Historic wrongdoing, Slavery, Compensation and Apology

   

Recently the Trevelyan family says it is apologising for its ancestor’s role in slavery in the Caribbean, see The Observer .King Charles also wants to better understand the part the royal family played in past slavery. In this posting I will use the Trevelyan case to examine apology and compensation for past wrongs. I will conclude that many people and organisations apologise, when they don’t need to, because saying sorry is easy, which it shouldn’t be, and fail to compensate when they should because it is expensive.

Let us consider compensation first. I would suggest that if compensation is due that three conditions must be met First someone or something must have benefitted from some wrongful action, it is important to note that they don’t have done anything wrong themselves. For instance receiving stolen goods when the receiver is unaware that they have been stolen. Secondly someone or something has been harmed by this action. Lastly there is someone who has been harmed who can benefit from any compensation. Do the Trevelyan family satisfy the first condition? It seems obvious that past members of the family became richer due to slavery. It also seems likely that present day members of the family have benefitted from this increased wealth, the Trevelyan’s aren’t a poor family. It seems that the Trevelyan family satisfy the first condition. It might be argued that some nations satisfy the first condition, Great Britain for instance. I’m doubtful if such an argument can succeed. It is difficult to show that a nation is more prosperous now due to a colonialist past. For instance the British with a long colonial past aren’t more prosperous than the Danes with none. Let us now consider the second condition. Cleary the Trevelyan family have damaged slaves and satisfy this condition. Do they satisfy the third condition? Clearly they cannot compensate those they harmed directly but have their past actions harmed people living now? Has the development and prosperity of some Caribbean islands been adversely affected by past slavery? This might be difficult to show but if it can then the Trevelyan family is right in offering compensation.

I now want to consider whether the Trevelyan family is right to offering an apology for past slavery. When is an apology required? Intuitively we might think an apology should be offered whenever compensation is owed under the three conditions outlined above. An example will show our intuition are unsound. Let us assume that a young man steals a great work of art from a museum and as a result becomes very rich. Later he marries and has a family who are unaware of his past. Much later when her parents are dead his daughter learns about the true source of her wealth and offers the museum compensation. She is right to do so but she has no reason to apologise. For someone to have reason to apologise it isn’t sufficient that she has benefitted from some wrongful action she must also have played a part in or endorsed the wrongdoing. Apology seems to be connected to guilt about the wrongdoing. The third condition needed for compensation is that there must be someone who can be compensated. Does the above mean that an apology is only needed when there is someone to apologise to? I’m not sure for apologising might benefit the apologiser. In the light of the above I would suggest that individual members of the Trevelyan family have no reason to apologise to Caribbean islanders affected by the past wrongs of slavery. It is important to distinguish between regret and apology. Regret comes from sympathy whilst apology originates in guilt.  The Trevelyan family might of course feel sympathy and express regret for their past actions but apology is inappropriate by present day individual members of the family aren’t guilty of any wrongdoing. Apologising is mistaken or even a form of moral grandstanding.  

Let us accept that individual members of the Trevelyan family haven’t any reason to apologise but in theory they do have a duty to compensate the victims of slavery. T\he amount of compensation cannot be assessed accurately but provided the amount is meaningful the duty will have been satisfied. Let us turn to a slightly different question does the family rather than individual family members have reason to apologise? Governments apologise for past wrongdoing so why shouldn’t families? I will now argue families don’t.

The first condition needed for an individual to have a duty to apologise is that she has done some wrong. Let us accept that this condition should also apply to families. However it is harder for families to satisfy this condition than individuals. Consider the Trevelyan family at the time of slavery. Did all members approve owning slaves or did some disapprove? If some members disapproved then it seems wrong to blame the family even if individual members can be blamed. This suggests that a fourth condition must be satisfied for any family to have a duty to apologise. Families must be united at the time of their wrongdoing for them to have a duty to apologise. This is a hard condition to satisfy but I will now argue that even if families are united at the time of wrongdoing and had a duty to apologise that this doesn’t mean that the family retains this duty several generations later. I would suggest for a family to retain a duty that not only must it be united at the time of wrongdoing but also over time. Of course a family such as the Trevelyans is united by a name but simply having a name doesn’t impose any duties for if it did it would apply to infants. A family might be united by inherited wealth but this seems to raise a duty to compensate rather than a duty to apologise. After several generations individual family members are linked to numerous other families, can someone be united with multiple families? However even if a family can be united in some way thus doesn’t mean it has a duty to apologise for past wrongdoing. For a family to apologise it must be united in its apology for a disunited apology is an individual one. An apology for being a member of the family rather than one on behalf of the family. It follows that a family cannot apologise for the wrongdoings of past members and that any such apology is mistaken or not inauthentic.

I have argued that it is difficult or impossible for families to apologise for historic wrongdoing due to a lack of unity but it might be argued that collective responsibility means governments and other organisations might do so. In what follows government means government or organisation. Collective responsibility means even if a member of a government argues against some policy and it is adopted that she must endorse it or resign. It follows that governments can make united decisions and if these decisions prove to be wrong have a duty to apologise. However governments are only united for a limited time. A government is unlikely to be united with previous governments several generations ago. It follows governments can’t apologise for historical wrongdoing. Lastly if apology is based on guilt and a government is not unites over time a past government night have a duty to apologise whilst the present one has none, it might of course have a duty to express regret but this is based  on sympathy rather than guilt..

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? First compensation is due in many cases when no apology is required. Secondly apologising for historic wrongs is mistaken or inauthentic in most cases because apology is based on guilt rather sympathy. Lastly perhaps some governments might apologise because it is a cheaper option than compensation even if this is due.

