Tuesday 23 October 2012

Biological and Adopted Children


In a posting on practical ethics Julian Savulescu relates the story of Brad and Melissa’s attempts to have a baby using IVF with PGD. They did so in order to avoid having a child with cystic fibrosis or a child who was a carrier of the gene for cystic fibrosis. Both Brad and Melissa were carriers of this gene. If parents have a child with cystic fibrosis this costs the state a great deal of money. Having a child cost Brad and Melissa a lot of money, in addition to their savings they had to sell their car to pay for the IVF. However the money it cost them was a great deal less than it would have cost the state had they had a child with cystic fibrosis. Savulescu argues that the state should bear the cost of IVF with PGD for parents such as Brad and Melissa because it is unjust to expect them to save the state money. In reply Khalid Jan and Elselijn Kingma suggest parents, such as Brad and Melissa, have the option of adopting a child and that because this option involves no extra costs to the state, indeed it may save the state money, that the state has no duty to pay for IVF for such parents.

In the following discussion I will assume for the sake of argument that adoptive children are usually adopted as babies. I will also assume that these babies don’t have any more potential health or mental problems than children in general. In practice these assumptions are not always met. Let us assume couples in a position similar to that of Brad and Melissa can adopt. If such couples would prefer a child of their own, using IVF with PGD, to an adopted child then they must have some reasons for this preference. They must believe there is a difference between nurturing a biological child and an adopted child. In this posting I want to examine what these reasons might be.

One difference between biological and adopted parents is the way they acquire their obligations to care for their children. The vast majority of biological parents naturally acquire an obligation to care for their children simply because they create vulnerable children. They may be certain exceptions such as a fourteen year old mother, who because she is a child herself, may be unable to fulfil this obligation, see deceit and unintentional fathers . Adoptive parents consciously assume this obligation at the time of adoption. However irrespective of how parents acquire the duty to care for their children the actual caring seems to be identical. It follows the difference between the way biological and adopted parents acquire their obligations to care for their children should not make any difference to the relationship between a parent and child. It gives no reason why couples such as Brad and Melissa want a child using IVF rather than adopting one. None the less such couples are concerned with not just with having any child; they are concerned with being the child’s biological parents. After all Brad and Melissa spent a great deal of money and even had to sell their car in order to achieve this aim.

I will now suggest two reasons why parents might want to be biological parents. Firstly parents might want to be biological parents as opposed to adoptive parents simply because they believe they will have a closer bond with their children due to this bond being unique. Adopted children have both biological and adoptive parents. Many adopted children feel the need later in life to seek their biological parents. This need may weaken the bond a child feels for her adoptive parents. It does not automatically follow that the bond the adoptive parents feels for their adopted child is weakened and as a result the first reason fails. A second reason why mothers might want to be biological mothers is that they believe carrying their children will increase the maternal bond. This may well be true but I am doubtful if it is the main reason why many couples in Brad and Melissa’s position seek IVF with PGD. Let us assume such a couple could have a child with donated gametes and that the woman involved could gestate the child. I would suggest such a couple would still prefer IVF with PGD and as a result the second reason fails. The reason for this failure I would further suggest is that they care about having a child of their own. By a child of their own they mean a child who is genetically related to them. I would still further suggest when parents express a preference to be biological parents that this really means they want to be genetic parents. For instance many mothers who are unable to bear children, for health reasons such as having a hysterectomy, might prefer a surrogate to bear their children using her and her partner’s gametes rather than adopt. But why should parents care that they are genetic parents? Once again I will suggest it is because they believe that they will have a closer bond with their genetic children; that they will care about, they will love, their genetic children more than any children they adopt. In what follows I will suggest two reasons why parents might have this belief.

