Showing posts with label Identity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Identity. Show all posts

Monday 3 September 2018

Honour in a Cosmopolitan Society


In the western world the idea of honour seems to be becoming less important. Politicians make promises and feel no shame when they break them, others offer apologies without feeling any sense of shame. In a new book Tamler Sommers argues that honour matters. Let us accept that honour matters. Sommers argues that in our cosmopolitan culture we have replaced honour by dignity and that this replacement damages society. In this posting I will argue that some of the goods honour delivers can be outweighed by other goods delivered by a dignity based culture. I will then argue that honour can matter in a dignity culture albeit in a modified form.

Why does honour matter? Sommers lists three main disadvantages of living in a culture without honour. Firstly he argues that such a culture makes us fearful. Secondly he argues that the rampant individuality of contemporary western leaves us without a sense of solidarity. Lastly that such a society diminishes the power of shame. Honour matters to Sommer because it gives us courage to combat fear, it helps to form our identity and it gives us a stronger disposition to feel shame. Honour matters because these goods are valuable.

Let us accept that courage is valuable, Martha Nussbaum like Sommers argues that we are damaged by living in a fear driven culture (2). However it might be argued that in a cosmopolitan society courage has diminished because the need for courage has diminished. For herders or hunter gatherers courage helped them to survive in a harsh environment. For a citizen in ancient Greece or Rome courage helped flourish in brutal times. However most of us no longer need courage to survive even if we might need it to flourish. Perhaps as the need for courage diminishes so does its value. It might be concluded that in a cosmopolitan society because we have less need for courage that this is on balance a good thing. It might be objected that some inner city dwellers live in a harsh and brutal environment which means that the need for courage remains. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why gangs persist in these areas. I would suggest what this objection shows is not that there is still an undiminished need for courage in a cosmopolitan society but rather that the domain of such a society is limited. A truly cosmopolitan society must address the needs of all of its citizens. I would further suggest that in an efficient cosmopolitan society which addresses the needs of all its citizens that there is less need for courage and that as a result the value of courage diminishes.

However even if it is accepted that there is less need for courage in a cosmopolitan society this does not imply we have no need for courage. It is sometimes remarked lose it or use it. If there is less need for courage in such a society does this damage our capacity to display courage when needed? I am prepared to accept it does but would suggest that any harm done by a lack of courage in a dignity based society is more than offset by living in a more peaceful society which protects its citizens. Perhaps the harm done by living in a fearful society might be better addressed by hope supported by faith as suggested by Nussbaum (3). In this context faith might regarded as the realistic optimism of Tiberius. Nonetheless I still believe courage should be fostered. Our educational systems seem to be becoming solely concerned with preparing people for work rather than life perhaps with more emphasis on sport and perhaps even the teaching of philosophy might foster courage.

Is Sommers right when he suggests that the rampant individuality of contemporary western leaves us without a sense of solidarity? It might be argued that a dignity culture means that all are valued. Perhaps all being valued gives all of us a basic sense of solidarity. However this is a very basic sense of solidarity and I accept Sommers is right and that rampant individualism can damage solidarity. A sense of solidarity can have various roots. It might be rooted in a profession, a religion, class, a nation or even a tribe. However even if a sense of solidarity has benefits it might have shallow roots. Let us accept our identity is linked to solidarity. We identify with those who are similar to us. If our sense of identity is rooted in some class, nation or tribe then our identity is passively determined and our sense of solidarity is easily acquired. Such a sense of dignity might increase solidarity with our own in group but lessen our sense of solidarity with others and lead to a decrease in toleration. Perhaps these harms outweigh the solidarity an honour culture fosters. Can a dignity based culture deliver a sense of solidarity other than a very basic form? In a dignity based cosmopolitan society we determine our identity to some degree. We might do so explicitly by choosing profession, such as joining the police force, or choosing a religion, perhaps by becoming a Buddhist. We might also do so implicitly by the actions we choose. I would suggest that if we choose our identity, even if our choice is implicit rather explicit, that we are more authentic than if are identity is acquired passively by being, born in some particular place or class. I would argue that even if solidarity is of value that the loss of solidarity in a cosmopolitan society might be more than offset by the value of authenticity. However at this point courage re-enters our discussions for someone wants to be true to himself must have the courage of his convictions. Does someone in this situation really need raw courage or would fortitude be more useful? I would also argue that a cosmopolitan society might increase a stronger sense solidarity in some cases. I have suggested above if we passively acquire our sense of solidarity that this is easily acquired. I have suggested that identity and solidarity are linked. If our sense of identity is based on partly on the choices we make we might feel a stronger sense of solidarity with those who have made a similar choice rather than those who are simply members of our class, nation or tribe.

