Pornography

Sex sells or so it would seem. In the western world we have developed a large porn industry as demonstrated by the BBC television documentary ‘Hardcore profits’ broadcast on 08/09/09 and 15/09/09. In this posting I want to specifically consider the harm pornography does to the consumers of pornography. I will not consider the harms done to those involved in making pornography. I believe these harms to be considerable even if it is possible, at least in theory, to have an unexploited pornographer involved in the trade merely to support her family. I will also not discuss the legality of the pornography. I will accept people have a right to make and consume pornography subject to suitable safeguards for minors. My attitude to the legality of pornography is analogous to my attitude to smoking. I am a non smoker who believes smoking, like pornography, is harmful. Nevertheless I am prepared to defend the freedom of smokers to smoke in their own homes and outside areas. It might be objected smoking whilst harmful to the individual does not damage society whilst pornography does. I will merely comment even if pornography does damage society to some degree, which I accept, its prohibition would damage our free society to a far greater degree.

Before I consider the harm pornography does to its consumers I must first define pornography. This task is not as simple as it might appear for whilst most people would easily recognise an example of pornography few could easily define it. Intuitively pornography might be defined as sexually explicit material designed to give sexual arousal to those who view, read or listen to it. The trouble with this definition is that there seems to nothing wrong with either sexual explicitness or arousal. A medical text book might be sexually explicit whilst a man may become aroused by simply watching his partner undress. This suggests that what is wrong with pornography is not that it simply causes arousal but rather the way it causes this arousal. For this reason I am going to initially adopt the definition of pornography given by Caroline West in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/pornography-censorship. She defines pornography as sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in its consumers which is bad in a certain way. Some might disagree with this definition pointing out it is already value laden before any discussion of why pornography is bad, see Wendy McElroy’s ‘A Woman’s Right to Pornography’ chapter two is available at www.wendymcelroy.com/xxx/, nevertheless I intend to use West’s definition. In my discussion of pornography I will consider the nature of pornography to be mainly heterosexual and its consumers male even though I accept pornography may be homosexual in nature and used by some women, see link above.

In what way is pornography bad for its consumers? It certainly isn’t bad because of the way its effects on someone’s physical health like smoking. The viewing of pornography and possible subsequent masturbation does not cause blindness and insanity as some Victorians believed. In what follows I will argue what is bad about pornography is not the way it affects someone’s physical or mental health but rather the way it affects his character. I will present three arguments in an attempt to show pornography damages someone’s character. Firstly I will argue pornography damages his natural disposition to feel empathy. Secondly I will argue pornography in some way splits his character and lastly that it damages this character.

I believe that normal human beings have a natural disposition to feel empathy. I further believe this disposition enhances our character. It might then be argued if the use of pornography damages this natural disposition then it also damages our character. Does the use of pornography damage someone’s disposition to feel empathy? The use of pornography certainly means the user uses others instrumentally but this fact alone does not mean his disposition to feel empathy is damaged. For instance he may catch a bus and normally be completely indifferent to the bus driver without any damage being done to his disposition to feel empathy. I see no obvious reason why the way someone uses explicit sexual material must automatically damage this disposition. I see no reason why readers of the Sun who avidly scan page three cannot express as much empathy as anyone else. However I do feel the nature of some explicit sexual material can damage a person’s disposition to feel empathy. The above suggests that the badness in West’s definition lies not in the way the explicit material is used but rather the way people are portrayed in this material. The badness lies in the way the explicit material portrays others as being exploited. Moreover it seems to me this portrayal of exploitation is not an incidental part of but an essential element of sexual arousal. In the light of the above West’s definition might be amended as follows, pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in its consumers in an exploitative way. In practice this portrayal of exploitation for the most part involves those being portrayed in being powerless or humiliated. West’s definition might then be further amended as follows. Pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in its consumers by portraying others as powerless or humiliated in some way. It seems probable to me that pornography, so defined, will damage the consumer of such material’s disposition to feel empathy. I have assumed above that a disposition to feel empathy is part of someone’s good character it follows that any damage done to this disposition will also damage his character.