The first reason is simply that evolution designed us to care more for our genetic children than others. Perhaps those people who acquired caring instincts simply raised more children to adulthood. Perhaps also evolution designed us to care and to care more for those genetically related to us. Perhaps then step parents don’t care about their children as much as genetic parents do. Fairy tales and myths abound with stories about wicked step parents. Indeed there might be some evidence to support the claim that step parents care less, see Hofferth and Anderson. Of course some step parents may behave better most than genetic parents. And of course some genetic parents may behave atrociously. Someone might object that even if we do have evolved an instinct to care more for those genetically related to us this does not mean this is what we ought to do. Modern human beings are reflective creature. My objector might then argue that after reflection couples like Brad and Melissa might decide they could care as much for an adopted child as they would for a genetically related child and as a result decide that adoption is the best option. In reply I would suggest coming to care about, coming to love, is not a matter of reflection or choice, see Frankfurt (1). Of course someone may reflect on how to love or even whether her love is prudent but she cannot simply decide on whom she will love and the degree of her love. However at the present time there seems to me there is insufficient evidence to definitely conclude that evolution means genetic parents love their children more than adoptive parents do.

A second reason why parents might care about their genetic children more than any children they adopt is that they will have more common interests. My objector might now suggest that parents and children come to share interests simply by family life. A child’s interests are a product of his upbringing. I agree a child’s interests are partly a product of her upbringing but they are also partly defined her genes. For instance an adopted child may be strong, supple and as a result excel in sports due to her genes whilst her adoptive parents may be intellectuals with no interest whatsoever in sport. Moreover it seems that someone’s personality is partly determined by their genes. It follows parents who bring up their genetic children will have more interests in common with these children than any children they adopt. My objector might suggest this does not by itself show they care about their genetic children more than any adopted children. I agree with my objector that more shared interests does not supply any reason as to why genetic parents should have a greater disposition to care about their children than adoptive parents. It follows in this sense of caring about there is no reason why adoptive parents should love their children any less than biological parents. However there is more to caring about or loving than having a disposition to love; I am here assuming the terms love and care about are interchangeable. I do not actively love when I am asleep or when I am concentrating on my next golf shot. Actively loving someone means sharing her interests, if I have no concern for her interests I simply don’t love her. It is easier to share interests if these are interests I already possess, see aspergers autism and love . It follows there is a reason why genetic parents might be more loving towards their children than adoptive parents. It also follows parents carrying genes for inherited diseases can justify their desire for a child of their own using IVF with PGD.

In conclusion parents such as Brad and Melissa do have the option of adopting but most of them would prefer a child which is genetically related to them by using IVF with PGD. Moreover it would seem they have sound reasons for this preference. Personally I would support their preference. However I am not sure whether or not the State has an obligation to help them satisfy this preference. After all some children might have a preference to be adopted.

1.     Frankfurt, H. (1999) Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge University Press, page 135.

Friday 5 October 2012

Two Types of Respect; Too Much Respect?



In these days of political correctness, the idea of respect is important. The idea of respect is also often unclear. In this posting I want to examine what we mean by respect. It seems clear that respect must play some useful part in our lives or else it would simply cease to exist. In the past respect was linked to etiquette which played an important part in our lives by gluing society together. Etiquette encouraged inequality and stratification. In this posting I will consider respect free from etiquette and will argue that there are two important types of respect serving different purposes. I will argue that there is recognition respect which defines our domain of moral concern and appraisal respect which defines what we approve of. We can respect someone for what she is and who she is. I will proceed to argue it is damaging to conflate these different types and that sometimes we should express less respect.

We can respect a wide variety of things from persons, to institutions such as schools, to virtues like courage, to nature. This diversity suggests there are different types of respect. According to the Oxford Dictionary respect is “is a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievement.” If we accept this definition, then respect must involve our affective states. Not all philosophers would agree. For instance, someone might object a pupil’s respect for her teacher is not based on deep admiration; it is based on the norms of education. I would argue such ‘respect’ is not true respect for but merely the acceptance of these norms out of habit or for pragmatic reasons. In what follows I will assume that all types of genuine respect must involve our affective states. I will also assume that all forms of genuine respect must affect our behaviour. It seems nonsensical to hold we can respect something but that this respect does not constrain how we behave towards that we respect.

