Parenting and Excessive Guidance

Phillip Larkin had a bleak view of parents.

‘They fuck you up your mum and dad and give you all the faults they had’

Dov Fox also paints a bleak picture of modern parenting (1). He argues when rearing children parents have a duty to do two things. They have a duty to guide their children, e.g. educate them. They also have a duty to accept them for what they are, e.g. love them. This latter duty means the aspirations of our children impose limits on what we may will for them. There is a tension between these two duties and parents should attempt to balance them. Parental attention deficit disorder occurs when parents do not get this balance correct. Fox points out modern parenting pays too much attention to guidance as opposed to acceptance. It is important to note too much attention can also be paid to acceptance. James Flynn argues that, in part, the gap in the IQ of black and other children may be due excessive acceptance rather than genetic factors (2). However in this posting I want to examine Fox’s point concerning excessive guidance.

Initially parents don’t guide their children. Parents should simply accept, love and nurture them. As a child starts to develop her parents should start to guide her. The emphasis on guidance will grow as the child develops. Perhaps as children become teenagers the balance between guidance and acceptance will shift again with greater emphasis again being placed on acceptance. I agree with Fox that excessive guidance is a bad thing and that parents who give excessive guidance act badly even if their motives are good. However excessive guidance need not always involve good motives and some parents substitute their own motives in place of their children, see substitute success syndrome in (3). The question to be addressed is this if we must guide our children at what stage does good guidance become excessive guidance? I will examine this question, as Fox does, by firstly considering pre natal and secondly post natal guidance.

There may be various forms of pre natal guidance. I will only examine genetic enhancement as I believe my comments on genetic enhancement apply equally to other forms of pre natal guidance. Fox argues that genetic enhancement is unwelcome but not because natural genetic combination is superior to an engineered combination of genes.

‘My argument, to be clear, is not that the randomness of genetic recombination is a moral good in itself.’ (4)

What is wrong with an engineered combination of genes according to Fox is as follows.

‘Rather, it is because genetic engineering is the ultimate manifestation of the triumph of excessive parental guidance that has become all too familiar in our time’ (5).

It might be questioned whether genetic engineering is a form of parental guidance. It is certainly a form of choosing some of the characteristics of an unborn child, perhaps a child that has yet to be conceived, but is choosing a form of guidance? It seems to me that guidance requires something to guide, in this context an existing child. Moreover it seems that, provided a child has a life that is worth living, genetic enhancement does no harm that child. An un-enhanced child would be a different child. An interesting discussion of this issue is found in ‘Parfit (6). It appears to follow that genetic engineering is not the ultimate manifestation of the triumph of excessive parental guidance as Fox argues. Parents may use genetic engineering to choose the kind of children they will have; this choosing is not guidance of any sort. Nonetheless Fox might give a second closely related reason as to why genetic engineering should be discouraged. He might argue even if genetic engineering is not a form of excessive guidance that parents who genetically engineer their children are more likely to excessively guide their children in later life. It might then be further argued for this reason genetic engineering should be discouraged. However even if parents who might genetically engineer their children were discouraged from doing so it does not automatically follow that these parents would be any less likely to excessively guide any children they might have. I accept genetic engineering should be discouraged if it can be shown that it encourages excessive parental guidance. However it seems to me that parents who excessively guide their children would continue to do so even if they were discouraged from genetic enhancement. The reasons, why parents might excessively guide children, lies in the parent’s own psychological makeup rather than whether they are able to genetically engineer their children’s future. The above suggests that Fox is wrong to believe there are reasons based on excessive parental guidance to discourage the genetic enhancement of children. Accepting my argument of course does not mean that genetic engineering is desirable. I agree with Fox when he states

‘Parental attention calls for moral scepticism towards the potential worth of those characteristics parents would seek to target for enhancement or eradication’ (7).

However my scepticism is not based on parental deficit disorder.

Fox approaches post natal enhancement in connection with excessive guidance as follows.

‘The parental attention approach suggests that certain enhancements – practices that aim to modify human form or functioning beyond what is required to sustain good health or restore the normal workings of the human mind and body – call for careful reflection into parental attitudes, depending on the particulars of the child’  (8).