Sommers argues that we are less likely to experience shame in a dignity culture than in an honour culture. I agree with Sommers that the ability to feel some form of shame is valuable but what form of shame? What do we mean by shame? I have previously argued that there are two types of shame. Firstly David Velleman defines shame as “anxiety about social disqualification” (4). This seems to be the sort of same fostered by an honour based culture. Secondly shame might be defined as someone’s anxiety about harming the things he cares about or loves and is linked to character. If we accept Velleman’s account of shame then a cosmopolitan society does indeed damage our ability to feel shame. A cosmopolitan dignity based culture seeks to include rather than exclude. But is Velleman’s type of shame really valuable? Consider a high caste Brahmin in India who has come into contact with something unclean and feels no shame. Has he done anything wrong and would social disqualification ever be valuable in this scenario? Shame is valuable but I would suggest that the type of shame which is valuable is linked to character. But shame linked to character is linked to authenticity which is perhaps best fostered in a cosmopolitan society than an honour culture. If we accept the above then shame matters and the shame that matters is connected to character. Such shame is not the shame fostered by an honour basis.


Let us accept that Sommers is right and that a loss of a sense of honour damages society. He argues honour is connected to being a member of some organisation such as a profession, a religion, class, a nation or even a tribe. If honour is only connected to some social group then in a dignity based society honour becomes irrelevant and fades away. I have argued if honour depends on the above bases that the goods delivered by a cosmopolitan outweigh the damage done by losing our sense of honour. Sommers argues that honour is damaged by an excessive focus on dignity. Perhaps it’s not our excessive focus on dignity but our excessive focus on rights, rather what it means to be a good person, which damages our sense of honour. I would suggest being a virtuous person is connected to being a good person. I would further suggest that being virtuous is not incompatible with living in a dignity or rights based society. I would still further suggest honour can be based on acting virtuously. Indeed it might be argued that virtue based ethics is impossible without some idea of honour. Moreover acting virtuously sometimes requires courage, gives us a sense of identity and if we fail a sense of shame. Such thoughts might have pleased Jane Austin. If we accept the above that being honourable means acting virtuously then honour is possible in in a dignity based or rights based society. Perhaps to promote honour we don’t need to encourage a greater sense of solidarity in our cosmopolitan society as suggested by Sommers but rather by encouraging people to be good persons by acting virtuously.

  1. Tamler Sommers, 2018, Why Honor Matters, Basic Books, chapter 2
  2. Martha Nussbaum, 2018. The Monarchy of Fear, Oxford University Press
  3. Nussbaum , chapter 7
  4. David Velleman, 2009, How We Get Along, Cambridge University Press, page 95

Wednesday 17 July 2013

More Autonomy

In Melbourne Australia Harry Kakavas lost $20.5 million to a casino. He sued the casino arguing it should have known he was a pathological gambler and as a result not taken his money. He lost his case in the Australian High Court. The Court ruled that Kakavas did not show that he suffered from a disability, special to him, which was exploited by the casino. What sort of disability is relevant in such a case? It would seem in this particular case that Kakavas did not have the ability to make meaningful decisions, decisions which were in his own interests, whilst gambling. Gambling affected his autonomy. The Kakavas case raises questions about the nature and extent of autonomous decisions. In this posting I will examine both of these questions. I addition I will consider when we have a duty to intervene when someone makes a non-autonomous decision; provided of course we have the power to do so as the casino involved with Kakavas did,

Which of the decisions we make are autonomous? It might be thought that these decisions must be important decisions which we make only after careful consideration. A patient giving informed consent might be seen a paradigmatic example of such an autonomous decision. If this is so someone making a decision without appropriate reflection might be said to be making a non-autonomous decision. It might then be argued we can safely ignore her decision because it does not represent her ‘real self’, see Berlin (1). It is not a decision she would have made if he had more adequately reflected on it. I would suggest such an attitude is one of moral arrogance.