However, I am not concerned with all forms of affective respect which alter our behaviour. We might for instance I might respect the sea by fearing it and by only going swimming on a safe beach with a lifeguard. Fear is an affective state and it affects my behaviour by causing me to only to swim on a safe beach. In this posting I am not concerned with respect for inanimate objects. We might also ‘respect’ a gang member by fearing him. Indeed, gang members might demand such respect. However once again I’m not sure such ‘respect’ is genuine respect. I would suggest genuine respect must be freely given. Regardless of whether the above suggestion is correct or not in this posting I am restricting my discussion to respect which is freely given. Such respect might take two forms, recognition and appraisal respect. For instance, we may respect someone simply because she is a person but we may also respect her because she is a doctor, which required determination and dedication on her part qualities we approve of. Respect for persons, as the kind of creatures who can determine their own future and for whom we should feel some empathy is recognition respect and should be universal, such respect need not involve any appraisal of someone’s attributes. Appraisal respect need not be universal and must include a positive appraisal. 

Let us accept that we should always respect someone by recognising what she is, a person. This respect need not involve any admiration. When we respect someone for who she is then respect must involve admiration. For instance, if someone is a thief preying on old vulnerable people we should only respect her by recognising her to be a person. However, if she is a doctor we might respect her as a person by admiring her for who she is and what she has achieved. I now want to argue if we conflate the expression of recognition and appraisal respect, then we limit the usefulness of respect by sending a confusing message.

In order to make my argument I need to differentiate between the uses of recognition and appraisal respect. Recognition respect defines who and even perhaps what we regard as members of our society; defines the domain of a society.  Recognition respect is not useful in binding society together. If we fail to see someone as the same kind of creature as ourselves who can determine her own future, then we simply do not see that person as part of our society. All persons are owed recognition respect. Not everyone is owed appraisal respect, appraisal respect has to be earned. Appraisal respect always includes a positive appraisal such as admiration. If our appraisal was negative, whatever we felt it certainly wouldn’t be respect. Appraisal respect for someone means admiring her and responding in ways which are appropriate to our admiration. However simply admiring someone’s characteristics and responding in an appropriate fashion is not a sufficient condition for appraisal respect. We might admire someone’s strength and act appropriately, but such admiration and appropriate action aren’t respect. They might be envy and envy certainly isn’t respect. I would suggest that appraisal respect is of necessity linked to admiring someone’s character. This admiration need not be limited to someone’s moral character but includes any character traits which aid someone to flourish, character traits such as wisdom or courage. It might be objected that by suggesting appraisal respect is of necessity linked to character I am contradicting myself as suggested above someone might respect her doctor. In response I would point out anyone who wants to become a doctor must cultivate wisdom and determination, character traits which enable her to flourish. Appraisal respect aids flourishing and if we believe flourishing should be encouraged then appraisal respect should also be encouraged. Let us consider flattery. Flattery might appear to be a form of admiration but in the long term flattery damages relationships because it doesn’t represent our true feelings. The same is true if we conflate recognition and appraisal respect. Consider someone who has a character we don’t admire. Of course we should respect her as the kind of creature who can determine her own future. However, it does not follow that we admire her character. Moreover, if we conflate recognition with appraisal respect then this is precisely the message we are sending to her. This false view, like flattery, is likely to damage our long term relationship with her because it is based on a misunderstanding.


What conclusions can be drawn from the above. First we must be careful about how and how often we express our respect. I would suggest that in most normal contexts there is no need for us to explicitly express recognition respect. We should express recognition respect simply by our behaviour, simply accepting people as members of our moral community. We should do so by accepting how others live and letting them explicitly express their views even if we believe these views to be mistaken provided their lifestyle and beliefs do not harm others. I would further suggest that in most normal contexts it is a mistake to explicitly express recognition respect. By doing so others might sometimes mistakenly believe we respect rather than accept their character, their lifestyles. In addition, because our character is related to our beliefs others might sometimes mistakenly believe we respect their beliefs rather than simply accept their right to express them. It seems to me that if we are careless in expressing our respect we might be expressing too much respect leading to misunderstandings which can damage society.

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