It might be pointed out in reply to my above conclusion that there is no empirical evidence that the consumption of pornography, explicit sexual material in which others are portrayed as powerless or humiliated, is linked to sexual violence. I am prepared to accept this point but I would merely point out a lack of empathy need not be connected to sexual violence. Someone whose capacity to feel empathy is damaged may be aloof, cold or indifferent to others and these traits are undesirable parts of his character even if they not of necessity linked to sexual violence. However it might also be pointed out I have offered no evidence for my belief connecting the consumption of pornography to the damage done to someone’s capacity to feel empathy. However there is compelling indirect evidence to support this connection. The evidence I offer is based on psychological research which shows the situation someone finds himself in affects his capacity to act beneficently. In 1972 Isen and Levin showed if someone dropped his papers outside a phone booth in a shopping mall he was more likely to be helped by a phone user who had just found a dime in the booth than by a user who had not (The Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 1972). Isen and Levin’s experiment clearly shows the situations which we find ourselves in affect our capacity for beneficence. It seems clear if someone reacts beneficently in such an experiment his decision to help is not based on his rationality. It further seems clear that in such a situation his capacity for empathy is enhanced leading him to react beneficently. It follows the situations we find ourselves in can positively affect our natural capacity for empathy.

In the light of the above I will now argue that a consumer of pornography is placing himself in a situation which will negatively affect his natural disposition for empathy. Sometimes we are in a situation in which we view or read about people who are powerless or humiliated such as famine victims. These people naturally arouse our empathy. However this situation is not the same as the one a consumer of pornography finds himself in. This consumer is purposely placing himself in a situation in which others appear to be purposely harmed by being portrayed as powerless or humiliated. It follows in pornographic situations the consumer must curb his natural empathy. If this was not so it would seem he could enjoy humiliating or degrading sexual acts and still feel empathy for the participants in these acts. It seems highly improbable to me that anyone placing himself in a situation in which he curbs his natural capacity for empathy will not negatively affect this capacity in related situations. These other situations may be related by either time or similar circumstances. It follows if a consumer of pornography purposely limits his capacity for empathy in some situations and as a result damages his capacity for empathy in some related situations that such a consumer will also inevitably damage his character.

I will now attempt to argue pornography in some way splits the personality of the user and that this split is detrimental to his character. I have defined pornography as sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in consumers by portraying others as powerless or humiliated. If men sometimes purposely view women as powerless and in humiliating positions and at other times have to deal with women in more normal situations then it might be argued that the different attitudes in different situations in some ways splits their personality. Of course some more radical feminists might argue it is in all men’s nature to see women powerless and humiliated and that their actual relationships with women are merely coated by some thin veneer of civilisation. It might be thought because I have argued pornography of necessity involves seeing others as powerless and humiliated that I would have some sympathy for such a position. I do not because I believe culture and civilisation contribute to an essential part of our nature and are not merely some thin veneer. I accept that the use of pornography does split the personality of the user. However I believe any evidence that this split damages someone’s character is weak for many people seem able to split their lives into different compartments and provided these compartments don’t overlap this causes no splits in character. It seems to me some people’s character, for example that of Oskar Schindler, seem resilient to splits in their personality. For the above reason I reject the above attempted argument.