I now want to argue almost all of the decisions we make are autonomous. A common theme throughout all my postings is that someone’s autonomy depends on what she ‘cares about’. Caring about in this context means not merely wanting something; it means someone’s identity, her ‘real self’, is dependent on what she cares about. Moreover I have argued in previous postings what someone ‘cares about’ is defined by what she is satisfied with. Satisfaction in this context simply means no resistance to a decision, no restlessness with that decision (2). There is no desire to change the decision. It is important here to be clear satisfaction with a decision does not equate with being happy about a decision. As I have argued before someone with a terminal illness may decide to commit suicide and be completely satisfied with her decision but nonetheless her satisfaction does not imply she is happy about it. Accepting the above means if someone is satisfied with some decision and has no inclination to change her decision that her decision is an autonomous one. I would suggest that people are satisfied, as defined above, with almost all of their decisions. The above leads to the tentative conclusion that almost all of the decisions we make are autonomous.

At this point an objector might be prepared to accept that for a decision to be autonomous it must be based on what we care about. However she might be unwilling to concede that it naturally follows that almost all of our decisions are autonomous. My objector might argue we can only know what we care about after adequate reflection. She might then further argue that because most of our decisions are non-reflective that most of our decisions are non-autonomous. If my objector’s argument is to carry any weight then she must accept one of two options. Firstly someone may make an autonomous decision based on what she cares about and be dissatisfied with her decision. Or secondly she must accept that being satisfied with a decision is a necessary condition for that decision to be an autonomous decision based on what the agent cares about but argue it is not a sufficient condition. Let us examine the first option. An agent can make an autonomous decision and be dissatisfied with it. I accept an agent can make an autonomous decision she’s not happy with, see above, but I can’t accept she can make an autonomous decision she’s not satisfied with. Let us accept satisfaction with a decision does not simply mean the agent has some smug feeling but means she has no resistance to her decision, no restlessness to change it. It follows if an agent is dissatisfied with a decision that she either resists the decision or seeks to change it. She is ambivalent about her decision. I don’t accept that any decision someone is ambivalent about and seeks to change can be an autonomous decision. It follows an agent cannot make an autonomous decision she is dissatisfied with.

Let us consider my objectors second option that being satisfied with a decision is a necessary condition for that decision to be an autonomous one based on what the agent cares about but that it is not a sufficient one. My objector might suggest that for a decision to be an autonomous one not only must the agent be satisfied with it but that she must have reflected on it. This suggestion would mean most decisions we make are non-autonomous. Of course for many of the decisions we make this doesn’t matter. No one is really concerned whether someone’s decision to have an ice cream is an autonomous one or not. However let us consider a family on a summer’s day sitting on the bank of a fast flowing river eating ice cream. Let us assume one of the children falls into the river and without any thought the mother jumps in and saves the child. Was this a non-autonomous decision? I would argue it was an autonomous decision. Indeed the mother might feel hurt if someone suggested afterwards her actions were mindless. She might say she minded very much, she loved her child, and that she couldn’t act any other way, reflection was pointless. The above suggests for a decision to be autonomous all that matters is that the agent cares about it. It suggests that caring about a decision is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for that decision to be autonomous in conditions in which the agent has been neither coerced nor deceived. Of course sometimes an agent may have to reflect on what he cares about but it is caring about rather than reflection that guarantees a decision is autonomous. Indeed it might be argued the fact that an agent feels a need to reflect on a decision make the autonomy of the decision less certain.

My objector might accept that for a decision to be an autonomous one the agent must care about her decision but suggest we don’t really care about many of our decisions. For instance she might point out my decision to buy an ice cream on a sudden whim is not based on what I really care about in the way we have been using the term. We only care about important decisions and only these decisions can be autonomous or non autonomous, mere whims don’t count. I believe this might be the position Frankfurt would adopt, see (3). I however would adopt a slightly different position. I would suggest an autonomous decision need not be one an agent cares about but any decision he makes which is not discordant with what he cares about. If my suggestion is accepted then most of the decisions we make, including my whim to buy ice cream, would be autonomous. At this point my objector might point out my suggestion seems to weaken the connection between autonomy and personal identity. Frankfurt argues our identity is linked to what we care about.

“Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the indispensably activity through which provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives. Regardless of whether its objects are appropriate, our caring about things possesses for us an inherent value by virtue of its essential role in making us the distinctive kind of creatures that we are.” (4).

