We live in an age of apparent forgiveness. In this age all sorts of organisations such as governments, corporations, universities and even churches as a matter of course ask for forgiveness. I believe it would be more accurate to talk about these diverse organisations apologising. Forgiveness involves the sentiments and these belong to the domain of persons rather than organisations, see (Griswold, Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press, 2007 chapter 4). On 17/11/09 the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd issued an apology to the 7,000 former child migrants who were taken from Britain and put into state-run homes in Australia where they suffered abuse. It appears that the British government is also to apologise for this matter. I believe some political apologies such as the above are meaningful. Nonetheless it seems clear to me that a great many apparent political apologies are meaningless because genuine apology is not easy. In this posting I want to investigate the domain in which political apology is meaningful.
Griswold argues if an organisation is to issue a meaningful apology that this apology must satisfy four conditions (Griswold, page 150). An organisation must,
Admit responsibility for the action
Admit the deed was wrong.
Say sorry.
Must commit to becoming a better organisation.
These four conditions are the same as the first four conditions Griswold believes are necessary for someone to make a personal apology. Kevin Rudd’s apology on behalf of the Australian Government completely satisfies all these conditions. I agree with Griswold that any meaningful political apology must satisfy these conditions. However in my investigation of the domain of meaningful political apology I want to concentrate on the first of these conditions, admitting responsibility. I will argue if a political apology is to be meaningful that any acceptance of responsibility for the wrong must also be meaningful and that this involves accepting guilt.
When is taking responsibility meaningful? Intuitively saying sorry seems to be an essential element of any apology for no apology would be complete without actually saying sorry. Merely expressing regret is insufficient for genuine apology. At this point it might be useful to differentiate between the different uses of the word “sorry” in expressing apology and regret. When I apologise, I am sorry and the “I” cannot be separated from the sorry if the apology is to be meaningful. When I regret something, I feel sorry for someone and the “I” may be replaced by another person without the regret becoming meaningless. In my previous posting I argued if someone is genuinely sorry then this involves moving from excusing himself to accepting guilt. Guilt differentiates between meaningful apology and regret because guilt ties a particular person to an apology. It follows if meaningful apology involves accepting guilt then any apparent apology which does not involve accepting guilt is not a meaningful apology. Let it be accepted that accepting meaningful responsibility when apologising involves accepting guilt. I believe the above remarks also apply to political organisations. It follows the first way many apparent political apologies are meaningless is because the organisation apologising does not genuinely accept guilt.
One of the principle goals of political apology is the restoration of moral relations with the injured party. This goal is an attractive one to many organisations. Some organisations attempt to apologise without any acceptance of guilt. It might be assumed such an apparently imperfect apology is nonetheless to be welcomed as it encourages some improvement in moral relations. I will now argue any justification for this assumption is weak. I have argued guilt differentiates between meaningful apology and regret. If my argument is accepted then it might be argued that any organisation giving an apparent apology without accepting guilt is actually expressing regret. It might be thought whilst a genuine apology is always preferable to an expression of regret that nonetheless even if an organisation feels it cannot genuinely apologise that any expression of regret is to be welcomed. I have suggested that when I regret something I feel sorry for someone. It seems to me the concept of regret makes sense when considering persons but not organisations. If I feel sorry for someone it would seem I share his feelings and must feel some empathy for him. However organisations are not people and as a result do not feel emotions. It is of course true that the members of an organisation may indeed feel strongly about some of the policies of that organisation but nonetheless I still contend organisations have no feelings. It follows organisations cannot feel empathy and hence express genuine regret. It further follows that any political apology without an acceptance of guilt is neither meaningful nor useful in the restoration of normal moral relationships.