The best way to achieve these ends would usually be to accept the child for what she is. However as Fox points out in certain contexts some interventions are morally required, for instance the removal of a child from a toxic environment caused by lead paint. Such interventions are acceptable even if these cause profound changes in the child’s personality. Fox would regard any intervention which changes a child’s personality but leads to normal functioning as acceptable, perhaps even mandatory. Fox would regard any other intervention which changes a child’s personality as unacceptable. It would seem Fox adopts a similar approach to parental guidance. Any guidance beyond that needed to maintain a child’s normal physical and mental health would be regarded by him as excessive. Moreover he thinks parents should simply accept the personality of a normal child and not attempt to change her personality by any guidance. The trouble with this approach is how to define normal. For instance is the prescription of Ritalin to a child for ADHD a means of aiding the child’s mind to function normally or a failure to accept the child as she is? One way to deal with this problem might be to consider any intervention as undesirable which would impede a child from developing and maintaining a conception of herself as the central character in her life story. It would seem Fox would endorse this approach (9). However it seems to me that excessive guidance does not necessarily destroy a child’s concept of herself as the central character in her own life. An excessively guided child might rationalise the changes brought about in her life in two ways. She may see her character as struggling to achieve these changes. She may see her character as struggling to accommodate these changes. In both of these scenarios her concept of herself as the central character in her life story remains in spite of the excessive parental guidance. However the above approach might be modified as follows. Any intervention would be undesirable if it would impede a child from developing and maintaining a conception of herself as the author, at least in part, of her life story.

This modified approach suggests if parents are to avoid excessive guidance they should accept the things their child sees as central to her life. The reason for this being the things a child sees as central to her life, the things she cares about, are the things she authors her life by. Authorship implies autonomy. It appears if this approach was adopted then parents should respect their child’s autonomy. If parents should respect a child’s autonomy it might also appear to strictly limit the guidance they should give to this child. I believe that this second appearance is illusory. It is generally accepted that people should respect other people’s autonomy. However children are not fully autonomous. Indeed at an early age children are not autonomous at all. A child’s autonomy develops as she matures. I believe good parenting requires that parents should assist their children become autonomous. The question I now wish to address is this, if it is accepted that parents should assist their children become autonomous, how does this affect the balance between accepting their children as they are and giving them guidance?

I have noted above when a child is very young her parents should simply love, nurture and accept her. As the child develops so her parent should start to guide her. Later on as the child starts to become autonomous her parents must again place greater emphasis on accepting her. The above suggests the balance between accepting a child and guiding her changes as the child matures. Good parenting calls for parents to be aware of this fact. It might be thought, if parents assist their children to become autonomous, that as these children mature the need for guidance shrinks dramatically. This is not so. Assisting children become autonomous is not simply achieved by giving more mature children ample choices and accepting these choices. According to Frankfurt,

‘With total freedom there can be no individual identity. This is because an excess of choice impairs the will.’ (10)

Being autonomous means an agent has ideals or something she cares about in order to let her make meaningful choices. It follows assisting children become autonomous involves parents both helping children obtain standards and ideals which permit them to make meaningful choices and the opportunity to make these choices. The process of helping children obtain standards and ideals of necessity involves guidance. It is impossible for a child, or any one else for that matter, to obtain a value simply by choosing randomly without some reference point. Any value obtained in this way is obtained wantonly. It follows if parents simply accept their children and fail to help them obtain some standards and ideals they risk that their children will behave wantonly as noted by Flynn above. Fox is right to note the dangers of excessive guidance but a lack of guidance also involves significant dangers. Competitive parenting of the kind noted by Fox and parenting in which parents seek to attain their own success through their children’s lives should be regarded as unacceptable. Good parenting involves some guidance even as a child matures. How should good parents approach this guidance? There is no algorithm for good parenting. It follows good parenting is akin to a craft that must be learnt in part by experience. It seems self evident that parents should bring good attitudes towards this learning experience. One such good attitude as suggested by Fox is to be aware of the need to balance acceptance and guidance. Another good attitude is to be aware this balance changes as the child matures. Lastly parents must reflect on the guidance they offer. I noted above when considering genetic enhancement Fox thinks parents should be morally sceptical towards these enhancements. I believe parents should adopt this sceptical attitude to any values they seek to inculcate in their children. Nevertheless a failure to inculcate any values in maturing children is a failure in parental attention. If such attitudes are adopted parents then parents should not ‘fuck up’ their children as Larkin suggests they do.