I agree our identity is connected to what we care about. It might appear that because identity and autonomy are connected that autonomous decisions must be decisions we care about. I believe appearance is unjustified. I have suggested above that autonomous decisions are connected to what we care about, our identity, by being decisions which are not discordant with what we care about, our identity. Of course when making most decisions we don’t reflect about our identity. Nonetheless I would suggest our identity is always present even if only in the background. I would further suggest this presence gives continuity and coherence to our lives. If autonomous decisions are any decisions which are not discordant with what we care about then not all autonomous decisions play an equal part in defining our identity. Indeed some like my decision to have an ice cream may play no part. Nonetheless if I continually buy ice cream I may be said to be someone who likes ice cream and this plays a small part of my identity. In the light of the above it appears an agent caring about her decision is not necessary for her decision to be an autonomous one. Moreover someone’s being satisfied with her decision is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the decision to be an autonomous one in circumstances in which she has not been deceived or coerced.

I have argued that most of the decisions we make are autonomous decisions. In addition I believe we should always accept an autonomous decision even if this decision harms the decision maker provided of course the decision does not harm others. I believe we must give precedence to respecting autonomy over acting beneficently. It seems to me someone’s identity is tied to her autonomy, tied to what she finds appropriate, what satisfies her. If we fail to respect someone’s autonomy we fail to respect her. Let us consider an example. Personally I detest is smoking. Moreover smoking harms smokers. Let us assume I one of my friends is a smoker who on hearing I am going to a shop asks me to buy her some cigarettes. As I am going to the shop anyway I will not be inconvenienced if I buy her cigarettes. Let us also assume she is completely satisfied with her decision, she will not smoke in my presence or that of other non-smoker and that she fully understands the dangers of smoking and is not deceiving herself. Let us further assume I refuse to buy her cigarettes because I believe these will harm her. I am helping her to prevent harming herself by not respecting her autonomous request even though satisfying her request would not inconvenience me. I am giving priority to acting beneficently over respecting her autonomy. I would suggest in this example I am merely paying lip service to respecting her as a person. Perhaps I might console myself that I am respecting her real self, but this real self is really an ideal self created by me. In this example I believe I could justly be accused of some sort of arrogance.

If we accept we should respect autonomy over acting beneficently and most decisions we make are autonomous in the sense used above then we have to accept a large number of decisions which are unwise or even foolhardy. Kakavas’ decision to gamble in the casino was certainly an unwise one but was it also a non-autonomous one? If it was an autonomous one then the casino should respect his decision however unwise it was. In theory it seems there might be completely satisfied gamblers. However in practice most gamblers feel guilty about their gambling and have some resistance to their compulsion to gamble. It follows most gamblers’ decisions to gamble are non-autonomous decisions. It seems probable that Kakavas’ decision to gamble was a non-autonomous one. It follows the casino could not justify, allowing Kakavas to continue gambling, on respect for his autonomy.


In normal life we generally accept peoples’ decisions, even if many of these are not autonomous decisions, provided we have no reason to suspect that these decisions will harm the decision maker. Kakavas’ gambling clearly harmed him. How could a casino possibly justify allowing Kakavas to gamble if his gambling was both non-autonomous and harmed him? One possible justification concerns the nature of the harm involved. Kakavas’ gambling harmed him financially but it might have done only limited harm to his capacity to make autonomous decisions. Kakavas’ capacity to make autonomous decisions was impaired whilst gambling but perhaps it remained unimpaired at other times. He could have made an autonomous decision not to go to the casino in much the same way a recovering alcoholic makes a decision not to go to a bar. The casino might argue even if Kakavas was harmed it was respecting his autonomous decision to go gambling and it was justified in respecting this decision because respecting autonomy should take precedence over acting beneficently. I would accept the above argument. However I would be some what sceptical about a gamblers ability to make a decision she knows will make her feel guilty without any resistance to her decision.

Monday 4 June 2012

Me and My Values


There is a tendency in philosophy to believe we define ourselves. That we define ourselves by our values or what we ‘care about’, see for instance Helm and Frankfurt.

“I have claimed that one’s identity is fundamentally a matter of the kind of life worth living and that this is determined largely by one’s personal priorities and values; ….Thus when asked who I am I do not say a 6-4 –inch former soccer player who likes chocolate and is susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy … I respond by saying that I am a philosophy professor, father of three, etc.” (1)

“It is in the nature of a lover’s concern that he is invested in his beloved. That is, he is benefited when his beloved flourishes; and he suffers when it is harmed. Another way of putting it is that the lover identifies himself with what he loves. This consists of accepting the interests of his beloved as his own.” (2)

In this posting I do not want to deny we partly define ourselves by our values or what we ‘care about’. However I will suggest there is a tendency to overstate this self-definition. Moreover I believe this overstatement applies to the importance of values and what someone ‘cares about’ and ignores other things that help define her.