Afterthoughts 

Too many people the practice of apologising when no apology is needed is harmless even if unwarranted. I would suggest this isn’t so as apology plays a vital role in forgiveness. Some might argue that I’m mistaken because we can forgive unconditionally, no apology necessary. Forgiveness aims to restore good relations between the victim and the wrongdoer. If a wrongdoer fails to accept his wrongdoing to himself or the victim then these relations cannot be restored. If a wrongdoer accepts his wrongdoing then he must show his acceptance to the victim by apologising.  Forgiveness requires apology. Unwarranted apologies diminish the power of apology and weaken the importance of forgiveness.

Engaging with Robots

 

In an interesting paper Sven Nyholm considers some of the implications of controlling robots. I use the idea of control to ask a different question about robots and AI more generally, in what follows the term robot will refer to robots and AI in general. Using the word control hints at agency. We talk of driving cars, operating machinery but of controlling ourselves, others, crowds and even our pets. If the things we control have agency then what and how we control them matters morally. Self-control is a virtue and controlling another competent adult a vice. Who we control matters for humans and what we are controlling matters for robots. The question this posting will consider is how can we know the nature of what we are controlling when considering robots.

 

If a robot is simply a tool then using a robot is an extension of our agency and when controlling a robot we are controlling our own agency. In this context controlling a robot raises questions as to how well we can understand our own agency which I won’t consider here. Can a robot have some sort if agency? I will assume here that for something to possess agency it must have some consciousness, some might disagree. If we accept the above then when considering controlling robots it is important to consider whether a robot can be conscious.

 

I am somewhat pessimistic about the chances that a robot might be conscious and certainly believe that none of today’s robots are. However most animals are material creatures and appear to be conscious and it seems possible that we might be able to construct other conscious material creatures such as robots. At the preent time we don’t understand what makes us conscious any better than Descartes did. It is possible that there are some things we can never know as shown by Turing’s halting problem, we shall return to Turin later/. The nature of consciousness might be one of these things. However most people seem to believe we might sometime be capable of understanding the nature of consciousness. If we can understand the nature of consciousness then it seems probable that we could create conscious robots and that my pessimism about doing so is unjustified. Of course such robots might be constructed from materials other than metal and silicon. If at some future date we ask how we should we control robots then we should first ask whether we are trying to control a conscious or unconscious robot. This question is matters morally. For instance how we should control and treat a sex robot would depend on whether it was conscious or not. Accepting this of course doesn’t mean how someone treats an unconscious sex robot doesn’t matter morally, see Inner Virtue . The rest of this posting will consider how we might tell       whether a robot is conscious or not.

 

Because we don’t have a theory of consciousness it is difficult to de design a test to decide if someone or something is conscious. If someone is in a coma we might simply prod her but this is unlikely to work with robots because of their construction. At this point someone might question whether we need such a test. He might point out that by the time such a test is needed that we might have a viable theory of conscious. In this scenario if we desire a conscious robot we simply build it in accordance with the theory.  I accept my objector’s point but in turn point out that we don’t have such a theory yet. Perhaps one way of building such a theory would be to attempt building a conscious robot In this scenario we would need a test for robot consciousness.  Because of these difficulties we might fall back on the Turing test. This basically involves having a conversation through a terminal with a robot and if we cannot tell the difference between this conversation and one with a person then we should assume that the robot is conscious. If we are going to apply the test them we assume that we can have a conversation with a robot. But must we accept this assumption? First someone with locked in syndrome suggests the possibility that a robot might be conscious but unable to communicate. However because we design and build robots I find such a scenario unlikely and won’t pursue it here. However there is another reason why a robot might be conscious and unable converse. According to Wittgenstein if a lion could speak we couldn’t understand him because of different ways of living. The same argument might be applied to robots. Robots might use language we can’t understand or inhabit a radically world. In response I would suggest that the worlds robots and we live in touch and that any creatures that live in worlds that touch can communicate to some degree, see if a lion could speak . Let us accept that we might use the Turing test as a test for robot consciousness. Unfortunately this isn’t a very reliable test as some unconscious bots seem able to pass it. How might we sharpen it up?

 

 

In the Turing test a person tries to decide if he is conversing with a machine or another person using a terminal and if he cannot then he assumes that he is talking to a person. Unfortunately human beings have a tendency to anthropomorphise things, for instance some might say it would be wrong to kick a robot dog. It follows that human beings might not be best placed to decide if a conversation is between two conscious creatures. Recently Edward Tian created an app that detects essays written by AI. This suggests that the Turing test might be amended as follows. A person would still have a conversation with another but the decision as to whether this conversation is between two conscious entities would be made by an AI program. I have previously argued that general or genuine AI must have a will, see emerging AI . Secondly the Turing test might be amended so the conversation with the unknown entity focusses on the will. To have a will any entity must care about something and perhaps the conversation should focus on what the unknown entity cares about. At this point it might be objected that what a robot cares about might be implanted and any will resulting from this implant isn’t genuine. In response I would argue that whilst a creatures is defined by what it cares about, whether it is conscious or not is determined by its reaction to this. Any creature in which what it cares about has been implanted isn’t authentic but it can still have a will and be conscious.  The Turing test might be amended so it probes what the unknown entity cares about and how it reactions to this in different situations. This amendment is interesting but I am doubt it would be useful at the present time in assessing conscious but it could be a useful tool for investigating the nature of consciousness. Lastly it might be suggested that a Turing test might not only be assessed by AI but be conducted by some AI system. Perhaps AI might find better questions than a human being. I would be reluctant to accept this suggestion for it might mean accepting an attribution of consciousness without any means of ascertaining the accuracy of the attrition.

