Love and Wholeheartedness

In my previous posting I presented two arguments. Firstly I argued loving persons is not the same as loving inanimate things such as cities, music or philosophical musings. Secondly I argued the love of persons might be best defined by someone having a disposition to feel empathy. In this posting I want to consider how this definition of love concurs with some of Harry Frankfurt’s ideas on love. Frankfurt believes love is both involuntary and must be persistent. In my previous posting I argued the above definition of love is compatible with both of these ideas. I will not repeat those arguments here. Frankfurt also believes a lover must be wholehearted. In this posting the question I want to examine is this. If love is a disposition to feel empathy must the lover be wholehearted? I will argue she does not.

Before proceeding I must make clear what Frankfurt means by wholeheartedness. He believes wholeheartedness requires that a lover must be able to love some things more than she loves others. He also believes wholeheartedness means a lover must in some sense be satisfied with the things she loves. This satisfaction is not some smug satisfaction but is defined by Frankfurt as follows,
“What satisfaction does entail is an absence of restlessness or resistance. A satisfied person may be willing to accept a change in his condition, but he has no active interest in bringing about a change” (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 103,).
A wholehearted person is contrasted to an ambivalent person. Such a person he believes is a wanton because she is torn in different directions and suffers from volitional division according to Frankfurt. Indeed it is argued by Cuypers that such a person is threatened by disintegration and personality disorder (2000, Autonomy, beyond voluntarism, In Defence of Hierarchy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30(2), page 236).

Frankfurt’s concept of satisfaction is central to his ideas concerning wholeheartedness and ambivalence. For this reason prior to my examination as to, whether regarding love as a disposition to feel empathy is compatible with wholeheartedness, I must first examine what is meant by satisfaction. Prior to doing this it must be clear that when I talk of love I am only talking about the love of persons. I believe love is not a simple unified concept as I argued in my previous posting. It follows when examining satisfaction in connection with wholeheartedness I am only talking about being satisfied with those we love rather than the things we love. Moreover by love I do not simply mean erotic love of one’s partner but include the love of children, friends, colleagues and even acquaintances. Love so defined seems to reflect real life in which we love different people to varying degrees. It seems clear someone may be completely satisfied with loving each of her beloveds but still be dissatisfied to some degree with the way she loves her beloveds. Wholeheartedness according to Frankfurt means a lover must be able to come to love some things more than she loves others. It follows satisfaction in regard to wholeheartedness means a lover is able to eliminate any conflict between loving her beloveds by ranking how much she loves each of them. Ranking of course does not mean the lover must be able attach weights to her various beloveds but only that she is satisfied she loves one more than another.

I am now in a position to address the question as to whether if love is a disposition to feel empathy a lover must be wholehearted. Clearly a lover can have a disposition to feel empathy for John and at the same time have a disposition to feel empathy for Jane. The question I am addressing is whether such a lover can have both these dispositions whilst being unable to say with certainty whether she loves John or Jane the most. If the lover’s life is highly compartmentalised and she actually feels empathy for John or Jane in different compartments of her life it seems possible that she can love both John and Jane without ever having to say with certainty which of the two she loves the most. However love is not easily compartmentalised and in most cases a lover may have to decide which of her beloveds she love the most. I have argued wholeheartedness requires that a lover in such situation must be able to make a decision she is satisfied with based on her ability to rank the things she loves. Let it be assumed a lover feels empathic concern for John and Jane at the same time. Let be further assumed she can only act on one these concerns and makes a decision she is not wholly satisfied with. I can see no reason why these two assumptions are incompatible in practice. It follows if love is simply a disposition to feel empathy a lover need not be wholehearted. Such a conclusion seems to concur with our intuitive ideas of love as is shown by considering the following example. Let it be assumed Samantha is married and has a child she loves called Jane in addition she loves John. Let it be further assumed Sam wishes to leave her husband to live with John but doing so will cause some damage to her beloved Jane. It is easy to imagine in this situation that regardless of whether Sam leaves her husband, because of her love of John, or remains in a loveless marriage, because of her love for Jane, she will have some regrets and be dissatisfied to some degree.