My third argument concerning the harm pornography does to a consumer concerns the way that it damages his pride and hence his character. For the moment I am going to assume without any argument that anyone who uses pornography cannot be proud of this fact and that his use damages his pride in himself. Accepting this assumption means I need only to show pride is part of someone’s good character in order to show the use of pornography damages his character. In essence I have to show pride is a virtue. The problem with doing this is that not all pride seems virtuous. For instance the pride of overweight football fans in their team’s athletic success hardly seems to count as a virtue, see (Solomon, 2007, True to our Feelings, Oxford, page 100). Moreover historically Christianity has regarded pride as vice. It seems clear not all pride is virtuous. However I think it is possible to show that a certain kind of pride is both virtuous and an essential part of a good character. In order to do so I will consider gay pride. What are the essentials of gay pride? To me gay pride essentially seems to consist of a rational evaluation that you are homosexual together with being satisfied with your sexuality. Two objections might be raised to the above. Firstly it might be objected that gay pride requires no evaluation by someone that he is a homosexual. Secondly it might be argued what is really important is not someone’s satisfaction with the fact that he is gay but his acceptance of it. My response to the first objection is to point out we often deceive ourselves as to our true nature and because of this I believe a rational evaluation of someone’s sexuality forms an essential element of gay pride. My response to the second objection is to point out someone might accept his homosexuality and be deeply unhappy about it. Such a person is not proud of his sexuality. It follows satisfaction with one’s sexuality appears to be an essential element of gay pride, connecting pride and satisfaction is not new see (Hume, (1978, originally 1739-40) A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, page 297). In the light of my discussion of gay pride I suggest pride is indeed a virtue when it is regarded as a rational evaluation of oneself together with being satisfied with oneself.

However if pride is to be regarded as a virtue more needs to be said about being satisfied with oneself. Firstly pride in oneself requires that one must satisfied with a reasonably accurate picture of oneself hence the need for rational evaluation. Secondly satisfaction does not mean some smug emotive feeling about oneself. In previous postings I have frequently used Harry Frankfurt’s definition of satisfaction in connection with ‘caring about’ or love. Having pride in oneself must of necessity involve caring about oneself and for this reason I will again use his definition. According to Frankfurt satisfaction entails an absence of restlessness to change one’s condition. A satisfied person is willing to change his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about any change (see Necessity, Volition, and Love, 1999, Cambridge University Press, page 103). It might be objected that satisfaction so defined merely means acceptance. However this is not so for as I have pointed out above someone may find himself in a situation he dislikes but accepts. Someone for example may accept he will continue to use pornography but be dissatisfied with this situation. In such a situation the person involved does have active interest in bringing about a change in his situation when change is a possibility. It seems provided pride is regarded as a rational evaluation of oneself together with being satisfied with oneself, using Frankfurt’s definition of satisfaction, that pride can be regarded as a genuine virtue. I assumed above without any argument that anyone who uses pornography cannot be proud of this fact using Frankfurt’s definition of satisfaction I am now in a position to provide a reason to back this assumption. It seems inconceivable to me that any consumer of pornography should feel absolutely no restlessness about this consumption. If it is accepted that pride in oneself is a genuine virtue and that the consumption of pornography damages this pride then it follows that the consumption of pornography damages the consumer’s character.

In conclusion I believe I have shown that the consumption of pornography damages the character of those who consume it. It is important to note I use the word damage rather than destroy. The consumption of pornography makes someone less good than he might possibly be. However it is still possible for someone who consumes pornography to possess a good, if damaged, character. His Character is damaged in two ways. Firstly his consumption of pornography erodes his natural disposition to feel empathy and secondly reduces his ability to feel pride in himself.

Why love is not just a disposition to feel empathy

In my last two postings I have argued the love of inanimate objects may not be same as the love of persons and that loving someone might simply be a disposition to feel empathy for beloved. However I will now present two examples which appear contradict my previous view. My first example is of a mother’s love of her baby and my second is self-love. I will firstly consider a mother’s love and attempt to show this love is incompatible with love being regarded as a disposition to feel empathy and I will then repeat the exercise with self-love.

Empathy is defined by the Cambridge Online Dictionary as follows; empathy is the ability to share someone else's feelings or experiences by imagining what it would be like to be in their situation. Let it be assumed that loving someone simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for her. It follows if a mother loves her baby she is able to share her baby’s feelings or experiences. I accept a mother may share her child’s feelings or experiences but it seems inconceivable to me that a mother could share her baby’s feelings or experiences. A baby’s experiences just aren’t available to others. Moreover it would seem to be impossible for a mother to share her baby’s feelings by imagining what it would be like to be a baby. She might of course be able to imagine what it would be like for her to be a baby but this is by no means the same thing as imagining what it is like to be a baby. It follows if we accept the premise that love is simply a disposition to feel empathy it follows that mothers are unable to love their babies. Mothers clearly do love their babies. It follows the above conclusion is false and we must reject the premise it is based on.

