller.
“Genuine autonomy requires options available within our actual environment, options chosen on the basis of our conditional preferences and changing circumstances; not mysterious alternatives that transcend all causal and environmental influences. This natural biological view of autonomy with its mundane alternatives, has special value in the medical environment.” (2001, Patient Autonomy Naturalised, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44(4), page 584)
In his paper Waller points out in a medical context limitations on a patient’s decision making may lead to passivity that threatens both her physical and psychological well-being, see page 585. It might then be argued, in a more general setting, any limitations placed on our ability to make some decisions also damages our well-being in the same way. Trout might respond to the above by pointing out that in many cases our apparent ability to make decisions is already severely limited or even illusory due to our psychological biases. In reply to such an objection I would point out what affects our physical and psychological well-being is not our actual ability to make decisions but rather our perception of ourselves as decisions makers. Trout appears to concur with the above, see page 57. It follows any limitations placed on some of the decisions we can make may well damage our well-being.
Trout might well further respond that whilst limitations on some of the decisions we can make may indeed damage our well-being in certain areas this damage is more than compensated for by increases in our well-being in other areas or over time. For instance if the autonomy of parents is limited by requiring them to ensure their children are educated this loss is more than balanced by an increase in their children’s well-being over time. Few if any would question such a limitation. However I will still believe any limitations imposed on our autonomy should be a cause of concern. In order to understand this concern we must try to understand why any limitations imposed on our autonomy affect our physical and psychological well-being. I would suggest it is because these limitations may affect our perception of the kind of person we are. This perception is tied to the intrinsic value of autonomy. Dworkin argues autonomy has both instrumental value and intrinsic value.
“But there is a value connected with being self-determining that is not a matter of either of bringing about good results or the pleasure of the process itself. This is the intrinsic desirability of exercising the capacity for self-determination. We desire to be recognized as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destiny”. (1988, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press,
page 112.)
I would argue the intrinsic value of autonomy is fundamental and that our capacity to make decisions, good or bad, becomes meaningless without this value, without us perceiving ourselves and being perceived as the kinds of creature capable of determining our own destinies. In the light of the above I would suggest priority must be given to recognising us as the kind of creatures, who perceive ourselves as being capable of making our own decisions, rather than any attempt to improve our decision making by limiting our ability to make certain decisions in an effort to overcome our harmful psychological biases. My suggested priority does not mean we cannot limit some of the decisions open to us. Further my suggested priority does not mean we can be autonomous without having meaningful choices. It seems obvious if people are to have meaningful choices that they must have a minimal standard of living to enable them to make these meaningful choices. It follows any disagreement between Trout and myself is to a certain extent a matter of degree. It does however mean we should not limit any decisions open to us if by limiting these decisions we might damage the intrinsic value of our autonomy. It might even be open to experiment to see how many limitations on the decisions people can accept without damaging their perception of themselves as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destinies.
Trout argues the twin pillars of any great society are creating the conditions in which we can be happy whilst at the same time allowing others a fighting chance to achieve this state, see page 39. He argues our limited capacity for long range empathy makes these goals difficult to achieve in practice. He believes our decision making might be changed to increase this limited capacity. In order to achieve this he believes the state must play a part in improving our decision making. He suggests the state might do this in two ways. Firstly it might improve our decision making by limiting some of our options. For instance he argues drivers who don’t wear seat belts or motorcyclists who don’t wear helmets have psychological biases that underestimate the probability of injury and overestimate their ability to cope once they are injured. To combat these biases he argues the state should simply prohibit such behaviour. Some of the ways he believes the state might limit our behaviour are quite sophisticated. For instance he believes all, who can, should be compelled to save for their old age. He argues this saving should come from wage increases rather than existing income in order to counteract our natural psychological bias to over discount the future. Secondly Trout suggests our decision making would be improved if when faced with complex decisions, for which we don’t have the necessary capabilities needed to make a good decision, we limit our decision making by accepting the accepted wisdom of experts. He believes this suggestion should apply especially to policy makers who should help formulate the aims of society; but should accept the advice of experts in how to best implement these aims. Trout believes if these two suggestions are adopted people would quickly adapt and accept them, see page 180.
I have a great deal of sympathy with Trout’s aims, nevertheless I now want now to consider whether his suggestions would affect our autonomy. I believe for all practical purposes Trout believes his suggestions would not damage most people’s autonomy. I believe Trout would argue even if for some people some options become unavailable that this loss would be more than compensated for by other people having their options increased by better education and a reduction in poverty. Trout it seems to me takes a purely instrumental view of the value of autonomy. I do not share this view and believe the intrinsic value of autonomy is also important. I now want to examine how our apparently different views about the value of autonomy might affect the acceptability of any limitations on our freedom of choice.
