Julian Savulescu argues in a posting in Practical Ethics that “performance enhancement is not against the spirit of cycling; it is the spirit cycling” he goes on to suggest that “we should focus on monitoring the athletes’ health rather than on losing a war on doping”, see Practical Ethics. In this posting I will argue performance enhancement is against the spirit of sport and because cycling is a sport it is against the spirit of cycling. At first hand it might appear that this will be a difficult task for me as I have previously argued that there is nothing wrong with taking cognition enhancing drugs subject to certain safeguards, see cognitive enhancement . I still stand by this position. In addition I would also support the use moral enhancing drugs, once again subject to suitable safeguards. In must be noted drug enhancement is usually not as straightforward as it sometimes seems initially and adequate safeguards are extremely important; for instance nasal sprays containing oxytocin may not be as effective as first thought and in some circumstances may even be counter productive.
Let us assume certain cognitive enhancing or moral enhancement drugs are as safe as any of the drugs used in medical practice, if this is so I see no reason why someone should not take these enhancement drugs. Prima facie enhancing someone’s cognitive abilities or her capacity to feel empathy will not damage her as a person. Moreover if any enhancement drug is as safe as those used in medical practice and reasonably cheap I can see no reason why this drug should give someone an unfair advantage over others. I will not pursue the argument here. Of course in this situation cognitive enhancing or moral enhancing drugs will have to be tested and approved by some appropriate authority just as the drugs used in medical practice are now. Savulescu, as I read him, believes the above should also apply to cycling. The cycling authorities rather than testing cyclists for drugs should test drugs for cyclists in order to ensure these drugs are safe for cyclists to take. Whether cyclists take advantage of these drugs would be up to them.
Before proceeding with my argument I must make it clear the type of sport which concerns me. My argument will not concern non-competitive sports, for in these sports there seems no spirit to contravene. For instance, if someone is a lone cyclist who cycles either because she simply enjoys it or to keep fit then she is of no concern to me here. If such a cyclist takes performance enhancing drugs in order to cycle faster or further then I see no reason why she should not do so provided these drugs are safe. I hasten to add as a lone cyclist myself I personally can see no good reason to go faster or further than I am normally capable of. My argument is limited solely to competitive sports.
I want to argue that all competitive sports incorporate the ideal of fairness. A cycle race, in which only one competitor was permitted to take enhancing drugs whilst the other riders were forbidden to do so by the cycling authorities and in which the authorities rigorously tested these other riders to ensure their compliance, could not possibly be regarded as fair. Nonetheless could such a race possibly be regarded as sport? I would argue if such a race could be regarded as sport then there is no essential difference between sport and spectacle, between sport and showbiz. Someone might suggest that the demand for tickets at the Olympic opening ceremony by some supposed sports fans shows that in practice there is really no difference between sport and spectacle. I would reject such a suggestion for it seems to me even if sport can be spectacular it cannot be regarded simply as a spectacle. Intuitively the hypothetical race suggested above cannot be regarded as sport. It would appear the idea of fairness is an essential part of sport, but the question remains why?
I would suggest fairness is an essential part of sport because it engenders what we find admirable about sport. Able bodied Olympians don’t compete with Para-Olympians, heavyweight boxers don’t compete with lightweights and golfers have handicaps to ensure fair competition. It follows what we find admirable about sport must be connected to sports men and women. What we find admirable about sportspersons cannot be that they are winners. If this was so we would not find anything admirable about the vast majority sportspersons. I would now suggest what we find admirable in sportsppersons is linked to their character and this character is connected to certain virtues. Virtues such as determination, dedication, fortitude and courage. If we accept the above then it seem competition between women born as female and women born as male damages sport. Such completion damages sport. These virtues can be best expressed if a sportsperson can compete equally, if sport is fair. Someone might object we don’t find all sportspersons admirable. She might point out we don’t have any reason to find some premiership footballers’ character as admirable. In reply I would argue we only find part of a sportsman’s character admirable. The fact that some footballer shows determination, dedication, fortitude and some courage when playing football is admirable. It may well be true that we find some of his activities off the pitch less than admirable. Nonetheless I would counter argue the fact that a footballer plays football to a high standard makes his character more admirable than if he did not. I would further argue that the same applies to amateur sportspersons who engage in sport purely for the pleasure it brings; engaging in sport may not make someone a good person but it nearly always enhances his character to some degree. Of course there may be a very few people who should not play sport due to their temperament, for instance someone might be unable to control his anger.
Savulescu might accept my argument. Nevertheless he might
continue to argue if all professional cyclists could take drugs which are
tested and approved by cycling authorities then cycle races would not be unfair
and that we could still admire the determination, dedication, fortitude and
courage of the cyclists involved. I would suggest he would be wrong to do so
because such a situation would be hard to maintain. Let us assume some drugs
are tested and approved by cycling authorities. However new drugs which might
enhance a cyclist’s performance further might be developed. It follows the
cycling authorities will have to continue testing cyclists for these new drugs
to promote fairness. It follows that allowing cyclists to take some drugs would
only change the current situation slightly. A partial ban on enhancing drugs
would mean some drugs are acceptable whilst others are not. It would also seem
to mean some new drugs initially unacceptable might, after suitable testing,
become acceptable. It follows policing such a fluid situation might be much
more difficult than trying to maintain the current position. Savulescu might of
course revise his position and insist that cyclists should be free to take any
drug and that drug testing should be abolished. It seems entirely possible that
in this revised situation argue some enhancing drugs might be developed and
only offered to selected cyclists. Real competition would then shift from
cyclists to the scientists producing performance enhancing drugs; competitive
cycling would be reduced to a mere spectacle.