I will now briefly examine two of the implications of accepting my conclusion. Accepting the above means a lover may be satisfied with her beloved or beloveds but still not be be completely satisfied as a lover because she is unable to rank the things she loves. It is important to be clear what I mean by rank the things she loves. The ability to rank the things a lover loves does not mean she must be able reflect on or even make a conscious decision about this ranking. It only means a lover can choose between the various things she loves without any hint of dissatisfaction with her decision. If it is accepted that love is simply a disposition to feel empathy then a lover may well be dissatisfied with some of her decisions. It follows all the things a lover loves need not be united in any meaningful way and she is not wholehearted. Frankfurt believes if lover is not wholehearted she is ambivalent. Moreover ambivalence is a disease of the will. Both Cuypers and Frankfurt believe the ambivalent person cannot make meaningful decisions concerning love. Indeed Cuypers implies that an ambivalent lover is threatened by disintegration and personality disorder, see above. I see no reason to accept such an implication. In practice it seems there is no unity between all of a lover’s loves as we often consider a lover as torn between two loves. Further in practice it seems in most cases that even if a lover is ambivalent about some of her loves she is still able to choose between these loves. Moreover by doing so she is not usually threatened by either the disintegration of her character or personality disorder. In my example let it be assumed Sam arbitrarily decides to stay with her husband, because she loves Jane, and let it be further assumed that this choice does not work out as well as she envisioned. It is quite plausible to believe in this situation Sam will abide by her decision and not be threatened by personality disorder even if she has long lasting regrets.

Frankfurt links the ability to love, to care about, to autonomy. It seems to me Frankfurt holds a lover is necessarily an autonomous person. This follows because a lover must be wholehearted and be able to rank the things she loves and hence has the ability to make an un-ambivalent decision with which she is completely satisfied. Frankfurt contrasts an autonomous person, a lover who cares about something, with a wanton who has no means of making meaningful decisions (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 106). I have argued a lover is simply someone with a disposition to feel empathy and that a lover need not be wholehearted. If my argument is accepted it implies a lover is not of necessity an autonomous person. Nonetheless I believe Frankfurt is right to associate love with autonomy because it seems obvious if someone doesn’t care about x she cannot make an autonomous decision concerning x. I also believe Frankfurt is correct in arguing that someone making an autonomous decision must be in some sense wholehearted. If love is simply a disposition to feel empathy it follows loving, caring about, x is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to make an autonomous decision concerning x. In the light of the above I want to revisit my example. Sam was torn between her love for John and Jane. Sam loved both John and Jane but her love was not wholehearted. In the light of the above Sam could not make an autonomous decision as to whether she should leave her husband for John. Nevertheless as I pointed out above I see no reason why we should regard Sam as non-autonomous or a wanton person. The above suggests that when we consider autonomy we should be concerned with autonomous decisions rather than autonomous persons. It further suggests that when we consider wholeheartedness we should only consider whether someone is wholehearted with respect to the things she loves or cares about which are relevant to the actual decision she is making. We should not be too concerned whether she is totally wholehearted where totally wholehearted means she must be wholehearted in relation to all the things she loves or cares about. Indeed in practice it would seem to be impossible ever to be sure someone was totally wholehearted.

Love Revisited

Love or ‘caring about’ is a constant theme of this blog. In previous postings I have discussed love in relation to keeping dogs, dissident IRA republican killers and arranged marriages. In this posting I want to examine the nature of love rather than any of its affects. It was suggested to me by Ian Law of Birmingham University in discussion that love is simply an emotion. In this examination I want firstly to discuss whether Ian was correct and secondly what this discussion tells us about emotions.