Are there any counter arguments which would enable us to accept the above premise and also accept that mothers love their babies? If empathy is defined as above it seems to me the answer is clearly no. However let us consider a real case in order to clarify our concept of empathy. In 2007 the Washington Post reported that a colonel in the US army called off a test using a land mine sweeping robot because it continued sweeping after losing several of its legs. The colonel declared the test was inhumane. What might be the reasons behind the colonel’s decision? His decision was clearly not based on pure rationality. It follows the colonel’s decision was at least in part emotionally based. People have a tendency to anthropomorphise in such situations. It seems likely this was happening in this case, the colonel was treating the robot as if it was something like a human being. It further seems to me the colonel was doing so because he attributed feelings or emotions to the robot. The colonel felt sympathy for the robot. I believe feeling sympathy is connected to some degree with feeling empathy. Sympathy is defined by the Cambridge Online Dictionary as; an expression of understanding and care for someone else's suffering. It seems to me one cannot possibly understand someone else’s suffering unless one has some ability to share that person’s feelings or experiences. Admittedly this sharing does not need to be very precise. For instance a child may share a sense of unease with his mother who has lost her partner. The mother feels uneasy but it would be more accurate to say she feels grief. I believe for sympathy to take place between persons there must be some basic sharing of feelings, or at the very least moods, between the persons involved. I believe understanding how someone feels must involve emotion. I cannot use pure logic to understand someone’s grief. Moreover the emotion involved must be an appropriate emotion. It makes no sense to say I understand someone’s grief if the only emotion I feel is happiness. Accepting the above means sympathy of necessity involves some basic form of empathy. Accepting the above also means the colonel felt some basic or primitive form of empathy for the robot. Clearly this scenario is nonsensical. However it might be suggested this difficultly might be overcome if a primitive form of empathy was defined as the ability to experience what you believe to be someone or something else's feelings or experiences by imagining what it would be like to be in their situation. It might then be argued that whilst a mother cannot feel full blown empathy for her baby she may nonetheless feel some primitive form of empathy based on what she believes her baby feels. And her disposition to feel this primitive empathy can form a basis of her love for her baby.

The question I now wish to address is whether the primitive form of empathy defined above really is a form of empathy? Does this primitive form of empathy even exist? It seems clear to me the concept of empathy can be stretched and that the feeling of empathy is to some extent a matter of degree. For instance I may have the ability to share some of someone else's feelings or experiences but not others. This is probably particularly true of the sharing of some feelings and experiences between men and women. However is describing, the ability to experience what you believe to be someone or something else's feelings or experiences as empathy, stretching the concept of empathy too far? Let it be accepted that the feeling of empathy depends on our ability to experience emotions as well as place ourselves in someone else’s situation. The connection between the emotion and the situation cannot be purely arbitrary. I believe empathy should not be regarded as the feeling of any emotion but the feeling of an appropriate emotion. The feeling of a shared emotion is an appropriate emotion. It follows the feeling of a believed shared emotion is not an appropriate emotion and for this reason, the ability to share what you believe to be someone or something else's feelings or experiences, is not a genuine form of empathy. Let us accept that mothers do love their babies. Let us also accept that mothers cannot feel or have a disposition to feel empathy for their babies. It follows that loving someone cannot simply be a disposition to feel empathy for the beloved.

It might be pointed out in response to the above that loving friends, partners and children differs from loving babies. It might then be suggested that loving someone other than babies means loving persons. Young babies might be regarded as human beings and potential persons rather than actual persons. It might then be further suggested that loving a person simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for her. Accepting these suggestions would not mean we don’t love babies, for clearly we do, but rather that we love babies in a different way to the way we love persons. I would be reluctant to accept to this suggestion. For they imply either we love babies in the same way as we love cities, landscapes or a particular piece of music. Or that we love babies in a completely different way to the way we love both inanimate things and the way we love persons.

