Thursday 19 June 2008

Autonomy and Caring Revisited


In this posting I want to examine whether an ethics based on empathic caring is possible and the relationship between empathic caring and Frankfurt’s ideas of ‘caring about’. Mackenzie and Leach Scully make the following two assumptions (1).

1.      There are no mental events without bodies.
2.      Imaginative prospective is based on personal experience.

I accept both of these assumptions. Mackenzie and Leach Scully then proceed to question whether because any system of morality, based on empathic or sympathetic caring, is possible because our empathic or sympathetic concerns are based on our own bodily experience. Intuitively Mackenzie and Leach seem to be correct for prima facie it seems hard for someone who is healthy and not disabled to imagine the prospective of someone who is in a wheelchair or suffers from dementia.

“The epistemic obstacles to imaging being another are so significant as to make this mode of imaginative engagement highly implausible as a basis for our capacity to morally engage with others.”(2)

They then proceed to argue due to these obstacles we should adopt an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others. They define asymmetrical reciprocity as the recognition of the other as a person, with distinctive point of view shaped by that person’s history, social situation, life experiences and relationships with others. I accept these obstacles do indeed present significant barriers to a caring morality based on empathy or sympathy. Nonetheless I will argue even if we adopt an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others that a caring morality is possible. However I will firstly argue these obstacles mean we must give greater importance to autonomy than some people who propose a caring morality, such as Gilligan and Slote, would favour.

Adopting an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others means we must adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards others according to Mackenzie and Leach Scully. This attitude means we cannot merely imagine ourselves in someone else’s shoes when trying to understand her attitudes towards events in her life. I will now argue if we adopt this attitude towards someone then we must respect her autonomous decisions. Adopting an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards someone is not the same as uncritically accepting her views for these views may be the result of coercion or delusion. Let it be assumed that the views of someone are not the product of delusion or coercion. Let it be further assumed we recognise these views but see no need to accept any actions that flow from these views even if these actions do not harm others. It seems clear that in this situation we do not have an attitude of epistemic humility. Indeed our attitude might be classed as arrogant. Moreover if we do not have an attitude of epistemic humility towards someone in these circumstances, which involves accepting her views and actions provided her actions do not harm others, then adopting an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity seems to serve no useful purpose. It follows if an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity is serve any useful purpose that provided an agent is un-deluded and is un-coerced we should adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards her views and accept any actions that flow from these views that do not harm others. It follows if we do adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards someone which involves accepting her views and the actions that flow from them that we of necessity must respect her autonomy.

In a previous posting I argued if I care about an adult in a purely empathic way I must care about what she cares about, rather than what I think might be in her best interests, see caring based solely on empathy . In what follows an adult means an un-deluded and un-coerced adult unless stated otherwise. Caring about such an adult in this way means I have adopted an attitude of epistemic humility towards her. I argued adopting an attitude of empathic caring has two important conditions for respecting someone’s autonomy. It follows these conditions also apply if I have an attitude of epistemic humility towards someone. Firstly even if I believe her best interests clash with her autonomy I must give precedence to respecting her autonomy over acting beneficently towards her. Secondly I must respect someone’s actual decisions rather than just her capacity for autonomy.

Many feminist and other philosophers who favour a caring ethic would find accepting these two conditions difficult. They would argue respecting autonomy does not automatically mean giving preference accepting autonomous decisions over acting in a caring manner, acting beneficently. A philosopher who favours a caring ethic might argue it is still possible to respect autonomy whilst not respecting all autonomous decisions. She might for instance argue one should respect someone’s capacity for autonomy rather than respecting all his autonomous decisions. This might involve helping people to develop the specific capacities needed for good reflective decision making and creating the conditions in which this type of decision-making can flourish. Michael Slote argues that respecting autonomy is like this and somewhat analogous to helping children to become fully independent (2). Let it be accepted that autonomy is simply defined as someone’s second-order capacity to reflect on her desires and to accept or change these desires in the light of her goals and values. Accepting such a definition means it might be possible to respect autonomy whilst not respecting all autonomous decisions. The trouble with accepting such a simple definition of autonomy is that there seems to be very little to differentiate autonomy from an individual’s capacity for practical reason. Using this definition means an autonomous action might be simply defined as the product of extra careful practical reasoning. It can be concluded such a concept of autonomy would be wholly instrumental.