1.      Dov Fox, 2008, Parental Attention Deficit Disorder, Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(3)

2.      Flynn, 2008, Where Have All the Liberals Gone, Race Class and Ideals in America, Cambridge University Press.

3.      Michael Slote, 2007, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Routledge, page 57.

4.      Fox, page 250.

5.      Fox, page 251.

6.      Parfit, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, section 122.

7.      Fox, page 248.

8.      Fox, page 252.

9.      Fox, page, 254.

10. Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity Volition and Love, Cambridge, page 110.

The Pharmacological Induction of Emotions

This posting is based on a paper by David Wasserman and Mathew Liao (1). In this paper they question whether the pharmacological induction of the emotions can satisfy reasonable conditions for authenticity. They conclude an induced emotion might well satisfy these conditions. I will argue what is important when considering an induced emotion is not simply whether the emotion is an authentic one but rather the ways in which an emotion might be induced. I will further argue we have no reason to reject some induced emotions which I would class as inauthentic.

Prior to setting out my arguments I first must briefly consider the intuitive meanings of authentic. Firstly we might intuitively say a person is simply authentic provided he is not a wanton. A wanton has no true self and bases his life on whims or the wishes. However this definition of an authentic person is no help in deciding whether an emotion is authentic or inauthentic. Secondly we might intuitively also say an action or an emotion is authentic if it accords, in some way, with the agent’s inner self. I would define someone’s inner self by the things he loves. Frankfurt would define the things someone loves by what he cares about.

“A person who cares about something is, as it were invested in it. He identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced.”(2)

Let us assume for now that an authentic emotion is one that accords with the things an agent cares about. It follows if we are investigate authentic emotions that we must be clear about the nature of the accordance between someone’s inner self and his authentic emotions if term authentic be useful.

Someone’s actions may be classed as authentic or inauthentic. I have suggested above that intuitively if someone is authentic then he leads his life in accordance with his own inner self. An authentic action might be defined as an action that accords with the agent’s inner self. It seems natural to define an action as according with someone’s inner self if it furthers the ends of his inner self. If this natural definition of accordance is accepted then an authentic action is simply one that furthers the ends of an agent’s inner self. It also seems natural to extend this definition of an authentic action to an authentic emotion. Let us accept our emotions are not just things we experience but reasons for action. This view holds that an emotion is not simply a physical feeling but combination of feelings behaviour and cognitions and is supported by Wasserman and Liao (3). A similar view is held by Michael Brady who argues emotions are analogous to alarms readying us for action (4). An authentic emotion might then be defined as an emotion that furthers the ends of the agent’s inner self.

Let us examine the above definition of an authentic emotion by the use of two examples. Firstly Wasserman and Liao use grief as an example of an emotion that it might not be wrong to induce pharmacologically. Let it be assumed it is possible to induce grief pharmacologically by taking a pill. Let it be further assumed someone does not feel genuine grief at the loss of a family member. However he may be aware society believes it right to grieve at the loss of a close family member. Such a person may care about what society cares about and thinks it right to take a pill to induce grief. In this case using the above definition of an authentic emotion this pharmacologically induced grief might be classed as not inauthentic and there seems to be no reason as to why it should not be induced. However not all authentic emotions using the above definition should be induced. Let us move from considering grief to considering love. Let it be assumed someone lusts after another but fails to love the other. Let it be further assumed he is unable to satisfy his lust because his beloved perceives this lack of love. Let it be still further assumed it is possible to pharmacologically induce love by taking a pill. Lastly let it be assumed this lustful person takes this pill in order to induce love so he can satisfy his lust. This pharmacologically induced love would be an authentic emotion according to the above definition, because it furthers the ends of the lustful lover. However the object of the lustful lover’s lust would not regard his emotion as authentic if she was aware his love was pharmacologically induced. Moreover it would seem wrong to induce love in these circumstances. It follows using my definition of authentic that not all authentic emotions should be induced.

Perhaps someone’s inner self or true self is an illusion. If this is true then there is no need to consider questions of authenticity. I would be reluctant to accept this position. Perhaps our inner self or true self is a purely cognitive construction. Once again there would be no need to consider questions of authenticity. And once again I would be reluctant to accept this position. I have suggested above that we are defined by what we care about. I will now argue we are not defined by all the things we care about. We are defined by those things which we care about and are either proud or would be ashamed of. Someone’s true self need not actually involve feeling shame but must include a disposition to feel shame in certain circumstance. Additionally I have suggested that actions which make someone proud are actions he can defend even if sometimes his defence can sometimes only be mounted retrospectively. Similarly someone must be able to give some reason for his shame, see true selves do they exist. Accepting this definition would mean someone’s true or inner self might include elements of which he is ashamed. Some of his actions might be authentic actions but would nonetheless be actions of which he is ashamed. Adopting this definition would mean someone’s true or inner self concurs better with third party assessments. For instance in my example of the lustful enhanced lover his love might be authentic but it is love he should be ashamed of, his beloved might concur.