It might be objected to the above that in some contexts in which wrongs occur that, whilst an organisation was responsible for some wrong, the context at the time of the wrong means even if apology is due the acceptance of guilt is inappropriate. It seems to me such an objection is based on a failure to differentiate between factors that excuse an action and factors that mitigate. Excuse means that whilst an action may cause harm no apology is necessary. Excuse means an agent has no reason to feel guilt. Consider for instance the case of Brian Thomas who strangled his wife during a nightmare when he dreamt that intruders had broken into their camper van. When Thomas strangled his wife he was in a state known as automatism. The judge when acquitting him said that he had been a “decent man and a devoted husband” and bore no responsibility for his actions. Thomas had no need to feel guilt because automatism excused him (http://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/man-who-strangled-wife-in-sleep-walks-free-1950088.html) Mitigation of necessity involves guilt because mitigating circumstances don’t excuse but determine the degree of guilt. Consider the case of Doreen Marshall who crushed sleeping pills into her 90-year-old mother's food and drink in desperation at the quality of her mother’s life. Marshall was guilty of a wrong but the facts that her mother was deaf, blind and bedridden mitigated her guilt nevertheless these factors did not excuse her (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/woman-walks-free-after-mercy-killing-case-671210.html). I am sure the persons involved in both of the above examples suffered great emotional trauma but morally Thomas did no wrong whilst Marshall did, even though her mother’s circumstances mitigated her wrongdoing. Morally it is important to differentiate between excuse and mitigation. The examples of excuse and mitigation I have used above apply to personal moral relations. I am going to assume here that the meaning of excuse and mitigation in the domain of political moral relationships is much the same as that used in personal moral relationships. If this is not so political apology and personal apology would only be very loosely related. This is not so as shown by political apology sharing most of the conditions needed for meaningful apology, see above. It follows there can be mitigating circumstances attached to political apology. However even if there are mitigating circumstances attached to some political apology then some guilt must be accepted if any apology offered is to be meaningful.
However apology is neither easy nor simple. In order to illustrate this I will now examine the provisional IRA’s attempt to apologise on 16/07/02 for its killing of non-combatants, see (http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/15235). Cleary the IRA attempts to say sorry, “We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to their families”. It also admits to the harm it has caused, “We also acknowledge the grief and pain of their relatives”. Moreover the IRA seems to be genuinely committed to the restoration of normal relations with all the people of Northern Ireland; “We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and difficulties which this presents”. The IRA’s genuine commitment to the peace process and the restoration of normal moral relations is praiseworthy. However the IRA has not accepted guilt for its actions. It admits to failures, “The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt” but admitting to failures is not the same as an acceptance of guilt. I have argued above that a meaningful apology requires that the apologiser must accept some degree of guilt. It might also be pointed out that the restoration of normal moral relations in Northern Ireland might well have been easier and quicker had the IRA accepted some degree of guilt. Accepting guilt means one acknowledges that one is responsible for some wrong. The IRA’s statement only accepts that the IRA did some wrongs and that these wrongs were mistakes or collective failures, it does not accept full responsibility for the wrongs. The IRA’s position seems to hold that even if it was responsible for some wrong, the context at the time of the wrong, means that even if apology is due that nevertheless the acceptance of guilt is inappropriate. I have argued above such a position is based on failure to differentiate between excuse and mitigation. Of course there are factors that mitigate the IRA’s actions, such as the B specials and loyalist killings, but mitigating factors only lessen the degree of guilt they do not excuse it. It appears that the IRA did not offer a meaningful apology for its killing of non-combatants and that this failure still helps delay the restoration of normal moral relations in Northern Ireland today.
However politics is a messy business and perhaps for some internal reasons the IRA could not apologise. It might be argued had the IRA offered a more meaningful apology it would have alienated some of its own members. It is possible such alienated members might then have supported other republican dissident groups further delaying the restoration of normal moral relations. In this scenario it might be argued the IRA could not sensibly offer a meaningful apology and the “apology” it did offer was useful. Even accepting the above I still believe the IRA did not offer a meaningful apology for its killing of non-combatants. Nor do I believe it offered its regrets for as I have argued above I don’t believe organisations can genuinely offer regrets. However I do accept the IRA’s “apology” as a statement of intent which is to be welcomed and perhaps this is all that can be expected at this time, as I remarked above political apology is not easy.
Both people and organisations find it hard to accept guilt and find it much easier to excuse themselves. To accept guilt means lowering one’s opinion of oneself or the organisation involved. I am only prepared to accept guilt for my voluntary actions and I am certainly not prepared to accept guilt for someone else’s actions. The “I” accepting guilt must be the same “I” as the one who accepts responsibility if any subsequent apology is to be meaningful. This is relatively unproblematic as far as people are concerned. Let it be accepted any organisation should only accept guilt for some wrong if it is substantially the same organisation that was responsible for the wrong. It follows the second way many apparent political apologies are meaningless is due to the organisation apologising not being substantially the same organisation as the one which was responsible for the wrong. It appears to me that there are two main reasons why an organisation might substantially differ from its predecessor. Firstly there has been some dramatic upheaval or discontinuity within the organisation involved and secondly the passage of time means the organisation has significantly changed its character.