It is usually accepted that autonomy has both intrinsic and instrumental value. I will now argue that to respect autonomy means one must respect the intrinsic value of autonomy and that this cannot be achieved by simply respecting someone’s capacity for autonomy. Harry Frankfurt believes the intrinsic value autonomy depends the recognition of us by others as the distinctive kind of creatures who can determine their own futures (3). It follows respecting the intrinsic value of someone’s autonomy might be defined as us accepting that she is the kind of creature capable of determining her own future. Let the above definition of respecting the intrinsic value of autonomy be accepted. Let it also be accepted that some of an agent’s autonomous decisions are respected and some are not. It follows that the agent is not recognised as someone who is capable of determining her own future and the intrinsic value of her autonomy is not respected. It might be objected that even if this argument is valid the first premise should be amended as follows. The intrinsic value of autonomy might be defined as accepting that someone is the kind of creature capable of only partially determining her own future. It might then be argued even if not all of an agent’s autonomous decisions are respected that nonetheless the intrinsic value of her autonomy might still be respected. However there are two problems with accepting this revised definition. Clearly if none of someone’s autonomous decisions are accepted then her autonomy is not the respected. This raises the practical problem about which of her decisions must be respected. Secondly children can partially determine their own future and are not recognised as fully autonomous creatures. For these reasons it seems the amended definition should be rejected and the original definition accepted. It follows that if an agent is not recognised as someone who is capable of determining her own future that the intrinsic value of her autonomy is not respected.

However feminist and other philosophers, who favour a caring ethic and find giving precedence to respecting someone’s autonomy over acting beneficently towards her, might argue we should only respect the instrumental value of her autonomy. This means helping people to develop the capacities needed for good decision-making and helping create the conditions in which this type of decision-making can flourish. I believe respecting autonomy cannot be simply reduced to respecting the instrumental value of autonomy for three reasons. Firstly someone who does not have her autonomous decisions respected might intuitively feel her autonomy was not being respected. Secondly Mackenzie and Leach Scully suggest we adopt an attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity towards others. It would seem impossible to adopt such an attitude if we fail to recognise the autonomous decisions of others. Indeed by not respecting someone’s autonomous decisions we might be classed as being exhibiting epistemic over-confidence rather than epistemic humility for instead of listening to the needs of others as perceived by them we substitute the needs we perceive them to need. Lastly if we only respect the instrumental value of autonomy it might be questioned if the concept of autonomy plays any useful part in determining our actions for as I argued above respecting our instrumental autonomy seems to differ little from respecting practical rationality. It follows if we regard autonomy simply as instrumental autonomy that we have no use for the concept of autonomy.

I have argued if we adopt an attitude of epistemic humility towards others we must respect their autonomous decisions. It might then be further argued that adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards others means we are unable to act beneficently towards them. This second argument depends on the assumption that because we cannot imagine ourselves in someone else’s shoes we cannot understand her true interests. Accepting this second argument would of course mean any caring ethic is meaningless. Moreover because someone’s interests are unrecognisable to us respecting her autonomy might also become impossible. In order to examine this second argument we must consider the assumption that because we cannot imagine ourselves in someone else’s shoes we cannot understand her interests. Let us examine a particular case. Consider a soldier who has been returned from the war in Afghanistan after losing both his legs. It seems to me that adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards him does not mean we cannot understand most of his interests. We can understand his sense of grief at the loss of a friend or at a more mundane level his hunger. It might then be questioned if we understand his needs whether an attitude of epistemic humility is indeed the correct attitude to adopt towards such a soldier. I believe an attitude of epistemic humility is the correct attitude to adopt because even if, we can understand most of his interests, we cannot understand the priorities he gives to these interests. For instance if I was a colleague of this soldier we both may have given a high priority to physical fitness and a low priority to learning in the past. However the soldier’s priorities may now have now changed due to the loss of his legs whilst mine remain the same. It seems possible to conclude using this example that the epistemic obstacles to imaging being another are not that we are unable to understand another’s interests but rather that we are unable to understand the priorities she gives these interests. Accepting the above conclusion means adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards others does not mean we are unable to act beneficently towards them. It can be further concluded the obstacles raised by adopting an attitude of epistemic humility towards others do not present significant barriers to a caring morality based on empathy or sympathy.