 

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? First whilst how we collaborate with robots is an interesting question it raises two equally interesting potential questions. First what are we collaborating with and secondly how can we ascertain this. Both these questions may be illusory, probably are illusory, but if they are we need to be able show why. Trying to answer these questions is important for another reason it might shed some light in the nature of consciousness. It also highlights the problems of using the Turing test to answer these questions because if we accept that animals are conscious we cannot use a Turing test to ascertain this.

 

Ecological Refugees

 

Let us accept that global warming will lead to ecological damage and that in turn will lead to more refuges. In this posting I want to consider what sort of duties we have to ecological refugees that is those people who become refuges due to climate change. Initially my discussion will be a deontological one involving the right not to have one’s environment polluted by others and the duty to compensate for any such pollution we cause. My discussion will assume that we haven’t any duties to purely economic migrants or to refugees who have destroyed their own environment because we haven’t harmed them. Nonetheless some economic migrants, those whose poverty is caused by climate change can be regarded as ecological refugees.

I will now consider those people we have a duty to accept as refugee s. I suggested above that we don’t owe a duty to purely economic migrants. However some people might become poor due to global warming. For instance some farmers might be unable to reliably grow some traditional crops due to global warming caused by the western world making them poorer. We have harmed these people and as a result have a duties towards them but is one these duties the offer of refugee status? The answer to this question depends on how much damage we have causes and whether it can be rectified. For instance we might find that we can fulfil our duty in other ways than offering refugee status by genuine aid. Providing such aid shouldn’t be regarded as an easy option as it must reflect the views of the people we have harmed. Such aid isn’t charity. However we have a duty to offer refugee status to some people whose home has been destroyed, perhaps by a rise in sea level, or been made uninhabitable by desertification.

I now want to consider what is involved in offering refugee status. I have argued that we have a duty to offer refugee status to those whose homeland has been destroyed or made uninhabitable by global warming. However we also offer refugee status to some who suffer from persecution. Our duty to help those who are persecuted is less clear cut than that we owe to ecological refugees because we haven’t harmed them nonetheless we have a more general duty to aid humanity. Alternatively it is the virtuous thing to do, virtuous people or nations naturally help those who are persecuted. I will return to virtue with regard to ecological refugees later. Let us now consider the differences between what we should offer refugees fleeing from persecution and those damaged by global warming.

Let us accept that offering refugee status shouldn’t be simply an act of charity but should include a consideration of the refugee’s needs. Ecological refugees need a new home whilst those fleeing from persecution need sanctuary. These different needs can be satisfied in different ways. Those fleeing from persecution hope to return to their homelands and only need temporary refugee status and needn’t fully integrate with their hosts. They need support, this can be provided directly or by the right to work. They also might need education for their children but they don’t need the right to vote.

Let us accept that those fleeing from persecution or war need a temporary home and that those fleeing from ecological disaster need a permanent home. Let us also accept that if we partly created the disaster that we have a duty to aid them find a new home. Cara Nine agues that the Lockean proviso means a people who have their homeland destroyed, or made uninhabitable by climate change due to global warming have a theoretical right to a new homeland. She argues that other states have a duty to provide for this homeland by ceding part of their sovereign territory (1). I have previously argued that we don’t have a duty to cede territory for a homeland, see ecological refugees  but I accept we that we have a duty to assist ecological refugees find a new permanent home. In light of the above it would seem that we must accept that this home must be within our own society.

What is entailed if we accept that we have a duty to provide ecological refugees with a permanent home within our society? What must we offer and how will this change our existing society? Let us accept that in any just society that all competent adults should have equal rights. Afghanistan under the Taliban is an unjust society as women don’t have equal rights. Any society in which any group such as women are denied the rights of others is unjust. It follows if any host nation doesn’t offer ecological refuges the same rights as the rest of its population that it is an unjust nation. These rights include any rights others have to education and healthcare, an immediate right to work and the right to vote. Someone might object that these rights go too far and that they would radically change the host nation, health and education services might be overwhelmed and the right to vote might profoundly change the nature of the existing society. I have two responses to my objector. First I would suggest that the number of ecological refugees we need to offer a new permanent home to won’t be very large. Global warming will cause great ecological damage but it is doubtful if many places will be made completely uninhabitable by rises in sea level or desertification. If this is so and we make an effective effort to aid those we have harmed by global warming then the small number of ecological refugees won’t radically change the society of the host nation. However for the let us assume that the number will be large and that these numbers mean that society in the host nation will be radically changed. In order to alleviate these changes it might be argued that we should only offer limited rights to ecological refugees. I have two responses to the above. First if we only offer limited rights we will create an unjust society, any society which doesn’t offer full rights to all competent members is an unjust one. My objector might respond by arguing we only need provide sanctuary to ecological refugees and not full membership of our society. I would counter argue that we are not offering temporary nut permanent sanctuary and that permanent sanctuary must involve full members of our society. Indeed it might be argued that we shouldn’t offer ecological refugees refugee status but full membership of our society. Membership of society shouldn’t have to be earned but is owed for after all children don’t have to earn membership of the society they live in. My second responses is that the need to change our society to accommodate ecological refugees is not caused by the refugees but by the harm we have caused. The damage our lifestyle has caused creates the need to change our future lifestyle, our society. Lastly I would that if we adopt a deontological approach to our duties connected to climate change we must accept living in a more cosmopolitan society. 