I will now argue if there has been some dramatic upheaval or discontinuity within an organisation between the wrong occurring and the apology being issued that any apology is meaningless. What I am arguing is that in these circumstances even if the name of some organisation remains the same as its predecessor there are in fact two different organisations involved. In order to give my argument some context I want specifically to argue that any post war German Government does not owe the victims of the holocaust an apology. Let it be accepted all post war German governments differ radically from their Nazi predecessor by specifically repudiating Nazi ideology. Intuitively it seems clear that because of the discontinuity of ideals any apology offered by post war German governments on behalf of its Nazi predecessor is meaningless. Any post war German government and its Nazi predecessor are not the same organisation. It might be argued by analogy that it is no more meaningful for any post war German government to apologise for its Nazi predecessor than for someone to apologise for a wrong committed by someone else. It seems to me this analogy is appropriate; it follows apology is not due by any post war German Government for the holocaust. It further follows if there is dramatic upheaval or discontinuity within any organisation that any apology this organisation issues for events prior to this discontinuity is meaningless.
Someone might object to the above by arguing that any apology issued by a post war German was not on behalf of its Nazi predecessor but rather on behalf of the German nation. I suggested above apology is due only from the organisation responsible for the harm. What then does the objector mean by the German nation? If the German nation means the German government then for the reasons given above any apology remains meaningless. If the German Nation means the German people then it seems to me the German people are not a political organisation. It follows the German people cannot issue a political apology. Moreover it is far from clear that even a majority of the German people bear any responsibility for the Holocaust. None of the above denies the terrible suffering of the Holocaust or that post war German governments should not pay reparations to the survivors. After all if I benefit from some wrong which I did not know about, or did not cause, I am nevertheless morally required to return the benefit.
I now want to consider a second way in which an organisation might substantially differ from its predecessor. Intuitively if a sufficiently long time passes then the nature an organisation can significantly change over that period of time. For instance it seems clearly ridiculous to hold the Roman Catholic Church responsible for its part in the crusades. Is it possible to account for this intuition? It seems clear that the policies of most organisations change over a reasonable period of time. However it might be pointed out that for many organisations the groups it represents and the goals it seeks to attain do not change significantly over time. It might then be argued that the groups an organisation represents and the goals it seeks give the organisation its identity. It might then be further argued if these do not change over time then the organisation does not significantly differ over time. Accepting the above argument would mean a change in an organisation’s policies however radical does not change the identity of the organisation. I believe such a conclusion is mistaken and will now argue a significant change in policies of any organisation signifies a significant change in its identity. Let it be accepted that the policies of any organisation do not exist in a vacuum but exist to further the organisation’s goals. Sometimes these policies change due to a change in non moral circumstances. I accept such changes do not change the identity of an organisation. However sometimes policies change for moral reasons. A change in policy due to moral considerations either firstly changes an organisation’s goals or secondly changes the values it believes it should adhere to when seeking to achieve these goals. Any organisation even if it has no explicit values has implicit values and these values are demonstrated by its policies and the way it acts. I would argue that these implicit values, at the very least, help to form the identity of an organisation. Indeed it might be argued these implicit values better define an organisation’s identity than its stated goals as many of these may be mere empty rhetoric. It follows the change over time in an organisation’s policies gradually change the organisation’s identity. It further follows if an organisation’s identity changes, over a significant period of time, then any apology it makes for an event long ago is meaningless.
The trouble with accepting the above is I have used the phrase “significantly differs over time”. There seems no clear cut method of deciding if an organisation differs significantly over time from its predecessor and that any such evaluation must be a matter of judgement. It follows from the above whether political apology is meaningful is also a matter of judgement. Griswold uses the University of Alabama’s apology for slavery as an example of acceptable political apology (Forgiveness, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pages 147, 152). I have used the word acceptable above rather than good as political apology like politics is a messy business. Griswold argues the University’s apology is an acceptable apology as it meets the four conditions he considers necessary for a meaningful political apology. I accept Griswold’s four conditions and that the University has met these conditions. However I have argued above in order for a political apology to be meaningful any organisation should only apologise for some wrong provided it is substantially the same organisation that was responsible for the wrong. I further argued that as the policies of an organisation change over time so does the identity of the organisation. My position over the identity of organisations is roughly analogous to Derek Parfit’s position concerning personal identity, see (Reasons and persons, Oxford University Press, 1984, pages 206, 209). Parfit uses psychological continuity as a criterion of personal identity and I have suggested that the continuity of policies might be used as a criterion of an organisation’s identity. I have suggested an organisation will not be identical with its predecessor if the policies differ significantly. I would argue that the time between the abolition of slavery and the University of Alabama’s apology means the University’s policies have significantly changed further meaning the identity of the University has significantly changed. I would argue this significant change in the identity of the University means that its apology for slavery is not meaningful even if the motives underlying the apparent apology are praiseworthy.