1.      Mackenzie, Leach, Scully, 2007,Moral imagination, Disability and Embodiment; Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24(4)
2.      Michael Slote, 2007, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, Routledge, page 60.

3.      Harry Frankfurt, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge University Press, page 163.


Thursday 5 June 2008

Moral Insanity

In this posting I want to examine the moral implications raised by the behaviour of the Austrian man Josef Fritzl who imprisoned and sexually abused his daughter for 24 years. The idea for this posting is “The stain of moral insanity” by A C Grayling and found in the New Scientist of 17/05/08. Grayling suggests evil simply means a great deal of wrong. Moreover he suggests evil is not a useful term and acts as a full stop on our understanding. It follows he argues describing someone as evil does not capture the moral implications his behaviour. He argues it might be better to regard people such as Fritzl as morally insane rather than simply mad or evil. I will use Grayling’s definition of moral insanity to give two further consistent definitions. I will also briefly examine the implications of these two definitions.

Insanity is not now usually regarded as a medical term. Legally insanity means an agent suffers from a mental disease or defect and does not possess the capacity to appreciate the requirements of the law. Moral insanity is defined by Grayling as follows
“Moral insanity is the refusal to act according to important moral dictates the agent fully understands.”
Grayling’s definition makes no mention of mental illness or defect. It follows Grayling’s concept of moral insanity appears to be unattached to the legal concept. This appearance does not of course mean his concept is not useful in examining the moral implications of the behaviour of people such as Fritzl.

It might be Grayling wants to connect the idea of moral insanity to our intuitive ideas of insanity. Intuitively insanity might be simply said to be acting without any regard for rationality. However it is hard to see how any requirement of rationality, other than understanding what society regards as a moral dictate, is needed by Grayling’s definition. Consider the behaviour of someone like Fritzl with regard to Grayling’s definition. Let it be assumed this person fully understands the moral dictates of society. Let it be further assumed that for someone to act rationally simply means to act in such a way as is likely to satisfy his desires and help him attain his goals. It appears to follow such a person may fully understand these moral dictates but have no reasons, other than prudential reasons, to obey them. Grayling argues the elaborate steps Fritzl took to conceal his behaviour showed he believed what was doing was wrong. It seems reasonable to assume Fritzl was aware society would punish him on account of his actions should these be discovered. It follows it is possible to give a different interpretation of Fritzl’s behaviour. Fritzl had good reasons to conceal his behaviour for his prudential interests. It then follows the steps he took were quite rational based purely on serving these prudential interests. It might then be concluded, provided the two above assumptions are accepted, that Fritzl’s behaviour might be better described as a failure to accept generally accepted moral standards rather than acting irrationally.

However it might be possible to connect rationality with moral insanity if Grayling’s definition is slightly amended. His definition might be amended as follows to give my first definition of moral insanity.

Moral insanity is the refusal to act according to important moral dictates the agent fully accepts.

Prima facie using this definition of moral insanity Fritzl’s actions would be irrational provided he fully accepted these important moral dictates. It is important to be clear about what ‘fully accepts’ means in this definition. Fully accepting something in this amended definition doesn’t simply mean that the agent accepts that some moral dictates are society’s moral dictates but rather that these dictates are his dictates. He identifies himself with these dictates. Moreover if someone identifies himself with a course of action in line with these dictates then rationally he should undertake this action in circumstances in which he is able to do so. Using this amended definition it might be useful to class someone, who acts contrary to moral principles he accepts, as morally insane due to his lack of rationality. However in practice such clear cut circumstances are rare. As a consequence it seems doubtful if my first definition of moral insanity would apply in many cases. Moreover whilst it is possible to check if someone acts logically it would seem to be difficult to assess whether someone’s actions are instrumentally rational. It follows in such cases it might be more useful to question whether the perpetrator is autonomous rather than morally insane.