In the light of the above my objector might suggest that we should adopt a caring approach to helping the victims of climate change rather than a rights based one. He might suggest that a caring approach is more natural and better suited to human beings than a deontological one. He might continue by suggesting that if we did so we don’t need to offer full rights to ecological refugees. With a deontological approach it is clear how much is required of us to compensate for the harm we caused. Unfortunately this isn’t true of a care based approach. How is the amount of caring required related to the degree of harm caused? If we offer ecological refugees only limited rights are we really caring? This difficultly might lead my objector to suggest adopting a virtue based approach. Once again he might point out that this is a more natural approach for human beings. It is by no means easy to apply virtue ethics to nations and societies but I will put this difficulty to one side. However even if we adopt a virtue ethics based approach towards  our duty to ecological refugees it is uncertain if doing so would satisfy my objector’s desire to lessen the rights of ecological refugees. Indeed it might increase the burden. I argued above that we don’t have a duty to aid those who have harmed themselves using a deontological approach but if we adopt a virtue ethics based approach then a virtuous person or nation might feel that they have a duty to act beneficently towards such people. Secondly justice is a prime virtue and a virtuous person must act justly. I argued above that if a society doesn’t offer all competent adults equal rights it is an unjust one. It follows that virtuous people and societies must offer ecological refugees living among them equal rights and that this includes the right to vote.

1. Cara Nine, 2010, Ecological Refugees, States Borders and the Lockean Proviso, Journal of Applied Philosophy; 27(4)

Stoics and Hope

 For many of us our hopes play an important part in our lives, try imagining a life without any hope. In this posting I want to examine four questions connected to hope.  First exactly what do we mean by hope?  Secondly why is hope valuable? Thirdly can a stoic hope? Intuitively I will suggest that hoping goes against stoic principles. I will then question whether the stoic idea of preferred indifferents might mean that I am mistaken. Lastly I will examine whether the idea of preferred indifferents is a meaningful one.

I will now outline a definition of hope. Intuitively someone hopes for some outcome if she desires that outcome even though this outcome is uncertain. In what follows I will make use of some of the ideas of Adrienne Martin (1). However Marin doesn’t believe hope can be accounted for by desire, in this posting I will argue that it can be provided that we understand desires correctly. Our intuitive definition seems to be an inadequate one, for instance does someone really hope for some outcome if she expects it? Does a spouse hope for a birthday present from a loving partner or simply expect it? With this in mind we might define hope as follows. 

Hoe 1.  Someone hopes for some outcome when she desires this outcome which has a low probability of being actualised. 

Unfortunately as pointed out by Martin such a desire might give rise to both hope and despair. Let us accept that emotions capture and focus our attention. If we accept this then then perhaps Martin is mistaken in believing our desires can’t account for hope. Using Martin’s example, let us consider two patients with advanced cancer who are offered a new treatment with a low probability of success. Each patient faces the same facts but the focus of each will determine whether they hope or despair. One might despairs because she focusses on probable bad outcome and the other hopes because he focusses on the low probability of a good outcome. This is a good point to make it clear how hope differs from simply wishing or being unrealistically optimistic. Hoping always involves being roughly aware of the probabilities. If someone simply wishes for some outcome then she pays no attention to the probabilities in much the same way as a bullshitter pays no attention to the truth. It might be suggested that whilst Panglossian optimism is harmful that realistic optimism can be beneficial by combatting passivity, see Tiberuus and Realistic Optimism sm . I won’t pursue this suggestion here.

 Let us now define hope as follows.

 ope 2.  If someone hopes then her desires focusses her attention mainly on some positive outcome which has a low probability of being actualises whilst being aware of the true probabilities.

However this definition seems to lack something. Hope doesn’t suddenly materialise out of a vacuum.  A pragmatic person who has never built up her hopes about anything in the past is unlikely to suddenly start hoping for some specific outcome. Hoping seems connected to being a hopeful person. The above definition might be refined as follows.

Hope 3,  If someone hopes then her desires focusses her attention mainly on some positive outcome which has a low probability of being actualises whilst being aware of the true probabilities and this desire is based on her character. .

Hope, like optimism, combats passivity. Some might argue all emotions combat passivity and that despair is mood rather than a genuine emotion. I won’t pursue this thought here. The hopeful person undertakes some sort of action, even if this is merely imagining a better future, whilst the despairing person simply does nothing. Why is combatting passivity valuable? Combatting passivity involves exercising the will and I will now argue that the exercise of the will has essentialist or intrinsic value for human beings.

How might exercising our will be valuable? The approach I will follow is based on that of Gwen Bradford (2). She introduces the idea of an essentialist value. If some capacity is essential to human beings then according to Bradford the exercise of this capacity is of value to human beings. One such capacity is the exercise of the will. It is tempting to equate essentialist value with intrinsic value. If we accept Bradford’s position then hope has essentialist value because it involves exercising the will.

Let us now consider why stoics believe hoping is harmful. Hope as I have defined it above is an emotion, it is possible to define hope in terms of ‘caring about’ or love, see What do we mean by Hope?  . I won’t pursue this further here. Let us accept that hope is an emotion. Stoics believe that we should avoid all emotions as far as possible because emotions harm us by making us vulnerable. But even if we accept that emotions harm us by making us vulnerable this alone doesn’t mean that we should avoid them. For instance a doctor might recommend surgery because it benefits a patient in the long term even if it harms her in the short term. It follows even if emotion harm us that this harm might be outweighed by some benefits. A stoic must be committed to one of two options. Either that emotions have no real value and don’t benefit us in any way or that any benefit emotions confer on us is always outweighed by the harm causes by making us vulnerable. It is difficult to accept the first option for almost everyone has some emotions and it seems unlikely that these would have evolved without benefiting us in some way. Most stoics seem to accept that emotions have some value because they accept the idea of preferred indifferents. For instance they accept that it is better to be happy rather than unhappy even if we shouldn’t pursue happiness. It would seem that most stoics must believe that the value of any emotion is always outweighed by the vulnerability it causes, but why?

