Friday 23 March 2012

Deceit and Unintentional Fathers


Elizabeth Brake (1) argues that unintentional fathers do not have an obligation to support any children they father. She bases here argument on equal rights for men and women. She argues if a women has right not to become a parent because she has a right to have an abortion then it follows that a man also has a right not to become a parent. She believes this means that a man has the right not support any child he unintentionally fathers. Her argument is based on the idea of consent. It assumes a woman must consent either explicitly or implicitly if she gestates. Her argument assumes that consent forms the basis for parental obligation. Clearly this assumption is true for adoptive parents but is it also true of biological parents? Lindsey Porter (2) argues it is not and that all parents have an obligation to support any children they create and that this obligation includes unintentional fathers. In this posting I will firstly outline Porter’s argument which I accept. I will then move on to consider a slightly different question as to whether her argument should also apply to unintentional fathers who have been deceived.

Porter points out that a biological parent is someone who causes a new person to exist. She argues biological parental obligation is based on the idea that because a biological parent is responsible for a child’s vulnerability he/she must take steps to remedy this situation. Prima facie this obligation means assuming a full parenting role in most cases. Of course there may be exceptions, for instance a fourteen year mother might best fulfil her obligation as a biological parent by allowing her child to be adopted. Unfortunately as Porter notes there is a problem with this account. Gamete donors and even IVF doctors might appear to have parental duties. Porter attempts to overcome this problem by presenting a bifurcated account of parenthood. A parent can either mean someone who causes a child to exist or secondly someone who “stands in a unique and invaluable social, personal, love relation to the child.” Her argument depends on the idea that a certain class of parents in the first meaning has a prima facie obligation to become a parent as defined by the second meaning. In what follows assuming full parental obligations means being a parent in sense of both of the above meanings. I agree with the thrust of Porter’s argument but believe we must be able to define which of those people who cause a child to exist have a prima facie duty to assume full parental obligations.

Porter correctly points out that in some cases people such as gamete donors and IVF specialists play a part in causing some children to exist. Without these people some children would not exist. It follows they cause vulnerable children to come into the world. Surely this causation means they have responsibilities. Clearly they do have responsibilities. Equally clearly gamete donors and IVF specialists should not offer their services to people who will not become good parents. However the question remains if gamete donors, IVF specialists and biological parents can all play a necessary part in causing a child to exist, then why should only biological parents have a duty to assume full parental obligations?

Of course it is impractical that gamete donors and IVF specialists should fully parent the children they cause to come into existence simply because of the numbers involved. However if they only caused one or possibly two children to come into existence is there any reason why they should not be obliged to assume full parental duties for the same reason as the biological parents are? It might be objected that in practice this just doesn’t happen and that my question is purely of theoretical interest. But this is not so let us consider two sisters Ann and Carol. Ann is married but is incapable of carrying a child because she has had a hysterectomy followed by chemotherapy due to cancer. Prior to her treatment some of Ann’s eggs were saved. Carol has two children of her own but nonetheless offers to act as a surrogate mother for Ann. Carol successfully undergoes IVF using her sister’s eggs together with her brother in laws sperm and produces a child. Let us assume Carol will never undertake surrogacy again or have any other children. Clearly Carol played a necessary part in causing Ann’s child to exist. Does it follow that in this situation that Carol has an equal obligation with Ann to assume full parental duties? I would argue it does not. Ann wanted a child. Having a child of her own was of intrinsic value to her. Carol only acted instrumentally to serve Ann’s wants. Carol may have played a necessary part in the creation of the child but she would not have done so without Ann’s need. Ann and Carol caused the child to exist in different ways. Ann’s need was the original cause of the child. Carol served this original cause instrumentally. I would suggest only those people who cause a child to exist by being the original cause of that child have a prima facie duty to assume full parental obligations. Those people who cause a child to exist by acting instrumentally to fulfil someone else’s need for a child do not. It follows that gamete donors, IVF specialists and surrogate mothers do not have a prima facie duty to fully parent any children they help to come into existence.

I now want return to the question as to whether unintentional fathers have full parental obligations to any children they father. I have suggested above that only those people who cause a child to exist by being the originating cause have a prima facie duty to become full parents. If my suggestion is accepted it follows most unintentional fathers do have a prima facie duty to accept parental obligations because by fathering a child a father is not usually acting instrumentally to serve someone else’s purpose. Moreover by engaging in normal sexual relations becoming a father, causing a child to exist, is a foreseeable risk. Of course not all unintentional fathers might be in a position to fully assume a full parenting role. In some cases an unintentional father or his child’s mother may be in another relationship. Or perhaps, like the fourteen year old mother mentioned above, he may be better able to discharge his parental duties in a different way. Nonetheless most unintentional fathers have a prima facie duty to assume a full parenting role.

However there is a subset of unintentional fathers to whom the above might not apply. A woman might intentionally deceive a man regarding contraception for some purpose of her own. For instance she might simply desire a child. In this case the child’s father seems to be being used by her instrumentally in much the same way a gamete donor is. Prima facie I can see no reason as to why he should be treated differently from a the donor and hence should not be subject to full parental obligations. Secondly a woman might seek to bind her partner to her by having a child. She might secretly stop taking any contraceptive measures in order to achieve her objective. In this context the man is being deceived but is he also being used instrumentally? It is of course true he is not being seen as an end in himself and this is wrong. The deceit is also wrong. However it is not clear that these wrongs mean he should be free from full parental obligations. It is clear is that this case the child is being used instrumentally by the woman to bind her partner to her. I would suggest this means the father in this case is also being used instrumentally. Once again prima facie it seems clear to me that he should also not be subject to full parental obligations.

Prima facie I have argued that those unintentional fathers who have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. Are there any reasons as to why my conclusion should not be accepted? Unfortunately applied philosophy like real morality is messy and there is at least one reason not to accept my conclusion. This reason is also concerned with deceit. Many unintentional fathers who have not been deceived might lie and say that they have been in order to avoid full parental obligations. It seems clear to me that those unintentional fathers whose partners admit to deceiving them and those for whom it can be shown that they have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. Again unfortunately this is likely to be only a small subset of unintentional fathers who have been deceived. It would appear we have almost arrived back at my starting point. Elizabeth Brake argued that unintentional fathers do not have an obligation to support any children they father due to equal rights for men and women. I have accepted Lindsey Porter’s argument that most unintentional fathers do have a prima facie obligation to fully support their children. However in the light of the above argument some might suggest that in practice, even if this obligation remains, unintentional fathers should not be made to support any children they father if they say they have been deceived and it cannot be shown that they are lying. It is not always possible to differentiate between unintentional fathers who have been deceived and those who merely say they have been deceived. In addition I have argued that unintentional fathers who have been deceived do not have a duty to assume full parental obligations. It might appear to follow that the right of unintentional fathers who have been deceived not to support any children they father means that all unintentional fathers, who say they have been deceived, should not be compelled to assume full parental responsibility. Personally I am reluctant to accept the above. It seems to me that children’s interests may well trump the right of unintentional fathers who have been deceived, but who are unable to show this, not to assume full parental obligations.

1. Elizabeth Brake, Fatherhood and child support; Do men have a right to choose?, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22(1), 2005.
2. Lindsey Porter, Adoption is Not Abortion-Lite, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 29(1), 2012.



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