Showing posts with label Leach. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Leach. Show all posts

Thursday 19 June 2008

Autonomy and Caring Revisited


In this posting I want to examine whether an ethics based on empathic caring is possible and the relationship between empathic caring and Frankfurt’s ideas of ‘caring about’. Mackenzie and Leach Scully make the following two assumptions (1).

1.      There are no mental events without bodies.
2.      Imaginative prospective is based on personal experience.

I accept both of these assumptions. Mackenzie and Leach Scully then proceed to question whether because any system of morality, based on empathic or sympathetic caring, is possible because our empathic or sympathetic concerns are based on our own bodily experience. Intuitively Mackenzie and Leach seem to be correct for prima facie it seems hard for someone who is healthy and not disabled to imagine the prospective of someone who is in a wheelchair or suffers from dementia.

“The epistemic obstacles to imaging being another are so significant as to make this mode of imaginative engagement highly implausible as a basis for our capacity to morally engage with others.”(2)

They then proceed to argue due to these obstacles we should adopt an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others. They define asymmetrical reciprocity as the recognition of the other as a person, with distinctive point of view shaped by that person’s history, social situation, life experiences and relationships with others. I accept these obstacles do indeed present significant barriers to a caring morality based on empathy or sympathy. Nonetheless I will argue even if we adopt an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others that a caring morality is possible. However I will firstly argue these obstacles mean we must give greater importance to autonomy than some people who propose a caring morality, such as Gilligan and Slote, would favour.

Adopting an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others means we must adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards others according to Mackenzie and Leach Scully. This attitude means we cannot merely imagine ourselves in someone else’s shoes when trying to understand her attitudes towards events in her life. I will now argue if we adopt this attitude towards someone then we must respect her autonomous decisions. Adopting an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards someone is not the same as uncritically accepting her views for these views may be the result of coercion or delusion. Let it be assumed that the views of someone are not the product of delusion or coercion. Let it be further assumed we recognise these views but see no need to accept any actions that flow from these views even if these actions do not harm others. It seems clear that in this situation we do not have an attitude of epistemic humility. Indeed our attitude might be classed as arrogant. Moreover if we do not have an attitude of epistemic humility towards someone in these circumstances, which involves accepting her views and actions provided her actions do not harm others, then adopting an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity seems to serve no useful purpose. It follows if an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity is serve any useful purpose that provided an agent is un-deluded and is un-coerced we should adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards her views and accept any actions that flow from these views that do not harm others. It follows if we do adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards someone which involves accepting her views and the actions that flow from them that we of necessity must respect her autonomy.

In a previous posting I argued if I care about an adult in a purely empathic way I must care about what she cares about, rather than what I think might be in her best interests, see caring based solely on empathy . In what follows an adult means an un-deluded and un-coerced adult unless stated otherwise. Caring about such an adult in this way means I have adopted an attitude of epistemic humility towards her. I argued adopting an attitude of empathic caring has two important conditions for respecting someone’s autonomy. It follows these conditions also apply if I have an attitude of epistemic humility towards someone. Firstly even if I believe her best interests clash with her autonomy I must give precedence to respecting her autonomy over acting beneficently towards her. Secondly I must respect someone’s actual decisions rather than just her capacity for autonomy.

Many feminist and other philosophers who favour a caring ethic would find accepting these two conditions difficult. They would argue respecting autonomy does not automatically mean giving preference accepting autonomous decisions over acting in a caring manner, acting beneficently. A philosopher who favours a caring ethic might argue it is still possible to respect autonomy whilst not respecting all autonomous decisions. She might for instance argue one should respect someone’s capacity for autonomy rather than respecting all his autonomous decisions. This might involve helping people to develop the specific capacities needed for good reflective decision making and creating the conditions in which this type of decision-making can flourish. Michael Slote argues that respecting autonomy is like this and somewhat analogous to helping children to become fully independent (2). Let it be accepted that autonomy is simply defined as someone’s second-order capacity to reflect on her desires and to accept or change these desires in the light of her goals and values. Accepting such a definition means it might be possible to respect autonomy whilst not respecting all autonomous decisions. The trouble with accepting such a simple definition of autonomy is that there seems to be very little to differentiate autonomy from an individual’s capacity for practical reason. Using this definition means an autonomous action might be simply defined as the product of extra careful practical reasoning. It can be concluded such a concept of autonomy would be wholly instrumental.