Perhaps they believe this because they believe that we are essentially rational creatures rather than emotional ones. What reason might they give for this belief? They might suggest that having a will is essential to being a human being. Let us accept this. However a stoic must also believe that we only express our will through our rationality and that we simply experience emotions. A stoic seems committed to the idea that emotions serve no purpose. Unfortunately for their argument it seems highly unlikely that emotions evolved to serve no purpose. It follows that if emotions serve some purpose then they aren’t totally irrational. For instance in some circumstances it can make sense to be angry because anger might focus someone’s attention on righting a wrong. It follows that even if we accept that we are essentially rational creatures that we don’t have reason to ignore our emotions. Emotions are connected to our rationality. Indeed it might be argued that a failure to attend to our emotions is itself irrational. At this point a stoic might modify her argument and suggest that not only are human beings rational but that they are also free to some degree. A stoic holds this view because she believes that even if we aren’t free to choose our fate we are always free to choose our attitude towards it. She might then argue even if emotions are rational that they deny our freedom by making us slaves to our passions. I would reject such an argument. I accept that we might become a slave to my age but my anger can be controlled and modified. For instance we might choose to retain our anger if an apology isn’t forthcoming and dismiss it if one is. It follows that we aren’t just slaves to our passions and that by controlling the emotions appropriate to us in different situations we shape ourselves. Human beings aren’t robots which act solely rationally without reference to emotions. Acting like a robot denies our nature. If we accept the above then stoics are mistaken in denying the importance of the emotions. Emotions, including hope, matter because they are part of our essential nature.

At this point a stoic might suggest that my treatment of emotions is too simple. She might further suggest that I should differentiate between experiencing an emotion and desiring one. She might move on to suggest that of course stoics prefer experience being happy but that they shouldn’t desire being happy. They believe that the pursuit of happiness makes us vulnerable and usually makes us unhappy and as a result we should remain indifferent to pursuing it. This is a very rough outline of the stoic idea of preferred indifferents. In response I would question whether it is possible to simply experience an emotion. If someone is in an affective state and this state creates no desire, either to avoid or maintain it, then I would suggest that she is experiencing a mood rather than an emotion. I would suggest that whilst there might be a grey area between emotions and moods that we can usually differentiate between the two. We can simply experience a mood because it serves no purpose, the same isn’t true of emotions. I argued above that it can be rational to experience some emotion which means emotions have some purpose. It follows that if an emotion serve some purpose that it is either illogical or impossible to remain indifferent towards them and simply experience them. It further follows that the idea of preferred indifferents makes no sense because it is impossible simply to experience an emotion.

In conclusion it appears to me that stoicism has a distorted notion of the emotions and that this distorted notion leads them to downplay emotions such as love and hope which have essentialist value to human beings. It might be concluded that stoicism hinders someone from living up to her full potential.

1.   Martin, Adrienne. 2014, How We Hope: A Moral Psychology, Princeton University Press.

2.   Gwen Bradford, 2015, Achievement, Oxford University Press

Angela's Wedding, Human Enhancement

 

It is the first of May in 2122 and Angela and Ian are getting married on another warm sunny day in Ullapool. A century ago Ullapool was a cold place and marriage seemed to be in terminal decline in the Western world with fewer and fewer bothered to get married. Times have changed. A century ago most couples who married in the West married did so for love, couples fell in love and as a consewuencet got married. Love still matters but now it is of secondary importance now and usually only blossoms after marriage rather than before as it did a century ago. Marriage has fallen in line with  Asian customs. Nowadays marriage is a practical matter and needs a marriage arranger. This change in the way people marry came about shortly after pharmacological and genetic enhancement were banned because of the damage they might do to society. However many parents still wanted to give their children a goof start in life. In order to do so many parents like Angela and Ian have replaced natural selection with conscious rational selection,

Angela decided to marry not because she needed to be loved but because she wanted to have children. A century ago she might have satisfied her desire for parenthood by simply finding a suitable man or sperm donor and raising the child together or by herself. Angela is a clever woman who had clever parents and wants to have clever children as she believes that this will give them a good start in life. In order to help her achieve this desire she employed a marriage arranger called Alex who suggested suitable partners. Ian also employed Alex and he also wanted clever children. Alex takes her profession seriously. First Angela had to submit an advanced CV called a PCV. Next she interviewed Angela to get a clear idea of Angela’s preferences for any future children. Together they gave weights to these preferences and then Alex used AI to suggest suitable matches. She did the same thing with all her clients including Ian. Alex had sent details of Ian and Angela to each other and suggested that they meet. Shortly after Christmas they did so. After a few more meetings Angela and Ian decided to marry and have children. In March they settled the practical details of living together and signed a pre-nuptial agreement. Perhaps such a scenario is unlikely to come about but it isn’t implausible but it might even be argued that the class system is a primitive form of enhancement. I now want to examine its philosophical implications of the above.