I suggested above that intuitively insanity might be simply defined as someone acting without regard for rationality. I then assumed an agent acts rationally if he acts in such a way as is likely to satisfy his desires and help him attain his goals. However if this assumption is rejected might it be possible to connect an agent’s refusal to act according to important moral dictates with our intuitive ideas of insanity in a more meaningful way? Let it be assumed the above assumption is incorrect by assuming Kant is correct in believing that morality is based on the rational recognition of universal moral norms. It follows Fritzl is defective because he is unable to correctly apply universal rationality. It further follows Fritzl’s actions might be intuitively considered as insane due to this inability to recognise rational moral norms. It still further follows if morality is based on universal rationality that the idea of moral insanity based on rationality might indeed be a useful concept. However the rational recognition of universal moral norms would seem to be something few, if any, could achieve in practice. It follows that in normal circumstances if we question someone’s ability to act rationally we assess his ability to use practical rationality. Let it be accepted if we question someone like Fritzl’s ability to act rationally we should use the same standard as we use to assess the rationality of others. It can then be concluded if we question someone like Fritzl’s ability to act rationally we should assess his ability to use practical rationality.

I have argued someone like Fritzl and sociopaths in general seem perfectly able to use practical rationality. It follows it would be wrong to class such persons as insane, or morally insane, provided they are capable of using practical rationality. However it still seems to me that the idea of moral insanity might be useful. Legal ideas on insanity mean that an insane person suffers from mental disease or defect and does not possess the capacity to appreciate the requirements of the law. I have argued that sociopaths do not usually have a defect of rationality. However sociopaths may be defective in other ways. Sociopaths may be defective because they lack sympathy and empathy for others. Slote argues actions are morally wrong and contrary to moral obligation, if and only if, they reflect or exhibit or express an absence of a fully developed empathic concern for others on behalf of the agent, see previous postings. Provided Slote’s argument is accepted then someone such as Fritzl and sociopaths in general are morally defective because they are unable to feel empathy for others. It follows the whole idea of morality makes no sense to such persons. It is now possible to give a second definition of moral insanity based on an inability to feel empathy for others.

Someone is morally insane if he acts contrary to accepted moral dictates he understands due to his inability to feel empathic concern for others.

It is important to be aware of two important properties of this definition. Firstly this definition makes no mention of rationality. Secondly this definition differs significantly from the legal definition of insanity. Legally in order to be considered insane someone must not only have some mental defect, in our case no capacity to feel empathy, but also not understand what the law requires. A sociopath might well understand the requirements of the law and have a defect in empathy, but is this defect a mental defect? It follows a sociopath might be considered as morally insane but as legally sane, depending on whether we regard an inability to feel empathy as a mental defect or not.

I will now consider the practical implications of accepting this second definition of moral insanity. Firstly it seems to me if we accept this definition then we have a duty to see the circumstances in which moral insanity arises are minimised. In practice this means trying to foster circumstances in which children grow up to be able to empathise with others. To do this we must address social problems such as struggling single parents, social isolation and poverty. Secondly accepting this definition carries certain dangers. If we regard someone as defective because he is incapable of empathic caring then we might also regard him as different from others in a particularly important way. If I lose a leg I am defective with regard to walking but I am not defective with regard to being essentially human. The same does not seem to be true of a sociopath. Furthermore if morality is in some way based on empathy, the fact a sociopath is defective with regard to empathising, might mean we would find it difficult to include him within our sphere of moral concern. See Slote and empathising with an alien, mentioned in an earlier posting. Returning to Grayling’s concerns the term sociopath might indeed act as a full stop on our understanding. Perhaps if evil is also seen as a full stop on our understanding it would be right to describe sociopaths as evil. The dangers of labelling people as evil are all too well illustrated by considering Nazi Germany. The dangers of seeing people as evil and beyond our moral understanding are real and present a challenge to those of us who see morality as based on empathic caring. In this case all that can be done is to admit sociopaths may indeed be evil, beyond our moral understanding, but we should never the less include them in our moral concerns. After all we may be morally concerned about the environment even if the environment has no moral concerns.

Historic wrongdoing, Slavery, Compensation and Apology

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