It is usually accepted that autonomy has both intrinsic and instrumental value. I will now argue that to respect autonomy means one must respect the intrinsic value of autonomy and that this cannot be achieved by simply respecting someone’s capacity for autonomy. Harry Frankfurt believes the intrinsic value autonomy depends the recognition of us by others as the distinctive kind of creatures who can determine their own futures (3). It follows respecting the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy might be defined as us accepting that she is the kind of creature capable of determining her own future. Let the above definition of respecting the intrinsic value of autonomy be accepted. Let it also be accepted that some of an agent’s autonomous decisions are respected and some are not. It follows that the agent is not recognised as someone who is capable of determining her own future and the intrinsic value of her autonomy is not respected. It might be objected that even if this argument is valid the first premise should be amended as follows. The intrinsic value of autonomy might be defined as accepting that someone is the kind of creature capable of only partially determining her own future. It might then be argued even if not all of an agent’s autonomous decisions are respected that nonetheless the intrinsic value of her autonomy might still be respected. However there are two problems with accepting this revised definition. Clearly if none of someone’s autonomous decisions are accepted then her autonomy is not the respected. This raises the practical problem about which of her decisions must be respected. Secondly children can partially determine their own future and are not recognised as fully autonomous creatures. For these reasons it seems the amended definition should be rejected and the original definition accepted. It follows that if an agent is not recognised as someone who is capable of determining her own future that the intrinsic value of her autonomy is not respected.

However feminist and other philosophers, who favour a caring ethic and find giving precedence to respecting someone’s autonomy over acting beneficently towards her, might argue we should only respect the instrumental value of her autonomy. This means helping people to develop the capacities needed for good decision-making and helping create the conditions in which this type of decision-making can flourish. I believe respecting autonomy cannot be simply reduced to respecting the instrumental value of autonomy for three reasons. Firstly someone who does not have her autonomous decisions respected might intuitively feel her autonomy was not being respected. Secondly Mackenzie and Leach Scully suggest we adopt an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others. It would seem impossible to adopt such an attitude if we fail to recognise the autonomous decisions of others. Indeed by not respecting someone’s autonomous decisions we might be classed as being exhibiting epistemic over-confidence rather than epistemic humility for instead of listening to the needs of others as perceived by them we substitute the needs we perceive them to need. Lastly if we only respect the instrumental value of autonomy it might be questioned if the concept of autonomy plays any useful part in determining our actions for as I argued above respecting our instrumental autonomy seems to differ little from respecting practical rationality. It follows if we regard autonomy simply as instrumental autonomy that we have no use for the concept of autonomy.

I have argued if we adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards others we must respect their autonomous decisions. It might then be further argued that adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards others means we are unable to act beneficently towards them. This second argument depends on the assumption that because we cannot imagine ourselves in someone else’s shoes we cannot understand her true interests. Accepting this second argument would of course mean any caring ethic is meaningless. Moreover because someone’s interests are unrecognisable to us respecting her autonomy might also become impossible. In order to examine this second argument we must consider the assumption that because we cannot imagine ourselves in someone else’s shoes we cannot understand her interests. Let us examine a particular case. Consider a soldier who has been returned from the war in Afghanistan after losing both his legs. It seems to me that adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards him does not mean we cannot understand most of his interests. We can understand his sense of grief at the loss of a friend or at a more mundane level his hunger. It might then be questioned if we understand his needs whether an attitude of epistemic humility is indeed the correct attitude to adopt towards such a soldier. I believe an attitude of epistemic humility is the correct attitude to adopt because even if, we can understand most of his interests, we cannot understand the priorities he gives to these interests. For instance if I was a colleague of this soldier we both may have given a high priority to physical fitness and a low priority to learning in the past. However the soldier’s priorities may now have now changed due to the loss of his legs whilst mine remain the same. It seems possible to conclude using this example that the epistemic obstacles to imaging being another are not that we are unable to understand another’s interests but rather that we are unable to understand the priorities she gives these interests. Accepting the above conclusion means adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards others does not mean we are unable to act beneficently towards them. It can be further concluded the obstacles raised by adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards others do not present significant barriers to a caring morality based on empathy or sympathy.

1.      Mackenzie, Leach, Scully, 2007,Moral imagination, Disability and Embodiment; Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24(4)
2.      Michael Slote, 2007, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Routledge, page 60.

3.      Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 163.


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