Helm when asked who he is does not say he was a soccer player or that he likes chocolate and is susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy but replies by choosing certain things he values. Helm is identifying himself with his values and seems to assume others will identify him in a similar way. However there are problems with this approach. Firstly someone may be unaware of some of the values she possesses. Secondly we must be careful about the idea of choice. As I noted in my previous posting what someone values need not be identical with the values she explicitly identifies with. She can be mistaken about some of her values. Our values are determined just a much by what someone actually does as by what she thinks she should do. I believe Helm would accept this point as he argues someone sometimes discovers her values.

However even if someone is unaware of some of her values, does she sometimes choose her values and in so doing is she creating her identity like some existential hero? Personally I am unhappy with such a position. Recent research in experimental philosophy has shown that sometimes someone’s choices are influenced less by her character and more by the situation she finds herself in; see for instance Appiah (3). It follows someone’s choices may sometimes be determined less by her character and more by her situation. It further follows some of someone’s values might well be determined by the circumstances she finds herself in. Helm holds our identity is determined by our values. It still further follows if we accept Helm’s position that in practice someone’s identity is not simply chosen by her. Accepting the above is one of the reasons I rather like Helm’s idea of someone discovering her values; discovering her identity. In spite of the above I do not want to completely downplay the role someone’s explicit choices about value play in creating her identity, I only want argue such choices do not play as big a part as we might assume. The fact someone has some value may in many cases be partly be due to the fact she made a choice. But even if someone has genuinely chosen something as a value does not guarantee it is in fact value. She must also be able to live up to her choice. In some cases she may discover she cannot, see Frankfurt discussion of Sartre’s young man (4). It might be objected there is some circularity in the above arguments concerning character, value and identity. I will not pursue this objection here but believe it can be overcome, see (5).

Helm and Frankfurt hold that our identity depends on what we value or ‘care about’. However I would suggest the fact that we often appear to discover our identity means other factors play a part in determining this identity. In my posting of 12/12/11 I argued that the fact someone suffers from Asperger’s syndrome partly determines her identity. Asperger’s syndrome affects someone’s neural development and hence the way she thinks, she chooses. I would go even further than this and suggest factors independent of our neural makeup also affect our identity. Consider someone born without legs and as a result of this is confined to a wheelchair. I would argue this fact affects the choices open to her and hence her identity. She may not for instance become a mountaineer like her parents. An objector to the above might use my wheelchair example to argue against me. She might argue if a soldier who loses his legs in Afghanistan and becomes confined to a wheelchair that this does not change his identity. Our intuitions about the mountaineer’s daughter and the wounded soldier seem to lead us to a paradox. I believe this paradox can be resolved. I accept soldier’s identity is not changed at the time of his injury but I would argue his identity will be changed over time. Let us assume prior to his injury the soldier identified himself with being a soldier leading his men into battle. This option is now closed to him. Let us further assume that post his injury he becomes a Para-Olympian and identifies himself with sport. It would appear then that over time the fact he has become a wheelchair user has in some ways affected his identity.

I have argued that in practice someone’s identity is not simply chosen by her but is also determined by her physical body and the circumstances she finds herself in. Part of these circumstances is the way other people see her. It follows our identity is linked to the way others see us. Let us return to a soldier example. Let us assume our soldier is a paramedic who does not see herself as brave. Let us further assume one day she tends to a wounded colleague under enemy fire. Her colleagues see her as brave and because of this she discovers herself to be brave. Of course she was brave before her discovery but her bravery was unreflective whilst after her discovery her bravery came to play a more central part in her life, in her identity and this centrality would not have happened had not others seen her as brave.

1.      Bennett Helm, 2010, Love, Friendship & the Self, Oxford University Press, page 130.
2.      Harry Frankfurt 2006, Taking Ourselves Seriously, Stanford University Press, Page 41.
3.      Kwame Appiah, 2008, Experiments in Ethics, Harvard University Press, chapter 2.
4.      Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press, page 84.
5.      Helm, page 140.

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