Aliens and Stephen Hawking

Stephen Hawking recently stated on the Discovery channel that alien life forms probably exists somewhere in the Universe and that we should try to avoid contact with them. He suggested that if aliens come into contact with us they might be liable to act as the first Europeans acted on discovering America. He further suggested if they are anything like us they are likely to be aggressive and either exterminate us or pillage our resources. However it seems to me there is a major objection to Hawking’s suggestion. His suggestion seems to depend on the assumption that any alien morality will be much the same as that of the first colonisers of the Americas. I find such an assumption hard to accept because it seems to me, however slow and lagging behind science, there is some moral progress. As evidence of this progress I would argue modern Europeans would not behave in a similar way to their compatriots of Columbus’ time on discovering a further new world. To support this argument I need only draw attention to the fact that most Europeans in Columbus’ times were all quite happy to deal in African slaves. The idea of moral progress is dealt with by Guy Kahane at what intelligent alien life can tell us about morality. . In what follows I will assume moral progress is real. I will argue moral progress consists at least in part in the expansion of the domain of our moral concern. I will further argue any advanced aliens are likely to share this expansion.

Shaun Nichols uses investigations into child development and moral pathology to conclude that all morality includes an affective element including utilitarianism (1). In what follows I am going to assume Nichols view is correct for it seems to me to be highly improbable that any grouping consisting mainly of sociopaths could possibly form a stable or moral society. I am also going to assume the domain of creatures we feel sympathy for defines the domain of our moral concern.

I have assumed above some natural sympathy is necessary for any system of morality. Initially it seems safe to assume this empathy was limited to the people we were close to, our family for instance. With time the domain of our empathy has expanded to include our tribe, country, people who share our culture and more recently animals. How can we explain this expansion in the domain of our sympathy? Firstly it might be explained by physiological changes which increase our capacity to feel empathy. However I would be very doubtful about accepting any such explanation. The reason for my doubts being the expansion that has occurred seems to be too rapid to be explained in purely evolutionary terms. A second explanation might depend on a change in our understanding of other people or creatures. But how could a change in our understanding of others lead to a change in our capacity to feel sympathy as it might be argued we simply feel emotions? I would suggest the emotions we experience depend on both our physiological and psychological states. I would further suggest our psychological state depends to some extent on the beliefs we hold, our understanding. It seems clear sympathy is generated in response to some particular situation. I would still further suggest we naturally feel sympathy for some creature in some particular situation if we believe, we understand, the creature to be capable of experiencing the situation in much the same way we would. Accepting the above means a change in our understanding of other people or creatures might alter the domain of our sympathy. As I have assumed the domain of our sympathy defines the domain of our moral concern. It follows a change in our understanding can alter the domain of our moral concern. It further follows if we come to see some creatures, which we previously believed did not experience some situation as we do does, that there is an expansion in the domain of creatures we believe merit moral concern.

It might be doubted by some, even if they accept the domain of morality naturally expands, that we have nothing to fear from alien contact. I will now examine some of these doubts. Firstly some might question whether aliens need have a system of morality at all. Accepting the above means even if it is agreed the domain of morality naturally expands this fact is irrelevant in any of our considerations about what to do in the case of alien contact. However it seems inconceivable that any group of creatures could expand throughout the universe without some form of co-operation among themselves. Such co-operation would be a form of morality. An objector might suggest that aliens might possess only an alien form of morality. Aliens they might argue just don’t have an affective form of morality like us. I find his suggestion difficult to accept. First I find it difficult to imagine either how any group of creatures who don’t care about anything could possibly want to expand throughout the universe. And secondly as I will now argue I believe any creatures that care about each must have an affective system of morality.

I concur with Frankfurt’s belief that if some creature cares about something that it must identify itself with what it cares about and as a result make itself vulnerable to any losses connected to this caring (2). It is important to be clear Frankfurt does not connect this vulnerability to the emotions. Frankfurt connects this vulnerability directly to an absence of satisfaction with a state of affairs connected to whatever the creature identifies with. Frankfurt further holds that an absence of satisfaction with a state of affairs of whatever the creature cares about is sufficient to motivate it to act. I would agree with Frankfurt that an absence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction motivates us to act. However I, unlike Frankfurt, would argue an absence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction about the affairs of something we care about naturally leads to certain emotions, albeit faint emotions. I would suggest it is these emotions that give us reason to act. Accepting this suggestion means any advanced alien must care about something and this caring about means it must have some sort of emotions. It might be objected that the fact that an alien has emotions is not a sufficient condition for it being moral creature or for that matter even being capable of being a moral creature. After all sociopaths do have some emotions but these are not the sort of emotions needed for morality. Sociopaths live in our society, our civilization, and I am doubtful if a civilization of only sociopaths is possible. If we accept the above then any civilization, alien or not, might contain sociopaths but it can't be a civilization of sociopaths. It follows any aliens capable of expanding throughout the universe must have some form of morality  and that this morality must have an affective basis based on sympathy. 

