Sunday 29 November 2015

Terrorism, Love and Delusion


In this posting I want to examine terrorism. As a philosopher rather than a psychologist I won’t examine the means by which potential terrorists might become radicalised, instead I will examine one of the conditions which might make some people might susceptible to radicalisation. Terrorists are sometimes seen as idealists, albeit with warped ideals. I will argue that ideals are vital to us as persons and that if someone lacks ideals that this lack creates a condition in which she becomes susceptible to radicalisation.

Usually the ideals that are important to a terrorist are grand political ideals. I’m interested in the time before she acquires such grand ideals, I’m more interested in the mundane ideals that shape people’s everyday lives. I want to link ideals mundane or otherwise to what someone loves. I will assume, as Harry Frankfurt does, that someone who loves nothing at all has no ideals (1). An ideal is something someone finds hard to betray and as a result limits her will. Love also limits the will. Love need not be grand romantic love but can sometimes simply be seen as ‘caring about’ something in a way that limits the carer’s will. I would suggest if someone loves something this something forms a sort of ideal for her as she must try to ensure the thing she loves is benefited and not harmed. If this wasn’t so she would remain indifferent to her supposed beloved rather than loving it. It is impossible for someone to be indifferent to her ideals. However accepting the above doesn’t mean that ideals have to be grand ideals, indeed someone’s ideals can be quite modest.
I now want to argue that ideals, as defined by what we love above, are essential to us as persons. According to Frankfurt someone without ideals,

“can make whatever decision he likes and shape his will as he pleases. This does not mean that his will is free. It only means that his will is anarchic, moved by mere impulse and inclination. For a person without ideals, there are no volitional laws he has bound himself to respect and to which he unconditionally submits. He has no inviolable boundaries. Thus he is amorphous with no fixed shape or identity.” (2)
Let us accept that ideals are essential to us as persons and I would suggest that someone without ideals has a sense of simply being. I would further suggest that this sense of simply being, simply existing, is one that most people would find unbearable. According to Christine Korsgaard human beings by their very nature are condemned to choosing (3). Someone without ideals has no basis on which to choose and as Frankfurt points out is ruled by impulse and inclination. It seems the combination of the need to choose even if that choice is an unconscious one and the lack of a basis for that choice is what makes simply being, simply existing, unbearable.
If one accepts the above then the need to love something, have ideals, expresses a quite primitive urge for psychic survival. I would suggest that in some cases this need to love something creates the conditions which makes some people vulnerable to radicalisation. Of course this need to love something might be met in other ways, perhaps even perhaps in such mundane ways such as keeping a pet. However the young, perhaps especially young men, want to feel important and perhaps this feeling causes them to prefer grand rather than mundane means in order to satisfy this need. In some cases the combination of the need to love and feel important creates the conditions in which some people become especially vulnerable to radicalisation.
I now want to argue that choosing to be a terrorist in order to satisfy the primitive urge to love something is a form of self-delusion. It is a self-delusion due to the nature of love. Love is not simply a matter choosing to love. According to Frankfurt, “love is a concern for the well-being or flourishing of a beloved object – a concern that is more or less volitionally constrained so that it is not a matter of entirely free choice or under full voluntary control, and that is more or less disinterested.” (4) Now if we accept Frankfurt’s position then when someone chooses to become a terrorist in order to satisfy her urge to love something she is deluding herself for two reasons. Firstly, love is not a matter of choice and it is impossible for someone to choose to love in order to satisfy this need. Secondly she is not really choosing a cause because she cares passionately about it but rather she is choosing in order to satisfy her need to love something. She is choosing to relieve her unbearable feeling of just existing.
It might be objected that I am exaggerating the importance of the need to love and underestimating the need to feel important. I will now argue even if this is so, which I don’t accept, that some of the same considerations apply. To terrorists the feeling of importance is connected to violent action. Terrorists want to be considered as heroes by some people. I have previously defined a hero as someone who chooses to recognisably benefit someone else or society in ways most people could not, in addition her actions must be beyond the call of duty and must involve some real sacrifice on her part, see Hobbs and Heroes . Now what motivates a true hero is a need to benefit someone else or society, it is not to satisfy some need to be seen as a hero. Some who pushes someone into a river in order to rescue them certainly isn’t a hero. Someone might choose to become a hero but if the motivation for her actions is a desire to be a hero then she is deluding herself about her actions even if this desire is an unconscious one because no real sacrifice is involved. Indeed it is even possible to argue that someone who resists her desires to be seen as heroic might be better seen as a hero even if a minor one.