How then are emotions linked to someone’s true self as defined above? It might be objected that there is no connection. Someone can have emotions but can’t have emotions about emotions. In reply I would point out pride and shame are meta-emotions. Schadenfreude is pleasure at another’s discomfort is surely an emotion one should feel some shame about. In addition if our lustful lover enhances his love to mislead his beloved then surely he should feel some shame at his tainted love. Let us divide emotions into two types. Firstly emotions we feel no pride or shame about are inauthentic emotions. Secondly emotions we feel some pride or shame about, even if only slightly, are authentic emotions. It might be objected that emotions we feel shameful about feeling, such as schadenfreude, are inauthentic emotions rather than authentic emotions. In response I would point out if we have a disposition to take pleasure at another’s discomfort that this is part of our essential character, even if we wish it wasn’t, and as such is an authentic disposition to feel a particular emotion. Most of us have some incompatible elements in our character and part of being a person is being able to come to care about some things rather than others (5). We want to eat cream cakes and remain thin.

Let us first consider emotions that are inauthentic, emotions that someone feels no pride or shame about. Let us accept that at some future date it is possible to induce love or compassion perhaps by the use of oxytocin. It seems clear that sociopaths lack compassion. Love and compassion are not connected to a sociopath’s true self. Let it be assumed some sociopath is given pharmacologically induced compassion. This induced emotion would be an inauthentic emotion at the time of its induction using the above definition because a sociopath feels no shame at his lack of compassion. However this induced emotion might be regarded as a moral enhancement that appears to benefit both society and the individual concerned. Provided of course the sociopath continues to take his drugs. It therefore seems possible to conclude that some induced emotions which are inauthentic, when they are induced, should be encouraged. Accepting this conclusion does not of course mean that all induced emotions which are inauthentic, when induced, should be encouraged. Consider again the lustful lover. Clearly his induced love should not be encouraged. Let it also be accepted that there some are harmful emotions such as spite and envy should never be induced in anyone. However there are some usually beneficial emotions for which there seems to be no reason, based solely on the nature of emotion, as to why they should not be pharmacologically induced. I suggest that we should permit the pharmacological induction of beneficial emotions which are inauthentic as defined above provided their induction is not intended to deceive. One way of safeguarding against these induced emotions deceiving would be to make the induction public knowledge.

It might be argued my safeguard is unnecessary because an inauthentic pharmacologically induced emotion might become an authentic one over time. Consider again the lustful lover whose love is clearly inauthentic when induced. It might argued, provided this lover persists in taking the drugs that induce his love, that his inauthentic love at the time it was induced becomes authentic love after a period of time. In reply I would suggest a beneficial induced emotion only becomes authentic provided the agent starts to take pride in feeling the emotion; time is irrelevant. I would further suggest authenticity is also irrelevant, all that matters is that the induced emotion is beneficial and does not deceive; my safeguard should help prevent deception.

Lastly I want to consider authentic emotions. These emotions cause the agent to feel some pride or shame. Such emotions cannot be induced but one or more of them might be enhanced. Enhancement might alter the balance between these emotions causing a shift in someone’s true self. It might be argued such a shift causes a change in authenticity, in his character. Is such a shift harmful? People try to change their character and stop doing or feeling the things they are ashamed of. Changing one’s character is hard and most people’s attempts are unsuccessful. I see no reasons why someone’s autonomous decision, driven by his authentic shame, shouldn’t be assisted by pharmacological means. However such enhancement carries dangers. Let us consider a homosexual man. Perhaps he feels shame at his homosexuality and perhaps some sort of emotional enhancement might curtail his desire for other men. Let us accept that homosexuality has some genetic basis it follows any change in sexual orientation is contrary to his nature. In order to safeguard against such dangers we need to be sure such decisions are autonomous and that the shame that drives them is authentic and not induced by others.

1. David Wasserman, Mathew Liao, Issues in the Pharmacological Inductions of Emotions, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25(3)
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, page 83.
3. Wasserman and Liao, page 17.
4.  Michael S. Brady, 2013, Emotional Insight; The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.
5. Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford.
6.  Frankfurt, 1988, page 91