My second example of why it is hard to accept that loving, someone is simply a disposition to feel empathy, is connected to self-love. Let it be accepted that I cannot feel empathy for myself. It follows if loving someone simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for that person that self-love is impossible. Intuitively we can love ourselves. If our intuitions are correct we must reject the premise that loving someone simply means having a disposition to feel empathy for her.

Let it be accepted the two examples I have used show that I was wrong to argue that loving someone might simply be a disposition to feel empathy for the beloved in a previous posting. However the idea of self-love is interesting and I now wish to examine self-love further in order to try and better understand the nature of love. Some people believe that the self-love is not at all bad even if it runs counter to accepted morality. They might use Nietzsche to justify this belief. However I would argue such a belief is based on a false view about the nature of love. This false view seems to connect loving purely with satisfying our desires. Nietzsche would have approved of the strong satisfying their desires. However let us consider a mother who desires chips, cocaine, cigarettes and large quantities of alcohol. Let it be assumed she neglects her child and indulges in all of the above. If loving one-self is purely a matter of satisfying one’s desires then clearly this mother loves herself. It might be objected my example only shows that self-love based on the rather basic desires, I introduced in my example, is not genuine self-love. My objector might then be suggest that the satisfaction of noble desires is a form of self-love. Once again Nietzsche might well have approved of this objection seeing the desire for power rather than gluttony as a form of self-love. My reply to this objection is simple. I do not deny love can be connected to our desires. Indeed I believe love must be connected to our desires. I do however believe love cannot be only connected to our desires. If love can be based on noble but not base desires then there must be some way, of differentiating between noble and base desires. Furthermore any way of differentiating between noble and base desires cannot itself be a desire. Returning to my example I would suggest that the mother in question not only neglects her child but that she also neglects herself. I would further argue anyone who neglects herself does not genuinely love herself. My reason being I believe loving is linked to caring about and it follows loving oneself involves caring about oneself.

I accept Harry Frankfurt is correct when he states that love is a form of ‘caring about’ and that love concerns the will rather than being a simple emotion. Love has persistence and desires and emotions however noble need not. This persistence was the main reason for my suggestion that love might be defined as a disposition to feel an emotion. It in order to better understand the nature of love we must understand the nature of caring about. What then does caring about consist of? Frankfurt argues a lover is benefited when her beloved flourishes and this means accepting the interests of her beloved as her own (1). Let it be accepted ‘caring about’ ourselves is the same as ‘caring about’ others. It follows if we ‘care about’ ourselves we must be concerned with our flourishing and our interests.

Let us accept that if I love someone that I must be concerned with my beloved’s flourishing and furthering her interests. It seems to me this concern must contain two important elements. Firstly this concern cannot be a passive concern but must involve action. If my beloved needs help and I fail to help for no good reason then it must be questioned whether my love is genuine. Secondly this concern must involve some reflection. If I am genuinely concerned with someone’s flourishing and interests I must concerned with how my actions will promote this flourishing and these interests. It follows loving defined as ‘caring about’ someone must involve our cognitive powers. Accepting that love involves cognition does not of course imply that love does not also involve the emotions. Personally I would argue love must involve the emotions. I pointed out in my posting ‘love revisited’ some philosophers would argue emotions are intentional and as a result must have a cognitive element. If this is correct then love might be regarded as an emotion which includes a cognitive element. However I myself am doubtful as to whether emotions contain a cognitive element. Emotions might of course act as alarms calling for reflection by our cognitive elements, see Brady (2). Our emotions might alert us to consider the needs of our beloved. It seems to me that any meaningful actions, including loving ones, must depend on both a cognitive and affective element for without any affective element we have no reason to act.