Let us accept that it is important to understand how people become radicalised and the conditions which make this radicalisation possible. One of the conditions which makes some people susceptible to radicalisation is a sense of simply being, simply existing, due to a lack of ideals. Other conditions may play a part but what might be done to alleviate this lack of ideals? Unfortunately there seem to no easy or quick solutions because real ideals must be acquired rather than given. In spite of these difficulties I will offer some rather tentative solutions. Firstly good parenting; good parenting should always involve love. Some deprived and inarticulate parents find it hard to give or to express their love even if they are excellent parents in other ways. Some parenting skills can be taught but loving can’t. It follows we should encourage social conditions conducive to the emergence of love. Perhaps also we should actively encourage policies that promote happiness, see action for happiness . Secondly education must be more broadly based. Education should not only be focussed on the skills valued by employers but also on the skills that help all pupils to flourish. For instance the skills needed in sport and music should not be considered to be on the educational periphery. Education should be broad enough so that all have the opportunity to acquire skills to enable them to be good at something rather just acquire skills that are good for employment. Even if terrorism can be defeated by other means or collapses due its inherently stupid doctrines the solutions outlined above would remain useful in building a more cohesive society. 

  1. Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 114.
  2. Frankfurt, page 114.
  3. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 1.
  4. Frankfurt, page 165.



Wednesday 11 November 2015

Autonomy and Beneficence Revisited


I have previously argued that if someone asks me to buy him cigarettes and I was not going to be significantly inconvenienced that I have reason to do so. I assumed that he was an adult fully aware of the dangers of smoking. I am a non-smoker and believe smoking is harmful. However I also believe in giving precedence to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. Recently a posting by Michael Cook in bioedge has caused me to question my position. Cook considers the case of a North Carolina woman called Jewel Shuping. Ms Shuping wasn’t born blind but was convinced that she was meant to be blind.  According to her doctors she had Body Integrity Identity Disorder. A psychologist gave her some counselling and after this failed gave her some eye-numbing drops before washing her pupils with drain cleaner. Cook asks was the psychologist right to destroy his patient’s eyesight even if she freely requested him to do so and was happy with the result of this treatment? The case of Shuping is an extreme one, however let us assume I am a carer for someone who becomes housebound and unable to buy the cigarettes he had previously enjoyed. Let us further assume that I buy these for him for a number of years and that eventually he develops lung cancer. In this situation am I partly to blame for his condition or have I only been respecting his autonomy? In this posting I want to examine the way in which we should respect someone’s autonomy. This examination is important for as Cook points out it has wider implications in difficult contexts for informed consent such as gender reassignment surgery and euthanasia.

Why did I argue that if it didn’t inconvenience me that I should buy a smoker a packet of cigarettes when he asked me provided he was an adult and fully aware of the dangers involved? I argued by doing so I was respecting his autonomy. Most people would object that my buying someone cigarettes has nothing to do with respecting autonomy. Respecting someone’s autonomy to most people simply means not interfering with someone doing something he cares about provided that by so doing he doesn’t harm others. If this is all it means to respect autonomy then respecting a smoker’s autonomy gives me no reason to buy him cigarettes when he asks me to do so. Let us accept informed consent is based on respect for patient autonomy. It then also follows that Shuping’s informed consent gave her psychologist no reason to acquiesce to her wishes. He might of course thought he was acting beneficently.

I now want to argue that the account of autonomy outlined above is an incomplete one. I will argue that a more complete account means that someone’s autonomous wishes must carry some weight for me. Let us suppose someone asks me to do him a favour and that doing so would not significantly inconvenience me. If I respect him I must feel it would be better to satisfy these wishes, provided by doing so I do no harm. If this was not so I would be indifferent towards him. Being indifferent to someone is not compatible with showing respect. At this point it might be argued that satisfying someone’s wishes has more to do with acting beneficently towards him than respecting his autonomy. However I would reject such an argument. I can act beneficently towards my dog by satisfying his needs but this doesn’t mean I respect him. I may of course love my dog but love differs from respect. Respecting someone as a person means accepting him as the sort of creature that can determine his own future. Respecting someone as a person means accepting what he determines to be his wishes must have some sort of weight for me. If I see someone as the sort of creature who can determine his own future but give no weight to his wishes then I am indifferent towards him rather than respectful. It does not of course automatically follow on from giving weight to his wishes that I have to satisfy them. Doing so might may harm others or cause me significant inconvenience. However it does follow that if I respect someone as a person and can satisfy those of his wishes which do no harm others without any significant inconvenience that I have reason do so. It further follows a more complete account of autonomy requires satisfying someone’s autonomous wishes provided these wishes do no harm to others or cause significant inconvenience.