For the sake of arguments let us assume that this scenario creates three main breeding groups. Angela’s group values intelligence, a second values physical and sporting prowess and lastly the traditional group who don’t prioritise any particular attributes, who still marry for love and don’t use marriage arranger. These groups aren’t races but might be classes as breeding groups of humans who mostly breed among themselves. Of course these breeding groups can interbreed but in most cases they don’t. However in a limited number of cases marriage arrangers such as Alex might recommend couples choose a partner from outside their own group in order to introduce hybrid vigour. The society which has been created seems to be a naturally created analogue of the one envisioned by Plato in his Republic. Few people would welcome such a society and this was the main reason why pharmacological and genetic enhancement were banned. At this point it might be objected that such a change in society is highly unlikely and that I have exaggerated the effectiveness of selected breeding. In response I would suggest that the Russian silver fox domestication experiment lead by Dimitry Belyayev showed that selective breeding can bring about large changes in a relatively short time, see  fox experiment . What are the consequences of accepting the above as a plausible, even if unlikely, future scenario?

First because such a scenario seems unpalatable to us because it seems to regard people as breeding animals we might take steps to prevent it occurring. Of course we are breeding animals and conscious rational selection would not make us into purely breeding animals. The breeders and those breeding are the same. Nonetheless such a scenario still seems an unpalatable one and steps might still be taken to prevent it from occurring. Unfortunately these steps would have to include measures limiting people’s ability to have children with whomsoever they please. Steps would have to be taken to control what happens in the privacy of people’s bedrooms. Such measures might be possible in a totalitarian society, China had a one child policy, but such measures would be impossible in a free society. It follows if we value our right to reproduce by natural means with anyone we choose to do so, with exception of incestuous relationships, that we must accept the possibility of the unpalatable scenario even if this is only because it is the less unpalatable option.

If we accept that enhancement could take place naturally by conscious rational selection then even if we ban pharmacological and genetic methods then perhaps we should question whether we should introduce such a ban in the first place. Such a ban would fail to fully address the problems it was meant to solve. It might be argued such a ban would delay the process giving us more time to consider how we might better mitigate some of its worst consequences for society. Perhaps but banning artificial enhancement doesn’t prevent enhancement by other means and I would suggest our energies would be better employed in regulating artificial enhancement so it takes place in a safe way. Perhaps for instance we should always take steps to enhance empathy in conjunction with any other enhancement. Perhaps also some of the harms of enhancement, which ever way they are caused, might be outweighed by some of the benefits. For instance those who are enhanced might have better health and be more able to control their destiny better.

If the unpalatable scenario came into existence one bad consequence would be that equality of opportunity might seem to be impossible. Perhaps if we accept that equality of opportunity doesn’t occur now and won’t occur in the future then we should be less concerned and concentrate on other goods. For instance we might concentrate on protecting personal autonomy and toleration. Some might argue that if we make artificial enhancement available to all that my worry about enhancement damaging equal opportunity is unfounded. Enhancement might actually increase equal opportunity.

Lastly I want to consider a much more fanciful consequence of enhancement which like climate change pose an existential threat to humanity. In the ‘Time Machine’ H G Wells envisions humanity evolving into two distinct species the Eloi and the Morlocks by natural selection. It is important to note that these are species who can’t interbreed rather than races. Might in the far distant future enhancement by artificial means or conscious rational selection lead to human speciation? Two enhanced species competing for control might pose an existential threat to humanity.

I have argued that in a free society that human enhancement is inevitable. If we accept this then instead of thinking about banning enhancement we should consider how we might mitigate some of its worst effects.

Cholbi and Grief

 

In his book on grief (1) Michael Cholbi argues that in the long term it is good to grieve. He concludes that grief serves a useful purpose. This is an excellent book and I recommend it to anyone interested in the topic. In this posting I will outline Cholbi’s arguments before moving on to offer an alternative as to why it is good to be able to grieve.

Cholbi argues that grief is paradoxical. He points out that grieving is painful and even harms us for no apparent benefit yet we would recommend others0 to grieve. Surgery hurts us but in the long term benefits us but the same doesn’t appear to be true of grief. Cholbi uses two examples to make his point. First he considers C S Lewis who terribly tormented by the death of his wife Joy. He then considers a fictional example. He considers Meursault in the book ‘The Stranger’ by Camus who remains completely emotionally indifferent to the death of his mother. Cholbi argues that the paradox of grief arises because we want to recommend Lewis’ torment rather than Meursault’s indifference whilst apparently having no reasons to do so. A Stoic might argue that we don’t have any reasons and commend Meursault’s indifference.

I will now outline Chobi’s reason for recommending Lewis’ torment before moving on to offer an alternative explanation. He points out that grief is a collection of negative emotions on the death of another. However this other can’t be anyone it must be someone who is close to us. Following Korsgaard he argues that those who are close to us help form our practical identity. It follows that the death of someone close to us damages our practical identity. Moods might be purposeless but emotions aren’t. Let us accept that purpose of emotions is to hold our attention on something important, see for instance Michael Brady. (2) Cholbi argues that the purpose of grief is to hold our attention on reshaping our relationship with the deceased and that this also involves reshaping our practical identity. He suggests that the grieving person needn’t be consciously aware of the purpose of his grief.

I agree with Cholbi that our practical identity is connected to grief. What we love is connected to our practical identity and I will now argue that grief is an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love. Before proceeding I must make it clear what I mean by love. To love doesn’t simply mean romantic love but to care about something as defined by Harry Frankfurt. According to Frankfurt love isn’t simply an emotion but a matter of the will. There seem to be three important features of ‘caring about’ or love so defined. First love makes the lover vulnerable to the fortune and fate of the loved one. If I appear to love someone or something and it is harmed and I remain indifferent, as Meursault did, then my love isn’t real. Secondly love must have persistence. IF I appear to love someone or something and five minutes later become indifferent to its fate thenonce again my love isn’t real. Of course love may fade over time, it needn’t be permanent, but it must have some persistence. Lastly love must motivate action. If I appear to love something but fail to act to prevent harm to the loved one when it is in my power to do so then once again my love isn’t real.