Before discussing the nature of love it must be clear what is meant by love. I consider love to be ‘caring about something’ as defined by Frankfurt.
“A person who cares about something is, as it were invested in it. He identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced” (1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 84).
The question I now wish to address is whether equating love with such ‘caring about’ is compatible with love being regarded as an emotion? Frankfurt would argue it is not,
“That a person cares about something or that he loves something has less to do with how things make him feel, or his opinions about them, than the more or less stable motivational structures that shape his preferences and guide his conduct” (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 129).
Why does Frankfurt believe love is not an emotion? Because he believes love must have some persistence and he also believes emotions do not have persistence. It seems clear that love cannot be turned off and on like a tap. It is also clear that emotions unlike love can quickly change. For this reason I accept love cannot be simply regarded as an emotion. Accepting the above of course does not mean love is unconnected to the emotions. Indeed I will now argue love must of necessity be connected to the emotions. I will argue love might be seen as a persistent emotion, a disposition to have an emotion or a sentiment.

If a lover identifies himself with what he cares about and makes himself vulnerable to the losses and susceptible to the benefits of love then love can be a motivation to act. Indeed if a lover can act to protect or benefit his beloved and fails to do so for no good reason it might be questioned whether he is a genuine lover. Love appears to be a matter of the will. Hume famously argued reason is the slave of the passions, the emotions in current parlance, and that reason alone gives us no motivation to act. It would appear to follow if we accept that reason alone gives us no reason to act and that love is a motivation for action then love must be an emotion. However I have accepted above that because love requires persistence and emotions are not necessarily persistent love is not simply an emotion. There are two ways this impasse might be avoided. Firstly it might be argued that love is connected to someone’s will. It might then be further argued that someone’s will is simply a stable motivational structure independent of both reason and emotion. This I believe would be Frankfurt’s position. Adopting such a position seems to me to be unnecessary and makes the will an unexplainable entity. For this reason I believe the second way of avoiding this impasse is preferable, this way assumes love is not simply an emotion but that it is connected to the emotions in some way.

How can love be connected to the emotions? I have suggested that love might be seen as a persistent emotion, a disposition to have some emotion or a sentiment. In what follows I will consider having a sentiment as being the same as having a disposition to feel some emotion. Accepting the above raises two questions. Firstly what exactly is an emotion; are emotions purely physical sensations or are emotions in some way intentional? Secondly if love is a persistent emotion or a disposition to have an emotion what is the actual emotion involved? There is a continuing philosophical debate as to whether emotions contain a cognitive element or are purely physiological states. Philosophers such as Nussbaum and Solomon would argue emotions are intentional and as a result must have a cognitive element. Others such as Prinz, would argue emotions are simply physiological states (2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford). People don’t just love randomly. It appears to follow love is intentional in some way. Prima facie it might then be suggested that any emotion underlying love must also be intentional. I believe this suggestion is doubtful. Clearly some emotions such as disgust are non intentional and are simply physiological states. It might then be pointed out not all emotions are the same and that some emotions may be intentional and include a cognitive element. However when assigning a cognitive element to an emotion we must be sure we should assign this element to the actual emotion rather than to the cause of the emotion. If for instance I eat too many strawberries this might cause me to have a stomach ache, a purely physiological state. Similarly if I am fearful, because I perceive a tiger approaching me, my perception is the cause of my fear. Moreover I see no reason why my fear must include the concept that tigers are dangerous. In light of the above I will assume there is no reason why all emotions, including persistent ones, should not be regarded as purely physiological states. It follows if love is intentional, as I believe it is, then I was wrong to argue with Law that love might be regarded as a persistent emotion. I now believe love might be better regarded as a disposition to feel some particular emotion. A disposition to feel a particular emotion partially causes this emotion. Further a disposition to feel an emotion may be based on certain beliefs and as a result this disposition might well contain a cognitive element even if the actual emotion does not.