I have argued loving someone must include a reflective element. This conclusion seems at odds with some parts of Frankfurt’s concept of love. Frankfurt argues a lover,

“is not free. On the contrary, he is in the very nature of the case captivated by his beloved and his love. The will of the lover is rigorously constrained. Love is not a matter of choice. (3)

Clearly reflection serves no useful purpose if someone’s will is rigorously constrained. Am I wrong to argue love involves reflection or is it possible to reconcile these two views? Frankfurt’s defines loving in terms of what a lover cares about. He also defines autonomous decisions as decisions the agent cares about. Cuypers believes Frankfurt’s concept of autonomy and hence his concept of love is a hybrid concept. He believes this hybrid as a combination of voluntaristic and non-voluntaristic components. He argues that the harmonious agreement between a person’s second-order volitions and his first order desires defines the voluntaristic component. He then further argues that the non-voluntaristic component consists of what the agent cares about (2). I have some sympathy for Cuypers view. However I believe these two views might be better reconciled by differentiating between the way someone loves a beloved and comes to love a beloved.

I believe the way we love someone involves reflection. We must consider the interests of our beloved. The way we come to love someone might not. The way we come to love someone is constrained. It seems ridiculous to me to say I choose to love Jennifer, Newcastle United or philosophy. Do the emotions play any part in the way I come to love someone? Frankfurt would argue not. According to him the emotions have no persistence whilst love does. Indeed it might argued that he believes what defines coming to love someone is a lack of emotion. A lover might be defined as a satisfied person, perhaps willing to change her beloved, but also one who has no active interest in bringing about such a change. Intuitively however coming to love someone does involve emotion. If I come to some love someone I identify with her and as a result I become vulnerable to any harm that befalls her and become distressed as a result. It might be suggested coming to love someone means coming to have a disposition to feel empathy for her. However my example of the love between a mother and her baby seems to make this concept of coming to love difficult to accept. For this reason it might be suggested that coming to love someone simply means coming to be pleased when she is pleased and distressed when she is distressed. It might be objected that accepting this suggestion seems to conflate coming to love and actual loving. In response I would argue that someone cannot come to love someone without actually loving her. Loving someone of necessity must involve some emotion, if I love someone and she becomes distressed I must also become distressed. It follows coming to love does involve the emotions.

However I can feel distress for a lot of people I hardly know. For instance I may feel distress at seeing the distress of famine victims on TV, victims I don’t really know. It follows if my suggestion is accepted that I love these famine victims. It might then be pointed out this love seems counter to our intuitions of love. I am however prepared to argue that I do in fact love these victims to some degree. The degree to which I love my wife, children, friends and neighbours varies greatly. I see no reason why I should not feel at least some slight degree love for these famine victims. Indeed it might be a natural default position for most people to feel some degree of love for others. Optimistically considering the last century one of the defining characteristics of persons might be a natural tendency to love. People lacking this tendency such as sociopaths might be seen as damaged persons.

There is one final question I wish to address in this posting; does coming to love come to involve our rational faculties in any way? Clearly we may choose who we wish to marry but not who we love. Prima facie if it is accepted that our love is constrained it might be concluded our rational faculties play no part in our coming to love. I will argue such a prima facie conclusion is unjustified. What is meant by our will being constrained when we come to love? It certainly doesn’t mean our will is constrained by others. It means we cannot choose whom we come to love, our will is constrained by forces which are part of us, we like Luther can do no other. However these constraining forces are our constraining forces and hence our will seem likely to shaped by our perceptions of the world. These perceptions include our beliefs. Our rational faculties shape these beliefs. My perceptions of a situation surely partly determine the emotions I feel as I pointed in my posting love revisited. In this posting I pointed out if I am fearful, because I perceive a tiger approaching me, my perception is the cause of my fear. Moreover part of my perception must include the concept that tigers are dangerous. It might now be argued our perception of someone, which includes cognitive elements, frames our coming to love that person and reason indirectly affects our choice of a beloved.

1.  Harry Frankfurt, 2006,Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, page 41.
2. Michael Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.
3. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity Volition and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 135.
4. Stefaan Cuypers, 2000, In Defence of Hierarchy, , Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30(2).