I now want to argue that our personal or practical identity can be defined by what we love. Someone whose actions are only guided by his emotions might be classed as a wanton because his life has no direction due to emotions having no persistence. Such a person doesn’t have a practical identity. If someone’s has a practical identity, rather than being a wanton, then his life must have some consistency and if this consistency cannot be achieved by his emotions then this might be done by his values or ideals. Our ideals and values have persistence, compel us to act and when our ideals are damaged we are damaged. It follows our values are determined by what we love or ‘care about’ and if our practical is defined by our ideals and values then our practical identity is defined by what we love.

If we accept this concept of practical identity then the paradox of grief disappears. Let us recall that the paradox of grief contends that grief is painful and even harms us for no apparent benefit yet we would recommend it to others in the right circumstances. Cholbi resolves the paradox by arguing that grief does have a purpose and it benefits us. However if we accept Frankfurt’s ideas on practical identity then if we love someone who dies we are harmed and this harm persists because of love’s persistence. If someone we love dies then grief is inevitable and it makes no sense to recommend the inevitable. The late Queen Elizabeth was right when she said grief is the price we pay for love. The paradox of grief is an illusion.

There are differences in our attitude to grief depending on whether we see grief as having a purpose or being an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love. Cholbi uses a thought experiment to illustrate the paradox. He imagines a situation in which a pill, which is completely safe to use becomes available, which takes away our grief. He argues that we shouldn’t take the pill as grief serves a useful purpose. However if grief is an unwanted side effect of our capacity to love we should. Caution is needed here. If such a pill only took away our grief then we should take it but if it also damaged our capacity to love we shouldn’t. Damaging our capacity to love would harm us. It is good to be the sort of person with a disposition to love even if this means we will sometimes grief and that this grieving will harm us. It seems possible to me that seeking to limit their capacity to grieve stoics limit their disposition to love, see Why I'm not a Stoic

I now want to briefly consider some of the consequences of accepting that grief is simply an unwanted consequence of our disposition to love. It seems if we accept this account then because we can love a great variety of things that we must also be able to grieve for a great variety of things and that some of these things aren’t persons or even living. Someone might love other people, dogs, a way of life and even a landscape or particular building. Does it make sense to say we can grieve for the last  things? Old people who live alone can become very attached to dogs and it is sensible to say that they grieve on their loss. It also seems to say someone can grief for a lost way of life, perhaps a new city dweller night grieve for his former existence. Lastly in some circumstances it makes sense to say someone can grieve for a building, perhaps the Dean of some ancient cathedral might grieve for it if it was burnt down. If we accept that we can grieve for a wide variety of things then this suggests grief is connected to love.

In the light of the above we might ask whether only humans can grieve. Can some animals grieve? Some might suggest a dog can grieve for their deceased owner and elephants appear to grieve for a dead herd member. Whether animals can experience a primitive form of grief or just exhibit grief like behaviour is an interesting question but the answer to it gives us some pointers to the nature of grief. Let us assume that no animal has a practical self. It follows if animals can grieve that the purpose of grief cannot solely be to reshape our practical identity.

I have argued that grief is an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love. I now want to row back a bit. Let us accept that grief is an unwanted consequence of our capacity to love and that it is unavoidable. Let us also agree with Cholbi that grief is connected to our practical identity. However I will still maintain that we cannot recommend grief to others. Let us further accept that most human beings ‘care about’ or love many things and that when we act we must be able to prioritise or rank these things, if we couldn’t our lives would be lives of inaction or chaos. Lastly let us also accept the things we love, ‘care about’, together with how we prioritise these things shapes our practical identity.  If we lose one of the things we love we should try to reshape our practical identity to reflect the change in reality. The bundle of emotions we experience during grief unconsciously draws out attention to the need to reshape our relationship with the deceases and our identity. These emotions are unavoidable and a failure to grieve involves a failure to love in the first place. Let us return to Camus’ Meursault. Meursault failed to grieve for his mother because he didn’t love her. Moreover it would be pointless suggesting to Meursault that he should grieve for his mother as this would require him coming to love her. People can’t simply come to love someone or something because they want to especially in retrospect. Coming to love is a natural process and cannot be willed. It follows that we have no reason to recommend grief to others and that the paradox of grief is an illusion. Nonetheless even if we have no reason to recommend grief to others we do have a reason to recommend that they lead a life which makes grief inevitable in the appropriate circumstances.

Even if the above is interesting does it have any practical consequences? First I would that grief counsellor’s should help the bereaved slowly overcome their grief by helping them reshape their identity. They should focus on how the changed relationship between the deceased and the bereaved requires that the latter needs to reshape her relationship with the deceased and by doing so her practical identity. Secondly it suggests that a stoic by seeking to eliminate her grief deprives herself of a useful tool which helps her maintain her focus on the need to reshape her practical identity. A reason to be wary of fully blown stoicism, see why I'm not a stoic . Lastly and somewhat controversially becausr people with autism have problems with empathy do they also have problems with grief?

 

 

1.Michael Cholbi, 2022, Grief: A Philosophical Guide, Harvad University Press.

2.  Michael Brady, 2016,Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford University Press.

Is Loyalty an Outdated Virtue?

 

We automatically assume loyalty matters and is a virtue. In this posting I will question this automatic assumption and will argue even if this true in the past it might not hold now. I have previously argued tact isn’t. Talk of loyalty comes easily to most of us but ease of use doesn’t make the assumption true. In practice we can only be loyal to certain kind of things. For instance it makes no sense to talk of being loyal to the humanity or being a loyal parent, parents are meant to be loyal naturally. I will argue that if we consider the sort of things we can loyal to then being a loyal x isn’t a useful term and in some contexts loyalty can be a vice rather than a virtue.