If love is not an emotion, persistent or otherwise, but rather a disposition to feel a particular emotion then the question as to which of the emotions is involved must be addressed. I suggested above if a lover can act to protect or benefit his beloved and he fails to do so it might be questioned whether he is a genuine lover. Accepting the above means neither lust nor sympathy can be the emotion underlying love. The lustful feel no need to benefit the objects of their lust. Sympathy involves understanding the suffering of others. However it is possible to act sympathetically without addressing the desires of others, see Nichols. (2004, Sentimental Rules, Oxford, pages 38, 39). Hence a sympathetic person may be unable to truly benefit the object of his sympathy. An empathic person both understands and feels the desires of the object of his empathy. It follows an empathic person will act to protect or benefit the object of his empathy. For this reason I suggest love would be best defined as a disposition to feel empathy.

I now wish to address three problems associated with adopting this definition of love. Firstly it might be argued that by defining love as a disposition to feel empathy we fail to accommodate one of our intuitive ideas of personal love. Love it might be argued is often limited, personal and private whilst empathy appears to have a much larger writ. Empathy does however have the property that it diminishes with distance. This distance might involve physical distance, time or just degree of acquaintance. For instance I may feel some empathy for protestors being crushed in Iran but I felt far greater empathy for my wife when she was admitted to hospital. This property of distance seems to allow us to account for the intuitive idea of love as personal whilst at the same time accepting the definition of love as a disposition to feel empathy. For instance it makes sense to say we can love the residents of our home town in an impersonal way whilst at the same time loving our children in a personal way to a far greater degree.

Secondly it might be argued accepting the above definition means we cannot learn to love. Some recent research suggests that mirror neurones play a central part in our ability to feel empathy. If this is so then it might be argued the ability to feel empathy, to love, depends on the physical structure of our brains rather than our brain states. It seems likely we can alter our brain states by learning. However it seems unlikely we can alter the physical structure of our brains to any great degree by learning. I have used the word unlikely above because we can alter to some degree the physical structure of our body by exercise and training. Accepting the above means it is unlikely we can learn to love. Autism might be advanced as an additional reason why if the definition of love, as a disposition to feel empathy, is accepted we cannot learn to love. In using the example of autism I am not necessarily connecting autism to mirror neurones or arguing autistic children cannot feel some form of sympathy. I am however arguing those suffering from autism cannot feel true empathy for others. Some parents of autistic children might argue their children can feel love and as a result would reject this definition of love. I would merely note it is possible that these parents’ empathy for their children may project non-existent love onto them. It might be argued good parents want their children to learn to love but if this definition is accepted learning to love is impossible for the two reasons outlined above. My starting point in this posting was Frankfurt’s definition of love. Frankfurt himself argues love is not a matter of choice and this seems to support the above argument, see (1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, page 135). However if the above definition of love is accepted does it really matter if we cannot learn to love? I would argue it does not. I would argue that under normal circumstances our natural capacity to love develops. I would further argue that in practice parents do not teach their children to love but rather that most parents create the circumstances in which their children’s natural capacity for love develops. I would further suggest that those parents who do not or are unable to create these circumstances should be helped to do so, see my posting of 30/03/09 concerning dissident IRA killers.

The third problem with defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is that the definition seems to be an inadequate definition. People don’t just love people. We can love cities, pieces of music and nature for instance. We are however unable to feel empathy for cities, pieces of music or nature. There seem to be two strategies for dealing with the inadequacy of this definition. Firstly it might be denied that we actually love these inanimate things. For instance can we actually love a city which has lost all its inhabitants forever? Perhaps when we love a city we do feel empathy but this is not empathy for a city devoid of its inhabitants but rather for these inhabitants. I find such a strategy unconvincing because it would be hard to apply to nature. Perhaps it might be better argued we feel empathy for life in general. However I still find this amended strategy unconvincing. Secondly it might be argued defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is an incomplete definition; the reason being that the concept of love is not a simple concept but rather a hybrid concept. The love of animate and inanimate objects is not the same. If this is accepted then defining love as a disposition to feel empathy is a definition limited to the love of animate objects.