Let us accept this more complete account of autonomy. If we accept that informed consent is based on respect for autonomy then I would suggest Shuping’s psychologist did have reason to acquiesce to her demands. It might be objected even if Shuping’s desire did have some weight him that her psychologist should not have acted as he did due the harm caused. Cook poses the question,

“Was the psychologist right to destroy his patient’s eyesight if she freely requested it, was happy with the treatment, and was living in psychological torment because she could see.”

Let us assume that Shuping would have been satisfied if the psychologist had blinded her but that he didn’t do so. Perhaps he believed his refusal to act was in her best interests. However if he did this he might be accused of epistemic arrogance. Moreover he might be accused of failing to respect her autonomy because he is failing to see her as the sort of creature who could make her own decisions. If the above is accepted then when respecting someone else’s autonomy requires that ‘the doing no harm condition’ should be replaced by ‘doing no harm on balance’. At this point it might be objected that such a concept of autonomy is far too demanding as people cannot always decide what on balance does no harm and we should retain the simpler condition of doing no harm.

I now want to argue we should accept the condition of ‘doing no harm on balance’. Let us assume that embedded within our thicker account of respecting autonomy is the simpler Millian account. Let us assume our smoker makes an autonomous decision to buy cigarettes. It follows that if I respect his autonomy that I should not act to stop him buying cigarettes by hiding his wallet according to the Millian account. Now let us now assume that he has broken his leg and that it would not inconvenience me to buy him the cigarettes. However I believe the cigarettes will cause him harm and refuse. In both scenarios I can prevent this harm by refusing to buy cigarettes when he has broken his leg and by hiding his wallet when he hasn’t. In both of these scenarios the outcome doesn’t change. If I hide someone’s wallet then I am acting to block him from exercising his autonomy. And if I refuse to buy him cigarettes I am omitting to act. A discussion of autonomy is an unusual place for the act’s/omissions controversy to occur. Does the difference between acts and omissions apply in this context? Indeed is there any real difference between acts and omissions in practical deliberation, see Julian Savulescu’s posting in practicalethics . In both of the above scenarios we are aware of the effects of our choice of behaviour. Christine Korsgaard argues that “choosing not to act makes not acting a kind of acting, makes it something that you do.” (1) I would suggest provided Korsgaard is correct then if someone chooses to act or chooses to omit to act that there is no meaningful difference between acts and omissions. It is still possible that acts and omissions might differ provided ones actions are ones he is fully conscious of and are omissions are unconscious choices. However is such a difference one between acts and omissions or a difference between degrees of consciousness concerning our behaviour? The above suggests to me that when it comes to respecting autonomy there is no meaningful difference between acts and omissions. It follows if I believe smoking will harm the smoker but refrain from hiding his wallet but refuse to buy him cigarettes I am acting inconsistently.


What conclusions can be drawn from the above? Firstly that a purely Millian account of autonomy is an incomplete account. A more complete account means that respecting someone’s autonomy requires that one must sometimes act beneficently towards him by attempting to satisfy his desires provided so doing does not harm him on balance and does not cause significant inconvenience. Autonomy and some forms of beneficence are linked. Of course I accept that someone might have other reasons to act beneficently which are independent of respecting autonomy. Secondly it follows I should buy the smoker his cigarettes. Lastly it would seem Shuping’s psychologist acted correctly. I am somewhat reluctant to accept this conclusion. Perhaps in cases in which the stakes are so high there must be some doubt as to whether one is in fact causing no harm on balance and the precautionary principle should be applied. Nonetheless in spite of my reluctance I am forced to conclude that provided he was sure he was causing no harm that on balance Shuping’s psychologist was acting correctly.

  1. Christine Korsgaard, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford University Press, page 1.


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