Let us accept that if someone has some virtue then she has a disposition to usually act in a way which helps her or others flourish, courage helps her and justice helps others. This is an incomplete definition but will serve our purposes here. Intuitively it seems to make sense to talk about a loyal friend. I will start by considering whether loyalty is a virtue by considering how loyalty and friendship are connected. Before doing so I must define loyalty and friendship. Loyalty can be roughly defined as a commitment to help someone or some cause achieve their aims. Friendship is more complicated. Basically friends care about each other but they do so for different reasons. According to Aristotle there are three types of friends. Friends who care about each other for erotic reasons, friends who care about each other because they are useful to each other and friends who care because they share aims and values. Friends of utility and those who share erotic purpose are fair weather friends and I will only consider the last sort as real friends. Friends share values and are committed to furthering their common aims, if they weren’t then these wouldn’t be aims or values. It should be noted that using this definition some people can be good friends even if they share bad values and have evil aims. Nazis can be friends. A good friend is someone is some who is good at furthering his friend’s aims. A loyal friend is one who is committed to furthering his friend’s aims. If we accept the above then adding the term loyal to f friend serves no useful purpose because friends by definition seek to further each other’s aims whenever possible. Adding loyalty to friendship does no work. A loyal friend is just a good friend. I would suggest that the same applies if we add loyalty to colleagues, team mates and causes. Colleagues and team mates have common aims which they seek to further whilst it would be nonsensical to say someone serves a cause if she doesn’t seek to further the aims of the cause. It might be concluded that in many contexts attaching ‘loyalty’ to someone does no useful work and is simply rhetoric and shouldn’t be considered as a virtue.   

I now want to consider some objections to the above conclusion. First an objector might argue that my definition of loyalty is an inadequate one. My definition focusses on the loyal person sharing the values and furthering the aims of the person or cause she is being loyal to. My objector might argue that these aims and values are the sub focus of loyalty and that the real focus should be on the person or cause involved. The aims and values only matter because they are the aims and values of the person or cause. I am reluctant to accept this conclusion for two reasons. First whilst it is possible to simply respect and accept human beings without referring to any aims and values this isn’t true of feeling positive affect for a person. Feelings of love, admiration and loyalty would seem to depend on the character of the person involved, on her aims and values. Even a Jane Austen heroine doesn’t admire her beloved simply because of his good looks and wealth, even if these help, she falls in love because of his values and sense of honour. It follows that we cannot be loyal to someone without reference to her aims and values.

Another argument can be used to counter my objector’s contention that we can be loyal to someone without reference to her aims and values. Even if this were possible we might question how we acquired our initial loyalty to someone or some cause, surely we must have had some reason to do so. Surely loyalty doesn’t just spring fully formed from thin air. We acquire loyalty because we admire a person or cause, loyalty based on admiration of someone’s beauty or the popularity of some cause would seem to be a shallow sort. Admittedly such loyalty is unconnected to aims and values but it gives no reason to further these. I would suggest that we can only acquire loyalty by admiring aims and values. I would argue that when we become friends, team mates or support a cause that we do so because of the aims and values and saying someone is a loyal friend or is loyal to a cause adds nothing and serves no useful purpose. At this point my objector might accept that aims and values matter in becoming loyal but continue to insist that loyalty is a meaningful idea. She might suggest that my defining of loyalty fails to consider persistence. Someone might become loyal to someone else because of his aims and values but even if his or the other’s aims and values change loyalty persists to a person or cause. She might suggest that it makes sense to talk about being a loyal friend because of the former congruence of aims and values. Once again I am reluctant to accept this objection. True friends share aims and values and once they cease to do so friendship dies as does the suggestion that loyalty can be based on persistence even if persistence matters. Political parties often demand loyalty when times are hard if the times are hard due to poor decision making or incompetence loyalty becomes an excuse for dishonesty.

At this point my objector might raise another argument against my contention that loyalty isn’t a virtue. She might argue that loyalty has a much broader domain than the one I’ve suggested. She might argue that we can be loyal to entities which don’t have particular any aims or values. Entities such as families, tribes and football teams. However being loyal to an entity without any aims isn’t always virtuous. A racist might be loyal to his race and a misogynist to the patriarchy. Such loyalty is a vice rather than a virtue. Nonetheless are there some things without any aims for which being loyal to is a virtue? Perhaps, I admit that the way I’ve used the term loyalty is incomplete.  Let us accept that it matters when we are loyal as well as how we are loyal. Being loyal in easy times is easy and doesn’t matter much. Perhaps loyalty only matters in hard times. It also matters why times are hard. For instance shielding a family member who is a killer isn’t acting virtuously.  Perhaps also being loyal to such entities requires a narrowing of our domain of moral concern. In the twenty first century do we really want loyal to a class or tribe, class traitor would seem to be an outdated idea. In conclusion I would suggest that in most cases using the term loyalty does no useful work because loyalty is already baked into the concept. A loyal friend is just a friend. Friendship incorporates the same characteristics as loyalty. Perhaps loyalty was an important virtue in ancient times but its importance has dwindled as our moral domain has expanded and  we can't restore its former importance without restricting this domain  again something I would be reluctant to contemplate.

Afterthoughts. loyalty is vital to tribes, clans and monarchies if l loyalty is outdated are these outdated? it might be objected that loyalty remains essential to families. loyalty to a murderer, rapist or even a liar?