I have argued aliens capable of travelling across space must have some sort of civilization and this means that they must feel some sort of sympathy. The fact that aliens feel sympathy by itself of course does not guarantee they will feel any sympathy towards us. Perhaps they might only feel empathy towards other aliens. I suggested above we naturally feel sympathy for some creature in some particular situation provided we believe, we understand, the creature to be capable of experiencing the situation in much the same way as we would. It appears to follow that any aliens will only naturally care about other aliens and closely related species which they believe to experience the world in much the same way as they do. I have argued above that if we come to understand others as experiencing the world as we do our domain of sympathy naturally expands. I have also argued above that aliens must “care about”, love, something as I believe persons must also do. It therefore seems probable if aliens come to understand us as at least partly experiencing the world as they do by “caring about” that the domain of their sympathy must naturally expand to include some sympathy towards us. In the light of the above it might be concluded Hawking’s suggestion that aliens are likely to be aggressive and either exterminate us or pillage our resources seems to be highly improbable.

It might be objected the way Europeans conquered and colonised the Americas is evidence that the above conclusion is unsound. It might be pointed out to me that these Europeans had a natural empathy together with a reasonable understanding of the world yet they still behaved dreadfully towards the Native Americans. I accept these Europeans had a natural sympathy but would argue their understanding of others did not encourage an expansion of the domain of their sympathy as far as ours. I have assumed moral progress in expansion of our natural sympathy is real. However, even if the expansion of natural empathy is real it is still feasible that aliens might contact us at an early stage in this expansion and behave as the European colonisers did in the Americas. Hawking’s believes the following scary scenario is possible,

“We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.”

This scenario is indeed a theoretical possibility. The film Independence Day  depicts such a scenario. I would argue in practice such a scenario is extremely unlikely. It is hard to see how creatures, which are capable of the understanding needed to build massive ships capable of crossing the vast distances of interstellar space, failing to sufficiently understand other caring creatures to permit a natural expansion in the domain of creatures they feel some sympathy for. A more likely scenario seems to be one in which advanced aliens are at worst indifferent towards us as depicted in Arthur Clarke’s  Rendezvous with Rama  . If we accept the above then we have little reason to fear aliens even if some caution is advisable. Perhaps the real reason we feel threatened by aliens is fear feeling inferior. Lastly it seems to me many of my comments here apply equally to any emergent superintelligence.

1. Shaun Nichols, 2004, Sentimental Rules, Oxford.
2. Harry Frankfurt, 1988,The Importance of What We Care about, Cambridge University Press, page 83.

Velleman and Shame

In this posting I want to examine the concept of shame. In particular I want to consider David Velleman’s ideas on shame. Velleman defines shame as “anxiety about social disqualification constitutes the emotion of shame” (1). I will argue Velleman’s definition does not easily concur with out intuitions and suggest an alternative definition.

Let it be assumed that I am the last person left alive on earth after some plague. Let it be further assumed that because I have a stoical character I have retained my mental stability. Let it be still further assumed the rest of nature is unaffected by this plague and perhaps even benefits from it. Finally let it be assumed that it is within my powers to prevent damage the environment. Hume famously pointed out that “Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger” (2). Let it be accepted Hume is basically correct. It follows in the above scenario, if I am not inclined to stop oil spilling into the environment perhaps because I prefer simply sitting at ease in a chair when only a little more effort would mean I could close a valve to prevent this environmental damage, then there is no rational reason for me to question my decision. It seems to me in such a scenario I might feel ashamed of my laziness and that this sense of shame would force me to question this laziness and act otherwise. However if we accept Velleman’s concept then in this situation I need have no fear of social disqualification and hence will feel no shame. Intuitively I believe in such a scenario I would feel shame. Velleman might object my above scenario is too far removed from reality for me to genuinely speculate as to whether I would feel shame. However I would point out almighty monarchs can feel shame and moreover the above considerations would be applicable in many more mundane situations. I would suggest it is possible to feel shame in a situation in which my actions would be undetectable by others. It therefore seems clear to me that fears about social disqualification offer at best only a partial explanation of shame.

I now want to argue our sense of shame is connected to our sense of self and that it is perfectly possible to feel shame without feeling any fear of social disqualification. If my argument is to be accepted then it should be possible to account for my shame predicted in the above scenario. Someone might point out to me that shame is a moral emotion and that there is a social aspect to shame. She might then argue my attempt to connect shame to a sense of self will fail because it fails to account for these social and moral aspects. I would argue that moral aspects must include both moral agents and those things, such as animals, which are of moral concern. I accept shame is a moral emotion. However I do not accept that shame cannot be connected to a sense of self if it is a moral emotion. Our sense of self is a sense of ourselves as embodied persons having certain attributes. For most of us, sociopaths excepted, this includes a sense of ourselves as moral persons. I would argue this sense of self as a moral person can only grow and flourish in a social setting. I would further argue whilst this sense of ourselves as moral persons may not be a source of great pride or self satisfaction that none the less it is important to us. We care about it. Harry Frankfurt believes caring about something means being satisfied with what we care about. He further believes this satisfaction is not some smug feeling but rather simply no active interest in bringing about a change in affairs (3). In the light of the above I would suggest shame might be simply seen as an unease or dissatisfaction with our sense of self as a moral person.

It seems to me using the above definition of shame it is possible to offer an explanation of my shame in the last man scenario outlined above. In this scenario I have previously acquired a sense of myself as a moral person in a social setting. When I become the last person alive I do not automatically lose this sense and hence still retain a disposition to feel shame even if I have no reason to fear social disqualification. In the light of the above hypothetical example I believe my definition of shame is better able to account for some of our moral intuitions than that of Velleman.

1. David Velleman 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95.
2. David Hume, 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, Book II, Section III, page 416, originally published 1739 – 1740).
3. Harry Frankfurt, Necessity Volition and Love, 1999, Cambridge University Press, page 103.