Prior to commencing this examination I want to make it clear I agree with Trout’s second suggestion. There are certain situations in which we cannot make truly autonomous decisions and I believe it does not damage our autonomy if in such situations we delegate decision making to experts. For instance in a medical context patients giving informed consent are supplied with a great deal of information which many find hard to understand. Moreover patients are often stressed and may be squeamish about learning about all the details of their condition. It seems clear to me provided a patient can articulate what she hopes treatment can achieve for her and these hopes are realistic that she can make a genuine autonomous decision to delegate all decisions as to her actual treatment to her doctors. It further seems to me that if such a patient is more fully informed she might not really understand the information provided and hence not be able to make a genuinely autonomous decision. In the light of the above I would argue, as does Trout, once policy makers have set out a policy, such as ones concerning our future energy requirements or reducing greenhouse gases, they should delegate the way the actual policy is to be implemented to the agreed experts. I would further argue such delegation does not damage our status as autonomous persons and may even enhance it.
Trout is concerned with good decision making. Moreover it seems he believes if our ability to make good decisions is not damaged then neither is our autonomy. In this blog I have frequently argued an autonomous decision is one we are wholehearted about and that being wholehearted simply involves an absence of desire or any restlessness to change that decision. I also argued in my posting of 01/07/08 that autonomous decisions are decisions that satisfice us rather than the best the best possible decision. It follows any improvement in our decision making whilst it may well improve our capacity for autonomy does not of necessity change the value of our autonomy. A down to earth concept of autonomy is provided by Waller.
“Genuine autonomy requires options available within our actual environment, options chosen on the basis of our conditional preferences and changing circumstances; not mysterious alternatives that transcend all causal and environmental influences. This natural biological view of autonomy with its mundane alternatives, has special value in the medical environment.” (2001, Patient Autonomy Naturalised, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44(4), page 584)
In his paper Waller points out in a medical context limitations on a patient’s decision making may lead to passivity that threatens both her physical and psychological well-being, see page 585. It might then be argued, in a more general setting, any limitations placed on our ability to make some decisions also damages our well-being in the same way. Trout might respond to the above by pointing out that in many cases our apparent ability to make decisions is already severely limited or even illusory due to our psychological biases. In reply to such an objection I would point out what affects our physical and psychological well-being is not our actual ability to make decisions but rather our perception of ourselves as decisions makers. Trout appears to concur with the above, see page 57. It follows any limitations placed on some of the decisions we can make may well damage our well-being.
Trout might well further respond that whilst limitations on some of the decisions we can make may indeed damage our well-being in certain areas this damage is more than compensated for by increases in our well-being in other areas or over time. For instance if the autonomy of parents is limited by requiring them to ensure their children are educated this loss is more than balanced by an increase in their children’s well-being over time. Few if any would question such a limitation. However I will still believe any limitations imposed on our autonomy should be a cause of concern. In order to understand this concern we must try to understand why any limitations imposed on our autonomy affect our physical and psychological well-being. I would suggest it is because these limitations may affect our perception of the kind of person we are. This perception is tied to the intrinsic value of autonomy. Dworkin argues autonomy has both instrumental value and intrinsic value.
“But there is a value connected with being self-determining that is not a matter of either of bringing about good results or the pleasure of the process itself. This is the intrinsic desirability of exercising the capacity for self-determination. We desire to be recognized as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destiny”. (1988, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press,
page 112.)
I would argue the intrinsic value of autonomy is fundamental and that our capacity to make decisions, good or bad, becomes meaningless without this value, without us perceiving ourselves and being perceived as the kinds of creature capable of determining our own destinies. In the light of the above I would suggest priority must be given to recognising us as the kind of creatures, who perceive ourselves as being capable of making our own decisions, rather than any attempt to improve our decision making by limiting our ability to make certain decisions in an effort to overcome our harmful psychological biases. My suggested priority does not mean we cannot limit some of the decisions open to us. Further my suggested priority does not mean we can be autonomous without having meaningful choices. It seems obvious if people are to have meaningful choices that they must have a minimal standard of living to enable them to make these meaningful choices. It follows any disagreement between Trout and myself is to a certain extent a matter of degree. It does however mean we should not limit any decisions open to us if by limiting these decisions we might damage the intrinsic value of our autonomy. It might even be open to experiment to see how many limitations on the decisions people can accept without damaging their perception of themselves as the kind of creature capable of determining our own destinies.
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